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The UN’s ongoing liquidity crisis has forced peacekeeping operations to implement contingency measures that have significantly reduced personnel, patrols, mission footprints, and programmatic activities. As missions adapt to these constraints, they face difficult trade-offs in maintaining mandate delivery while responding to increasingly complex security environments.

In this context, the International Peace Institute (IPI), in partnership with the permanent missions of Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Pakistan to the United Nations, convened a workshop to examine how UN peacekeeping operations are adapting to contingency measures. The discussion brought together member-state representatives and UN officials from headquarters and the field to assess the operational implications of the cuts and identify lessons for the future of peacekeeping.

Key themes from the discussion included the growing reliance on mobile operational approaches, the impact of reduced mission presence on the protection of civilians and community engagement, increasing risks to peacekeeper safety and security, the opportunities and limits of digital technologies, the importance of strategic communication with host states and local communities, and the critical role of partnerships in sustaining mandate implementation amid resource constraints.

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Despite progress in increasing the participation of women in UN peacekeeping operations, gender bias continues to shape the experiences of peacekeepers in ways that can affect both inclusion and operational effectiveness. 

This policy paper examines how gender bias manifests itself across seven dimensions of peacekeeping work: day-to-day operations, field deployments, organizational processes, professional development, engagement with host populations, data and assessments, and communications. Drawing on focus groups and interviews with personnel from the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), as well as a cross-mission survey, the paper highlights how informal norms and structural barriers continue to shape women’s experiences in mission environments. 

The paper argues that addressing gender bias requires moving beyond representation targets to examine the systems, practices, and organizational cultures that influence how peacekeeping personnel are recruited, deployed, supported, and promoted. It offers recommendations to strengthen accountability, leadership, data collection, training, and institutional learning across UN peace operations. 

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On June 23rd, the International Peace Institute (IPI), in partnership with the Permanent Missions of Bangladesh, Denmark, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the UN Department of Peace Operations, Peace Direct, and the Cairo International Center for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding, cohosted a public policy forum on “Strengthening the Peace Operations–Peacebuilding Nexus: From Policy to Practice,” during Peacebuilding Week 2026. 

In an era of increasingly complex and protracted conflicts, building and sustaining peace remains central to the work of the United Nations. UN peace operations play a critical role in creating space to advance national and local ownership over peacebuilding, while the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) provide valuable support within mission settings, including during transitions.  

Under increasing financial constraints, sustaining peace requires an integrated approach that connects protection, political engagement, prevention, and peacebuilding while working effectively with partners – at the local and global level. To that end, the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review (PBAR) resolutions seek to strengthen the nexus between peace operations and peacebuilding, while the forthcoming secretary-general’s review on the future of all forms of peace operations intends to provide a strategic vision for aligning peace operations with today’s rapidly evolving global environment. Strengthening this nexus can maximize impact across the peace continuum – from conflict prevention and crisis response to post–conflict reconstruction and development. 

Against this backdrop, this panel discussion explored how the peace operations-peacebuilding nexus is operationalized in practice. Bringing together headquarters and field-level perspectives from policymakers and practitioners, the discussion examined: the contribution of peace operations to peacebuilding; missions’ support for community-centered approaches that support prevention and local-level conflict resolution led by Civil Affairs components; and how the PBF and PBC can be effectively leveraged in peace operation settings to support national and local peacebuilding priorities alongside missions. Overall, the discussion highlighted the importance of planning, coordination, and partnerships for peacebuilding in peace operation contexts.  

The civil affairs components of UN peace operations play an important role in advancing peacebuilding goals through community-centered approaches. Several speakers highlighted the value of the work undertaken by civil affairs teams, including facilitating local peace dialogues, community trust-building activities, and efforts to build local capacities to manage tensions and protect civilians. Many also mentioned the impact of contingency cuts implemented because of the UN’s ongoing liquidity crisis. For example, in South Sudan, approximatelu 40% of UNMISS civil affairs staff were cut, reducing the mission’s capacity. Some speakers underscored that these and other constraints are likely to limit early warning, conflict mitigation, and civilian protection capacities.  

Speakers also emphasized the importance of integrating longer-term peacebuilding perspectives in planning mission drawdowns and transitions. In this respect, speakers discussed how the UN peacebuilding architecture, including the PBC and the PBF, could be leveraged. One briefer argued that connecting political, security, and governance elements through the PBC can help strengthen the peacebuilding-peacekeeping nexus. Several speakers emphasized the need to strengthen the relationship between the Security Council and the PBC, as called for in the twin resolutions that emergee from the 2025 PBAR. The PBC’s advisory role to the Council can be particularly important in mandate renewal and in transitions and drawdowns, supporting host states in mobilizing support and financing to cover resource gaps that often emerge in transitions. In this regard, one speaker highlighted the role of the informal coordinator between the PBC and the Security Council, stressing that member states should help bridge the gap between the UN’s peace operations and the UN peacebuilding architecture.  

Central to the discussion was the practical contribution peace operations make to peacebuilding at the local level, and how that contribution can be maintained and strengthened during a period of financial pressure, transition, and reform. The discussion also examined how to leverage the momentum of the PBAR and the peace operations review to foster greater cohesion within the UN system and with partners, including during mission transitions and drawdowns, to maximize impact amid geopolitical turbulence, ongoing reforms, and increasingly violent contexts. 

Welcome and Opening Remarks:
H.E. Fergal Mythen, Permanent Representative of Ireland to the UN
H.E. Lise Gregoire-van Haaren, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN

Speakers:
David Haeri, Director, Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training, UN Department of Peace Operations
Hiroko Hirahara, Director, Civil Affairs, UNMISS, South Sudan (virtual)
Ewa Turyk-Mazurek, Civil Affairs Field Operations Manager, UNIFIL, Lebanon
Edmund Yakani, Executive Director, Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO), South Sudan (virtual)
Daniel Prins, Chief, Security Sector Reform Unit, UN Peacebuilding and Peace Support Office, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Department of Peace Operations

Moderator:
Lauren McGowan, Policy Analyst, International Peace Institute

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South Sudan is facing a period of growing uncertainty. Rising political tensions, delays in implementation of the Revitalized Peace Agreement (R-ARCSS), spillover effects from the conflict in Sudan, and mounting economic and humanitarian pressures are testing the country’s fragile stability. At the same time, the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is adapting to a newly renewed mandate amid funding constraints and a reduced operational footprint.

In this context, the International Peace Institute (IPI) and the Stimson Center convened a workshop to examine South Sudan’s evolving security environment, regional diplomatic efforts, and the implications of recent changes to UNMISS’s mandate. Participants discussed the role of regional actors, the future of the peace process, challenges surrounding elections and political transition, and the mission’s ability to implement its mandate under increasing operational and financial pressures.

Key themes from the discussion included the continued importance of civilian protection, the need for sustained regional and international political engagement, the risks associated with a reduced mission footprint, and the importance of maintaining community engagement and local peacebuilding efforts amid a rapidly changing political and security landscape.

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As feminist foreign policies face growing political backlash around the world, questions remain about how states can ensure these policies are grounded in the lived realities of the communities they seek to serve. One way to bridge the gap between international commitments and domestic implementation is through the care economy.

This policy paper examines Mexico City’s UTOPÍAS—publicly funded community centers that provide care services, educational opportunities, cultural programming, and support for economic autonomy. Drawing on field research and interviews with policymakers, civil society representatives, and community members, the paper explores how these centers embody feminist principles through an intersectional approach to care, gender equality, and social inclusion.

The paper argues that initiatives like the UTOPÍAS demonstrate how local governments can advance transformative care policies while contributing to broader feminist foreign policy goals. It highlights the potential of municipal feminist diplomacy and city-to-city exchanges as avenues for sharing innovative approaches to care, human security, and gender equality across borders.

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Developments and Implications for Political Arrangements

Key Takeaways

May 2026 was marked by a widening gap between an increasingly detailed international transition framework for Gaza and a deteriorating situation on the ground. At the center of this disconnect lies the deadlock over disarmament and decommissioning, which is blocking progress across the broader transition agenda, including withdrawal of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), reconstruction, and the deployment of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG). On May 21, High Representative Nickolay Mladenov presented a 15-point Roadmap for Phase Two centered on reciprocity and an independent verification mechanism designed to overcome the zero-trust environment between the parties.

The Roadmap is premised on the view that reconstruction, governance transition, and Israeli withdrawal cannot be sustainably implemented while multiple armed structures continue to operate alongside civilian institutions, and therefore places gradual, Palestinian-led decommissioning under NCAG authority at the center of the transition process. In practice, however, this sequencing links progress across multiple tracks to movement on the disarmament file. Hamas has rejected two versions of the plan, citing Israel’s continued non-compliance with key ceasefire and Phase One obligations, including restricted aid flows and border crossings, persistent military strikes, and the expansion of control beyond the Yellow Line established under the Sharm el-Sheikh arrangement. Hamas has also questioned the absence of a sufficiently defined political horizon, arguing that the Roadmap specifies detailed obligations on decommissioning while providing less clarity on the political steps that would lead to Palestinian statehood. Meanwhile, in the West Bank, a nine-country joint statement condemned construction in the E1 area amid record settler violence, and Israel’s interception of the Global Sumud Flotilla exposed fractures within the Israeli government. The overall trajectory points toward a hardening partition of Gaza, accelerating de facto annexation of the West Bank, and a widening gap between the peace framework’s ambition and its ability to deliver.

Main Developments

● Mladenov presents a 15-point Roadmap to the Security Council, demanding both sides act. On May 21st, High Representative Mladenov briefed the Security Council with a 15-point “Roadmap to Complete the Implementation of President Trump’s Gaza Comprehensive Peace Plan.” Built on the principle of reciprocity, each step by one side triggers a corresponding step by the other, verified by an independent committee before the next is taken. Mladenov stressed that despite months of consultations with various factions, Hamas has not accepted the framework. He urged the Security Council to “use every means at its disposal” to press Hamas to disarm and Israel to honor its ceasefire obligations, warning, “It is a deteriorating status quo or a new beginning, there is no third option.”

● Gaza ceasefire holds, but violations mount; humanitarian gains remain fragile. In the seven months since the October 2025 truce, over 2,400 Israeli violations have been documented, and at least 856 Palestinians have been killed. Mladenov acknowledged limited improvements but said 85% of Gaza’s buildings are damaged or destroyed, 70 million tons of rubble remain, and 80% of working-age Palestinians are unemployed. Humanitarian leaders from Save the Children and Refugees International however noted that aid deliveries remain far below the 600 trucks per day stipulated in the peace plan. Since March 2025, Israel has blocked UNRWA from directly bringing humanitarian personnel and aid into Gaza. The agency’s health director warned that the spread of rodents and infections signals the “near collapse” of Gaza’s health system.

● Israel killed Hamas’s military chief in Gaza City airstrike. Israel’s killing of al-Qassam Brigades commander Izz al-Din al-Haddad on May 15th was followed just 11 days later by a strike targeting his successor, Mohammed Ouda, on the eve of Eid al-Adha on May 26th. Simultaneously, systematic strikes on Hamas’s police force, with 42 officers killed since the ceasefire, suggest Israel is pursuing unilateral military disarmament rather than engaging with the roadmap’s reciprocal framework.

● Shin Bet chief meets Dahlan in Abu Dhabi to discuss Gaza governance. Shin Bet director David Zini met Mohammed Dahlan, a former Fatah security chief and long-time adviser to UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed, in Abu Dhabi in late May. The meeting focused on postwar governance arrangements for Gaza, with Israeli, American, and Arab officials exploring Dahlan as a potential figure to lead or broker a transitional administration. This could signal the exploration of governance alternatives to both transitional NCAG and the Palestinian Authority (PA) leadership under President Mahmoud Abbas, Dahlan’s bitter rival who expelled him from Fatah in 2011. If it gains traction, the Dahlan channel could reshape the political landscape but also deepen Palestinian factional fragmentation.

● Israel–Lebanon talks continue amid efforts to reinforce a fragile US-brokered ceasefire. On June 2nd and 3rd, Israeli and Lebanese officials held a fourth round of direct talks in Washington focused on strengthening deescalation arrangements and exploring phased measures to reduce hostilities. Proposals under discussion reportedly include the establishment of “pilot zones” where hostilities would cease, Israeli forces would withdraw, and the Lebanese Armed Forces would deploy, with the aim of gradually expanding these arrangements across southern Lebanon. Despite diplomatic engagement and US efforts to prevent escalation, Israeli military operations have continued in southern Lebanon, while Hezbollah has maintained its rejection of any arrangement that does not include a comprehensive halt to Israeli operations throughout Lebanon.

● Nine Western nations condemn settlements and warn against E1 construction. The UK, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, and the Netherlands issued a joint statement on May 22nd condemning settlement construction in the E1 area as a “serious breach of international law,” warning that it would further fragment the West Bank by linking Ma’ale Adumim to East Jerusalem and undermining the territorial contiguity of a future Palestinian state. The statement warned businesses against bidding for E1 tenders. With over 760 documented incidents (an average of six per day) and 2,000 Palestinians displaced, 2026 has already surpassed 2025 as the deadliest year for settler attacks.

● Global Sumud Flotilla is intercepted; Ben Gvir’s treatment of activists sparks crisis. Israeli forces intercepted over 60 boats that were part of a Gaza-bound aid flotilla in international waters, detaining some 420 activists. A video showing National Security Minister Ben Gvir taunting detainees drew condemnation from ten foreign ministers, Netanyahu himself, and the United States. Separately, the UN’s Secretary-general’s annual report on conflict-related sexual violence included Israeli armed and security forces in its list of parties credibly suspected of patterns of sexual violence in conflict, citing verified cases primarily involving Palestinian detainees in detention and prison facilities.

● US political support for Israel continues eroding. Declining American public support for Israel is increasingly translating into policy friction. The once-assured annual military aid package is now subject to debate across party lines, while Washington appears reluctant to endorse renewed large-scale operations in Gaza to break the disarmament impasse. Instead, US policymakers are reportedly giving greater consideration to a contingency approach that would allow elements of the transition framework to proceed in areas outside Hamas’s control. The Board of Peace’s $70 billion reconstruction plan nevertheless faces an urgent liquidity crisis, with disbursements far below commitments.

Structural Dynamics

From a stalled 15-point Roadmap to a partition trajectory: Mladenov’s warning that the Board of Peace may “explore alternative modalities” if both sides refuse to engage and agree to the 15-point Roadmap signals a possible pivot toward partial implementation in areas outside Hamas control and beyond the territory held by the IDF west of the so-called Yellow Line. Increasingly referred to as the “Orange Zone,” these areas fall under the control of Israeli-backed militias. While potentially pragmatic, such a contingency would risk formalizing Gaza’s fragmentation rather than resolving it, resulting in a de facto partition between Israeli-controlled buffer zones in the north and east, a Hamas-administered enclave in the center, and an Orange Zone stranded between them.

Escalating military operations since Mladenov’s Security Council briefing: In parallel, the pattern of Israeli military operations since Mladenov’s May 21st briefing suggests an effort to achieve through force what the Roadmap seeks to accomplish through negotiation. Israel has stepped up its attacks in Gaza since the US–Iran ceasefire took effect. This includes the systematic elimination of Hamas’s military command with al-Haddad and Mohammed Odeh’s killings, the degradation of its governance capacity through renewed strikes on police and administrative structures, and renewed attacks on alleged weapons caches. Together, these actions bypass the Roadmap’s phased, Palestinian-led decommissioning process. The strategic risk is considerable: if Hamas concludes that engagement with the Roadmap offers no protection against military dismantlement and targeted killings, it will have little incentive to participate and engage in negotiations to dismantle its military wing.

Accelerating de facto annexation: The West Bank is experiencing a convergence of legal, administrative, and vigilante actions that collectively accelerate annexation. The E1 tender, if construction proceeds, would physically sever the northern and southern West Bank, a move the nine-country joint statement explicitly flagged as a “decisive blow” to the viability of a two-state solution. Settler violence in 2026 has already surpassed the entirety of 2025, and Israel’s February 2026 registration of West Bank lands as “state property” formalizes administrative control in ways that are increasingly difficult to reverse, regardless of any future political agreement.

The Lebanon track’s fragile promise: The Israel–Lebanon peace talks represent the most significant diplomatic opening on any front, but they rest on precarious foundations. The 45-day ceasefire extension buys time, yet Israeli strikes killing 22 people including civilians during the truce period undercut its credibility. Hezbollah’s categorical rejection of the talks mean that any agreement between Israel and the Lebanese government may face significant implementation challenges if contested by the country’s most powerful armed actor. The Pentagon coordination meeting on May 29th is a critical test. If it can produce a credible withdrawal timeline, the talks may survive into a substantive phase. Without it, the Lebanon track risks following the Gaza ceasefire into indefinite stalemate.

Shifting US political constraints and potential openings: May’s events confirmed that the bipartisan consensus on unconditional US support for Israel is fragmenting. Reports on June 1st signal that even the most pro-Israel administration in decades sees Israeli unilateralism as a political liability. The flotilla crisis deepened the rift, with Washington joining the chorus of condemnation against Ben Gvir. Yet structural constraints persist: Congress continues to fund military aid, and the Board of Peace framework gives Israel effective veto power over Gaza’s governance transition. The emerging US posture is one of rhetorical distance without material consequences, a gap that Israeli leaders have proven adept at exploiting. Israel-Palestine Monthly Brief May 2026

Recommendations

Regional and international actors, should:

1. Endorse and operationalize the Implementation Verification Committee envisioned in Mladenov’s 15-point Roadmap, with a Security Council mandate to report publicly on ceasefire violations and implementation progress by both parties, breaking the cycle of unaccountable breaches and building the trust infrastructure that the Roadmap’s reciprocity model requires.

2. Coordinate a unified European and allied diplomatic response to E1 construction, including concrete measures such as investment screening for settlement-linked enterprises and enhanced support for Palestinian communities facing displacement in Area C and the Jordan Valley.

3. Press for Hezbollah’s inclusion, directly or through Lebanese government channels, in the substantive phase of Israel–Lebanon negotiations, recognizing that any durable agreement requires buy-in from the principal armed actor.

4. Demand an immediate halt to targeted killings during the ceasefire period, framing the systematic elimination of Hamas commanders and police as fundamentally incompatible with the Roadmap’s reciprocity principle, and condition further reconstruction disbursements on verified Israeli compliance with ceasefire obligations and NCAG’s access to the territory.

Indicators to Watch

• Pentagon military coordination meeting (May 29th) and fourth round of Israel–Lebanon talks in Washington (June 2nd–3rd): Watch for whether a credible Israeli withdrawal timeline from southern Lebanon emerges and substantive issues beyond ceasefire extension are addressed.
• Dahlan governance track: Watch for whether the Shin Bet–Dahlan channel produces a concrete proposal, how the NCAG and the PA respond to this, and whether Arab states coalesce around a Dahlan-brokered alternative transitional framework for Gaza.
• E1 construction timeline: Watch for whether tenders advance and whether international pressure produces any Israeli policy adjustment.
• NCAG entry into Gaza: Watch for any movement on the committee’s ability to establish a physical presence and begin governance operations and whether the Board of Peace supports partial implementation in non-Hamas “Orange Zone” areas.
• Palestinian legislative elections: Watch for whether the momentum from April 25th local elections and Fatah’s 8th Convention catalyzes broader demands for national-level elections, particularly from independent and reform-oriented constituencies.

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This document was prepared by IPI Consultant Jaser Abu Mousa with editorial support from IPI. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author and do not represent those of IPI.

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Women’s meaningful participation in UN peacekeeping operations has advanced since 2020, but progress remains uneven and fragile. While dedicated training initiatives, peer-support structures, and women’s visibility in leadership roles have expanded, women peacekeepers continue to face structural barriers that limit their operational participation, safety, and career advancement.

This policy paper draws on interviews with eighty-five women military peacekeepers from forty-three troop-contributing countries, along with consultations with UN officials, force commanders, and mission personnel. The paper examines the gap between the UN’s commitments on women’s meaningful participation and the realities women encounter in mission environments. It highlights persistent challenges including role misalignment, harassment, exclusion from operational decision making, inadequate equipment, and weak accountability systems.

The paper argues that leadership is the decisive variable shaping women’s deployment experiences. It calls for linking training nominations to deployment commitments, tracking participation in substantive tasks rather than headcounts, embedding gender-responsive indicators in leadership evaluations, establishing confidential reporting channels outside national chains of command, and auditing equipment standards before deployment.

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Gender-responsive peacekeeping operations are designed and implemented in ways that recognize gendered differences and inequalities and advance gender equality and the rights, protection, and participation of all genders as a core part of mandate delivery. Yet while normative commitments on women, peace, and security (WPS) have expanded considerably over the past two decades, these commitments have been unevenly translated into practice.

This policy paper examines how gender-responsive peacekeeping has been operationalized in the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the African Union missions in Somalia (AMISOM and ATMIS), with a focus on mandates, institutional design, force composition, leadership, and community engagement. It finds that gender responsiveness depends less on formal commitments than on whether missions embed gender analysis into the operational systems that shape planning, protection, and decision making.

The paper highlights how institutional placement of gender advisers, leadership support, deployment of women peacekeepers, and sustained community engagement can strengthen both mission effectiveness and legitimacy. At the same time, it underscores the persistent gap between procedural responsiveness to meet institutional requirements and transformative responsiveness that changes how missions operate and protect civilians in practice.

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IPI and the Stimson Center, in partnership with the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN and the Permanent Mission of Denmark to the UN, co-organized a workshop on “UNMISS in the Context of Changing Security and Regional Dynamics” on May 26th. This event is part of a series of workshops, “Missions and Mandates: Toward Adaptable, Nimble, and Effective Responses,” that aim to support the sustained engagement of UN member states on how to make peace operations mandates more adaptable.

The workshop reflected on the mandate of UNMISS, which is set for renewal on April 30, in the context of heightened political and security tensions in South Sudan, while also assessing how broader regional insecurities are shaping dynamics within the country, including the ramifications of the war in Sudan. The situation in South Sudan requires urgent action: escalating violence across multiple states, political detentions in breach of the peace agreement, and a humanitarian crisis worsened by the war in Sudan. More than 1.3 million people have crossed into South Sudan from Sudan since 2023. Over half the country’s population faces food insecurity.

Under the Chatham House Rule, today’s conversation brought together UN and AU representatives as well as, Member States, and independent experts to address critical questions concerning the practical implications of the renewed mandate and the ways in which regional dynamics shape the prospects for stability in South Sudan.

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IPI, in partnership with the United Nations Department of Peace Operations, McGill University’s Max Bell School of Public Policy, the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA), the Challenges Forum for Peace Operations, and the Permanent Missions of Canada and the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations, co-hosted a closed-door hybrid workshop, “Keeping Protection in Focus: Emerging Research on Protection and Peace Operations,” on May 22nd.

Over more than two and a half decades, there has been significant normative and operational progress in protecting civilians through UN peace operations. There is a wide range of policies, guidance, and good practice to support mandate implementation, as well as a rich body of evidence indicating the effectiveness that peace operations can have in preventing and responding to violence against civilians. At the same time, changes and uncertainty in the global peace and security landscape are challenging the nature of collective security more broadly, with implications for UN peace operations and their ability to protect civilians. Against this backdrop, and amidst an ongoing review on the future of all forms of peace operations, prior assumptions and approaches need to be tested to ensure their continued applicability, and new ways of working need to be considered.

This interactive workshop will present the findings of a series of policy briefs published by IPI, covering a diverse range of issues on how to strengthen protection by UN and UN-supported peace operations. This workshop will feature presentations by some of the authors and an interactive exchange with respondents. Participants for the event will be member state delegates, UN and AU officials, civil society representatives, and other scholars, researchers, and experts. The event will be hybrid and held under the Chatham House rule of non-attribution.

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UN peacekeeping transitions are increasingly unfolding under crisis conditions marked by deteriorating host-state consent, imposed timelines, and escalating insecurity. While the UN has developed more sophisticated transition frameworks over the past two decades, recent mission withdrawals have exposed significant gaps between policy guidance and operational realities.

This issue brief examines “transitions in crisis” through the cases of UNMEE in Ethiopia and Eritrea, UNAMID in Sudan, MINUSMA in Mali, and MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It explores how operational obstruction, weakened political cooperation, inadequate successor arrangements, and abrupt withdrawals create acute risks for civilians, peacekeepers, and peace processes.

The findings highlight that crisis transitions require different analytical and operational approaches than standard mission drawdowns. Stronger contingency planning, earlier political engagement, more integrated protection mechanisms, and clearer responses to host-state obstruction are essential to mitigating the risks associated with abrupt or noncooperative mission withdrawals.

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Strategic communications are critical when a peace operation is preparing to leave a country. Effective communication can help manage expectations, counter misinformation and disinformation, preserve trust, and facilitate handover processes. Failure to communicate effectively can leave civilians feeling abandoned, fuel false narratives, and complicate mission withdrawals and transitions.

This issue brief examines lessons related to strategic communications during recent peacekeeping transitions, including in Mali and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It explores how missions have approached external messaging with local populations and host-state governments, internal communication with mission staff, coordination with national and UN actors, and the transition or closure of UN radio stations.

The findings highlight that communications planning must be integrated into transition processes from the outset and supported at the leadership level. Maintaining communications capacity through and beyond mission drawdowns, strengthening joint messaging with UN and national actors, and developing sustainable approaches to UN radio are essential to effective transitions. At the same time, the brief underscores that even well-executed communications cannot compensate for deteriorating security conditions or political realities on the ground.

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UN peacekeeping missions have played an important role in advancing the women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda, including by supporting women’s participation, strengthening gender-responsive institutions, and expanding protection mechanisms. Yet these gains often become vulnerable during mission transitions and withdrawals.

This issue brief examines how peacekeeping transitions have affected WPS gains in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and Mali. It explores how missions have incorporated gender-responsive analysis, gender benchmarks, technical expertise, and coordination with civil society into transition planning and implementation.

The findings highlight that sustaining WPS gains requires more systematic gender-responsive planning, stronger coordination with local actors, and continued political and financial support after mission withdrawal. Integrating gender expertise and local women-led organizations into transition processes is essential to preserving progress and reducing protection gaps.

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IPI, in partnership with the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations, co-hosted an ambassador-level, off-the-record roundtable continuing the strategic dialogue launched at the May 2025 Berlin Peacekeeping Ministerial, where Germany brought together over 134 countries under the theme “The Future of Peacekeeping” on May 13th.

One year on, the landscape remains uncertain. A liquidity crisis continues to drive reductions in UN personnel and programming. Security Council dynamics have grown more contested. And the collective security environment increasingly involves regional bodies, ad hoc coalitions, and bilateral arrangements. The discussion focused on how the UN can best operate in this environment of fragmentation — identifying its continued comparative advantages and connecting to the Secretary-General’s forthcoming review on the future of all forms of UN peace operations under the Pact for the Future.

The conversation focused on how the UN can best operate in an environment of fragmentation and alongside multiple actors—including regional bodies, ad hoc coalitions, and bilateral security arrangements—and identified the UN’s continued comparative advantage and added value, and ways to preserve and enhance it. The discussion also connects to the forthcoming secretary-general’s review on the future of all forms of UN peace operations, called for in the Pact for the Future.

Welcome and Opening Remarks
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations and Peacebuilding, International Peace Institute
H.E. Ricklef Beutin, Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations

Scene-setting
Elizabeth Spehar, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding and Peace Support, Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations
Daniel Forti, Head of UN Affairs, International Crisis Group

Moderator
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations and Peacebuilding, International Peace Institute

 

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Peacekeeping missions today operate in increasingly complex and volatile environments often characterized by fragile political processes, asymmetric warfare by non-state armed groups, transnational criminal networks, rapid technological changes, and the growing impacts of climate-related vulnerability. These evolving dynamics have heightened the risks faced by both civilians and peacekeepers, reinforcing the central importance of protection of civilians (POC) and the safety and security of personnel.

In this context, IPI convened T/PCCs for the first in a series of informal discussions on the future of peace operations on April 30th. This initial meeting explored T/PCCs’ perspectives on emerging threats to civilians and peacekeepers, as well as the measures, processes, and capabilities required to enable peacekeepers to deliver on their mandates. Drawing on the operational experience of T/PCCs, the discussion generated practical insights into how peacekeepers’ capabilities can be better aligned with evolving conditions on the ground and changing political and financial contexts to ensure their safety and security. It also considered the policy responses required from the UN.

Welcoming Remarks
Jenna Russo, IPI Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations and Peacebuilding
Lieutenant-Colonel Royal Marines Jonas van Hooren, Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN

Opening Remarks
Lieutenant-General Mohan Subramanian, Director of the Office for Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership, DPO

Moderator
Bitania Tadesse, Policy Specialist for Africa, IPI

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IPI, in partnership with the Permanent Missions of Bahrain and Switzerland, and the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), cohosted a fireside chat between IPI President Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein and Gilles Michaud, UN Under-Secretary-General (USG) for Safety and Security on April 22nd.

In the conversation, USG Michaud reflected on his seven-year tenure leading the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) and the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS), comprising over 50 organizations. The discussion shed light on how the UNSMS is addressing current challenges such as increasing threats from state and non-state actors, the UN funding crisis, and the evolving multilateral landscape. It also focused on how the UNSMS is embracing new opportunities, including emerging technologies, to meet its goal of enabling the UN to stay and deliver while mitigating security risks to its approximately 180,000 personnel.

This discussion took place against the backdrop of the recent Security Council briefing on Resolution 2730 (2024) and annual General Assembly deliberations culminating in the adoption of Resolution 80/112 (2025) on the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of UN personnel. USG Michaud shared his lived experience, often behind the scenes, of directing security support to reach people in need or to assist personnel and families affected by traumatic incidents, and his efforts to ensure that the UNSMS remains fit for purpose for years to come.

Welcome and Opening Remarks:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and CEO, International Peace Institute
Oliver Hoehne, Deputy Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations

Featured Speaker:
Gilles Michaud, UN Under-Secretary-General (USG) for Safety and Security

Closing Remarks:
Suma Sameer Abdulkarim Alalaiwat, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Bahrain to the United Nations

The post Fireside Chat between Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein and Gilles Michaud appeared first on International Peace Institute.

For nearly thirty years, beginning with the Razali Initiative in 1997, I’ve been in and out of discussions related to UN Security Council reform. Aside from the work undertaken by the Small Five Group (S-5) and later by the ACT Group on working methods (with which I was fortunate to be involved), much of the discussion at the UN has focused on permanent representation and whether the privilege of exercising the veto should be extended to new permanent members. So much so that it is now almost taken for granted that Security Council reform will only be meaningful if it brings about permanent representation for both the Group of Latin America and the Caribbean and the African Group, with the question of the veto remaining in the balance.

While permanent membership is a matter of utmost significance, just changing the composition of the membership (permanent, elected to two-year terms, or elected to longer terms) would not be enough to deliver a fully functional Security Council. This led me to indulge in some thinking on what else would be needed.

The first thought came to me months ago as I was sharing with my law students some of the techniques a multilateral diplomat chairing a complex legal negotiation would use to arrive at a strong outcome. I pointed out that if a delegation was being obstructive, I would suspend the meeting for a period of time and ask that delegation to come up with a solution that would secure widespread support. No multilateral diplomat worth their salt, or with any sense of professional pride, would refuse me, simply because it would be too embarrassing for them to admit before all their peers that they were lacking the skills to do so. If it was the first time a delegation had ever experienced something like this, they would shuffle out of the conference room looking dumbstruck. They would, however, return at some point, beaming with pride at having found a solution. They would be exhausted, too, and the very next day they would be less enthusiastic about raising an objection.

This reflection coincided with an argument I recalled hearing in private repeatedly from Larry Johnson and Mona Khalil of the UN Office of Legal Affairs when I was a permanent representative (PR). They would tell me time and again that the permanent members of the Council were always quick to seize on their veto privileges expressed in Article 27(3) of the UN Charter but not to honor this article’s twin—the “responsibility” conferred on them in Article 24(1). In other words, they were happy to exercise the privilege of blocking actions without bearing the responsibility of ensuring the maintenance of international peace and security.

Fifteen years ago, I remember casually making remarks in this direction in discussions within the ACT Group. Now, I believe this issue needs to be studied more closely.

The problem with the Council is its chronic state of constipation, with obvious and disastrous effects felt around the world. Changing the composition in any direction won’t affect that underlying state. Instead, we can learn from the techniques used to unlock complex negotiations. Would it not be more sensible to make the exercise of the veto contingent on having a permanent member first provide the Council (in informal consultations) with a credible alternative that could secure nine affirmative votes and no vetoes? This would mean that the PR of a permanent member could only block a draft resolution if they were also willing to do the work of imagining another possible solution—and one that would win widespread support. No work, no veto. The work of the Council might then tip from blocking action to ensuring the maintenance of international peace and security.

The same principle applies to other multilateral bodies. It is high time we dispense with references to a “consensus rule” in multilateral negotiations and call it what it is: a “veto rule.” I have been saying this for many months now. It is hypocritical for member states to weigh in against the use of the veto in the Security Council when they are only too happy to themselves block agreement in the climate negotiations or the negotiations on a pathogen access and benefit sharing system for the Pandemic Treaty. If we are serious about wanting to do something about the veto in the Council, we must address it in all multilateral bodies and stick to the intent behind Article 18 and its provisions on majoritarian voting in the General Assembly.

If Article 27(3) were to be amended, what might it look like? It might require the concurrence of permanent members “provided those members can first assure the Security Council of there being an accepted alternative.”

There would also have to be an additional subparagraph (4): “The Secretary-General will provide the first draft of every resolution (carrying a decision) to the Security Council but will not subsequently negotiate over it; that will be the prerogative of the Council.” More on this point in my next post.

“From pillar to post” is an English expression denoting frenetic activity—an accurate representation of a functioning multilateral system.

The post From Pillar to Post: No Work, No Veto appeared first on International Peace Institute.

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IPI and the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN, in partnership with the UN Department of Peace Operations, cohosted a high-level, closed-door roundtable on “Looking to the Future of Action for Peacekeeping Plus,” on April 16th.

Since it was established in 2021, Action for Peacekeeping Plus (A4P+) has helped mobilize action on critical issues affecting UN peacekeeping operations, including peacekeeper capabilities and mindsets, strategic and operational integration, and cooperation with host countries. To ensure the framework is aligned to the current context, builds on achievements and challenges implementing A4P thus far, and in response to a request from the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34), DPO has developed an updated A4P implementation framework. It establishes a strategic, focused, and streamlined set of priorities to improve the impact, effectiveness, and cost-effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. This renewed framework will continue to mobilize action across critical priorities in UN peacekeeping operations, taking into account changing political, security, and resource imperatives. This includes recent reform efforts to ensure the UN remains “effective, cost-efficient and responsive,” as part of the UN80 initiative.

Member states participating in this ambassadorial roundtable heard from Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Jean-Pierre Lacroix, on the new A4P implementation strategy. Following a briefing by the USG, member states engaged in an interactive dialogue on the future of A4P and A4P+.

The post Looking to the Future of Action for Peacekeeping Plus: A discussion with Under-Secretary-General Jean-Pierre Lacroix appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Implementing the women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda and mainstreaming gender have the potential to make UN peacekeeping operations more operationally effective, including by improving situational awareness and strengthening mission planning. Within this effort, military gender advisers (MGAs) play a central role in integrating a gender perspective across the military components of UN missions.

This policy paper examines the role of MGAs in UN peacekeeping operations, drawing on interviews and survey data from gender advisers and focal points across missions.

It discusses how MGAs are situated within the UN Peacekeeping Gender Architecture, variations in recruitment and training of MGAs, and the wide range of roles and responsibilities of MGAs. Furthermore, the paper identifies persistent challenges, including unclear job descriptions, short deployment cycles, limited training, and difficulties in coordination with civilian counterparts. The paper finds that the effectiveness of MGAs is shaped by factors such as leadership support, professional background, gender and cultural dynamics, and resource constraints. It underscores that as peacekeeping operations face financial pressures and structural reforms, ensuring that gender advisers are adequately trained, resourced, and integrated into mission planning will be critical to maintaining operational effectiveness.

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The post The Role of Military Gender Advisers in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Implications for Operational Effectiveness and The Future of Peacekeeping Operations appeared first on International Peace Institute.

The African Union’s admission to the G20 as a permanent member in 2023 marked a major milestone in global economic governance, giving the continent its first collective seat at one of the most influential decision-making forums on debt, trade, climate finance, and development. While this corrected a long-standing imbalance in representation, key questions remain about whether this institutional presence will translate into substantive influence.

This issue brief examines how the AU organizes its participation in the G20 and assesses the progress made under South Africa’s 2025 presidency, particularly on debt sustainability. It highlights initiatives such as the ministerial declaration on debt and the Africa Expert Panel proposals for reforms to the global debt architecture, while underscoring the continued limitations of existing G20 mechanisms, and the structural challenges posed by high borrowing costs..

The brief finds that while Africa has generated momentum within the G20, sustaining progress will require stronger coordination within the AU, the operationalization of key institutional mechanisms, and a more focused and strategic approach to advancing continental priorities in a shifting geopolitical landscape.

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The post Africa in the G20 and Debt Sustainability appeared first on International Peace Institute.