Dans God Will Not Help, Hana Jušić signe une chronique patiente et acérée du début du XXᵉ siècle, entre film d'époque et allégorie de la condition féminine. L'arrivée d'une veuve venue du Chili dans une communauté montagnarde croate bouscule un univers clos, régulé par les traditions, la foi et le patriarcat. La cinéaste explore les liens entre exil, superstition, sororité et paysages, tout en évitant les stéréotypes sur les Balkans.
- Articles / Courrier des Balkans, Cinéma yougoslave, Croatie, Culture et éducationPodgorica, Bar, Budva, Bijelo Polje... Du littoral jusqu'aux montagnes du nord en passant par le centre du pays, tout le Monténégro est en proie depuis dimanche à des incendies géants. Un soldat a été tué mardi dans la zone de Kuči, un autre blessé.
- Articles / Monténégro, Environnement, Courrier des Balkans, changement climatiqueLa condamnation de Milorad Dodik a un an de prison et six ans d'interdiction de toute fonction officielle a été confirmée en appel, mais le maître de l'entité serbe de Bosnie-Herzégovine, n'a pas l'intention d'en tenir. Jusqu'où peut aller le bras de fer ?
- Articles / Bosnie-Herzégovine, Défense, police et justice, Politique, Courrier des Balkans, RS sécessionWe use new data on political connections from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys to examine the impact of connections on firms' participation in international trade through global value chains (GVCs) for six lower middle income MENA countries and territories (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, and Lebanon). Our findings add to the literature on “hidden protection” and corruption in the region: trade- and investment policies and regulations are tailored to benefit or protect politically connected firms. Our findings suggest that politically connected firms are more likely to participate in GVCs by 9.8 percentage points and that the intensity of their participation in GVCs increases by 4.1 percentage points. Combining political connections and grand corruption increases firms' participation in GVCs by 13.6 percentage points.
We use new data on political connections from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys to examine the impact of connections on firms' participation in international trade through global value chains (GVCs) for six lower middle income MENA countries and territories (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, and Lebanon). Our findings add to the literature on “hidden protection” and corruption in the region: trade- and investment policies and regulations are tailored to benefit or protect politically connected firms. Our findings suggest that politically connected firms are more likely to participate in GVCs by 9.8 percentage points and that the intensity of their participation in GVCs increases by 4.1 percentage points. Combining political connections and grand corruption increases firms' participation in GVCs by 13.6 percentage points.
We use new data on political connections from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys to examine the impact of connections on firms' participation in international trade through global value chains (GVCs) for six lower middle income MENA countries and territories (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, and Lebanon). Our findings add to the literature on “hidden protection” and corruption in the region: trade- and investment policies and regulations are tailored to benefit or protect politically connected firms. Our findings suggest that politically connected firms are more likely to participate in GVCs by 9.8 percentage points and that the intensity of their participation in GVCs increases by 4.1 percentage points. Combining political connections and grand corruption increases firms' participation in GVCs by 13.6 percentage points.
Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries (TURFs) are a rights-based management strategy that grants area-based fishing rights to specific community groups. In Ecuador, following immense mangrove deforestation caused by industrial shrimp farming, TURFs have been implemented through Mangrove Sustainable Use and Custody Agreements (AUSCEMs, for its Spanish acronym), driven by grassroots demands to conserve remaining mangroves and recognize ancestral territorial rights. This article examines the power-laden dynamics of these agreements in the Gulf of Guayaquil, Ecuador through ethnographic research in two fishing communities. We analyze historical and ongoing conflicts and reveal how multi-scalar power—across visible, hidden, and invisible forms—shapes access to and control over mangrove resources, often reinforcing inequalities and epistemic injustices. Our findings highlight how funding inequities, limited tenure security, and rising threats from organized crime compromise community-led conservation. For this management approach to succeed, it is essential to close funding gaps for stewardship and innovation, address security and service disparities, recognize local ecological knowledge, and fully honor ancestral territorial rights to promote equitable, sustainable governance.
Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries (TURFs) are a rights-based management strategy that grants area-based fishing rights to specific community groups. In Ecuador, following immense mangrove deforestation caused by industrial shrimp farming, TURFs have been implemented through Mangrove Sustainable Use and Custody Agreements (AUSCEMs, for its Spanish acronym), driven by grassroots demands to conserve remaining mangroves and recognize ancestral territorial rights. This article examines the power-laden dynamics of these agreements in the Gulf of Guayaquil, Ecuador through ethnographic research in two fishing communities. We analyze historical and ongoing conflicts and reveal how multi-scalar power—across visible, hidden, and invisible forms—shapes access to and control over mangrove resources, often reinforcing inequalities and epistemic injustices. Our findings highlight how funding inequities, limited tenure security, and rising threats from organized crime compromise community-led conservation. For this management approach to succeed, it is essential to close funding gaps for stewardship and innovation, address security and service disparities, recognize local ecological knowledge, and fully honor ancestral territorial rights to promote equitable, sustainable governance.
Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries (TURFs) are a rights-based management strategy that grants area-based fishing rights to specific community groups. In Ecuador, following immense mangrove deforestation caused by industrial shrimp farming, TURFs have been implemented through Mangrove Sustainable Use and Custody Agreements (AUSCEMs, for its Spanish acronym), driven by grassroots demands to conserve remaining mangroves and recognize ancestral territorial rights. This article examines the power-laden dynamics of these agreements in the Gulf of Guayaquil, Ecuador through ethnographic research in two fishing communities. We analyze historical and ongoing conflicts and reveal how multi-scalar power—across visible, hidden, and invisible forms—shapes access to and control over mangrove resources, often reinforcing inequalities and epistemic injustices. Our findings highlight how funding inequities, limited tenure security, and rising threats from organized crime compromise community-led conservation. For this management approach to succeed, it is essential to close funding gaps for stewardship and innovation, address security and service disparities, recognize local ecological knowledge, and fully honor ancestral territorial rights to promote equitable, sustainable governance.