SWP

Sudan’s two main security forces are fighting each other. A swift military outcome is not to be expected in view of the relatively balanced power between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This strategic stalemate means that the chances for successful mediation are not hopeless. For this to happen, how­ever, Sudan’s international partners would have to abandon the approach that domi­nated negotiations for decades, namely giving violent actors a leading role in nego­tiations. Civilian actors formed a broad anti-war coalition that should set the tone for peace talks from the very beginning. This could well be in the interest of the parties to the conflict, as they will need a third actor to arbitrate their relationship in the future. The German government should strive for stronger coordination of the inter­national mediation approaches under civilian leadership from Sudan, while the Euro­pean Union (EU) should initiate constrains on the financial leeway of Sudan’s violent actors.

Die G7 tritt im Ukraine-Krieg geschlossen auf. Doch Russland betreibt eine international durchaus erfolgreiche Gegenmobilisierung. Was kann der Westen dagegen tun?

In a “non-paper” published at the beginning of May, 19 EU member states – including Germany, France, Hungary and Poland – outline ways to combat the growing problem of supply shortages of medicines. The situation is particularly dramatic for generic drugs, i.e., medicines without patent protection. Antibiotics, oncological preparations as well as medicines containing paracetamol and ibuprofen, such as syrups for children’s fevers, are particularly affected. In order to solve the problem, the relocation of production sites back to the EU takes a central role, both in the non-paper and in the latest proposal of the German government offered on the sidelines of the meeting of EU health ministers in Stockholm. However, the foundation and ultimate goal of any strategy must be the diversification of supply chains. Previous initiatives have neglected this aspect.

Initiatives to Address Bottlenecks

Health Minister Karl Lauterbach is promoting a “pan-European response”. His proposal to bring some generic drug production back to the EU is based on a current German legislative initiative to combat the supply shortages of generic drugs. Among other things, this initiative provides for incentives to relocate production back to Germany by requiring European production sites to be awarded contracts even if they charge higher prices.

 

The non-paper of the 19 EU member states takes a similar approach. It calls for a “Critical Medicines Act” to relocate essential steps in the production process back to the EU, following the example of the “European Chips Act” and the “Critical Raw Materials Act”. Although it makes sense to follow initiatives in the area of critical raw materials, the relocation of production back to the EU and also the obligation of manufacturers to stockpile – as included in the German legislative initiative – cannot be the only way. Although relocation and stockpiling may make sense in individual cases that still need to be examined in detail, these strategies are associated with enormous costs. Since manufacturers usually relocate due to low profit margins and a lack of investment incentives, production would have to be permanently subsidised or market prices would have to be increased. The latter would be a burden on health insurers and/or insured persons. Therefore, there is another component that is crucial and has received little attention so far, but it could be the foundation for a robust European pharmaceutical supply: The diversification of supply chains.

Necessary Diversification of Supply Chains

The EU is largely dependent on foreign-produced intermediates, active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) and finished pharmaceutical products (FPPs) in order to import generic drugs. Trade data from Eurostat shows that in 2021, 79 per cent of all antibiotic API imports (trade code 2941) came from China and 82 per cent of ibuprofen API imports (trade code 29163990) came from China and India in roughly equal proportions. In addition, the production of more than 50 per cent of global API production is concentrated in five producer countries. This strong concentration means that European supply chains are extremely vulnerable and present security-relevant weaknesses. During the Covid-19 pandemic, the geopolitical implications of medical supplies was already evident, and it is foreseeable that they will be increasingly instrumentalised in the future. To overcome this import concentration, new supply chains must therefore be opened up. Two points are important here.

 

First, more transparent supply chains are needed to identify critical dependencies. Currently, neither the European Health Emergency Response Authority (HERA) nor any other body has the power to require companies to disclose their supply chains. The European Commission should examine whether such a competence can be created through EU law. However, in order to avoid unnecessary bureaucracy and to protect companies, a disclosure obligation only makes sense on an event-related basis. The Commission could find inspiration in competition law, which requires transparency from companies in certain scenarios, such as subsidies and mergers.

 

Second, the EU will continue to be dependent on cheap medicines from abroad, since a large-scale relocation of production to the EU cannot be financed in the long term. This is all the more true as kick-start financing alone will not be sufficient, and permanent support for companies from states, health insurers and/or insured persons will be needed. To build up new supply chains, companies – mediated and secured by member states or the EU – could find new suppliers and manufacturers in Africa or South-East Asia, for example, or build up and expand local production, following the example of the “European Raw Materials Alliance” (ERMA) and the “Raw Materials Investment Platform” (RMIP). This also involves costs, as projects can fail, and diversification runs counter to cost-saving economies of scale. However, these costs are likely to be lower than those resulting from a strategy that relies solely on relocating production back to the EU and stockpiling goods that are already in short supply.

Die griechischen Parlamentswahlen am 21. Mai 2023 werden in mehrerlei Hinsicht einschneidend sein. Zum ersten Mal stimmen die Bürgerinnen und Bürger des Lan­des nach dem Verhältniswahlrecht für politische Parteien ab. Da Griechenland kaum Koalitionen kennt, ist mit einer schwierigen Regierungsbildung zu rechnen. Eine weitere Premiere ist, dass Griechen, die im Ausland leben, in ihrem Wohnsitzland wählen können. Und schließlich sind es die ersten Parlamentswahlen nach dem Ende der internationalen Aufsicht, dem das Land im Zuge seiner Staatsschuldenkrise mehr als ein Jahrzehnt lang unterstand. Für die griechische EU-Politik wird vor allem von Bedeu­tung sein, inwiefern sich neue Dialogformate im bilateralen Verhältnis zur Türkei ergeben – dem Nachbarland, das nur eine Woche zuvor gewählt hat.

When it comes to being supplied with raw materials, Europe faces a number of chal­lenges. These include the diversification of European supply chains, the implementation of effective sustainability standards, and the reduction of strategic dependencies on China. What will European-Chinese raw material supply chains look like in 2030? This paper outlines three possible scenarios, illustrating the combined effects of dif­ferent political and socio-economic developments and the impact they could have on European-Chinese supply chains. It aims to help political actors gain a deeper under­standing of possible future trajectories and map out appropriate policy strategies in response to different scenarios.

In einem Anfang Mai veröffentlichten »Non-Paper« skizzieren 19 EU-Staaten ­– darunter Deutschland, Frankreich, Ungarn und Polen – Möglichkeiten, um das wachsende Problem von Lieferengpässen bei Arzneimitteln zu bekämpfen. Vor allem bei Generika, also Medikamenten ohne Patentschutz, ist die Lage dramatisch. Betroffen sind insbesondere Antibiotika, onkologische Präparate sowie paracetamol- und ibuprofen-haltige Medikamente wie Kinderfiebersäfte. Um das Problem zu lösen, nimmt die Rückverlagerung von Produktionsstätten in die EU sowohl im »Non-Paper« als auch im jüngsten Vorschlag der deutschen Bundesregierung am Rande des Treffens der EU-Gesundheitsminister in Stockholm eine zentrale Rolle ein. Das Fundament und oberste Ziel jeder Strategie muss jedoch die Diversifizierung der Lieferketten sein. Bisherige Initiativen vernachlässigen dies.

Initiativen zur Bekämpfung von Engpässen

Gesundheitsminister Karl Lauterbach wirbt für eine »gesamteuropäische Antwort«. Sein Vorschlag, Teile der Generikaproduktion zurück in die EU zu holen, fußt auf einer aktuellen deutschen Gesetzesinitiative zur Bekämpfung von Lieferengpässen bei patentfreien Arzneimitteln. Diese sieht unter anderem vor, Anreize zur Rückverlagerung zu schaffen, indem europäische Produktionsstandorte im Vergabeverfahren auch einen Zuschlag bekommen müssen, selbst wenn sie höhere Preise verlangen.

Einen ähnlichen Ansatz wählt auch das »Non-Paper« der 19 EU-Mitgliedstaaten. Darin wird ein »Critical Medicines Act« gefordert, um – in Anlehnung an den »European Chips Act« und den »Critical Raw Materials Act« - wesentliche Produktionsschritte in die EU zurückzuverlagern. Obwohl eine Anlehnung an Initiativen im Bereich kritische Rohstoffe sinnvoll ist, kann die Rückverlagerung der Produktion in die EU und auch die Verpflichtung der Hersteller zur Bevorratung, wie sie in der deutschen Gesetzesinitiative enthalten ist, nicht der einzige Weg sein. Während Rückverlagerung und Bevorratung in noch genau zu prüfenden Einzelfällen sinnvoll sein können, sind diese Strategien mit enormen Kosten verbunden. Da Hersteller meist aufgrund geringer Gewinnmargen und mangelnder Investitionsanreize abwandern, müssten entweder die Produktion dauerhaft subventioniert oder die Marktpreise erhöht werden. Das würde Krankenkassen und/oder Versicherte belasten. Entscheidend ist daher eine weitere Komponente, die bisher wenig Beachtung gefunden hat, aber das Fundament einer robusten europäischen Arzneimittelversorgung darstellen könnte: Die Diversifizierung der Lieferketten.

Notwendige Diversifizierung von Lieferketten

Die EU ist beim Import von Generika in weiten Teilen abhängig von Vorprodukten, Wirkstoffen (API) und fertigen Dosen (FPP) aus ausländischer Produktion. Handelsdaten von Eurostat zeigen, dass im Jahr 2021 79 Prozent aller Antibiotika API-Importe (Handelskennung 2941) aus China und 82 Prozent der Ibuprofen-API-Importe (Handelskennung 29163990) zu etwa gleichen Teilen aus China und Indien stammten. Zudem konzentriert sich die Herstellung von mehr als 50 Prozent der globalen API-Produktion auf fünf Hersteller. Diese extreme Konzentration führt dazu, dass europäische Lieferketten äußerst anfällig sind und sicherheitspolitisch relevante Angriffsflächen bieten. Während der Covid-19 Pandemie wurde das geopolitische Potential von Medizinprodukten bereits deutlich und es ist naheliegend, dass sie in Zukunft vermehrt als geopolitische Instrumente eingesetzt werden. Um diese Importkonzentration zu überwinden, müssen daher neue Lieferketten geschaffen werden. Dabei kommt es auf zwei Punkte an:

Erstens sind transparentere Lieferketten notwendig, um kritische Abhängigkeit zu identifizieren. Derzeit hat weder die EU-Behörde für die Krisenvorsorge und -reaktion bei gesundheitlichen Notlagen (HERA) noch ein anderes Organ die Kompetenzen, Unternehmen zur Offenlegung ihrer Lieferketten zu verpflichten. Es gilt durch die EU-Kommission zu prüfen, ob eine solche Kompetenz mittels EU-Recht geschaffen werden kann. Um unnötige Bürokratie zu vermeiden und Unternehmen zu schützen, ist eine Offenlegungspflicht aber nur anlassbezogen sinnvoll. Anlehnung könnte die EU-Kommission im Wettbewerbsrecht finden, das von Unternehmen in bestimmten Fällen Transparenz verlangt, wie etwa bei Subventionen und Fusionen.

Zweitens wird die EU weiterhin abhängig von günstigen Arzneimitteln aus dem Ausland sein, da sich eine umfangreiche Verlagerung der Produktion in die EU nicht dauerhaft finanzieren lässt. Dies gilt umso mehr, als eine Anschubfinanzierung allein nicht ausreichen wird, sondern es einer dauerhaften Unterstützung von Unternehmen durch Staaten, Krankenkassen und/oder Versicherten bedarf. Zum Aufbau neuer Lieferketten könnten Unternehmen – vermittelt und abgesichert durch Mitgliedstaaten oder die EU – in Anlehnung an die »Europäische Rohstoffallianz« (ERMA) und die »Raw Materials Investment Platform« (RMIP) zum Beispiel in Afrika oder Südostasien neue Zulieferer und Hersteller finden beziehungsweise lokale Produktionen aufbauen oder ausweiten. Auch hiermit sind Kosten verbunden, da Projekte auch scheitern und Diversifizierung kostensparenden Skaleneffekten zuwiderläuft. Allerdings dürften diese Kosten geringer sein als bei einer Strategie, die ausschließlich auf die Rückverlagerung der Produktion in die EU und die Bevorratung ohnehin knapper Güter setzt.

Annalena Baerbock besucht Saudi-Arabien und Katar. Was kann die Außenministerin dort mit ihrer wertegeleiteten Außenpolitik erreichen? Golfexperte Dawud Ansari über eine heikle Reise zwischen Markt und Moral.

In Sudan kämpfen die wichtigsten Sicherheitskräfte des Landes gegeneinander. Eine schnelle militärische Entscheidung ist angesichts des relativ ausgeglichenen Kräfteverhältnisses zwischen den Sudanesischen Streitkräften (SAF) und den Rapid Support Forces (RSF) nicht zu erwarten. Durch dieses strategische Patt sind die Chancen auf eine erfolgreiche Vermittlung nicht ausweglos. Dafür müssten Sudans internationale Partner aber von dem seit Jahrzehnten dominierenden Ansatz Abstand nehmen, Gewaltakteuren die Hauptrolle in Verhandlungen zuzugestehen. Zivile Akteure haben eine breite Anti-Kriegs-Koalition gebildet, die bei Friedensgesprächen von Anfang an den Ton angeben sollte. Dies könnte durchaus auch im Interesse der Konfliktparteien sein, denn diese brauchen einen dritten Akteur, der ihr Verhältnis in Zukunft mode­rieren kann. Die Bundesregierung sollte sich um eine stärkere Koordination inter­nationaler Vermittlungsansätze unter ziviler Führung aus Sudan bemühen. In der EU sollte sie eine Initiative zur Eingrenzung des finanziellen Spielraums der sudanesischen Gewaltakteure anstoßen.

Turkey 2023: the nation heads to the polls amid an uncertain future

There are growing concerns that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) may not hand over power peacefully. The AKP’s long history of investment in the criminal sector, its alliance with mafia organisations, the establishment of shadow paramilitary organisations such as SADAT, and the creation of new security forces such as the “night watchmen” – made up entirely of AKP loyalists – all raise suspicions that the AKP may be preparing a violent rejection of the election results if it does not win. Recent statements from the AKP leadership reinforce this fear. The experiences relating to other right-wing populists, such as Donald Trump in the United States and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, reinforce the fear that such populist politicians tend not to concede elections.

There are two different ways in which a defeated leader could refuse to concede the election results, depending on whether state institutions and the judiciary side with the incumbent. If Erdoğan loses the election but manages to force state institutions to declare him the winner, that would be Turkey’s “Belarus moment”, similar to when Alexander Lukashenko claimed victory amid widespread evidence of vote rigging.

Although it is conceivable to think that the AKP is preparing for a “Belarus scenario”, there are several factors that could disrupt the government’s plans. First, Turkey’s electoral system is very thorough, and opposition members can be present at all levels. Thus, committing large-scale fraud without getting caught is unlikely. In case of a dispute, the final decision would be made by the Supreme Election Board (YSK), which is vulnerable to government pressure and manipulation, as already demonstrated in its decision to repeat the 2019 Istanbul elections. However, it could only go so far as repeating the election rather than falsely declaring an AKP victory. Moreover, although Erdoğan may be an autocrat, his power is derived from the fact that he has the popular vote on his side. Without public support, he loses his legitimacy, signalling further weakness. Given the harsh sentences for electoral manipulation, public officials will tend not to approve the rigging of the elections, even if they have supported Erdoğan in the past. If Erdoğan pushes for such a scenario, there is a serious risk of Turkey descending into chaos. Assuming that the opposition takes its fair share of responsibility and demonstrates the credibility of its victory, it is likely that supporters of the opposition would take to the streets. The AKP may respond either by using the police or unleashing its own base onto the streets. In either case, the result would be skirmishes and street fights either between the police and the demonstrators or between supporters of the opposing political groups. Unleashing such a scenario is too risky and does not offer clear gains, and it is hard to predict how events might unfold.

Is Erdoğan afraid of being sent to court?

The second scenario would be similar to the cases in Brazil and the United States, where neither Trump nor Bolsonaro conceded the elections, despite the verdicts of the respective election authorities. However, such attempts have little to no chance of subverting the electoral process. Moreover, the assumption that Erdoğan cannot – and will not – concede defeat is based on a number of faulty assumptions. The main narrative is that defeat would be too risky for him and open the door to jailtime due to potential charges against him. However, this scenario does not account for Turkey’s current power configuration or the country’s specific legal aspects. From a political point of view, even if he is defeated, Erdoğan would still have the support of more than 40 per cent of the society. He would continue to be an important political figure.

Also, Erdoğan is under legal protection. Since he served as the president, he could only be tried by the Constitutional Court. For him to be sent to the Court first requires a two-thirds majority in the parliament: an unlikely vote share to ever be reached by the opposition. But more importantly, even if the opposition managed to send Erdoğan to the Court, he would be tried by 15 judges, all of them appointed by the AKP leadership. The opposition would have to wait until August 2028 to shape the court’s composition and appoint the majority of the judges.

Erdoğan is a shrewd politician with a keen sense of power balance and a penchant for not overplaying his hand. Since he is a fighter, he might prepare himself for a future comeback, just like Benjamin Netanyahu managed to do in Israel after losing the government in 2021. The potential hurdles the new government will face in trying to solve the country’s dire economic problems also encourage him to plan a comeback. In this context, Erdoğan would most likely consider that, not conceding the election would make it much harder for him to plan a comeback.

Moreover, the Turkish public – even though it is not keen on the irregularities of the electoral process and the lack of a fair playing ground tends to be very protective of its right to vote. Hence, attempts to alter the electoral process are often met with resistance, even from the party base. The 2019 Istanbul municipal elections demonstrated the political risks of not conceding the election. Although the election, which was later annulled by the YSK, resulted in a very narrow margin of 13,000 votes in favour of the opposition candidate, Ekrem İmamoğlu, in the repeat elections, the difference was more than 800,000. If Erdoğan does not acknowledge the election results, one can expect defections from the AKP rank and file as well as the AKP leadership.

From Erdoğan’s point of view, refusing to concede the elections would not just be hard to sustain and pointless, it would also not be wise politically, assuming that Erdoğan remains in politics after a potential defeat. The chances of success are limited, whereas the risks are many. Erdoğan may take this course of action only if he believes that the opposition has not fully secured the electoral process. Therefore, the decisive element is not Erdoğan’s respect for the election results, but the opposition’s ability to demonstrate its resolve and willingness to protect the vote.

The current wave of emigrants from Russia can play an important role in the country’s political transition in the long term. As Russia’s aggressive wars are a consequence of the personalist dictatorship that has embraced the imperialist idea, a regime change towards a more pluralistic model of rule would be in the West’s strategic interest.

Mit Sorge blickt die Weltgemeinschaft auf die nahende Präsidentschaft der Vereinig­ten Arabischen Emirate bei der diesjährigen Vertragsstaatenkonferenz (COP) der UN‑Klimarahmenkonvention (UNFCCC). Bisher glänzte der Ölproduzent nicht mit Anstrengungen für den Klimaschutz, und Sultan Al Jaber, der diesjährige COP-Vor­sit­zende, ist Chef der Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, einer der größten Ölfirmen der Welt. Um den Anstieg der durchschnittlichen Erdtemperatur gemäß Pariser Klima­abkommen möglichst auf 1,5 Grad Celsius über dem vorindustriellen Niveau zu be­grenzen, strebt die Staatengemeinschaft Klimaneutralität in der zweiten Hälfte des Jahrhunderts an. Dafür muss in globalen Energiesystemen der weitgehende Ausstieg aus den fossilen Energieträgern gelingen – wo diese jedoch nach wie vor dominieren. Eine Trendwende lässt sich nicht absehen. Dass ein vollständiger fossiler Ausstieg momentan nicht zu erwarten ist, geht in klimapolitischen Debatten oft unter. Er ist in den meisten Ländern weder politisch gewollt noch in Langfristplänen vorgesehen. Ein geordnetes, zügiges Herunterfahren ist allerdings nicht nur wünschenswert, son­dern absolut nötig, um die richtigen Investitionsanreize zu setzen und auch Sicher­heiten für fossile Produzenten zu schaffen. Entsprechende Politik- und Governance-Instrumente müssen dringend weiterentwickelt werden, denn die Zeit drängt.

On May 14, Turkey is heading to the polls to vote in what are deemed to be the most important elections of 2023. Most of the polls indicate it will be a tight race and that the opposition has a chance to unseat President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan after 20 years. Last week, Turkey’s Interior Minister described the elections as a “political coup plot” by the West to overthrow the government. Given that elections are not always fair in Turkey, such a statement raises concerns about the security of the elections. Yet, extensive electoral fraud seems highly unlikely.

According to the Freedom House’s electoral integrity index, Turkey scores only 33 out of 100. The media is under government control and heavily censured, and state resources are used exclusively to support the government’s election campaign. There is severe voter suppression in the rural areas under the pretext of security concerns. Finally, the government instrumentalises the judiciary to intimidate and suppress political opponents.

Given such authoritarian elements of the political regime in Turkey, there are serious concerns that the elections could be rigged. Despite some attempts by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), elections in Turkey are generally free, the process is transparent and vote rigging is difficult.

Possibility of election rigging on election day

Although citizen participation is very limited when it comes to political affairs, even at the local level, voter turnout never falls below 80 per cent, as elections are the main means for citizens to express their political views and hold elected officials to account.

Each citizen is allocated an electoral box, and the electoral rolls are announced by the Supreme Electoral Board (YSK) well in advance of elections. The YSK shares these electoral rolls with all competing political parties. For each ballot box there is an appointed electoral board, which is responsible for the safe conduction of the elections and the vote counting. The head of the board is a civil servant appointed by the government, and there are appointees from the top five political parties who are ranked according to their share of the vote in the previous elections. Other smaller parties may also have observers at the polling stations, but they have no official role.

Each citizen can only vote at their assigned polling station and must present an official ID before voting. The electoral board members check that the ID matches the name on the electoral roll to prevent double voting and also ensure that votes are cast in private. The vote count is made available to the public and citizens are usually present for this. After the votes have been counted, a report on the results is drawn up and signed by all members of the electoral board. Each political party representative on the board receives a copy, and a final copy is placed on the door of the polling station. Any citizen can take a photograph of this copy. It is the most important official document, and the remaining vote counting calculations are based on it.

These reports are collected at the district and provincial polling stations and combined into a single report, which is sent to the YSK for final tabulation and the declaration of the election results. Six-member electoral boards at the district and provincial levels undertake the process of combining the documents. The board consists of a judge, a second public official and four representatives of the top four political parties, determined according to the results of the last election. 

Overall, the system is very thorough and open to public scrutiny at all levels. It is a paper-based system that limits issues relating to cyber security. There are also severe penalties for attempts to influence election results. For example, the penalty for falsifying an electoral register is eight years in prison.

Questionable past elections and the opposition’s learning curve

The relative security of the electoral system in Turkey does not mean that the AKP has not tried to rig elections. There have been serious concerns over the integrity of certain elections. In the past, the opposition parties often failed to appoint members to the electoral board for every ballot box. Furthermore, since the 2014 elections, Anadolu Agency (AA), Turkey’ official news agency, has falsely announced landslide AKP victories very early on, leading disgruntled opposition observers to abandon the ballot boxes without retrieving the election reports. As mentioned, the crucial document for electoral security is the election report kept by each observer. The only way for opposition parties to control and prove any possible irregularities is to compare the results with the election reports. This also leads to an inability to shape the public discourse. Once the government declares itself the winner and the opposition fails to respond on election night, the opposition is faced with a fait accompli and their follow-up objections have little impact.

But past elections have also served as a learning curve for the opposition. This was apparent in the 2019 Istanbul municipal elections. The opposition appeared to have properly organised all ballot boxes and their observers did not leave early, despite AA’s declaration of an AKP victory. The rapid collection of election reports enabled the opposition candidate, Ekrem İmamoğlu, to openly and legitimately confront the AA’s results throughout the night by regularly sharing his own data. The government was thus unable to shape the public discourse as it had in previous elections. As a result, despite an extremely narrow margin, the government was unable to manipulate the election results.

For the upcoming elections, the opposition states that they are prepared as a result of these past experiences and that a member is being assigned to observe each ballot box. Furthermore, civil society has mobilised and established successful election monitoring organisations, most famously Oy ve Ötesi (Vote and Beyond), which can reliably assess the integrity of the election results. As long as the opposition succeeds in appointing observers to the electoral boards – thereby collecting results quickly and efficiently, and then sharing the data with the public – it will be very difficult for the government to steal an election it has lost. But if the opposition fails in any respect, then there is a serious possibility of electoral fraud. It is therefore crucial that international election observers remain vigilant and request information from the opposition.