Débordée par l’afflux de réfugiés et de migrants, incapable de jouer collectivement, tétanisée par des opinions publiques travaillées par des pulsions xénophobes soigneusement entretenues par des partis populistes, l’Union européenne, pour assurer sa survie, a jeté par-dessus bord, lors de son sommet du 7 mars, le droit d’asile, pourtant l’une de ses valeurs fondamentales qui ont justifié sa création au lendemain du second conflit mondial. Toute honte bue, les vingt-huit chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement ont décidé de sous-traiter à la Turquie, en en payant le prix fort, la crise des réfugiés. Si le plan présenté par Angela Merkel, la chancelière allemande, et Mark Rutte, le Premier ministre néerlandais, est finalement accepté en l’état la semaine prochaine, l’UE va procéder à l’expulsion collective de tous les migrants arrivant dans les îles grecques, qu’ils aient vocation ou non à demander l’asile, et ce dans des proportions jamais vues en Europe depuis le nazisme et le communisme.
Même si elle promet d’en reprendre ensuite un certain nombre, le symbole est terrible pour une Europe qui se veut un modèle pour le reste du monde, une Europe fondée sur le respect des droits de l’homme. Il est vrai que le droit d’asile est d’ores et déjà enterré, chaque Etat tentant de se décharger du fardeau sur ses voisins. Ce sont les pays de l’Est qui ont donné l’exemple en construisant dès l’automne des murs à leurs frontières et en proclamant que les musulmans sont irréductibles à la civilisation européenne, une opinion partagée par de larges secteurs des opinions publiques des pays d’Europe de l’Ouest. Depuis, menace terroriste aidant, toutes les frontières se sont fermées. Dès lors, dans le chaos actuel, l’urgence est de calmer le jeu, d’où la volonté de la chancelière allemande, qui s’est pourtant faite le chantre de l’ouverture des frontières, de ralentir, voire de stopper le flux des migrants et des réfugiés. Mais si l’opération réussit, ce qui n’est pas sûr, il sera extrêmement difficile de revenir en arrière. Mal préparé, mal pensé, son plan, conçu comme temporaire, le temps que les opinions publiques se calment, risque de devenir définitif.
Après tout, comme le dit la vox populi, les réfugiés n’ont-ils pas vocation à s’installer dans le premier pays sûr qu’il rencontre dans leur fuite ? En clair, que la Turquie, la Jordanie ou le Liban, pays de premier accueil, se débrouillent, quitte à ce qu’on les subventionne. Finalement, l’Europe ne donnera asile qu’à ceux qui arriveront directement de zones de conflit soit par avion, soit par bateau, ce qui concernera peu de monde. Cette crise montre qu’il y a urgence à refonder une Europe qui s’est perdue. L’Union élargie n’est pas, contrairement à ce qu’on a cru lors de l’effondrement du communisme en 1989-1990, une union de valeurs partagées, mais une communauté d’intérêts matériels. Cela, François Mitterrand, très réticent à l’idée d’élargir l’Europe, l’avait parfaitement compris, tout comme Valéry Giscard d’Estaing qui avait proposé de créer deux Europe, une «Europe espace» et une «Europe puissance». L’Union paye aujourd’hui au prix fort la naïveté allemande et risque d’y laisser son âme. Car l’Europe sans valeurs a-t-elle encore un sens ?
N.B.: édito paru dans Libération du 8 mars
Last week The Sun ran a front-page ‘exclusive’ claiming that, ‘the Queen has been hailed as a supporter of Brexit’.
According to the Sun’s version of events, ‘Her majesty let rip’ during a lunch at Windsor Castle with the then deputy prime minister and Lib-Dem leader, Nick Clegg.
It’s reported that the event took place in 2011 during the coalition government between the Conservatives and Lib-Dems.
The Sun’s report asserted:
‘The 89-year-old monarch firmly told passionate pro-European Mr Clegg that she believed the EU was heading in the wrong direction. Her stinging reprimand went on for “quite a while”, leaving other guests around the table stunned.’
And The Sun added,
‘Brexit-backing Tory MPs are already leaping on The Sun’s revelations as a strong sign the Queen is secretly on the side of Leave ahead of the landmark EU referendum on June 23.’
The newspaper also quoted Tory Eurosceptic MP, Jacob Rees Mogg as saying:
‘The reason we all sing God Save The Queen so heartily is because we always believe she is there to protect us from European encroachment.’
Former Lib-Dem leader, Nick Clegg, has complained that he had no recollection of the conversation ever taking place.
Buckingham Palace officials confirmed that the Queen is neutral on matters of politics, and that she disputes The Sun’s version of events.
In modern times the Queen cannot throw the Editor of the Sun, Tony Gallagher, or indeed, The Sun’s owner, Rupert Murdoch, into the Tower of London, although maybe she’d like to.
So instead, The Queen is making a complaint to IPSO, the ‘Independent Press Standards Organisation.’
Although, I would hardly call IPSO independent – it’s owned, and mostly run, by the press: the very people who would want to protect their industry, rather than uphold complaints against it.
The Queen is complaining to IPSO under clause 1 of their ethics code called, The Editors Code of Practice, which deals specifically with inaccurate stories in the newspapers. However, it should be noted that the chairman of the Editors Code of Practice is none other than Paul Dacre, editor of the Daily Mail – who just attended the wedding of Rupert Murdoch, owner of The Sun.
The Sun says it stands by its story that the Queen supports Britain’s withdrawal from the EU, and that it has impeccable sources and will “defend this complaint vigorously”.
I don’t have confidence that the press watchdog – mostly run by the press – will adequately investigate or adjudicate on the Queen’s complaint. Let’s see.. I would hope to be surprised and proved wrong, as for sure, we do need a proper press regulator. (See my video below: why I won’t use IPSO)
In the meantime, although we don’t know for sure what the Queen said in private, we do know what she said in public. Last June, speaking in Germany, the Queen talked about Britain’s relationship with the rest of Europe.
(That’s four years after her disputed comments in private that the EU was ‘heading in the wrong direction’).
Speaking with her Greek husband by her side, the Queen at least hinted that she supports the UK’s continued membership of the European Union. The Queen spoke in front of an audience of 700 dignitaries in Berlin, including British Prime Minister, David Cameron, and German Chancellor, Angela Merkel.
She said:
“The United Kingdom has always been closely involved in its continent. Even when our main focus was elsewhere in the world, our people played a key part in Europe.”
And addressing German President, Joachim Gauck, the Queen continued:
“In our lives, Mr President, we have seen the worst but also the best of our continent. We have witnessed how quickly things can change for the better. But we know that we must work hard to maintain the benefits of the post-war world.
“We know that division in Europe is dangerous and that we must guard against it in the West as well as in the East of our continent. That remains a common endeavour.”
Observed The Guardian at the time:
‘As she spoke, Angela Merkel, the German chancellor who sat at the Queen’s table in Berlin’s Schloss Bellevue along with her husband Joachim Sauer, nodded vigorously, a gesture that did not go unnoticed among observers.’
The Queen spoke of the advantages of Britons emigrating to the rest of Europe in the past, such as the Welsh engineer, John Hughes. He founded the mining town of Donetsk, now in Ukraine, in the Russian empire of the 19th century.
She also mentioned the 17th-century Scottish publican Richard Cant, who moved his family to Pomerania.
“His son moved further east to Memel and his grandson then moved south to Königsberg, where Richard’s great-grandson, Immanuel Kant, was born,” said the Queen.
The German media were very supportive of the Queen’s visit. The Bild mass daily described her as “the secret weapon of British diplomacy” on a visit to “remind everyone of how poor Europe would be without the UK”.
And the Handelsblatt business daily commented:
‘Every gesture, every word of the queen in the coming days has meaning, for Germany, Britain, Europe. It is the politics of the apolitical.’
But possibly it was Britain’s ‘Guardian’ newspaper headline that summed up both the mood and impression following the Queen’s historic speech:
‘The Queen hints at desire for Britain to remain in European Union.’
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• Why I won’t use IPSO
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#Queen complains against @TheSun front page that she supports #Brexit. See my Facebook: https://t.co/vaaucbSEqE pic.twitter.com/qFaJeoTzDA
— Jon Danzig (@Jon_Danzig) March 9, 2016
What the #Queen really said about #Europe (official version) My blog; her #Majesty’s speech: https://t.co/e9KdgJ9p3i pic.twitter.com/gBbBycLtwc
— Jon Danzig (@Jon_Danzig) March 15, 2016
The post What the Queen really said about Europe appeared first on Ideas on Europe.
O-Gon Kwon bíró elnökletével a hágai nemzetközi bíróság március 24-én délután 14.00 órakor hoz ítéletet Radovan Karadzsics perében.
A hágai nemzetközi törvényszék
„A Szerb Köztársaság egykori elnökének perében várható ítélet egészen biztosan egyike lesz a hágai bíróság történetének legjelentősebb ítéletének” – értékelte Serge Brammertz főügyész.
Serge Bammertz
„Sok jelentős per folyt ezen a bíróságon és sok fontos ítélet született, de Karadzsics ítélete a törvényszéken kimondott legfontosabb ítéletek egyike lesz.” - nyilatkozta a főügyész a France Pressnek.
Szerbia és Jugoszlávia Szövetségi Köztársaság volt elnöke, Slobodan Milosevics 2006-ban bekövetkezett halála után – akit a hágai bíróság ugyancsak elítélt - Karadzsics a legmagasabb rangú politikus, akit az 1990-es években Jugoszláviában zajló polgárháború idején elkövetett bűnökért vonnak felelősségre a nemzetközi törvényszéken.
„A Karadzsics elleni ítélet rendkívül jelentős, mert megmutatja a politikai vezetők felelősségét, megmutatja hogy mi vár rájuk, ha szenvedést okoznak saját népüknek.”
Karadzsics a bíróság előtt
Brammertz kijelentette, igaz a mondás, hogy a késedelmes igazságosság tulajdonképpen késői igazságosság, de ebben a speciális esetben soha nincs későn.
„Az ítélet az áldozatoknak is igazságot fog szolgáltatni”- jelentette ki, kifejezve meggyőződését, hogy a számonkérés fontos annak érdekében, hogy esély legyen a megbékélésre.
Elismerte ugyanakkor, hogy a törvényszéknek korlátozottak a lehetőségei és vannak olyan bűnösök, akiknek sikerült „kicsúszniuk” a felelősségre vonás alól.
„Az igazságszolgáltatással remélhetőleg sokan elégedettek. Hogy sikerül-e igazságot szolgáltatni minden áldozatnak? Sajnos nem, mert a különböző esetek között meg kell találjuk a helyes választást” - állítja Brammertz.
Az ügyészség a délszláv háborúval összefüggésben 161 fő ellen emelt vádat, ami több, mint eddig bármely más nemzetközi törvényszék esetében, de lehetetlen volt minden bűnös ellen, minden erőszakos cselekedet esetében vádat emelni.
„Ez a mi legnagyobb csalódásunk”- mondta a főügyész kifejezve meggyőződését, hogy ha nem lenne a nemzetközi törvényszék és a felelősségre vonások nem történtek volna meg, a helyzet mára sokkal rosszabb lenne.
Karadzsicsot 12 év bujkálás és menekülés után 2008 júliusában tartóztatták le Belgrádban, ahol hamis személyazonossággal, doktor Dabics néven élt, és egy héttel később már a bíróság előtt állt. A pere 2009 októberében kezdődött.
Karadzsics a letartóztatásakor
A vádirat ellene népirtás, népirtásban való részvétel, háborús bűnök, gyilkosság, önbíráskodás, deportálás, antihumánus cselekedetek, Szarajevó lakosságának tüzérségi és orvlövészekkel való terrorizálása 1992-1995 között, ENSZ alkalmazottak túszul ejtése és egyéb bűncselekmények elkövetése bosnyákok, horvátok és más civil, nemszerb lakosok ellen Bosznia-Hercegovinában.
Az ügyészség a bizonyítási eljárást 2012. május 25-én fejezte be, miután bemutatott több ezer oldalnyi bizonyítékot és meghallgattak 195 tanút.
Les 12 et 13 mars, Le sceptre d'Ottokar de Hergé, traduit en albanais, au Salon du livre et des culture de Luxembourg.
Tintin parle désormais albanais ! Tintini flet shqip tashmë !
Invité aux rencontres littéraires organisées chaque année à Luxembourg, l'album Skeptri Otocarit d'Hergé rencontrera les lecteurs, petits et grands, au Salon du livre et des cultures, pendant deux jours, sur le stand de littérature et culture albanaises.
Rencontre publique avec les traducteurs de de l'album Skeptri i (...)
Cette plainte pointe du doigt les défaillances et dysfonctionnements qui ont provoqué l’infiltration des terroristes sur le territoire français et la « commission des attentats ». Le recours dénonce « une atteinte aux obligations de sécurité », invoque l’article 2 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme sur le droit à la vie.
Le document d’une quinzaine de pages énumère les nombreuses défaillances, l’inaction des autorités belges d’autant moins compréhensible que neuf des treize interpellations réalisées lors du démantèlement de la cellule de Verviers qui projetait un attentat en Belgique dix mois plutôt en janvier 2015 avaient déjà eu lieu à Molenbeek. Plusieurs d’entre eux un instant inquiétés ont été laissés en liberté, multipliant les allers retours en Syrie sans être repérés, ni inquiétés. Des zones d’ombre subsistent, mais apparaissent comme criantes les lacunes dans le traitement des informations alors que la police fédérale avait bel et bien été mise au courant. Le danger concernant notamment les frères Abdeslam a été minimisé. Des problèmes de carences budgétaires, de manque de personnel qualifié, de vétusté informatique de manque de coordination ont été soulignés.
Le conseil des familles a fait valoir que les autorités belges auraient pu empêcher les attentats parisiens, qu’elles n’ont pas pris les mesures nécessaires pour protéger la vie d’autrui. Elles ont failli à leur obligation de sécurité. Depuis des années elles étaient informées de la radicalisation de ces filières, elles ne pouvaient ignorer leur préparation à l’acte et leur endoctrinement. Il n’y a pas eu d’action concertée entre les services, ni de suivi dans les échanges d’information ; les listes de noms n’ont pas été exploitées. Les hommes politiques sont restés inactifs pour s’assurer un réservoir électoral de voix. L’ancien bourgmestre est resté vingt ans à la tête de la ville : « il a selon moi une responsabilité morale et politique » nous dit l’avocat des plaignants Me Samia Maktouf. Les principaux organisateurs de l’attentat ont pu narguer les autorités belges sans être inquiétés. »La Belgique a porté atteinte à un droit fondamental, qui est le droit à la vie, prévu par l’article 2 de la Convention européenne(…) cette tuerie n’était pas une fatalité et on l’a vue venir sans rien faire » !
Ces propos sont accablants et l’intérêt exceptionnel de cette affaire va bien au-là du feuilleton politico policier qu’elle engendre. Cet intérêt est double : c’est le droit à la vie qui est en jeu, d’autre part la plainte sera déclarée recevable ou non, mais la portée sera considérable dans les deux cas par les attendus que la Cour sera amenée à faire valoir. En entrant dans ce fait divers tragique, la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme reçoit une consécration d’une grande ampleur que d’autres (comme le Royaume-Uni par exemple) voudraient lui contester.
Federica MOGHERINI, EU HR for foreign Affairs and Security Policy, attends a High-Level ministerial meeting on Syria, in Paris.
«On major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus, they agree on little and understand one another even less» wrote Robert Kagan in his essay “Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order”. Kagan argued that the EU and the USA have different philosophical outlooks on the use of power. In his opinion, the consequence would be a lack of a genuine European military force in the international scenario. As a result, the EU has always needed to appeal at NATO in order to implement its own foreign policy and to have a military impact. This article is a brief analysis of the evolution and implementation of the EU cooperation with NATO.
According to Johannes Varwick and Joachim A. Koops, two major experts in European Foreign and Security Policy at the Institute for European Studies, we can identify three phases in the emergence of EU-NATO relations:
of its existence, and the European Union wanted to become an actor with a military force capable or dealing with the crisis in the Balkans region.
1.The reasons of the EU-NATO partnership
In 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall blurred the clear distinction of competences, roles and functions between NATO and the European Community (EC): with the dissolution of the Soviet enemy, NATO lost its raison d’être. At the same time, the Balkans crisis led Europe to think about its military power. In 1992, during the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union (WEU) the «Petersberg tasks» were adopted: more specifically, the member states agreed to deploy their troops and resources of the whole spectrum of the military under the authority of the WEU. The Petersberg tasks covered a great range of possible military missions and interventions. Indeed, they were formulated as humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping and combat forces in crisis management missions, including peace-making. At the 1996 NATO ministerial meeting in Berlin, it was agreed that the WEU would oversee the creation of the European Security and Defence Identity within NATO structures. After the new eastern countries entered into the European Community, the question of European military became more delicate, because the US feared that the Community could potentially become a direct competitor of NATO. For these reason, the development of European military capabilities was restrained within the NATO structures.
In 1997, during the European Summit in Amsterdam, the Petersberg tasks were incorporated in the «Treaty on European Union», the goal being the increase of European military capacity, beyond NATO. Although it did not create a common defence policy, the Treaty codified a number of new structures and tasks for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and increased responsibility in the realms of peacekeeping and humanitarian work. In December 1998, a huge step was made forward in terms of strategic and military development with the signature of the «Saint-Malo Declaration». In this occasion, the Heads of State and Government of France and United Kingdom (respectively Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair) agreed that the European Union needed to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. The Union should have the capacity of an autonomous action, developing military forces and establishing which instruments are more appropriate, case by case, in order to respond to international crises. Accordingly, the Union needed appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic planning. The Saint Malo declaration was the result of the compromise between France’s desire of independence from NATO and the pro-American stand of Great Britain. Indeed, prime minister Tony Blair pushed for avoiding the creation of a European foreign policy capable of damaging the ratio of NATO, preventing negative reactions from the United States. As a result, in 1998, during the NATO Summit, Madeleine Albright (United States Secretary of State), noted that as Europeans looked at the best way to organise their foreign and security policy cooperation, the key was to make sure that any institutional change was consistent with basic principles that had served the partnership between EU and NATO. The objective was to avoid the so-called “Three Ds”:
In 1999, at the Cologne European Council, Member States reaffirmed the Union’s willingness to develop capabilities for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces. In the recognition that the evolution of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was a prerequisite for the Union to play a full role on the international stage, EU Member States agreed in Cologne on the necessity to put in place institutional arrangements for the analysis, planning and conduct of military operations. In 2001, the «Treaty of Nice» formalized the creation of the Political Security Committee (PSC), the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). Nevertheless, in 2002 the EU still lacked the operational capabilities for developing its own crisis management: EU still needed NATO’s instruments
2. The Berlin Plus Agreement.
The big step forward for the European Union was in 2003, when the «Berlin Plus Agreement» was concluded. The Berlin Plus agreement referred to a comprehensive package of arrangements between the EU and the NATO that allowed EU to make use of NATO assets for EU-led crisis management operations. The formal elements of the Berlin Plus agreement included:
After the conclusion of the Agreement, the EU and NATO conducted their first joint operation, named “Concordia in Macedonia”. In December 2004, the EUFOR Althea operation in Bosnia showed the effectiveness of cooperation between the two institutions. At the same time, it shall be recognised that the nature of this partnership has showed ambiguities. On one hand, France (as a state member of the EU) and Turkey (as a member of NATO) had strong strategic contrasts during the planning-phase of the two missions; on the other, EU wanted to further increase its autonomy towards NATO. Indeed, in June 2003, the first autonomously EU-led military operation, Operation Artemis, was launched. Within this context and based on a French-British-German initiative, the EU Military Staff (EUMS) developed the battlegroup concept, which was agreed upon by the EU Military Committee (EUMC) in June 2004. The Battlegroup concept provided EU with a specific tool in the range of rapid response capabilities, making EU more coherent, active and capable. The Battlegroup was based on the principle of multinational force, formed by a framework nation or by a multinational coalition of Member States. In 2004, the «Headline Goal 2010» aimed at completing the development of rapidly deployable Battlegroup, including the identification of appropriate strategic lift, sustainability and disembarkation assets by 2007. In November 2009, the European Council approved guidelines for improving the flexibility and usability of the Battlegroup. Most recently, in December 2012, in its Conclusions on CSDP, the European Council called for strengthening the EU’s ability to deploy the right capabilities rapidly and effectively on the whole spectrum of crisis management action. As a result, during last years, the EU-NATO relationship has evolved. In the field of military capabilities, the EU has become an international actor tanks to NATO: the Berlin Plus Agreement allowed the EU to access to NATO planning capabilities and established the availability of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led civil-military operations. At the end, the EU wanted to become more independent by NATO.
3. What kind of relationship?
The EU-NATO relationship was driven by external and internal factor, which shaped their ambitions and their aim. In this case, we can say that the major structural variables were external factors, such as power shift and exogenous shocks in the international system. Regarding internal factors, we can include the impact of shifts at the national, organizational and individual level. For Joachim A. Koops, the end of the Cold War, the crisis in the Balkans, the intervention in Iraq and the development of EU-UN relationship as concrete examples of external factors. With the end of the Cold War, NATO lost its raison d’être and had to change its mission in order to continue to exist. At the same time, the EU would increase its power. In 2001, in Afghanistan, NATO showed his weakness, mainly due to internal disagreements about the intervention. On several occasions, the United States have called for structural reforms to enhance NATO’s efficiency and legitimation. With the Berlin Plus agreements the EU developed its military capabilities, but it nevertheless gave a new window of opportunity to NATO. This is what we can define effective multilateralism: shaping the preferences and interests of each other. Its impact on the EU’s institutional design (in the field of crisis management) has been fundamental. In 1999, the decision to appoint the former NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana, as the first EU’s High Representative was an instrumental factor for the promotion of Berlin Plus and the formalization of that relationship.
In conclusion, during the first phase in the late 80s, NATO needed to find its raison d’être. The only way to be helpful attain it was cooperating with the European Community. At the same time, the EU needed NATO’s tools and assets to develop its military capabilities. After the end of the Cold War, the two institutions needed each others. Only in the early 2000s, the EU started developing its military strength «taking advantage» of the Berlin Plus agreements. The EU took advantages of NATO, but then preferred to become autonomous from it, in order to collaborate with other regional organisations and with the United Nations. However, recent events in the Mediterranean, related to migration crisis, shows that some EU member states still ask for help NATO, in order to protect their borders. The EU military operation Sophia takes place in the central Mediterranean in order to control migratory flows and combat human traffic. However, during the NATO summit on 9 February 2016, Greece, Germany and Turkey did not hesitate to explicitly ask for its support in the Aegean. At this point we have to ask which kind of relationship the EU and NATO have nowadays. Are they two complementary institutions? Are they antagonistic? Are they competitors? What is NATO today? Does Europe still need of NATO military experience? Does NATO need Europe? From 16 February 2016, NATO is operating in the Aegean Sea after the request of two European countries, and Turkey, which will receive 3 billion euro deferred over three years by the EU. Does this imply that EU operations cannot be efficient? Or, on the contrary, we can say that NATO now acts only under the impetus of the European countries (or Western countries), needing them to fully exercise its role? The strategic and political implications of NATO operation on Aegean will perhaps clarify some questions (in a future article), emphasizing who needs who and if the two institutions (seemingly different and incompatible) are truly politically autonomous or at the mercy of their member states.
Maria Elena Argano
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