Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Es ist einer der größten Sicherheits-Skandale in der jüngeren US-Geschichte: Spitzen der US-Regierung haben Details eines geplanten Angriffs auf die Huthi-Terroristen über die Messenger-App „Signal“ diskutiert und - wohl aus Versehen - einen Journalisten mitlesen lassen.

The arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu has sent a chilling signal about the state of democracy in the country. The authors of this article have repeatedly argued that the political attacks against İmamoğlu risk pushing Turkey’s authoritarianism beyond a critical limit. As President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan bets that Turkey’s strategic value will shield him from serious consequences, Europe must now answer a crucial question: Should it forge a security partnership with a government that has completely abandoned democratic principles? 

İmamoğlu’s arrest on corruption charges is not an isolated incident – it is just the latest in Erdoğan’s sustained campaign to marginalise political rivals and erode democratic institutions over more than a decade of autocratisation. With the detention of his most prominent rival, President Erdoğan has effectively crossed a new threshold, one that leaves little room for political competition – the last vestige of democratic practice in Turkey. The arrest undermines the possibility for free elections, which have not been fair since 2015, and irreparably biases the existing political playing field. 

Although the motivations behind this move are primarily domestic – namely a deepening economic crisis and growing public discontent – Erdoğan appears determined to neutralise any threats to his rule ahead of upcoming elections, scheduled for 2028. International developments have facilitated this authoritarian manoeuvre. The global resurgence of authoritarian politics – and particularly the return of Donald Trump to the White House – has emboldened strongmen worldwide. Erdoğan seems to have calculated that the US administration would once again turn a blind eye to democratic backsliding abroad, as indicated in the recent statement by the US State Department spokesperson, who dismissed the question concerning İmamoğlu’s arrest as an internal judicial affair.

The same logic applies to Europe. Erdoğan currently feels emboldened in his dealings with European governments, particularly due to shifting dynamics in transatlantic security. With the erosion of trust in the US security umbrella – especially in the context of a Trump administration – Europe has recognised the urgent need to invest in its own collective defence. 

Europe’s security calculus

In this new geopolitical context, Turkey is emerging as a key player in Europe’s future security arrangements. This is evident in the recent tempering of diplomatic discourse between Ankara and European capitals. Erdoğan is opportunistically using Turkey’s potential role in a future European security architecture as a shield against criticism of his domestic power grabs.

But the question confronting Europe is no longer just moral – it is strategic: Can a long-term security partnership be sustained with a regime that rejects democratic norms, lacks institutional checks, and concentrates power in a single individual? The answer must be no.

Vladimir Putin’s Russia is the best case in point: After years of hoping that economic partnership and interdependence would lay the groundwork for political stability, it has turned against the Europeans with its war against Ukraine. Why should Europe expect a different outcome with Erdoğan’s Turkey? Likewise, if Trump’s return to power has shown that unpredictability and disregard for democratic norms are unacceptable foundations for transatlantic security, then the same logic must apply to Turkey. Strategic security partnerships require trust and predictability – qualities that Ankara has repeatedly failed to offer.

Europe should certainly seek pragmatic co-operation with Turkey, especially in an increasingly unstable global security environment, but it must also draw clear boundaries. A democratic Turkey can be trusted to be a reliable security partner for Europe, but a non-democratic one cannot.

Instead of issuing yet another vague statement of “concern”, the EU must deliver a clear and principled message to both the Turkish government and its public: Europe wishes to deepen its relations with Turkey, but such a partnership is only possible with a Turkey that maintains at least a minimum level of democratic governance and rule of law. A strategic alliance with a regime that has abandoned all democratic norms is not sustainable – neither politically nor morally. 

This clarity is crucial – not only for Europe’s long-term credibility, but also to signal to Turkish society that authoritarian consolidation will not be rewarded with international legitimacy.

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In the Horn of Africa, two peace processes are in acute danger: Local power struggles in South Sudan and Ethiopia’s Tigray region are at risk of escalating into regional crises. In South Sudan – as in 2013 at the beginning of the last civil war – a power struggle is raging over the possible successor to 73-year-old President Salva Kiir. He is already positioning his son-in-law as a potential replacement. At the same time, clashes between the White Army – a Nuer militia – and the South Sudanese army in the Upper Nile region are causing a stir after a United Nations helicopter was shot down and a high-ranking army general was killed.

During the civil war from 2013 to 2018, the White Army fought on the side of the main rebel group, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement-in Opposition (SPLA/M-IO) under today’s First Vice President Riek Machar. Tensions between Kiir and Machar are intensifying once again – a dangerous déjà vu for the country, which has barely had time to recover after decades of conflict.

Ethiopia: Split within the TPLF and growing tensions with Eritrea

In Ethiopia, a local power struggle in the Tigray region threatens to escalate into a regional crisis between the federal government in Addis Ababa and Eritrea. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) – once Ethiopia’s ruling party and the Ethiopian government’s opponent in the war between 2020 and 2022 – is divided: A faction led by chairman Debretsion Gebremichael is opposed by a reformist faction under the president of the Tigray Interim Regional Administration, Getachew Reda. 

The Debretsion faction has large parts of the Tigrayan military on its side and has been taking over local administrative structures for months, sometimes violently. In the meantime, it has also brought media and parts of the administration in the provincial capital, Mekelle, under its control. The TPLF’s Debretsion faction is said to have good relations with Eritrea, whereas Getachew is counting on Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Bilateral relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea have cooled markedly since the Pretoria Agreement, which ended the war between the TPLF and the government in 2022. Both countries are accused of supporting opponents of the other’s regime.

Due to the increasing tensions, there is a risk that there will be a regionalisation of the conflict landscape. Uganda has already sent troops to support the South Sudanese government, as it did in 2013. Similar to previous clashes, Sudanese actors are also intervening. Over the weekend, militias of the Rapid Support Forces in South Sudan were already fighting against units of the SPLA/M-IO, which were apparently on their way to receive weapons from the Sudanese Armed Forces.

Failure of the peace agreements – fragmented international engagement

The current escalations are no coincidence. The respective agreements to end the civil wars in South Sudan and Ethiopia have only been implemented to a limited degree. Unilateral deviations by both governments from their obligations have de facto prevailed. Kiir rapidly replaced cabinet members and had high-ranking generals of the SPLA/M-IO arrested. In Ethiopia, important measures of the Pretoria Agreement, such as the demobilisation of militias and the withdrawal of Eritrean and Amharic troops from Tigray, have largely failed to materialise. 

International engagement with the region is increasingly fragmented – as are the states of the region themselves. In Ethiopia, for example, there is a lack of credible guarantors for the peace process. At the recent extraordinary summit of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on South Sudan, only two countries took part at the level of their president. Whereas the United States used to be the most important international partner for peace in the region, countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are now influential, but they tend to support certain sides rather than mediate in internal conflicts.

In view of the deteriorating situation, it is now time for high-level preventive diplomacy. A coordinated international approach could contain the escalation. An informal division of tasks would be conceivable: Influential countries such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia could defuse tensions at the intergovernmental level, while European actors could support IGAD and the African Union in local mediation processes.

Zusammenfassung:

21. März 2025 – Das Ende der Ampelkoalition hat auch dafür gesorgt, dass das eigentlich geplante Forschungsdatengesetz vorerst auf Eis liegt. Es ist von zentraler Bedeutung, um den Zugang zu Forschungsdaten zu verbessern, wissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse zu fördern und eine evidenzbasierte Politikgestaltung zu ermöglichen. Internationale Erfahrungen zeigen, dass eine bessere Datenverfügbarkeit die Zahl hochwertiger wissenschaftlicher Publikationen sowie deren Nutzung in politischen Entscheidungsprozessen erhöht. Zudem trägt sie zu einer effizienteren Verwendung öffentlicher Mittel bei – ein zentraler Aspekt angesichts der bevorstehenden schuldenfinanzierten Ausgaben in Billionenhöhe. Der vorliegende Entwurf des Forschungsdatengesetzes adressiert wesentliche Probleme: So würde es unter anderem eine Datentreuhandstelle schaffen, die rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen für die Bereitstellung und Verknüpfung unterschiedlichster Daten verbessern und moderne Zugangsverfahren ermöglichen. Ein modernes Forschungsdatengesetz ist essenziell, um politisches Lernen zu fördern, die Wirksamkeit öffentlicher Maßnahmen zu bewerten und innovative Lösungen für gesellschaftliche Herausforderungen zu entwickeln. Die nächste Bundesregierung sollte das Gesetzgebungsverfahren priorisieren und auf den bereits geleisteten Vorarbeiten aufbauen, um unnötige Verzögerungen zu vermeiden.