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The BBC goes on patrol with the Kenyan officers sent to quell violence in gang-ravaged Haitian capital Port-au-Prince.

While the Biden administration’s views on energy policy are arguably of rapidly diminishing importance, the study on U.S. exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) released by the Department of Energy (DOE) on December 17 will define the Democrats’ views on the subject during the coming Trump administration. However, it is neither good policy nor good politics. While it did not conclude that the moratorium on new project approvals should be permanent, it warned against a policy of “unfettered” LNG exports on the grounds that it would increase emissions of greenhouse gases and drive up costs for American consumers. It places the outgoing administration squarely in the corner of the shrill “keep it in the ground” progressive wing of the Democratic Party.

By taking this tack, the Biden administration stuck to the strategy they had pursued when Biden was running for renomination. This aimed to prevent a primary challenge from the Left by pausing new approvals of LNG export projects. However, after handing the nomination over to Kamala Harris and seeing her lose to Donald Trump, they should have been freed of such constraints. There is still no indication in polling data that climate change is even a top issue for American voters, who are much more concerned about jobs and the economy. Opposition to all fossil fuels projects, however, is an important litmus test for a small but influential group of progressive activists.

Manmade climate change is real, obviously, and it is rational to support policies for the reduction of greenhouse gases. The question is whether limiting the production and export of natural gas from the United States really serves that goal. The DOE study made a very dubious set of assumptions to support the view that there was a substantial tradeoff between U.S. LNG exports and renewable energy—U.S. LNG would reduce zero-carbon energy development, and a lack of U.S. LNG would increase in it. That assumes that other exports would not become available—very dubious in a world with many stranded gas deposits—and that the LNG is being immediately used for power generation. A lot of gas in power generation is used as “firming capacity” for renewables, a backup for periods of low generation, making renewable use possible without sacrificing grid reliability. It also ignores the fact that, in many cases, LNG offsets coal use, allowing coal plants to be retired. It ignores the fact that in the largest LNG growth market, China, much of the incremental LNG is used for industrial purposes like petrochemical feedstock rather than to generate electricity.

The study also tunes out the geopolitical benefits the United States derives from LNG. When Russia invaded Ukraine, having a flexible supply of American LNG available offset some of Russia’s piped gas, which needed to be embargoed for sanctions purposes. It rightly points out that European gas demand is projected to flatten out in the long term, but that could be impacted now by the recent indications that the grid is becoming less reliable as intermittent renewables approach half of European power generation. With China—a U.S. adversary—the largest growth market, the study implies that we would be fueling the economic rise of a rival. Yet, that ignores the availability of other supplies and the power that the United States gains over China by having them dependent on energy and petrochemical feedstocks, which must come by sea, with the United States still the dominant naval power outside China’s immediate vicinity. Expanding LNG also strengthens the U.S. balance of payments overall and would help to reduce the trade deficit with China.

The study highlights how the Biden administration reverted to using the role of Secretary of Energy as a placement for someone of senior stature who needs a job rather than choosing someone who has a background in energy, big science, or nuclear technology. The Obama administration chose much more qualified secretaries. Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz articulated a much more nuanced and intelligent view of the role of natural gas in the transition to a low-carbon economy, both in and out of government. 

The bottom line is that withholding U.S. LNG would force out other sources of supply and, in some cases, lead to more coal consumption. It makes sense to try to reduce demand for fossil fuels, but limiting U.S. exports is not going to force other countries to adopt the policy changes, which would make the straight tradeoff between LNG and renewables work in the manner that the study suggests it would. Trump’s chest-thumping about “energy dominance” is an exaggeration. Still, Democrats would do better, both politically and in terms of rational policymaking, to quit listening to the tiny sliver of American public opinion that insists on “keeping it in the ground.”

Greg Priddy is a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest and does consulting work related to political risk for the energy sector and financial clients. Previously, he was director of global oil at Eurasia Group and worked at the U.S. Department of Energy.

Image: Andrew Leyden / Shutterstock.com. 

Calls for a 2030 emissions reduction target of at least 65 per cent, matched with halving of energy consumption by 2040 and phasing out fossil fuels by 2030. Ambitious or impossible?

The post World is far from halting deforestation, urgent government action required appeared first on Euractiv.

The Polish government has allocated over €215 million to support investments in healthcare facilities in smaller towns and rural areas.

The post Poland’s health minister praises a year of intense action; wins for pharmacy, women’s health appeared first on Euractiv.

A jihadist rebel group wants to build and govern a stable country that is at peace with its neighbors and recognized by the international community. As much as that may seem an impossible contradiction destined to end in failure and violence, there are reasons to believe that a positive outcome might be achievable. 

It has been two weeks since the hasty fall of the Assad regime, and the situation in Syria is surprisingly stable. This is despite the takeover of the capital by jihadist rebels, who are led by a commander once associated with both Al Qaeda and ISIS. In the south, Israeli forces occupy a buffer zone and conduct hundreds of targeted airstrikes on former government military assets. In the north and northeast, the prospect of a Turkish invasion looms over the Kurds. 

Outside observers have sought to explain the calm in Damascus by noting how Syrians are exhausted after almost fourteen years of civil war, pointing to lessons learned from other civil conflicts in other Arab countries. More importantly, however, the situation is relatively contained because of the desire of one man, Ahmed al-Sharaa (a.k.a. Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), to show the world that he and his followers are capable of governing in peace and deserving of international recognition. 

Journalists, academics, and other pundits have been trying to predict the future by looking back on how al-Sharaa and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) handled governance in Idlib province during the civil war. Analysts search for signs that would indicate how they will tackle their new assignment at the national level. The results are a set of contradictions and mixed messages.

On the one hand, last year, HTS tried to pass a Public Morality Law that would have banned alcohol and deployed a morality police force on daily patrols. On the other hand, HTS walked back the proposals when they caused friction among religious scholars, other armed factions, the public, and international aid groups. This led al-Sharaa to say that the government should not impose Islam but rather encourage people to seek religion out of their own volition.

Al-Sharaa has been praised for helping to attract foreign investment and maintaining functioning electricity and medical services while at the same time being criticized for ruling like an autocrat in the face of popular protests. Consequently, experts remain confounded as to what version of HTS is the one currently ruling the fifth-largest Arab country by population, with more than 20 million citizens precariously positioned between Israel, Lebanon, Turkiye, and Iraq.

These attempts to read something into the past few years entirely miss the opportunity of the present moment. Current circumstances shape Ahmed al-Sharaa’s objectives. He is focused on gaining the recognition of the Syrian people and the international community for his movement, and in doing so, he is putting himself in a tight position that will make it difficult for him to walk back. He has renounced ambitions for transnational jihad, encouraged engagement with the West and an eventual diplomatic solution with Israel, and declared the need for the protection of all religious minorities. He has also promised to demobilize all militias and abolish conscription in favor of a volunteer army so that all arms are in the hands of the state, and even suggested that he may disband HTS in favor of reconstituting state institutions that reflect the diversity of the country. He continues saying all of the right things for both local and Western audiences despite sporadic off-message comments coming from some members of his group on key issues, such as roles for women and Shari‘a law. 

This is remarkable for a man who has effectively become the most successful jihadist in the post-9/11 era. HTS is on the verge of achieving something that no other jihadist group could have dreamed of—the control of a sovereign state that is capable of attaining international recognition. Neither the Taliban nor even ISIS could claim such a thing. Even many people in Syria who value liberal rights and freedoms might support a government comprised of moderate Islamists from HTS. We cannot underestimate the way that half a century of economic struggles, international isolation, and regime brutality have impacted the public’s hopes and expectations. The average Syrian only knows a binary world of state and mosque, not civil society, due to the severe restrictions imposed by emergency law, which has been in effect since the early 1970s. 

Ahmed al-Sharaa’s move toward the center puts him in a delicate balance with Syrians on all sides, and his transitional government will inevitably face criticism and protests from one constituency or another. Average Syrians want their interests represented. Damascus witnessed its first major protest last Thursday over comments by an HTS spokesperson about women’s roles in society. Al-Sharaa’s ability to maintain a balance, for now, may only be possible because the fighters who drove the Assad family away after decades of brutal repression believe they are witnessing a historical moment that will define the country for generations. 

Those fighters may have many different motivations. One motivation among them is the narrative in which their efforts in Idlib to create a functional government and a stable society within a broadly Islamic framework have served as a model for Syrians everywhere looking for an alternative to Assad. They may be willing to share power with other local and expatriate factions, but they will also expect their own abilities and contributions to be honored and respected. 

The international community, especially the United States and Israel, are understandably much more cautious about the claim that al-Sharaa and HTS have abandoned jihadism. For the United States, Al-Sharaa is personally responsible for American and coalition casualties in Iraq and known for his collaboration with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. For Israel, HTS resembles Hamas, an undeniable example of the perils of trusting enemies when they make bold and ultimately baseless statements about fundamental change. Examples of just such a tectonic shift in Islamist ideology are incredibly rare in the region, with Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr more an imperfect exception than the rule. 

Al-Sharaa needs significant economic and technical support from the international community to rebuild the country’s infrastructure, economy, and institutions. The level of that support will depend on the Trump administration’s willingness to engage with the new government in Damascus, which means that al-Sharaa must reassure Washington about his intentions, especially those toward Israel. Netanyahu has been clear that he seeks to reduce the long-term threat from a resurgent Syrian military directed against Israel, with no intention of escalating into a broader conflict with the transitional government. He has even said that he supports exploring relations with the new Syrian Government. If al-Sharaa wants to put relations with Israel on a new footing, he will have to find a way to communicate with the Israelis without alienating the Syrian public during this limited window of goodwill that the transitional government currently enjoys. In this effort, he will benefit from a surprising amount of interest among many Syrian youth for a more positive relationship with Israel. 

The challenge for the next Trump administration is learning to decipher Ahmed al-Sharaa’s intentions and motivations. He may be offering a palatable alternative to more hardcore jihadist leaders in the region, but that does not mean that his followers will not seek other ways to subtly Islamicize society and export their Islamist ideology in the region. Obama and Biden engaged in a lot of virtue-signaling on Syria about the respect for international law and establishing a transitional process. Yet, they never set clear expectations and held the Assad regime to those commitments. President Trump must take a more realistic approach and hold the new government accountable to its pledges in exchange for any potential support or recognition while recognizing that the Syrian people are ultimately the best fail-safe against radicalization.

Hazem Alghabra, born in Damascus, Syria, is the founder and president of Frontiers Consultants, a Washington, DC-based consultancy firm that provides public relations and crisis management solutions with a focus on the Middle East and the United States. Alghabra previously held multiple positions with the U.S. Department of State, including Senior Advisor for Public Affairs in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. Alghabra is a frequent commentator on a wide range of television stations, including i24, ILTV, Alarabyia, Sky News, and BBC.

Joshua Yaphe is a Visiting Fellow at the Center for the National Interest. He previously served as Senior Analyst for the Arabian Peninsula at the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), Visiting Faculty at the National Intelligence University (NIU), and scholar-in-residence at the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations. He has a Ph.D. from American University and is the author of Saudi Arabia and Iraq as Friends and Enemies: Borders, Tribes and a History Shared (University of Liverpool Press, 2022). 

The opinions and characterizations in this piece are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Government.

Image: Abidin Yagmur / Shutterstock.com. 

Ce lundi 23 décembre, le quatrième gouvernement français en un an a été annoncé. Largement constitué d’alliés de longue date et d’anciens ministres, il s’ancre dans le cap politique mis en œuvre les sept dernières années par le président Emmanuel Macron.

Christmas came early for the crew of the United States Navy's USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72). "California dreams coming true," the official Facebook account for CVN-72 announced as the warship arrived home on Friday.

The fifth Nimitz-class nuclear-powered supercarrier is now back at her home port of Naval Air Station North Island following a five-month deployment that included operations in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibly.

Unexpected Deployment to the Middle East

The USS Abraham Lincoln was originally deployed last summer to the Indo-Pacific region but was ordered to the Red Sea in August to relieve USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71), as part of the service's ongoing carrier rotation in the Middle East.

There has been a continuous U.S. Navy CSG presence in the Middle East since October 2023 following the Hamas terrorist attack on southern Israel as well as missile attacks from the Houthis. USS Abraham Lincoln remained in the region until last month when she was ordered back to the Indo-Pacific.

USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-76) transited the Suez Canal earlier this month and is now operating in the region.

First Combat For the F-35C During the Deployment

While operating as part of CENTCOM's 5th Fleet, USS Abraham Lincoln conducted air strikes on the Iran-back Houthi militants in Yemen. That included the first-ever combat sortie of a Lockheed Martin F-35C Lightning II, the carrier-based variant of the Joint Strike Fighter. In November, F-35C aircraft, assigned to Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314 (VMFA-314) "conducted multiple strikes on Houthi weapons storage facilities within Houthi-controlled territories in Yemen," U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, U.S. Fifth Fleet, explained.

According to CUSNC, the Miramar, California-based VMFA 314—"Black Knights"—of the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing had operated the Boeing F/A Hornet until 2020, when it became the "first fleet squadron in both the Navy and Marine Corps to operate the 5th Generation fighter aircraft."

In addition, the U.S. Navy announced that E/A-18G Growlers, the electronic warfare (EW) variant of the F/A-18 Super Hornet, from Electronic Attack Squadron 133 (VAQ-133), were "deployed with the next generation jammer," marking the first use of the advanced jammer "both deployed and in combat, marking a generational leap in electronic warfare capability."

Home For the Holidays

For many U.S. sailors around the world this year, they will be home for Christmas only in their dreams. Yet, for the personnel of the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group (ABECSG), their holiday dreams have come true.

And it was one the crew truly earned.

"Our incredibly successful deployment of firsts includes the first combat employment of the F-35C Lightning II platform, the first employment of the ALQ-249 Next Generation Jammer, the first Nimitz-class aircraft carrier to re-fuel at sea with a commercial oiler, the first Multi-Large Deck Event with the Italian Navy's Cavour CSG in the Indo-Pacific, the first west coast CSG to conduct combat strikes to degrade Iranian-backed Houthi rebel combat capabilities, and the first carrier to pull into Malaysia in over 12 years to strengthen critical regional partnerships," said commander, Carrier Strike Group 3, Rear Adm. Adan Cruz. "All of this was made possible through the incredible hard work and dedication of the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group Sailors and Marines, who are reuniting with their loved ones in time for the holidays."

CVN-72 is the second U.S. Navy vessel named after the 16th president—after the Cold War-era George Washington-class ballistic missile submarine. She was commissioned in November 1989, and over the past three decades and a half decades in service, USS Abraham Lincoln has carried out multiple humanitarian missions in the Persian Gulf and Pacific region and has taken part in multiple combat operations.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Greg Meland / Shutterstock.com

From the Vault

Could China Sink a U.S. Navy Aircraft Carrier in a War?

USS Parche: The Navy Submarine That Could Self-Destruct

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The government is only new by name.

The post Bayrou makes new government out of Macron centrist allies and ex-ministers appeared first on Euractiv.

Très largement répandue dans les années 1970, l'adoption internationale traverse une profonde crise morale. Du Tchad au Chili, de la France à la Suède, de nombreux scandales ont discrédité une pratique longtemps perçue comme un acte de générosité. Sur les ruines de ce secteur, un autre émerge : la (...) / Inégalités, Suède, Enfance, Chili, Relations Nord-Sud, Pauvreté, Commerce international - 2023/05

Le gouvernement italien s'est engagé lundi 23 décembre à poursuivre la mise en place de l'accord sur ses centres controversés pour demandeurs d'asile en Albanie, même s'ils restent vides en raison de recours en justice.

« Les États-Unis doivent cesser d'encourager la guerre et parler de paix », a déclaré le président brésilien Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva le 14 avril dernier à Pékin, à l'occasion d'une visite d'État. Pareille prise de position sur le conflit ukrainien a valeur de symbole, dans un contexte où nombre de pays (...) / Relations bilatérales, États-Unis (affaires extérieures), Brésil, Diplomatie, Ukraine, Russie, Amérique latine, Relations internationales - 2023/05

Depuis septembre 2020, l'Azerbaïdjan multiplie offensives militaires et coups de force contre l'Arménie. Son objectif : la réintégration du Haut-Karabakh, une enclave arménienne enchâssée dans son territoire que Bakou a partiellement reconquise. À Erevan, on craint un nettoyage ethnique et la (...) / Arménie, Caucase, Azerbaïdjan, Conflit - 2023/05

Fast drei Wochen nach Beginn der politischen Krise, die zum Sturz von Michel Barnier als Premierminister führte, gibt es immer noch keine neue Regierung. Zweifel bestehen, ob eine künftige Regierung von längerer Dauer sein wird.

Am Sonntag (29. Dezember) findet in Kroatien die erste Runde der Präsidentschaftswahlen statt. Gleichzeitig richten EU-Beamte und Regulierungsbehörden ihr Augenmerk auf ein zentrales Thema: den Kampf gegen digitale Desinformation.

For some time, some western politicians and press have repeatedly hyped up the so-called Chinese "overcapacity", and extended such accusation from new energy to more sectors, claiming that China exports excess capacity and hits the global market. In fact, this argument is abusing the concept of "overcapacity" and goes against both the objective facts and rules of market economy.

The post The So-Called Chinese “Overcapacity” Is Completely Untenable appeared first on Euractiv.

Une cinquantaine de frontières terrestres dans le monde font l'objet de litiges entre voisins. Certains conflits donnent lieu à des affrontements, d'autres sont gelés, d'autres encore sont en voie de résolution, les gouvernements ayant décidé de négocier. Tels ceux de Hanoï et Phnom Penh, qui ont (...) / Asie du Sud-Est, Géographie, Conflit, Cambodge, Vietnam, Frontières - 2023/05

The United States cannot deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan nor win a long war without Indonesia. In conjunction with Australia, Indonesia could ensure a virtually impassable maritime blockade of Chinese commerce, enforced with only land-based aircraft and light patrol ships and backed up by the U.S. Navy’s littoral combat ships. Its collaboration would also be crucial for the protection of all convoys proceeding to friendly Asian littoral states routed through the Timor and Arafura Seas. 

Even on its own, democratic Indonesia, with a population of 280 million, a robust GDP of $1.3 trillion, an active military of over 400,000, and a historical suspicion of China, is a natural obstacle to Beijing’s aspirations in Southeast Asia. In January of 2018, U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis described Indonesia as a “maritime fulcrum” in East Asia. In November of 2024, President-elect Donald Trump had a very positive conversation with Indonesia’s new President, Prabowo Subianto, who had received his staff officer training in the United States in the 1980s.   

U.S. aircraft carriers are the cornerstone of the blue water navy and guarantors of trans-oceanic commerce. Diverting these capital platforms to enforce a close blockade of the Chinese littoral in the event of a multi-year war over Taiwan is risking the United States’ preeminent great power status. A network of usable airbases already being constructed in the Philippines, such as at San Vincente Naval Airfield, are less than 600 kilometers from the Taiwan Strait and are a far more cost-effective staging area from which to interdict a Chinese amphibious crossing with combat aircraft and drones. At these distances, U.S. Air Force aircraft will be able to operate with maximum bomb load-outs and without the need for refueling. They will also benefit from the radar masking of their approach by Taiwan’s central mountainous ridgeline. 

China’s principal anti-carrier systems are its estimated thirty 1,800 km range DF-21D missiles and approximately 140 4,000 kilometer range DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles, plus an H-6 bomber carried DF-21 variant in development, with a reaction time of less than twenty-five minutes. China’s Type 055 Renhai destroyer can also deliver the 1,000-kilometer range YJ-21 hypersonic anti-ship ballistic missile. A 2,000-kilometer range system will cover Luzon, the Strait of Malacca, and all of the Bay of Bengal, problematizing the use of U.S. carriers there to enforce a blockade, and a 4,000-kilometer range system will encompass Guam, all of Indonesia, and the Central Indian Ocean. 

On September 25, 2024, China launched an 11,500-kilometer-range DF-31AG ICBM into the Pacific for the first time since 1980. This may have been a test of China’s space-based surveillance system to track surface ships. The low probability of a successful strike on a U.S. aircraft carrier increases substantially over the course of an entire blockade campaign, as weather, accidents, miscommunications, chance satellite observation, submarine interceptions, and electronic detection turn a possibility into a high aggregate cost probability of a disabling and subsequent sinking.

While unlikely to be decisive, like any form of sanctioning or interruption of trade, a complete naval blockade of China will contribute significantly to war termination by disrupting China’s export trade, which has grown from $2.2 trillion in 2013 to $3.3 trillion in 2023. Most of China’s imports of $2.16 trillion, 80 percent of its oil, and 90 percent of its overall trade are moved by ships. China is aware of its vulnerability to a blockade and has taken measures to achieve energy and food self-sufficiency. Beijing plans to double its fleet of nuclear reactors to 150 by 2035. 

By cultivating trade and connecting infrastructure to Russia through its overland route, Moscow will be able to provide oil, gas, grain, and key military technologies, even if Washington has the political will to bar the Bering Strait passage to Moscow’s tanker fleet. Beijing has passed legislation requiring local authorities to take responsibility for food reserves, as well as other measures promoting greater domestic productivity. China projects a further 16 to 30 percent increase in caloric demand by 2050 from the growth of its middle class. Of China’s $235 billion in food imports, its three principal suppliers of its largest commodity, soybeans, are Brazil, the United States, and Argentina.

The closure of Indonesia’s Strait of Malacca, through which passes $3.5 trillion in trade aboard 80,000 ships annually, like the 1967 closure of the Suez Canal, would impose an extra monthly re-routing of shipping cost of $2.8 billion, not including the increased cost of insurance. One-third of the world’s shipping, including 23.7 million barrels of oil per day and a substantial portion of the trade of the littoral Asian democracies, transit through the adjacent South China Sea. Needless to say, a war over Taiwan will severely disrupt global supply chains.

Indonesia’s four main straits are easily interdicted by boarding teams carrying patrol ships and helicopters and mobile land-based anti-ship missile platforms. The Strait of Malacca is only 2.7 kilometers wide at its narrowest choke point. The other three principal straits, from west to east, are the ten kilometers wide Sunda, the twenty kilometers wide Lombok, both of which were blocked by Indonesia in 1988, and the ninety kilometers wide Makassar. Other straits further east are the ninety-kilometer-wide Lifamatola, the thirty-five-kilometer-wide Wetar, the thirty-kilometer-wide Ombai, and the 20-kilometer-wide Dampier. 

According to the 2024 International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Military Balance, excluding frigates and coast guard equivalents (Bakamla and KPLP), Indonesia’s available strait policing forces consist of eight Exocet and sixteen torpedo-armed corvettes, fifteen missile-armed patrol craft (out of 159 patrol vessels), eight mine countermeasure ships, drone-ships, eleven Panther and eight AH-64 Apache helicopters, and about thirty maritime patrol aircraft. Given the narrowness of most of the straits, even an instrument as extreme as the use of nuclear weapons could not undo a land-based Indonesian blockade. 

Beijing’s option of directly seizing the Strait of Malacca would be possible but complex. Unlike Japan’s sweep through Southeast Asia in 1941, the major powers, including the United States, have been careful not to become irretrievably committed to conflicts elsewhere in Ukraine and the Middle East. China has six Marine Brigades, a Naval Special Forces Brigade, and six Army Marine brigades, totaling some 40,000 troops. This presumes China would then train new substitute army formations for an amphibious assault on Taiwan. 

Because China’s supply line through the South China Sea would be so precariously exposed to aerial interdiction, even supposing a neutral Vietnam, it would be necessary to seize the airfields of Western Taiwan, Luzon, Palawan, Natuna Island, and several hundred kilometers of Sumatra’s east coast. China would only need to land at Lingayen Gulf and defeat the Philippines’ under-armored 5th and 7th Divisions to neutralize the airbases in northern Luzon and push to Manila. 

Any prospect of securing the 800-kilometer Malacca Strait would require a diplomatic victory to obtain Malaysia and Singapore as bandwagoning allies of a Chinese attack against U.S. interests. A PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy) landing would still confront three Indonesian maneuver brigades and four brigade equivalents of battalions, backed up by two Kostrad strategic reserve divisions in Java. 

The United States, Australia, and Japan have anticipated this possibility and have since conducted joint exercises with Indonesia on Sumatra. In November 2023, the United States and Indonesia announced a Joint Comprehensive Strategic Partnership aimed at improving maritime cooperation and as a lead-in to the signing of a future Defense Cooperation Arrangement. Accordingly, Jakarta is in negotiations for the purchase of 24 F-15EXs and additional F-16s. 

At the same time, Jakarta’s relations with Beijing have worsened since China extended its territorial claims to the Exclusive Economic Zone of Indonesia’s Natuna Island. To comply with U.S. investment tax incentives, Indonesia has further imposed high tariffs on a number of Chinese imports and decreased Chinese shareholding in Indonesian nickel-mining concerns (the world’s largest reserves) related to electric vehicles. 

Indonesia, after General Suharto’s 1965 counter-coup against the Communist-influenced Sukarno regime, was a key Cold War ally, securing East Timor from Soviet domination, which had befallen other newly independent Portuguese colonies. Indonesia also plays a useful counter-balancing role against the influence of China, primarily because of its size, in Malaysia and Singapore. Current Malaysian prime minister Anwar Ibrahim has criticized Western hostility to the rise of China, tilting Kuala Lumpur towards Beijing as it seeks its economic investment. 

In a 2022 poll, 39 percent percent of Malaysians viewed China favorably. Singapore, whose 75 percent Chinese population is deeply sympathetic with China, was 67 percent favorable towards Beijing in a 2022 Pew Research Center poll. Although Singapore has shared a Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United States since 2015, providing basing for U.S. LCSs and P-8s, its principal strategy of hedging makes it liable to shift its support to Beijing if the United States appears weak.

Washington’s influence is, however, limited by Jakarta’s policy of non-alignment. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore have all resisted U.S. efforts to subject the Strait of Malacca to international administration. China remains the largest trading partner with all of ASEAN as well as Indonesia and is a major contributor to a $132 billion industrial project and hydropower plant in Kalimantan. Indonesia is also torn between coordinating its response to China with India and privileging its historical alliance with Pakistan, an ally of Beijing.

Furthermore, most Indonesians and the Jakarta government see U.S. support for Israeli military action in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran through the prism of anti-colonialism and Islamic solidarity. Southeast Asia is about 40 percent Muslim. In Indonesia, 87 percent of the population practices Islam. Malaysia is 61 percent Muslim. In all of the first and second Trump administrations and the Biden administration, Washington’s diplomatic priority was to secure the normalization of relations between Israel and Indonesia as an extension of the Abraham Accords. There is little prospect of success at the moment, given Indonesian sympathy for the Palestinians. 

The best substitute for an extraordinarily inexpensive and low-risk blockade conducted from the shores of Indonesia would be for the U.S. Navy to retreat its cordon to the west of the Strait of Malacca and leverage access to bases near the Indian coast. In so doing, it would sacrifice the easy reach of coastal Indonesian airbases to interfere with the inshore shipping of the Gulf of Siam and South China Sea. Furthermore, Indian and U.S. ships operating anywhere in the Bay of Bengal and even the central Indian Ocean would be vulnerable to strikes by China’s DF-21/26 anti-ship ballistic missiles, guided by PLAN submarines operating out of Myanmar, Pakistan, Iran, or possibly even South Africa. 

In the event that China secured the Malacca Strait with the help of Malaysia or obtained a land bridge from Thailand through the Kra Isthmus, shipping could still be interfered with from India’s bases on the Nicobar and Andaman Islands. If China’s naval expansion permitted it to deploy a permanent flotilla of two aircraft carriers in the Indian Ocean by 2035–2040, it would still be hard-pressed to shepherd convoys against the littoral threat from Indian ships, aircraft, or submarines. 

Similar attempts to establish a permanent station, as the PLAN has practiced in the South Atlantic for the last decade, are unsustainable in wartime without being replenished in a well-protected allied safe harbor. In the further absence of support from Delhi in the Indian Ocean, the U.S. Navy could operate further west from Oman’s Masirah Island near the Straits of Hormuz, Socotra Island at the mouth of the Bab el-Mandeb strait, or from the Diego Garcia anchorage in the Chagos Archipelago.

Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill is an associate professor of international relations at Concordia University and the author of Militarization and War (2007) and Strategic Nuclear Sharing (2014). He has published extensively on Pakistan security issues and arms control and completed research contracts at the Office of Treaty Verification at the Office of the Secretary of the Navy and the then Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO). He has also conducted fieldwork in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Egypt and is a consultant. He is a former Operations Officer of the 3rd Field Engineer Regiment from the latter end of the Cold War to shortly after 9/11. He tweets at @Ju_Sp_Churchill.

Image: Muratart / Shutterstock.com. 

Chaque jour, le bilan humain à Gaza s’alourdit sous les bombardements intensifs. Des milliers de personnes restent piégées sous les décombres, tandis que d’autres succombent à des conditions de vie désastreuses, faute de nourriture, de soins ou d’eau potable.
Peut-on parler de génocide pour qualifier les actions israéliennes dans la bande de Gaza ? Certains affirment que ce terme ne doit pas être utilisé « à la légère » et qu’il nécessite une réflexion approfondie. Pourtant, il est essentiel de rappeler que la Convention de 1948 sur la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide existe précisément pour éviter de telles tragédies.
Depuis novembre 2023, des institutions spécialisées et des experts des Nations Unies alertent sur un risque de génocide Cette année, la Cour Internationale de Justice a reconnu un risque plausible de génocide à Gaza. Au cours des dernières semaines, des ONG comme Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch et Médecins sans Frontières ont publié plusieurs rapports documentant des nettoyages ethniques et des crimes de génocide contre les Palestiniens de Gaza.
La mise en place d’un cessez le feu ainsi qu’une prise de conscience de la communauté internationale sont plus pressantes que jamais, alors que les voix dissidentes qui dénoncent les agissements de l’armée israéliennes sont toujours censurées.