Különösen nagy értékre elkövetett pénzhamisítás bűntette miatt vádat emeltek két férfi ellen, aki hamis amerikai dollárt és ukrán hrivnyát nyomtatott csaknem 160 millió forint értékben Miskolcon — tájékoztatta a Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén Megyei Főügyészség szóvivője az MTI-t.
Martossy György közölte: egy hatvanéves férfi ismeretlenektől kapott megbízást tavaly év elején arra, hogy hamis húszdolláros bankjegyeket állítson elő ukrajnai forgalmazásra. A vádlott ezután megállapodott 54 éves ismerősével, hogy a munkahelyén, egy miskolci nyomdában gyártják majd le a hamis pénzt. Az idősebb férfi beszerezte a bankjegyfestéket, a speciális UV-jelzőfestéket és a húszdolláros bankjegy képfájljait.
Rávették a nyomda üzemeltetőjét – aki nem tudott a vádlottak terveiről – egy drága digitális nyomdagép vásárlására azzal, hogy nagyobb megbízást ígértek neki. A pénz előállításához szükséges grafikai és digitális háttéranyagot a fiatalabb vádlott készítette el. A próbanyomatokat bemutatták a megrendelőknek, és tavaly januártól júliusig folyamatosan nyomtatták a hamis pénzt.
A szóvivő emlékeztetett arra, hogy a rendőrök tavaly júliusban rajtaütöttek a pénzhamisítókon, lefoglalták a festékeket, a nyomólemezeket, a papírokat és a kész hamis bankjegyeket, a két vádlottat pedig őrizetbe vették.
Kitért arra is, hogy fél év alatt mintegy 123 millió forint értékű hamis dollárt és 36 millió forint értékben hamis ukrán kétszáz hrivnyást készítettek. A közepes minőségű hamis bankjegyekből pontosan meg nem állapítható mennyiség forgalomba is került, nyíregyházi pénzváltókban felbukkant.
This report is for media and the general public.
The SMM recorded a lower number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous day. It conducted further crater analysis related to the shelling in Olenivka. The Mission observed presence of weapons in violation of the respective withdrawal lines. It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works. The SMM observed long queues at checkpoints near the contact line. It observed a protest in Odessa.
The SMM recorded a lower number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the previous day.[1] In the evening hours of 28 April, whilst in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions 7-10km north-west of its position. Positioned at Donetsk central railway station (“DPR”-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard 52 undetermined explosions, and 32 explosions assessed as caused by automatic-grenade-launcher fire, 29 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire and 123 single shots of small-arms fire at locations ranging from 1-7km and from west to north of its position.
In the evening hours of 28 April, whilst in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard at least 15 explosions (five outgoing and ten incoming) assessed as caused by 73mm cannon (BMP-1), recoilless-gun (SPG-9) and rocket-propelled grenade-launcher (RPG-7) fire, 41 explosions (20 outgoing and 21 incoming) of automatic-grenade-launcher fire, and at least 38 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire and intermittent shots of small-arms fire 2-6km south-south-east of its position.
In Luhansk region, the SMM observed a low number of ceasefire violations. In the evening hours of 28 April, whilst in “LPR”-controlled Stakhanov (50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 50-60 single shots of small-arms fire, 1.5-2km west of its position. On 29 April, whilst near Vrubiskyi (“LPR”-controlled, 22km south-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard and saw around 32 explosions, assessed as mortar rounds outgoing at a location 3km south west of its position, and subsequently heard and saw 32 explosions assessed as rounds impacting at a training area in “LPR”-controlled Myrne, (31km south-west of Luhansk), outside the security zone.
The SMM conducted further crater analysis following the fatal shelling incident in “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk) on 27 April (see SMM Spot Report 28 April 2016). The SMM further analysed five craters in proximity to the clinic. The SMM determined the origin of the shelling (south-west and west-south-west) for the five craters, four of which were assessed as caused by 122mm artillery and the fifth by 152mm artillery. The closest crater to the clinic was 50m east of its entrance. The SMM observed some damage to the eastern walls of the clinic building caused by shrapnel, and minor damages to its roof caused by a blast wave. The SMM observed a storage building 100m south of the clinic which had been completely destroyed by a direct impact. Apart from a security guard, the clinic was empty at the time of the shelling, according to the deputy chief doctor. Whilst in Olenivka, the SMM observed at least two small arms firing positions, less than 500m from the clinic and less than 400m from where four civilians were killed by the shelling on 27 April. Also less than 500m from the clinic and 200m from the place of the incident, the SMM observed several residential houses, blocked by ammunition boxes (marked 120mm mortar) and other materials, such as sandbags, assessed as quarters of armed “DPR” members. The SMM observed four heavily armed “DPR” members guarding one of the buildings.
The SMM followed up on alleged shelling on 26 April near the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk). In the vicinity of the “LPR”-controlled checkpoint at the bridge, the SMM observed that a tree on the south-western side of the bridge had been hit. The impact was fresh and SMM assessed that it had been caused by fire from a north-westerly direction. The SMM observed impacts and remnants, as well as a mortar tail section stuck in the north-facing side of a hill nearby.
In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of Measures, the SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage sites whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines and observed that three anti-tank guns (D-44, 85mm) were missing, as they have been since 29 December 2015.
In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed seven tanks (T-72) in “LPR”-controlled Luhansk city.
Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside storage sites, the SMM observed 12 tanks at a training ground in “LPR”-controlled Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk).
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures. The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification.
In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed: seven MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), and ten towed howitzers (five 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm, and five D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) in “LPR”-controlled Luhansk city.
The SMM revisited locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the 16 October 2015 notification.
In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations and observed ten MLRS (BM-27 Uragan), 12 anti-tank guns (2A29/MT Rapira, 100mm) and four Addendum-regulated mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm).
Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside storage sites, the SMM observed: a stationary anti-aircraft system (SA-8) near government-controlled Novovasylivka (59km north-west of Donetsk); five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and five towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) in “LPR”-controlled Uspenka.
The SMM continued to observe the marking of mined areas and presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). The SMM observed six billboards providing information on mines (three on each side of the road), within approximately 2km, between two government-controlled checkpoints near government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM observed an improvised 20 by 40cm mine hazard sign written in black letters on a wooden stick 1km north-west of government-controlled Nadezhdynka (63km north-west of Donetsk).
The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. Positioned both in “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk) and in government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk) between 09:10 and 12:55, the SMM observed the adherence to the ceasefire and the repair works of three bank filtration wells, whereby the pipelines, transformer and valves of the wells were replaced.
The SMM continued to monitor long queues at entry-exit checkpoints near the contact line. At a checkpoint in government-controlled Marinka the SMM observed several angry civilians who said that they had been waiting in queue all day. Some of them started to hit and kick the SMM vehicles, causing light scratches to one vehicle. At a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Oktiabr (29km north-east of Mariupol), a group of 16 civilians (aged 35-40, males and females) said they had been waiting for six hours. They feared that the slow crossing procedures would prevent them from returning to their homes or join their families in time for the forthcoming holidays.
The SMM monitored border areas in government- and non-government-controlled areas. At the government-controlled Milove (107km north of Luhansk) border crossing point, the SMM observed a queue of around 50 civilian vehicles waiting to cross into the Russian Federation, as well as around 15-20 pedestrians. At the border crossing point in Marynivka (“DPR-controlled, 78km east of Donetsk) the SMM observed 33 civilian vehicles, five commercial trucks (one loaded with coal) and two passenger buses waiting to cross into the Russian Federation (mostly with Ukrainian license plates except for three cars with Russian licence plates). At the border crossing point in Uspenka (“DPR-controlled, 73km south-east of Donetsk) the SMM observed 42 cars waiting to cross into the Russian Federation (all with Ukrainian license plates except for four with Russian licence plates). During one hour, the SMM also observed some 15 pedestrians crossing from the Russian Federation into Ukraine.
The SMM met with the head of the state penitentiary service department for Donetsk region who confirmed that 20 prisoners (18 males and two females) were transferred from facilities in non-government controlled areas to Mariupol on 20 April, where they will serve the remainder of their sentences. He stated that a total of 112 prisoners, all convicted by Ukrainian courts prior to or during the initial stages of the conflict, had been transferred from areas not under government control, following requests made by their relatives to the Ukrainian Ombudsman.
In Odessa, the SMM monitored the 17th consecutive day of a protest aimed at demanding the resignation of the mayor. The SMM observed 10 people (aged 30-70, three females) at the campsite in front of the city hall. Three protestors at the camp informed the SMM about an airsoft grenade thrown 65m away from the campsite in the early morning hours. The SMM visited the site, but saw no traces of an explosion. A spokesperson of the police regional headquarters informed the SMM that at 02:00 the police found an unexploded airsoft grenade near the city hall. The spokesperson added that no investigation was opened in connection with the incident.
The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi, Dnepropetrovsk and Kyiv.
*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.
Besides to the abovementioned general restrictions, the SMM was not subject to any specific restriction to its freedom of movement.
[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.
Related StoriesJournalists in Zambia protest against attacks on the media. Credit: Kelvin Kachingwe/IPS
By Zubair Sayed
JOHANNESBURG, Apr 30 2016 (IPS)
Imagine a world without the media, where we have no verified information about what’s going on around us. Where everything is hearsay and gossip, where there are no trusted sources of information. It would be hard to operate in a world like that: to make decisions about what to do about the things that affect our lives.
Think for a minute too about what it would mean for those in power; they would be able to act as if we, the people, did not exist. It would be impossible to hold them to account, to know that they’re keeping the election promises they made in their wordy manifestos, and it would be impossible for our voices to be heard. Similarly, it would be difficult to know how companies are behaving, how they are treating their workers and the environment, and whether they are colluding to extract ever more from our pockets.
The role of the media in providing credible information, of giving voice to the people and holding those in power to account is fundamental to the realisation of our freedom and human rights. Whilst there are differences of opinion about whether the media are part of civil society, what is undisputed is the key role that they play in social and economic development, democracy, human rights and the pursuit of justice. Organisations and activists that work on social issues and help articulate public opinion need the media to disseminate the voices they represent. Without a plurality of voices, ideas are diminished, debate is stifled and tolerance is weakened.
Yet, or perhaps because of their role in giving voice and speaking truth to power, the media are increasingly under attack from both governments and corporate interests.
In its recently released World Press Freedom Index, Reporters Without Borders say that there has been a “deep and disturbing decline in respect for media freedom at both the global and regional levels” and that there is a “climate of fear and tension combined with increasing control over newsrooms by governments and private-sector interests.”
This assault on journalistic freedom takes many forms, including regular harassment of journalists, censorship, confiscation of equipment, closure of media outlets, arrests and in some cases direct and dire attack. Research by the Committee to Protect Journalists is quite chilling: 72 journalists were murdered in 2015 and a further 199 imprisoned.
In Africa, the situation for media varies in different countries across the continent. Alongside Eritrea and Ethiopia as two of the most censored countries in the world – in first and fourth place respectively – there are countries like Namibia, Ghana, Cape Verde and South Africa that score highly when it comes to freedom of information (even though those countries too experience challenges to media freedom). However, in far too many African countries the media come under regular attack and freedom of information remains a distant right.
There is perhaps no clearer indication of both the importance of the media and the assault it faces than when governments crackdown on journalists and media houses in the run up to and during elections. In January this year, Ugandan officials shutdown an independent radio station after it broadcast an interview with a leading opposition candidate. A few months earlier, police shot and injured radio journalist Ivan Vincent as he covered squabbles between supporters of the leading opposition candidate and the police. Between October 2015 and January 2016, the Human Rights Network for Journalists–Uganda documented about “40 election-related incidents in which journalists have been shot at, assaulted, their gadgets damaged, detained and released without charge and blocked from accessing news scenes.”
The situation for media in Burundi following the violence and repression that started ahead of last year’s election has not improved, and some say that the country has seen the near complete destruction of independent media with journalists and civil society being targeted. Facing shutdowns and direct attacks, many journalists have fled the country out of fear for their lives.
Similarly, during the last year in Djibouti and the Republic of Congo, the desire of leaders to hold onto power and to silence voices opposing them, contributed to election-related violence and media repression.
Of course, the media don’t only face attack during elections. In Angola, the government has kept a decades-long close watch on the media, frequently arresting and harassing those it disagrees with. Currently, journalist Domingos da Cruz is one of 17 activists in prison for his participation in a private gathering to discuss non-violent strategies for civil disobedience.
An Ethiopian human rights advocate that spoke with CIVICUS recently reiterated that “Ethiopia has for a long time severely restricted press freedom and the work of civil society. It is one of the top countries when it comes to jailing journalists, many of whom it charges under the 2009 anti-terrorism law.”
This attack on the media is itself part of a broader attack on the fundamental freedoms of expression, association and assembly that CIVICUS has been documenting during the last few years (in 2015 there were serious violations of these freedoms in more than 100 countries). Attacks on the media often go hand in hand with those on activists and organisations that challenge or question the powers that be. In many countries, this crackdown happens with impunity and attacks often go unpunished.
While governments are the main culprits when it comes curtailing media freedom, the private sector also often seeks to control or manipulate media outputs in ways that favour them and their narrow interests: putting profit before people. This takes place in multiple ways, from the concentration of media ownership and the power that allows corporates to yield, to bribing journalists and influencing editorial content in exchange for paid advertising.
Often caught between state repression and corporate influence, media in many African countries face huge challenges. While there is no one-size-fits-all solution to these challenges a key part of the solution must be to support independent media, including citizen-journalism; for regional governance institutions to hold African countries accountable and for African countries to hold each other accountable; and for education and awareness about rights related to freedom of information and expression.
With regard to the latter, recent research shows that there is widespread support for media freedom and freedom of expression in Africa but that support for these rights is not universal. In some contexts, journalistic ethics need to be strengthened; media outlets need to invest more in their journalists and support for independent media amongst civil society and the general public needs to be amplified. We need to look towards innovation too, to think of ways to use inexpensive technology to produce people-powered information and data.
Media that is accurate, credible, ethical and impartial is crucial to development, freedom, human rights and justice in Africa – as it is elsewhere. A study on freedom of expression across 34 African countries in 2013 showed the link between this most basic right and a range of factors, stating that “freedom of expression is also consistently linked to better ratings of government performance, especially with respect to government effectiveness in fighting corruption, but also in other sectors such as maintaining roads and managing the economy.”
Given the challenges we face on the continent, the current media crackdown is untenable and dangerous, and does nothing to facilitate the progress so many are working hard to achieve. As citizens of Africa, we need to increase our efforts to protect those that give us voice and help us realise the full scope of our rights.
Zubair Sayed is the Head of Communication and Campaigns at CIVICUS, a global alliance of civil society organisations.
Follow him on Twitter @zubairsay
Samedi 30 avril de 12h à 15h nous fêtons Pâques selon la tradition roumaine sous le soleil parisien !
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Le Ministre des transports et des infrastructures Hervé Hèhomey a effectué dans la matinée de ce vendredi, une descente à l'aéroport cardinal Bernadin Gantin de Cotonou, pour l'inspection en compagnie des les experts de l'Agence Nationale de Navigation Civile (ANAC), l'avion présidentiel. Ce fut l‘occasion pour le Ministre de constater les travaux en cours sur la piste d'atterrissage et les conditions d'accueil des usagers dans l'aérogare de cet aéroport.
Par : Willy N. OLA
Le ministre a débuté sa tournée marathon par une séance de travail avec le personnel de l'ANAC. Après cette séance, Hervé Hèhomey et sa délégation se sont rendu avec des experts de l'ANAC sur le tarmac de l'aéroport pour faire une inspection physique du Boeing 727 livré au Bénin, le 5 avril dernier. Selon les explications du Commandant Hervé Alotchénou, chef division Air du cabinet militaire, cet aéronef, livré par une société de Dubaï basée en Afrique du sud, est équipé d'un puissant moteur silencieux et doté d'un dispositif Wendell. A l'en croire, « l'appareil est le fruit d'un troc de l'ancien avion présidentiel (Boeing 727-200) déclaré inapte et la transaction devrait coûter à l'Etat béninois 3.500 millions de dollars », a-t-il précisé. Mais selon Béhanzin Prudencio, Directeur du contrôle et de la sécurité de l'ANAC, les inspecteurs de l'aviation civile n'ont pu avoir accès au certificat de navigabilité de l'appareil, à la plaque d'identification, ni au numéro de série de cet aéronef. Cette inspection de navigabilité de l'aéronef demandée par le gouvernement, précise Béhanzin Prudencio, n'a pu aboutir pour défaut des documents qui devraient renseigner sur l'état technique du nouveau Boeing présidentiel.
Face à cette situation, le ministre en charge des Transports entend passer au peigne fin les éléments contractuels et rendre compte au gouvernement afin que les mesures qui s'imposent soient prises. Il n'exclut pas l'éventualité d'un audit pour vérifier la santé technique de l'appareil.
Au niveau de la piste d'atterrissage, Hervé Hèhomey a constaté un piétinement des travaux de terrassement et revêtement d'une partie de la piste atterrissage. Ici, à moins de trois mois de la fin du délai contractuel, les travaux sont exécutés à 15 %. "Nous allons organiser une séance de travail avec les acteurs pour voir les dispositions de la prestation et prendre les mesures coercitives qui s'imposent", a indiqué Hervé Hèhomey.
Cet article 32 milliards pour la rénovation de l’aéroport de Niamtougou sans intérêt économique pendant que les hôpitaux manquent de tout est apparu en premier sur Togoactualite.