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Credit: Luke Dray/Stringer via Getty Images. Source IMF

By Martin Schindler, Nikola Spatafora and Andrew Tiffin
WASHINGTON DC, Jul 22 2026 (IPS)

A farmer in Kenya gets weather and planting advice on a basic phone. A teacher in Nigeria uses a chatbot to help students catch up in math. South Africa’s revenue authority uses data analytics to better target tax audits. These are not futuristic examples from Silicon Valley. They are early signs of the broader transformation that artificial intelligence (AI) could bring to sub-Saharan Africa.

AI will reshape the global economy. The question for Africa is whether it rides the wave or gets left behind.

Transformative potential

Our research shows AI’s promise, but it also points to significant risks and challenges. At current levels of preparedness, we estimate that AI will add just 0.2 percent to the region’s GDP over the next decade—little more than a rounding error. However, if countries can put the right foundations in place to accelerate adoption and extend the impact of AI beyond today’s digitally connected firms, the gains could rise to about 4 percent over the decade—nearly half a percentage point of additional growth a year.

That extra growth is critical given Africa’s vast jobs challenge. By 2030, sub-Saharan Africa will account for roughly half of new entrants into the global labor force. But the issue is not only the number of jobs needed—it is also their quality. Most workers are still in informal microenterprises or smallholder agriculture, where productivity is far below that of formal firms.

For the region, AI’s main promise is not about replacing office workers, but boosting productivity across the economy—helping informal firms manage inventory, enabling farmers to increase yields, and supporting mid-sized firms to transition to formality and export readiness.

The risk is that the opposite happens. AI adoption in sub-Saharan Africa currently lags well behind every other region. If richer economies race ahead while African firms and governments lag, the productivity gap between the region and the rest of the world will only widen.

A different reality

Aid flows have always fluctuated. But this episode stands apart.

The recent cuts are large and broadly simultaneous across countries. They are driven by donor decisions rather than changes in recipient economies. And they come at a time when traditional buffers are weaker: multilateral institutions and NGOs, which have often cushioned past declines, are themselves facing funding constraints. While non-traditional donors, such as China and the Gulf States, have grown their aid presence in the region, the magnitudes are not able to cover the reduction in traditional donors.

The cuts are also difficult to manage because they follow six years of successive shocks—including the pandemic, tighter global financial conditions, and food and energy crises—that have already eroded fiscal space.

Delivering on AI’s promise

Two priorities for AI adoption stand out.

First, countries must build the foundations for broad adoption.

AI depends on reliable electricity, affordable broadband and data infrastructure, and workers with digital skills. That means investing in power and connectivity, supporting regional data infrastructure where viable, and strengthening digital and AI literacy through education and training. Countries in Africa do not need to develop the world’s most powerful AI models. But they do need the capacity to adopt, adapt, and scale AI quickly.

Second, build trust—and scale.

AI can widen inequality if its benefits are concentrated among large firms, skilled workers, and urban hubs. It also creates risks around privacy, cybersecurity, misinformation, and dependence on foreign providers. Governments need clear and practical rules on data, competition, consumer protection, cybersecurity, and the public sector’s use of AI. Regional cooperation will also be essential. Many African economies are too small to build AI ecosystems alone. But together they can create the scale needed for infrastructure, data standards, regulation, and markets.

AI in Africa is not just a technology policy issue—it is central to the region’s growth strategy. Africa does not need to win the race to build cutting-edge AI models, but it must find ways to use AI widely, cheaply, and safely. The window is narrow. Over the next debate, Africa’s young and growing workforce will either find more productive jobs, or watch the global productivity gap widen further. The outcome will not be shaped in Silicon Valley, but in the choices made across governments, schools, farms, and firms from Dakar to Dar es Salaam.

Martin Schindler is an advisor, Nikola Spatafora is a senior economist, and Andrew Tiffin is a deputy division chief, all in the IMF’s African Department.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Tensions between Addis Ababa and the Tigray Region are gradually mounting. Mis­calculations could even trigger another large-scale war, although the parties involved may not directly seek one. Since the war in northern Ethiopia ended in November 2022, no new, stable political order has emerged. Tigray remains suspended between war and peace. Responsibility for this lies with both the Ethiopian government and its partner in peace, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Having lost power in the national government in 2018, the TPLF has yet to find a new role for itself; in­stead, it has been marked by internal power struggles and characterised by authoritarian tendencies. Conversely, the Ethiopian government has not done enough to facilitate the return of internally displaced persons and restore Tigray’s territorial integrity. A renewed outbreak of hostilities could draw in Eritrea, Sudan and other regional actors. Germany and the European Union (EU) should firmly commit to crisis prevention in order to avoid further escalation in the already tense Red Sea region.

DIW Energiewende-Monitor: Photovoltaik fällt hinter steigende Ausbauvorgaben zurück – Wärmepumpen und Elektrofahrzeuge gewinnen Marktanteile, kommen aber zu langsam voran – Strompreise zeigen wachsenden Flexibilitätsbedarf – Großbatterien wachsen Die Energiewende in Deutschland kommt weiter voran, ...

By CIVICUS
Jul 22 2026 (IPS)

 
CIVICUS discusses land grabs and environmental damage linked to a luxury coastal resort project with Eva Kushova, Director of Destination Management Organisation Albania, a civil society organisation that supports sustainable tourism in Albanian destinations, seeking to preserve culture and nature while maximising benefits for communities.

Eva Kushova

Since May, protests have rocked Albania over a luxury coastal resort project linked to US President Donald Trump’s family, to be built on protected land near Vlorë. Protests, now dubbed the ‘Flamingo Revolution’, have spread nationwide and won diaspora support, broadening into an anti-corruption movement.

What are the impacts of Albania’s foreign investment laws?

The Law on Strategic Investments was passed in 2015 to attract foreign investment and boost Albania’s economy. Its deadline has since been extended several times, most recently to 2027. In practice, it has become a vehicle for serious abuses. Unlike ordinary investment laws, it gives the state the power to expropriate private property on investors’ behalf, often at compensation well below market value. Some residents say they were forced off their land after refusing this compensation.

Despite the law’s stated purpose, only two of around 44 projects approved so far are genuinely foreign investments. Most are owned by domestic investors with close connections to the government. The system gives selected companies access to public land, beaches, forests and national assets, and grants them tax exemptions for up to 10 years. The state also pays for all the necessary infrastructure, including electricity, roads, telecommunications and water, effectively subsidising private profit. In some cases, water meant for villages has been diverted to supply resort swimming pools. Meanwhile, local communities lose beach access and remain economically marginalised.

What does the Zvërnec case reveal about how these deals are made?

The Zvërnec project, a luxury resort planned on the coast near Vlorë, in southern Albania, comprising around 10,000 accommodation units, drew international attention because of its Trump family ties, but it exposed broader governance failures. It includes a large property allegedly acquired by an internationally wanted drug trafficker under highly questionable circumstances, and there are also allegations that officials manipulated property records at the regional land registry. Many local residents claim ownership of the property, yet it was suddenly recognised as belonging to the trafficker, who then sold it to Arab investors.

This fits a wider pattern in Albania’s land governance. After communism collapsed in 1991, the law mandated redistribution of agricultural land to rural families in small parcels. Thirty-five years on, most Albanians own only limited land, while strategic investors obtain vast coastal properties through questionable transactions, controversial expropriations and alleged manipulation of property records. Property rights have remained unresolved for over 30 years, forcing people into costly court proceedings.

The secrecy around the Zvërnec deal is typical too. The public only learns about the projects once construction machinery arrives on site. News of Zvërnec, and of Sazan Island, an island off Albania’s Adriatic coast earmarked for luxury development, broke via international media in March 2024. Even now, the identity and ownership of the investors behind several of these projects remain unclear, and sites are fenced off with barbed wire. Authorities say this is in preparation for infrastructure works, fuelling further distrust.

What environmental damage have these developments caused?

The Zvërnec coastline is home to the Narta Lagoon, one of Albania’s most biodiverse areas and a critical stopover for thousands of migratory birds travelling between Africa and Europe. It was first threatened by the construction of Vlora International Airport and now by the Zvërnec resort.

The legal groundwork was laid in 2022, when the government removed thousands of hectares from protected areas, cutting total coverage by 20 per cent. In 2024, another law opened the door to construction inside protected areas, allowing for the transformation of one of Albania’s last wild coastal lagoons into a heavily urbanised area. A further law passed in 2025 extended the threat to forests and pastures elsewhere in the country.

This runs counter to Albania’s European Union (EU) membership bid, targeted for 2030. All candidate states must align their laws with EU standards across 33 negotiating chapters before joining, and chapter 27 covers environmental protection. The European Commission’s 2025 Enlargement Report raised serious concerns on this front, criticising recent legal changes for weakening environmental standards. The Bern Convention’s Standing Committee, an international body that protects European wildlife and habitats, has repeatedly asked Albania to suspend construction of Vlora International Airport inside the Pishë Poro–Narta Protected Area, which includes the lagoon, pending proper environmental assessment. So far these requests have gone unheeded. But sustained EU pressure could still force a repeal of regressive laws and the introduction of stronger protection for natural areas.

What has driven recent protests, and how has the government responded?

Protests began on 23 May in Zvërnec after the developer fenced off part of the beach with barbed wire. They intensified after footage emerged on 30 May showing private security guards beating a protester while police stood by without intervening. The movement spread to the capital, Tirana, the next day, then to other Albanian cities, Kosovo and diaspora communities abroad, becoming known as the ‘Flamingo Revolution’. Protesters have marched nightly since under the slogan ‘Albania is not for sale’, demanding the project’s cancellation and Prime Minister Edi Rama’s resignation.

What began as opposition to a single resort has broadened into a wider anti-corruption movement, with protesters citing grievances such as poor public healthcare. A nationwide protest on 10 June deliberately coincided with a national historic commemoration, joined by Albanians from the diaspora on five continents. Yet Rama has stayed defiant, arguing that the backlash has more to do with the Trump links than with the project itself.

There are encouraging signs of accountability, though. The Special Structure against Corruption and Organised Crime, an independent judicial body created in 2016, has opened an investigation into the 2024 legal changes that enabled the Zvërnec deal. Arrest warrants have been issued against around 20 businesspeople suspected of illegally obtaining land or permits linked to various projects. People hope public pressure will keep judicial investigations alive, ensuring accountability for abuses of power, environmental damage and property rights violations.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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SEE ALSO
Albania: protesters and police clash at anti-corruption demonstrations; amendments partially decriminalising defamation criticised CIVICUS Monitor 22.Apr.2026
Albania: ‘Corruption is a serious problem, but no political force commands enough public trust to unite demands’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Gresa Hasa 13.Feb.2026
Albania: ‘Diaspora voting ensured every citizen, regardless of location, could exercise their right to vote’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Erida Skëndaj 01.Jun.2025

 

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Le Parlement a adopté mardi la loi d'urgence agricole, qui prévoit notamment le doublement des volumes de stockage d’eau à des fins agricoles d’ici 2035. Très attendu par les agriculteurs dans un contexte de sécheresse exceptionnelle, le texte suscite des inquiétudes quant à la répartition entre usagers de cette ressource stratégique. Décryptage avec Gabrielle Bouleau.

Des centaines de pompiers sont mobilisés, mercredi, dans le Var, où un incendie persistant a déjà parcouru 2 550 hectares et provoqué l'évacuation de quelque 400 personnes. Il est désormais "contenu" et "ne progresse plus beaucoup", malgré des points chauds, qui mobiliseront les pompiers à grand renfort de moyens aériens, ont annoncé les secours.

Le parquet national antiterroriste (Pnat) a ouvert une enquête préliminaire en France pour tortures le 1er juillet, "à la suite des plaintes de deux personnes ayant pris part à une flottille pour Gaza en octobre 2025", a-t-il indiqué mardi, sollicité par l'AFP.

Africa’s presence within BRICS has expanded significantly. South Africa, Egypt, and Ethiopia are now full members, while Nigeria and Uganda participate as partner countries. Yet despite this growing representation, there is no mechanism for African states to coordinate their positions within the grouping, raising questions about whether a larger footprint has translated into greater collective influence.

This issue brief examines how African states are engaging BRICS as part of broader strategies of diversification rather than alignment. It explores the distinct priorities driving South Africa, Egypt, and Ethiopia’s participation, the relationship between BRICS and other multilateral forums such as the African Union and G20, and the opportunities and constraints for developing a more coordinated African voice within the bloc.

The brief argues that while African states share an interest in advancing reforms to global governance and international finance, coordination within BRICS remains limited by differing national priorities and the absence of institutional mechanisms. Rather than viewing BRICS as a standalone platform, it suggests that African governments may derive greater value by integrating BRICS into a broader multilateral strategy while strengthening cooperation where interests converge.

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The post Diversification without Coordination: The Scope for a Collective African Voice in BRICS appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Les États ont progressivement pris conscience des conséquences du changement climatique et ont intégré la sécurité climatique dans leurs stratégies de défense. Cette approche consiste à prendre en compte l’impact du dérèglement climatique comme facteur d’aggravation des crises, à protéger les populations face à ses conséquences et à préserver les écosystèmes. Chaque État aborde la sécurité climatique de manière différente. La France adapte sa stratégie pour préparer ses armées aux nouveaux défis climatiques, tout en cherchant à réduire leur empreinte carbone. À l’inverse, aux États-Unis, la sécurité climatique est un sujet fortement politisé, notamment sous l’administration Trump, ce qui influence les priorités des politiques publiques.

Tour d’horizon des enjeux de la sécurité climatique et de son intégration étatique et institutionnelle, avec Adrien Estève, maître de conférences en science politique à l’Université Clermont Auvergne.

L’article La sécurité climatique comme nouvel enjeu stratégique pour les États est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Global Nobel Laureates at the Assembly on Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear War held last week in Rome. Credit: Katsuhiro Asagiri/INPS Japan.

By Ariel F. Dumont
BORGO LAUDATO SI’, Italy, Jul 21 2026 (IPS)

“I’m sorry, Dave. I’m afraid I can’t do that.” By bringing the supercomputer HAL 9000 to life in his 1968 film 2001: A Space Odyssey, American director Stanley Kubrick created one of the most powerful symbols of the fear of artificial intelligence (AI) escaping human control.

Fifty-eight years later, that question is more relevant than ever. It was precisely this issue that brought together more than 200 international figures for three days of discussions in the exceptional setting of Borgo Laudato Si’, located within the papal summer residence at Castel Gandolfo, where Pope Leo XIV is currently staying.

Organised by the Global Nobel Laureates Assembly on Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear War, the conference set out to reflect on “the future of international security, the governance of emerging technologies, disarmament and the building of an economy of peace”.

Yoshiyuki Nagaoka, Executive Director, Office of Public Affairs at Soka Gakkai. Credit: Katsuhiro Asagiri/INPS Japan

The programme brought together a number of leading international figures, including former Italian Prime Minister and former President of the European Commission Romano Prodi; Nobel Peace Prize laureate and former Chief Advisor to Bangladesh Muhammad Yunus; Yoshiyuki Nagaoka, Executive Director of the Office of Public Affairs at Soka Gakkai; Filipino journalist and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Maria Ressa; Amnesty International Secretary General Agnès Callamard; and several scientists and nuclear experts.

The assembly was officially opened by Monsignor Fabio Baggio, under-secretary of the Dicastery for Promoting Integral Human Development.

In his welcoming address, he immediately established the central thread of the discussions by stressing that “peace is not simply the absence of war but an order founded on justice, mutual trust, respect for the rule of law and the inviolable dignity of every human being.”

The central idea was clear: regulating artificial intelligence has become imperative if peace – and ultimately humanity’s very survival – is to be preserved. AI is now integrated into military systems, dramatically increasing the risks of proliferation, cyber warfare and high-intensity conflicts, with the potential to undermine global stability and respect for ethical principles.

Although the speakers sometimes differed in their analyses, reflecting their diverse backgrounds, they all converged on one essential conclusion. Artificial intelligence should not be feared, but that certainly does not mean it should be given free rein until it becomes another HAL 9000. On the contrary, most participants stressed the urgent need to establish safeguards before potential abuses become impossible to control.

Karen Hallberg, Argentine physicist and president of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. Credit: Katsuhiro Asagiri/INPS Japan

This concern was voiced in particular by Karen Hallberg, the Argentine physicist specialising in condensed matter and president of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. AI, she argued, is a “dual-use” technology, much like nuclear energy itself. While nuclear fission has led to extraordinary advances in energy production and medicine, it has also made atomic weapons possible.

“Artificial intelligence has the same ambivalence. It can certainly contribute to scientific research, medicine and even the monitoring of international commitments. However, its integration into nuclear weapons systems could usher in a period of dangerous uncertainty,” she warned.

Hallberg also stressed that one of the greatest risks would be to allow algorithms to intervene in processes related to the command and control of nuclear weapons – for instance, analysing satellite imagery, interpreting military situations or contributing to decisions whose consequences could prove irreversible for the future of humanity.

“I am not afraid; I am concerned. And it is precisely this concern that should give us the determination to act before it is too late,” she said, calling on governments to apply the precautionary principle before technology outpaces political regulation and leads to an irreversible drift.

A concern that Nagaoka shares, albeit from a different perspective, is that artificial intelligence is not inherently dangerous. Everything, he argued, depends on how humanity chooses to use it.

“The question ultimately comes back to humanity itself, which has the choice of becoming either more selfish or more compassionate.”

Nagaoka placed particular emphasis on the responsibility of younger generations, who are growing up in an environment where digital tools occupy an ever greater place and where the risk of isolation continues to increase. Humanity’s greatest challenge, therefore, is not to reject AI but to learn how to use it without abandoning the uniquely human capacity for judgement.

“We must preserve our conscience and our wisdom when making decisions,” he said, reminding participants that education and critical thinking will remain the best safeguards against a technology capable of influencing both individual and collective choices.

“I recently heard on television the story of an 86-year-old Japanese woman faced with the painful decision of ending life support for her seriously ill husband. She chose to seek advice from ChatGPT rather than from her family.”

For Nagaoka, the issue is not to condemn such a choice but rather to reflect on these new forms of dialogue emerging in societies where machines may increasingly become trusted interlocutors at the most important moments of human existence.

This reflection on human responsibility echoed the concerns raised by Maria Ressa, winner of the 2021 Nobel Peace Prize for her defence of freedom of expression and her fight against disinformation.

Peace is not simply the absence of war but an order founded on justice, mutual trust, respect for the rule of law and the inviolable dignity of every human being.
Throughout the discussions, she repeatedly highlighted the risks AI poses to the future of democracy, including the accelerating spread of false information, the large-scale manipulation of public opinion and the concentration of power in the hands of a limited number of technology companies.

“AI is not simply an issue of innovation. It concerns the very functioning of democratic societies,” Ressa insisted.

But it was undoubtedly Yunus who delivered the conference’s most far-reaching criticism by shifting the debate onto economic ground. The Bangladeshi economist, founder of the Grameen Bank and recipient of the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize offered a profoundly humanist critique that challenged the very foundations of AI’s use within contemporary capitalism.

“The main problem is not simply the possible disappearance of certain jobs, but the growing concentration of wealth,” Yunus said.

Artificial intelligence, he warned, risks reinforcing a model in which a handful of companies control technologies, data and income, while an ever larger share of the population is excluded from economic participation.

“It could deprive people of their livelihoods, their dignity and their ability to remain independent,” he argued.

The future, he said, cannot be an economy in which artificial intelligence replaces human beings. Instead, it must be based on participation, entrepreneurship and the sharing of opportunities.

His message to political leaders around the world was unequivocal: AI must not become an instrument for concentrating power but rather a tool placed at the service of everyone.

And now what? At the end of these discussions, one certainty emerges: there can be no turning back. Artificial intelligence is now part of our world. Humanity should not fear it, nor should it regard it as tomorrow’s greatest enemy. But several fundamental questions remain unanswered: Who will control this technology, according to what rules, and in the service of what kind of society?

More than half a century after HAL 9000, the real threat may not be that a machine could become human. It may be that human beings gradually renounce what defines them most: their capacity to decide, to judge and to assume responsibility for their own choices.

IPS UN Bureau Report

Note: This article is brought to you by IPS Noram in collaboration with INPS Japan and Soka Gakkai International in consultative status with ECOSOC.

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L’article L’inextricabilité des intérêts de la famille Trump au Moyen-Orient : la privatisation des fonctions diplomatiques étatsuniennes est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Mit Andy Burnham hat am Montag der siebte britische Premierminister innerhalb von zehn Jahren die Downing Street Nummer 10 betreten. Es war der bisher geräuschloseste Übergang: Mit 379 Nominierungen der 403 Labour-Abgeordneten stellte sich die Fraktion geschlossen hinter Burnham, der erst im Juni ins Unterhaus eingezogen war. Ein Nebeneffekt dieser für die jüngere britische Politik erstaunlich glatten Machtübernahme war, dass sich Burnham politisch bisher kaum positionieren musste. Als ehemaliger Bürgermeister von Manchester, der das Unterhaus 2017 verlassen hatte, gilt das in besonderem Maße für seine Außen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik sowie seinen zukünftigen Kurs gegenüber der EU.

Innenpolitik als zentrale Priorität

Die bisherigen Äußerungen von Burnham im »Wahlkampf« um die Nachfolge von Keir Starmer deuten jedoch in eine eindeutige Richtung: Der politische Fokus von Andy Burnham liegt auf der Innenpolitik. Aufbauend auf den Erfolgen in Manchester stellt er die »Devolution« – also die Übertragung von Kompetenzen von der nationalen auf die regionale oder kommunale Ebene – in den Mittelpunkt. Den Labour-Abgeordneten verspricht er einen neuen Regierungsstil, der die Parlamentsfraktion stärker einbindet und den britischen Staat modernisieren soll. 

Auch in seinem bisher einzigen ausführlichen Beitrag zur Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik leitet Burnham seine Linie davon ab, wie sich jüngere Kriege, etwa im Mittleren Osten oder Russlands Angriff auf die Ukraine, direkt auf die britische Bevölkerung und ihren Wohlstand ausgewirkt haben. Investitionen in mehr Verteidigung verbindet Burnham klar mit dem Ziel, durch eine stärkere britische Rüstungsindustrie regionale Wirtschaftsräume zu stärken und die Reindustrialisierung voranzutreiben. 

Brexit-Skepsis und pragmatischer Europakurs

In der Europapolitik gehört Andy Burnham, wie viele bei Labour, zu den Brexit-Kritikern. Er befürwortet eine engere Zusammenarbeit mit Brüssel sowie mit Berlin und Paris im sogenannten E3-Format. Noch im vergangenen Jahr, als eine Rückkehr auf die nationale Bühne für ihn noch eine ferne Möglichkeit war, äußerte er die Hoffnung, das Vereinigte Königreich werde »zu seinen Lebszeiten« wieder in die EU zurückkehren. Mit dem Wahlkampf um den Einzug ins Parlament und der Vorbereitung auf die Übernahme des Premierministeramts hat er diese Vision aber erst mal wieder abgeräumt. Hier zeigen sich dieselben innenpolitischen Druckpunkte, die bereits Keir Starmer gegenüber der EU gebremst haben. Um keine Pro-Brexit-Wähler an die führenden Rechtspopulisten um Nigel Farage zu verlieren, sagt auch Burnham, er wolle zunächst alte Wunden nicht öffnen und alte Debatten nicht neu führen.

Im direkten Umgang mit der EU ist daher Pragmatismus zu erwarten. Der kürzlich verschobene EU-UK-Gipfel dürfte bald nachgeholt werden. Hierfür will Burnham »die Fortschritte konsolidieren«. Zu seinen Prioritäten zählen die Bekämpfung illegaler Migration, ökonomische Sicherheit und Resilienz gegenüber externen Bedrohungen wie Terrorismus oder Desinformation. Bisher unterscheidet er sich dabei von Keir Starmer am ehesten dadurch, dass er die Prioritäten in den Partnerschaften eher bei den Europäern – in der EU sowie bilateral und multilateral mit den E3 – sucht als bei den USA unter Donald Trump. Während Burnham den nationalen Sicherheitsberater von Keir Starmer behält, hat er den Außenminister und den für EU-Verhandlungen zuständigen Minister in der Neuaufstellung des Kabinetts ausgetauscht. Hier sind also neue Impulse möglich.

Bedeutung für Berlin und Brüssel

Für Deutschland und die EU stellt sich die Frage, ob und inwieweit man über diesen Pragmatismus hinausgehen möchte. Mit Burnham dürfte das Vereinigte Königreich ein verlässlicher Partner bleiben, der sowohl mit Deutschland bei der Umsetzung des Kensington-Freundschaftsvertrags als auch mit der EU bei der EU-UK-Agenda eng zusammenarbeiten will. Um die bisherige Agenda zu erweitern, müssten europäische Partner und die neue britische Regierung bereit sein, alte rote Brexit-Linien hinter sich zu lassen und eine tiefere sicherheitspolitische Partnerschaft einzugehen. Ansatzpunkte hierfür bietet etwa die Verteidigungszusammenarbeit, wo Burnhams Fokus auf regionale Reindustrialisierung, verbunden mit einem Angebot engerer Kooperation mit der EU, neue Perspektiven eröffnen würde.

 

By Maximilian Malawista
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 21 2026 (IPS)

Despite rising geopolitical tensions, trade restrictions and calls to bring production back to domestic shores, the global economy remains more interconnected than it may appear. Trade through global value chains (GVCs) reached historic levels in 2024, according to a new report from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

GVCs, the cross-border production networks through which countries exchange materials, services and intermediate inputs used to produce goods and services, accounted for roughly 17 percent of global GDP in real terms between 2022 and 2024. This is up from approximately 16 percent before the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.

The findings stand to challenge expectations that the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical tensions would have on the campaign of de-globalization. GVC trade expanded rapidly before the Global Financial Crisis and later stabilized at historically high levels. Nevertheless, in 2024 inflation-adjusted GVC trade remained close to its 2022 peak, even as total global trade declined slightly from its 2022 level.

The distinction between real and nominal figures is particularly important following years of elevated inflation and volatile commodity prices. Rising prices can inflate the apparent value of international trade without representing an actual increase in the volume of goods and services exchanged. The OECD’s inflation-adjusted figures indicate that cross-border production itself has remained historically high.

Beneath that overall stability, however, industries have moved in markedly different directions. Manufacturing and transportation remain among the sectors most dependent on internationally sourced inputs.

Coke – a carbon-rich fuel produced from coal and primarily used in steelmaking – refined petroleum products, water and air transport, information and communication technology, electronics, rubber, plastics, chemicals, basic metals and motor vehicles all recorded GVC trade exceeding 35 percent of their gross output in 2024, indicating their heavy reliance on cross-border production networks.

While gains were recorded in those sectors, the motor vehicle industry became less internationally integrated over the period examined, falling from the sixth-most internationalized sector in 2011 to tenth in 2024, being overtaken by chemicals, air transport and electronic equipment.

Pharmaceuticals moved in the opposite direction. Despite increased policy attention toward strengthening domestic medical supply chains following the COVID-19 pandemic, pharmaceutical production became more dependent on internationally sourced inputs between 2011 and 2024.

GVC participation also increased notably in air transport and warehousing, highlighting the continued importance of globally connected logistics networks in supporting production.

The differences illustrate the uneven nature of supply-chain reconfiguration: while some industries have reduced their reliance on foreign inputs, others have become increasingly integrated into cross-border production networks.

The same pattern is visible across national economies. Of the 80 economies examined by the OECD, 49 had a higher share of foreign value added embedded in their exports in 2024 than in 2011.

Across the economies examined, countries generally relied more heavily on foreign inputs to produce their exports than they contributed inputs to exports produced elsewhere. For example, a country importing foreign-made components to manufacture and export a car is participating backward in a GVC. A country supplying steel that is then used to manufacture and export that car elsewhere is participating forward.

These patterns vary depending on the structure of each economy. Large economies such as the United States, China and Brazil are generally less reliant on foreign inputs because more of their production can be sourced domestically. Major commodity exporters such as Norway and Kazakhstan, meanwhile, rank highly in forward participation because their domestically-produced energy and raw materials become inputs in production and exports elsewhere.

Yet, increased GVC participation does not necessarily mean companies are simply buying more supplies from abroad.

Between 2019 and 2024, China, Japan, the United States and the European Union all became more reliant on foreign value in their exports. However, the OECD found that this was not primarily because companies shifted toward foreign suppliers. Instead, these economies increasingly produced and exported goods and services that themselves relied more heavily on international supply chains.

For example, an economy could begin sourcing more car parts domestically but simultaneously increase its exports of cars, which depend heavily on globally connected production networks. Its individual supply chains may become more domestic, while its overall economy becomes more integrated into global production.

The findings suggest that efforts to bring parts of production closer to home can therefore occur alongside deeper global economic integration.

Trade flows – the movement of goods and services across borders – only captures part of that interconnectedness. Multinational companies (MNCs) also operate and produce directly in foreign markets through foreign affiliates — companies they own or control outside their home country.

If a German MNC owns a factory in the United States, that American operation is a foreign affiliate. Products it manufactures and sells within the United States would not count as international trade, as they never crossed a border, yet the factory remains part of the German company’s global production network.

In 2023, foreign affiliates generated approximately USD 25.6 trillion in output, equivalent to one-quarter of global GDP and only slightly below the USD 26.6 trillion value of total world trade in goods and cross-border services.Together, MNCs and their foreign affiliates accounted for roughly 35 percent of world gross output in 2023 but only 60 percent of world exports, demonstrating their outsized role in international trade.

The geography of MNC production is also gradually broadening. While companies headquartered in OECD economies still controlled nearly 85 percent of foreign-affiliate output in 2023, the share of production involving non-OECD companies operating in non-OECD markets, nearly doubled from 4.9 percent in 2011 to 9.3 percent.

The report’s findings suggest that globalization is not simply retreating in the face of geopolitical fragmentation, rather global production is being reorganized across industries, companies and countries. Supply chains may be shifting, diversifying and adapting to new risks, but the networks connecting the global economy remain deeply entrenched and central to the production of goods and services.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Nelson Mandela, the former President of South Africa, addresses a press conference at UN Headquarters in New York in December 1991. Credit: UN Photo/John Isaac

By UN News
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 21 2026 (IPS)

Sixty-seven minutes. That is how long volunteers spent serving lunch to people experiencing food insecurity at Refettorio Harlem in New York City last week – one for every year Nelson Mandela gave to public service.

Diplomats stood alongside city officials and neighbourhood volunteers, dishing out plates rather than platitudes, in a small but pointed answer to a question the UN spent Monday asking in more formal terms: what does Mandela’s legacy actually demand of us now?

That question sat at the centre of the General Assembly’s commemoration of Nelson Mandela International Day, where the focus fell squarely on poverty and inequality – and on whether the world is living up to the example Mandela set.

Courtenay Rattray, Chef de Cabinet of the Secretary-General, addresses the General Assembly on the observance of the annual Nelson Mandela International Day. Credit: UN Photo/Loey Felipe

‘The wrong choices’

Secretary-General António Guterres, speaking through his Chef de Cabinet, Courtenay Rattray, did not mince words.

Mandela understood that the world’s deepest problems come from human decisions – and can therefore be undone by different ones, Mr. Rattray said.

Right now, he warned, the world is doing the opposite: pouring resources into militaries while poverty and development needs go underfunded. “There is something deeply wrong when we spend more on the instruments of destruction and death than on the tools of development and peace,” he said.

South African journalist and broadcaster Redi Tlhabi, addresses the General Assembly on the observance of the annual Nelson Mandela International Day. Credit: UN Photo/Loey Felipe

Beyond the myth

The sharpest words of the morning came from South African journalist Redi Tlhabi, the observance’s keynote speaker, who pushed back against the softened, reconciliatory image of Mandela that has settled into global memory.

She called him the “Inconvenient Mandela” – a man who stayed principled through imprisonment rather than negotiate his way out of it.

“Only free men can negotiate,” she quoted him telling his captors in 1985, when he was offered freedom in exchange for renouncing the struggle.

Reconciliation, she argued, was never where Mandela started. Justice was. “He never asked his oppressed to become comfortable with injustice. He asked the world to become uncomfortable with injustice,” she said.

Ms. Tlhabi turned that history into a direct challenge for today’s diplomats, pointing to the decades-long stalemate over reforming the UN Security Council – including the case for a permanent African seat – as proof that talk without risk changes little. “What are you prepared to risk for justice?” she asked the room.

General Assembly President Annalena Baerbock addresses the General Assembly on the observance of the annual Nelson Mandela International Day. Credit: UN Photo/Loey Felipe

Remembrance into action

Annalena Baerbock, President of the General Assembly, opened proceedings by insisting that Mandela Day must mean more than a moment of reflection. The point, she said, is to honour his legacy “not only through remembrance but through action.”

Volunteers from the United Nations and the diplomatic community preparing and serving meals at Refettorio Harlem to mark Nelson Mandela International Day. Credit: United Nation/Beatriz D’Alessand

That is where Harlem comes back in. The Refettorio Harlem meal service was one of a series of volunteer projects the UN ran with city partners to mark the day, and it gave literal shape to Ms. Baerbock’s point.

Shaffiou Assoumanou, representing Mayor Mamdani’s office for International Affairs, put it plainly: “History won’t judge us by the words we take, but by the actions we take.”

It was a modest event by UN standards – no cameras in the General Assembly Hall, no resolutions attached. But it echoed the same argument running through the day’s speeches: that Mandela’s fight against poverty and exclusion was never only an institutional project.

It played out in neighbourhoods, in shared meals, in the everyday choice to show up. Sixty-seven minutes at a time.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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L’Amérique latine connaît une recomposition politique marquée par le recul des gouvernements progressistes au profit de droites conservatrices et radicales. Les élections présidentielles organisées en juin 2026 en Colombie et au Pérou ne font pas exception et s’inscrivent pleinement dans cette dynamique. En Colombie, l’outsider d’extrême droite Bernardo Della Espriella s’est imposé face au candidat de gauche Iván Cepeda. Au Pérou, Keiko Fujimori, figure de la droite conservatrice péruvienne, a remporté l’élection face à Roberto Sánchez. Dans les deux pays, les nouveaux dirigeants ont été élus avec une très faible avance sur leur adversaire, donnant lieu à des contestations des résultats de la part des candidats battus. Ces deux nouveaux gouvernements de droite radicale ont des orientations politiques proches, notamment sur les plans économique, sécuritaire, sociétal et diplomatique.

Comment expliquer l’ascension des droites radicales en Amérique latine ? Dans quelle mesure l’absence de majorité parlementaire pourrait-elle limiter leur capacité à gouverner ? Comment ces nouvelles présidences pourraient-elles redéfinir les orientations économiques, sécuritaires, diplomatiques et sociétales de la Colombie et du Pérou ?

Nouvelle chronique de l’Amérique latine avec Christophe Ventura, directeur de recherche à l’IRIS et responsable du Programme Amérique latine/Caraïbe.

L’article Élections en Colombie et au Pérou : quelles leçons politiques pour l’Amérique latine ? est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Sichere Ernährungsversorgung wird international umfassend definiert: Nahrung muss jederzeit verfügbar, zugänglich und bezahlbar sein. Ob dies durch heimische Produktion oder Importe erreicht wird, ist dabei unerheblich. Beide Wege bringen spezifische Vorteile und Risiken mit sich: Die Eigenproduktion macht unabhängiger von anderen Ländern, was in Zeiten internationaler Krisen an Bedeutung gewinnt. Aber der Anbau in Europa kann teurer sein als anderswo und manchmal auch ökologisch nicht sinnvoll, etwa wegen begrenzter Flächen. Gleichzeitig ist die heimische Agrarproduktion in der Regel auch auf Importe angewiesen, insbesondere bei Energie und Düngemitteln. Zudem gleicht Handel regionale Produktionsausfälle aus, etwa infolge von Dürren. Nicht zuletzt trägt Handel dazu bei, Nahrungsmittel erschwinglich zu halten, da sie dort produziert werden können, wo dies am kostengünstigsten ist.

EU-Versorgung: Binnenhandel und Solidarität als Rückgrat

Die EU ist bei den meisten Nahrungsmitteln ausreichend versorgt – auch dank des Binnenmarkts: So finden 70 Prozent des deutschen Agrarhandels mit EU-Mitgliedstaaten statt. Trotz dieser großen Verfügbarkeit können sich viele Haushalte keine regelmäßige, vollwertige Mahlzeit leisten. In Bulgarien waren dies 2025 etwa 18 Prozent aller Haushalte, in Deutschland rund 11 Prozent.

In Krisensituationen können Handelsbeeinträchtigungen die Lage verschärfen. Zu Beginn der Coronakrise etwa verzögerten innereuropäische Grenzkontrollen den Warenverkehr und damit auch die Warenverfügbarkeit. Um die bis dahin als selbstverständlich angesehene Errungenschaft eines freien Binnenhandels auch im Krisenfall zu sichern, wurde der »Europäische Mechanismus zur Krisenvorsorge und Krisenreaktion im Bereich der Ernährungssicherheit« geschaffen. Dieser identifiziert frühzeitig Risiken und soll durch den kontinuierlichen Austausch zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten den gemeinsamen Konsens zu einem offenen Binnenhandel sichern. Ergänzend dazu unterstützt die europäische Solidaritätsklausel eine gegenseitige Hilfe bei Versorgungsengpässen, unabhängig davon, durch welche Krise sie verursacht werden – von Terrorangriffen bis hin zu Naturereignissen.

Internationale Importe: Diversifizierung und Verlässlichkeit als Schlüssel

Bei Produkten wie Kaffee, Tee sowie einigen Obst- und Gemüsesorten spielen internationale Importe für die EU-Versorgung schon immer eine wichtige Rolle. Versorgungsrisiken entstehen erst dadurch, dass Importe nur aus sehr wenigen Ländern stammen. Dann kann schon der Wegfall einzelner Quellen die Versorgung gefährden. Laut EU-Monitoring gibt es aktuell nur in begrenztem Umfang hohe Importkonzentrationen, etwa bei bestimmten Nussarten, Futtermittelzusätzen und einzelnen Düngerkomponenten. 

Zur Absicherung ist eine Importdiversifizierung durch mehr Zulieferer wichtig, aber auch deren Verlässlichkeit ist zu berücksichtigen: Geografisch nähere Handelspartner wie die Türkei und Nordafrika bieten durch kürzere Lieferketten stabilere Transportbedingungen. Handelsabkommen mit diesen Ländern stärken die Verlässlichkeit. Die bestehenden Vereinbarungen können aber gerade beim Marktzugang für Agrarprodukte in die EU noch ausgebaut werden. Zudem sind Handelspartner verlässlicher, die nicht dazu neigen, kurzfristig Agrarexporte zu beschränken. Dies zeigte sich zuletzt zu Beginn dieses Jahres bei China im Fall von Stickstoffdünger. Auch argentinisches Soja ist häufig betroffen, beispielsweise in den Jahren 2007, 2012 und 2022. Handelsabkommen können solche Exportstopps verbieten oder begrenzen, wie es das EU-Mercosur-Abkommen vorsieht. 

Kurzfristige Engpässe aufgrund von Krisenereignissen können auch durch staatliche Notfallreserven überbrückt werden. Auch hier bleibt Handel aber relevant, so auch für den jüngsten Vorschlag, die seit Langem bestehenden deutschen Reserven um verzehrfertige Produkte wie Dosenravioli zu ergänzen. Der Aufbau und Einsatz solcher Reserven müssen klaren Kriterien folgen. Sonst können diese ineffizient und zu teuer sein und die wirklich Vulnerablen nicht richtig versorgen. Vor allem aber hilft internationaler Handel, Zutaten für Reserveprodukte wie Dosenravioli zuverlässig bereitzustellen.  

Handel und Importe tragen also auf unterschiedliche Weise zur Versorgungssicherheit in Krisen bei – und öffnen zugleich politische Türen: Wer Marktzugang gewährt, kann im Gegenzug den Zugang zu anderen Märkten für die eigenen Exporte verbessern. Dies ist für eine Exportnation wie Deutschland besonders relevant.