Die weltweite Krise der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit lässt sich nicht durch Maximalversprechen im Hinblick auf die Leistungsfähigkeit dieses Politikfelds lösen. Hauptziel muss die Verbesserung der Lebensbedingungen vor Ort bleiben – eine Überfrachtung mit Nebenzielen führt oft nur dazu, dass kein Ziel mehr realistisch erreicht werden kann. Immer knappere Ressourcen zwingen Projekte ohnehin, sich thematisch zu fokussieren.
Die weltweite Krise der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit lässt sich nicht durch Maximalversprechen im Hinblick auf die Leistungsfähigkeit dieses Politikfelds lösen. Hauptziel muss die Verbesserung der Lebensbedingungen vor Ort bleiben – eine Überfrachtung mit Nebenzielen führt oft nur dazu, dass kein Ziel mehr realistisch erreicht werden kann. Immer knappere Ressourcen zwingen Projekte ohnehin, sich thematisch zu fokussieren.
Die weltweite Krise der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit lässt sich nicht durch Maximalversprechen im Hinblick auf die Leistungsfähigkeit dieses Politikfelds lösen. Hauptziel muss die Verbesserung der Lebensbedingungen vor Ort bleiben – eine Überfrachtung mit Nebenzielen führt oft nur dazu, dass kein Ziel mehr realistisch erreicht werden kann. Immer knappere Ressourcen zwingen Projekte ohnehin, sich thematisch zu fokussieren.
We use new data on political connections from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys to examine the impact of connections on firms' participation in international trade through global value chains (GVCs) for six lower middle income MENA countries and territories (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, and Lebanon). Our findings add to the literature on “hidden protection” and corruption in the region: trade- and investment policies and regulations are tailored to benefit or protect politically connected firms. Our findings suggest that politically connected firms are more likely to participate in GVCs by 9.8 percentage points and that the intensity of their participation in GVCs increases by 4.1 percentage points. Combining political connections and grand corruption increases firms' participation in GVCs by 13.6 percentage points.
We use new data on political connections from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys to examine the impact of connections on firms' participation in international trade through global value chains (GVCs) for six lower middle income MENA countries and territories (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, and Lebanon). Our findings add to the literature on “hidden protection” and corruption in the region: trade- and investment policies and regulations are tailored to benefit or protect politically connected firms. Our findings suggest that politically connected firms are more likely to participate in GVCs by 9.8 percentage points and that the intensity of their participation in GVCs increases by 4.1 percentage points. Combining political connections and grand corruption increases firms' participation in GVCs by 13.6 percentage points.
We use new data on political connections from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys to examine the impact of connections on firms' participation in international trade through global value chains (GVCs) for six lower middle income MENA countries and territories (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, and Lebanon). Our findings add to the literature on “hidden protection” and corruption in the region: trade- and investment policies and regulations are tailored to benefit or protect politically connected firms. Our findings suggest that politically connected firms are more likely to participate in GVCs by 9.8 percentage points and that the intensity of their participation in GVCs increases by 4.1 percentage points. Combining political connections and grand corruption increases firms' participation in GVCs by 13.6 percentage points.
Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries (TURFs) are a rights-based management strategy that grants area-based fishing rights to specific community groups. In Ecuador, following immense mangrove deforestation caused by industrial shrimp farming, TURFs have been implemented through Mangrove Sustainable Use and Custody Agreements (AUSCEMs, for its Spanish acronym), driven by grassroots demands to conserve remaining mangroves and recognize ancestral territorial rights. This article examines the power-laden dynamics of these agreements in the Gulf of Guayaquil, Ecuador through ethnographic research in two fishing communities. We analyze historical and ongoing conflicts and reveal how multi-scalar power—across visible, hidden, and invisible forms—shapes access to and control over mangrove resources, often reinforcing inequalities and epistemic injustices. Our findings highlight how funding inequities, limited tenure security, and rising threats from organized crime compromise community-led conservation. For this management approach to succeed, it is essential to close funding gaps for stewardship and innovation, address security and service disparities, recognize local ecological knowledge, and fully honor ancestral territorial rights to promote equitable, sustainable governance.
Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries (TURFs) are a rights-based management strategy that grants area-based fishing rights to specific community groups. In Ecuador, following immense mangrove deforestation caused by industrial shrimp farming, TURFs have been implemented through Mangrove Sustainable Use and Custody Agreements (AUSCEMs, for its Spanish acronym), driven by grassroots demands to conserve remaining mangroves and recognize ancestral territorial rights. This article examines the power-laden dynamics of these agreements in the Gulf of Guayaquil, Ecuador through ethnographic research in two fishing communities. We analyze historical and ongoing conflicts and reveal how multi-scalar power—across visible, hidden, and invisible forms—shapes access to and control over mangrove resources, often reinforcing inequalities and epistemic injustices. Our findings highlight how funding inequities, limited tenure security, and rising threats from organized crime compromise community-led conservation. For this management approach to succeed, it is essential to close funding gaps for stewardship and innovation, address security and service disparities, recognize local ecological knowledge, and fully honor ancestral territorial rights to promote equitable, sustainable governance.
Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries (TURFs) are a rights-based management strategy that grants area-based fishing rights to specific community groups. In Ecuador, following immense mangrove deforestation caused by industrial shrimp farming, TURFs have been implemented through Mangrove Sustainable Use and Custody Agreements (AUSCEMs, for its Spanish acronym), driven by grassroots demands to conserve remaining mangroves and recognize ancestral territorial rights. This article examines the power-laden dynamics of these agreements in the Gulf of Guayaquil, Ecuador through ethnographic research in two fishing communities. We analyze historical and ongoing conflicts and reveal how multi-scalar power—across visible, hidden, and invisible forms—shapes access to and control over mangrove resources, often reinforcing inequalities and epistemic injustices. Our findings highlight how funding inequities, limited tenure security, and rising threats from organized crime compromise community-led conservation. For this management approach to succeed, it is essential to close funding gaps for stewardship and innovation, address security and service disparities, recognize local ecological knowledge, and fully honor ancestral territorial rights to promote equitable, sustainable governance.
Russia apparently aims to be capable of attacking targets in the Baltic Sea region from Lake Ladoga, which is located north of Saint Petersburg and only 40 kilometres from the Finnish border. Since 2023, Russia has been evaluating the deployment of corvettes equipped with cruise missiles there. Such warships have already carried out strikes deep into Syria and Ukraine. Their recent deployments to Lake Ladoga could complicate the defence of NATO’s north-eastern allies. Simulated launches were reportedly conducted for the first time in autumn 2024. However, NATO still lacks information about Lake Ladoga. Developments there underscore the need for conventional long-range fire capabilities into Russia’s strategic depth to deter Moscow effectively.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine marked the start of a prolonged confrontation between Moscow and Europe – one that is fundamentally reshaping the parameters of European security. The return of Donald Trump to the White House and his stated intent to quickly end the war in Ukraine and put pressure on the European allies including Ukraine to assume greater responsibility for their security is a second critical inflection point. In this rapidly evolving security landscape, Europe faces the dual challenge of ensuring the long-term security of Ukraine, the Baltic states and the Black Sea region and strengthening the European Union’s defence and military capabilities. Turkey has a strategically significant, albeit politically contentious role to play within both contexts. What kind of an alignment might there be between the EU and Turkey, given that Ankara is simultaneously a partner, competitor, rival and even threat to EU member states? For its part, the European Union should adopt a gradual, pragmatic and interest driven approach to Turkey’s integration into the changing European security architecture. It should aim to reinforce the role of Europe – including Turkey – as a strategic and capable security actor while making clear that enhanced defence cooperation with Ankara and Turkey’s stalled EU accession process are two separate issues.