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This graphic shows how the THAAD system is networked via fiber optic cables to its various components to detect, identify, and engage an incoming missile. The THAAD missile, called an interceptor, has no warhead or explosives. Instead, it uses “kinet… (Photo Credit: U.S. Army)

After over 500 ballistic missiles demonstrated a historic threat to city centres and thoroughly established a Causus Belli, the United States’ responded to future threats by erecting a THAAD site in the Middle East. In past conflicts, a significantly smaller SCUD threat in the 1991 Gulf War was a large factor in establishing a coalition of willing powers to challenge tyranny in the region. With ballistic missiles being a known threat during the Second World War via V-2 rockets, it has only been a recent phenomenon where a defence against such threats even exists. Even during the 1991 Gulf War, early Patriot missile systems were largely ineffective in intercepting SCUD missiles, despite the SCUD being significantly older technology and in a lot smaller numbers. A notable strike on US personnel in Saudi Arabia showed there was little defense against the SCUD if the launchers were not intercepted within minutes of the missile being made ready to fire. The invention of THAAD came from the motivation to have missile interceptors protect allied forces as well as innocent civilian populations as promised in 1991. With that technology finally becoming active, missile interception systems closely belongs to the era of the 2020s.

The THAAD system was mostly known previously for its deployment and political tension created around it in the Pacific region. With North Korea continuously demonstrating the range of their ballistic missile programs, THAAD was proposed to be introduced in Asia at the protest of China’s Government. THAAD is designed to target long range, high altitude rockets and intercept them in the upper atmosphere. THAAD would protect America itself from a massive attack, often eliminating large warheads that are designed to create a lot of area damage, but also could carry chemical and nuclear warheads. THAAD, if successful, would mirror Reagan’s Star Wars system, eliminating missiles at the highest arc of their trajectory, except being based on the ground. THAAD would work however, whereas Star Wars was a proposal well beyond the technology of its time.

Despite there being versions of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems surrounding Moscow since the 1960s, there were no confirmed successful uses of these systems in combat until recent more modern missile systems demonstrated they could target and eliminate other active missiles. During the War in Ukraine, older ballistic missiles like the OKA were able to beat out more modern S-300, SA-11 and SA-15 systems designed to knock missiles out of the sky. Only the most modern missile systems are able to knock out Russian missiles, with a spotty success rate at best. THAAD will likely be more active in the region soon, and a true test of its capabilities will be established. The ability of THAAD to coordinate missile defense with other systems is significant, as the THAAD radar is extremely powerful and able to detect missiles being fired from across the entire Middle East.

The THAAD system may have a weakness if it is not coordinated and connected to smaller defensive missile systems/Anti-Air systems that can protect the THAAD site and radar from smaller missile and drone threats. Bleeding THAAD and other expensive and complicated systems of their missiles was experienced in Ukraine as Russia used low cost drones to drown the radar detection with multiple targets and use up crucial missiles that are needed against high speed targets, as opposed to slow, inexpensive drones and missiles. The THAAD system therefore should only be used for its main purpose, and other systems need to be married to it for its own defense and a proper long term layered defense of the protected territory. Taking out a THAAD or something claimed as equivalent like a Russian S-400 system is a significant victory, as it shows that the territory cannot be protected and a new strategy needs to be initiated and installed, a task that can take a large amount of time in a difficult and ever expanding conflict. Suffering a missile barrage, even if defended successfully, allows the enemy to better target vital resources and civilians the next time around, and requires a defensive capability along with offensive action. The result of failures has already demonstrated the brutality of conflict when missile defense is relied upon too much and a military becomes complacent in war.

In October, maritime security experts, military leaders, and industry professionals gathered to enhance international cooperation and expertise in defending maritime infrastructure.

The Naval Station of La Algameca, in Cartagena, hosted the first "Harbour Protection Seminar-Exercise" from 7 to 18 October. Organized by the Spanish Navy's Unit of Countermine Measures Divers (UBMCM) in collaboration with the European Defence Agency (EDA), the exercise gathered over 100 experts and professionals from 10 different countries: Spain, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Ukraine, Greece, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Romania, and Belgium. The event underscored the importance of international cooperation in safeguarding harbors and critical maritime infrastructures.

The main objective of the seminar was to update participants on the latest technologies, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) related to maritime infrastructure protection, with a special focus on the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

During the first week, presentations were given by experts from renowned institutions, such as the National Geographic Institute and the IED Centre of Excellence in Countermeasures (COE-CIED).

Industry was also present and several companies from the defence sector presented cutting-edge technological innovations in this field.

The most relevant innovations included the Bayonet tracked underwater robot, an aerial drone equipped with a LIDAR with bathymetric sensor, and software for the creation of 2D models from sonar images. A 5G remote device control system was also presented.

The second phase of the seminar consisted of simultaneous practical exercises in various maritime scenarios, including port areas, shallow waters and a simulated gas pipeline. During these exercises, limpet mines and over 100 kg of explosives were used, where teams worked on the identification and neutralisation of mines and explosive ordnance, covering all stages of the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and incident management (WIT) process.

The ‘Harbour Protection Seminar-Exercise 2024’ has proven to be an invaluable platform for the improvement of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) and interoperability between the various participating Armed Forces. It highlighted the importance of continuous readiness and learning in a constantly evolving technological and threat environment.

 

 

Ebben a bejegyzésben folytatjuk tavasszal megkezdett sétánkat a USS Harry S. Truman repülőgép-hordozó kilenc repülőszázadának gépei között. Márciusban az F-14 Tomcat-tel kezdtem, augusztusban az E-2 Hawkeye és a C-2 Greyhound került sorra, most pedig három típussal, az EA-6B Prowlerrel, az S-3B Vikinggel és az SH-60F / HH-60H Seahawkkal folytatom. Emlékeztetőül: a helyszín a Földközi-tenger, az időpont 2005 márciusa.

*

A VAQ-130 Zappers elektronikai hadviselési század 2000 óta volt része a Truman ezredének. 2005-ben már a harmadik bevetést teljesítették ezen a hordozón és végeztek elektronikai harctevékenységet az Iraqi Freedom műveletben. Amíg a vadászbombázó századok egy-egy repülőgép-hordozós bevetés végén többnyire közzéteszik a ledobott bombák, elindított rakéták, kilőtt gépágyúlőszerek és úgy általában a felszállások számát, a Prowler alegységek ebben a kérdésben igen diszkrétek voltak. Jöttek-mentek, zavartak, adatokat gyűjtöttek, esetleg elindítottak egy-egy lokátor elleni HARM rakétát – ha volt mire. A VAQ-130-asok nyilvánosság számára szóló naplójában sem szerepel több, de hát ez már csak így működik, amióta légi elektronikai hadviselés létezik. A század szárazföldi bázisáról, a Washington állambeli Whidbey Island-ről 180 fővel települt a Trumanra. Ebben a létszámban mindössze 24 hajózó volt, ők osztoztak a négy Prowler 16 ülésén.

[...] Bővebben!

Mire Lajçi serait la dernière vierge jurée du Kosovo. Iel a décidé un jour de devenir un homme et de s'occuper des moutons dans les montagnes de la Rugova. Aujourd'hui, iel vit ses vieux jours dans la famille de son frère, sans regret mais en souffrant du manque de ses montagnes. Reportage.

- Articles / Kosovo, Société, Courrier des Balkans

How much do we really understand about the virus formerly known as monkeypox?

The case of Bülent Mumay in Türkiye
The cases of unjustly imprisoned Uyghurs in China, notably Ilham Tohti and Gulshan Abbas
Iraq, notably the situation of women’s rights and the recent proposal to amend the Personal Status Law
Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

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IPI in partnership with Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, cohosted a policy forum on “National Action Plans for National Challenges: Addressing Environmental Crises through the WPS Agenda” on October 24th.

The women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda has recently expanded to include issues outside of “traditional conflict,” such as climate change and environmental disasters. As the agenda has evolved, this expansion has become a key part of contextualizing and applying WPS principles and priorities in different countries. However, despite recognizing that preparing for disasters and climate emergencies are gendered processes, few national action plans (NAPs) on WPS incorporate specific language about disasters. Incorporating disaster preparedness and climate considerations into NAPs is an important way to consider peace through a feminist viewpoint and define it as more than just the absence of violent conflict. NAPs should be tailored to a specific country’s context and integrating disaster risk reduction (DRR) or climate dynamics more broadly can be a powerful way to make an NAP relevant to a country’s internal dynamics. Panelists at the event explored how the WPS agenda has been expanded to include climate and environmental concerns and how different member states contextualize these issues within their NAPs.

Welcoming Remarks:
Adam Lupel, Vice President and COO, International Peace Institute

Opening Remarks:
Shanti Shoji, Director of Programs, Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA
Irene Fellin, Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security, NATO 

Speakers:
Sho Ono, Minister, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Permanent Mission of Japan to the UN
Katrina Fotovat, Principal Deputy Director, Office of Global Women’s Issues, US Department of State
Japhet Eichel, Associate Expert, Climate, Peace and Security, UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
Maryruth Belsey-Priebe, Co-Founder, aXXelerate
Harriette Williams Bright, WPS Humanitarian Action Compact Lead, UN Women

Interventions from the floor:
Miwako Kitamura, Researcher (specially appointed), International Research Institute of Disaster Science, Tohoku University
Dalal El Taher, Board Member at Syria Civil Defence, The White Helmets (Virtual)

Moderator:
Phoebe Donnelly, Senior Fellow and Head of Women, Peace and Security, International Peace Institute

The post National Action Plans for National Challenges: Addressing Environmental Crises through the WPS Agenda appeared first on International Peace Institute.

The Dutch Parliament has passed two fresh biased resolutions against Azerbaijan, a strong ally of the United States.  These two resolutions were passed after the Dutch Parliament recommended that the government support Armenia in every possible way, particularly in the context of the “seizure of Karabakh,” a resolution that was heavily criticized in Azerbaijan

The first fresh resolution states: “Considering that the Azerbaijani army attacked Nagorno-Karabakh (again! – Ed.) in September 2023, causing almost the entire population to flee to Armenia and not yet return to their homes, and also because Azerbaijan is destroying Armenian cultural heritage in the region… We call on the government to take action to protect Armenian cultural heritage, both under the 1954 Hague Convention and within the framework of UNESCO.”

The second resolution states: “that “obstacles (to the peace process – Ed.) still exist, including Azerbaijan’s continued detention of Armenian prisoners of war.” The resolution calls on the Dutch government, along with other European countries, to intensify pressure on Azerbaijan to expedite the release of all Armenian “prisoners of war.”

Following the parliamentary initiative, a representative of the executive branch—Dutch Foreign Minister Caspar Veldkamp—also expressed support for these resolutions during his speech. He called for the release of individuals associated with the former separatist regime and terrorists arrested by the Azerbaijani side, framing them as “prisoners of war.”

I have visited Karabakh five times and the only significant destruction of cultural heritage that I witnessed was that of Armenians destroying Azerbaijani cultural heritage.    I saw the ruins of Aghdam, where 100,000 people used to live in the Soviet period.  I saw the ruins of the historic Bread Museum, which used to house a loaf of bread that was preserved by Soviet soldiers dating from the Second World War. All that remains of that museum is a half-destroyed mural. I saw tombs dating from the Karabakh khanate, a world heritage site which were partially destroyed. I saw a mosque, which until recently housed pigs and goats, and was used as an Armenian watch tower. And I saw the remnants of a cemetery, where all of the bones were thrown away, with the tombstones and gold teeth in the graves being sold for use in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

I was in Shusha and saw a destroyed Azerbaijani palace, a destroyed bank, and destroyed government offices.  All of Shusha, the capital of Azerbaijani music and poetry, was essentially ruins, after the Armenians controlled the area for thirty years and literally lived among the ruins, not rebuilding anything.     I saw a monument to Soviet soldiers that was destroyed in the city of Sultanya.    I saw a ruined mosque in Zangilan, which was recently rebuilt but the ruins were preserved as a memorial to Armenia’s crimes against humanity.   Mile after mile, I saw destroyed agricultural fields, ruined homes and other cultural heritage sites, and many mosques that lay demolished or disrespected in cruel ways.   In contrast, I saw that the Azerbaijanis only caused mild damage to a church in Shusha, which they rushed to fix.   Yet, the Dutch Parliament is silent on all of this destroyed cultural heritage. 

They only care about the few churches that accidently got damaged in the fighting and that Azerbaijan imprisoned some Armenian separatists, like Ruben Vardanyan, a Russian oligarch of Armenian ethnicity close to Putin who committed crimes against Azerbaijanis.   Just as the West wants to see Israel release Hamas and Islamic Jihad terrorists in exchange for freeing the hostages, so does some Western countries like the Netherlands wish to see terrorists with Azerbaijani blood on their hands set free.      

The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry stated in its response: “It is regrettable that the aforementioned documents and expressed opinions completely ignore the fact of military occupation that was once perpetrated against our country, the ethnic cleansing of the Azerbaijani population, and the ongoing territorial claims of the Armenian side against Azerbaijan.”

This is major double standard on the part of the Netherlands: “The colonial past of the Netherlands is marked by the enslavement and exploitation of numerous peoples in Asia, Africa, and the Americas, along with numerous crimes committed against them. As they expanded their colonial empire through brutal tactics, the Netherlands consistently prioritized profit over human rights. A significant portion of the Netherlands’ development is built on the plundered national wealth of enslaved countries. Therefore, the statement from the Netherlands—who continue to keep various peoples around the world in a state of dependency—that they are making efforts to overcome the severe consequences of their own colonial history should be viewed as hypocrisy,” stated the Milli Majlis of Azerbaijan.

The Baku Initiative Group (BIG) has announced its invitation to the Parliament of the Netherlands to urge the government to put an end to the crimes occurring on the islands of Bonaire, Sint Maarten, Aruba, Curaçao, Sint Eustatius, and Saba. The group also called for the establishment of an investigative commission to hold accountable those responsible for past and ongoing crimes. Additionally, the Group urges the European Union to support the creation of a relevant body under the UN Human Rights Council to oversee criminal activities in these territories and facilitate forwarding recorded cases to other UN bodies. “We urge you to support initiatives against colonial crimes at the international level and back the activities of the Baku Initiative Group,” BIG stated.

 

Megjelent az ökológiai gazdaságra átállást segítő pályázat felhívása. A pályázat keretében mezőgazdasági termelők tudnak pályázatot benyújtani, támogatást különböző fajtájú (szántóföld, gyümölcsösök, ültetvények) mezőgazdasági területek ökológiai gazdálkodásra való átállására lehet igényelni. A pályázat keretösszege 64 milliárd Ft.

La dirigeante des forces démocratiques du Vénézuéla et le candidat de l’opposition aux élections présidentielles de juillet recevront le Prix Sakharov pour la liberté de l’esprit 2024.
Commission des affaires étrangères
Commission du développement
Sous-commission "Droits de l'homme"

Source : © Union européenne, 2024 - PE

En Albanie, la réforme de la justice est présentée comme un « succès » de la communauté internationale. En fait, elle a été instrumentalisée par le régime d'Edi Rama pour écarter les opposants tout en renforçant sa légitimité sur la scène internationale. L'analyse au vitriol du fondateur de Lapsi.al.

- Articles / PS Albanie, Courrier des Balkans, Albanie, Défense, police et justice

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IPI in partnership with the Berghof Foundation, cohosted a policy forum on “Building Bridges for Nonviolent Change: The Role of Women as Insider Mediators” onn October 23rd. This event was held the day before the UN Security Council open debate on women, peace and security (WPS) and focused on the vital need to increase women’s participation in formal mediation processes.

This policy forum exposed multiple stakeholders in New York to the crucial work of women as informal bridge-builders in conflict situations, and discussed strategies for including their expertise in formal mediation processes. At the event, the Berghof Foundation launched research reports and a policy brief on the role of women mediators in recent protests in Venezuela, Thailand, and Iraq. These reports offer specific and actionable recommendations for how international donors and practitioners can fulfill capacity building and support needs to empower these women to sustain and deepen their engagement, thereby expanding the potential for achieving peaceful change and conflict transformation.

Opening Remarks:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and CEO, International Peace Institute
H.E. Jacqueline O’Neill, Canada’s Ambassador for Women, Peace and Security
H.E. Pascale Christine Baeriswyl, Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the UN
H.E. Arlene Tickner, Ambassador-At-Large for Gender Issues and Global Feminist Politics, Government of Colombia

Speakers:
Rachel Gasser, Senior Adviser, Negotiation and Mediation Support, Berghof Foundation
Isabella Picón, Activist and Researcher (Venezuela)
Nang Raw Zahkung, Peace Practitioner and Facilitator (Myanmar)
Tahani Abbas Ali Balalelsheib, Women Activist and Human Rights Defender (Sudan)
Sarah Taylor, Policy Specialist, Women, Peace and Security and Resilience, UN Women

Moderator:
Phoebe Donnelly, Senior Fellow and Head of Women, Peace and Security, International Peace Institute

The post Building Bridges for Nonviolent Change: The Role of Women as Insider Mediators appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Headaches in the morning

Maybe it’s some kind of Stockholm Syndrome, but since the Tories left office I have not felt the same urge to write about British European policy.

Equally possibly, it might be because I feel a bit broken by another government with a lack of clear purpose in this domain. Labour, like their predecessors, seem to be stuck at the point of realising this whole Europe thing might be a bit more complicated than they thought, so extemporise until they can work it all out some more.

This was brought to a certain head last week for me off the back of some comments I made in an interview. In it, I said:

“The secrecy right now lets others claim he [Starmer] has no plan – or worse, is just looking to make deals where he can.”

Various people have pushed back on this, mostly by reading it as ‘Starmer actually has no plan’. While I’m not quite arguing that, the impression that this is the case seems somewhat self-evident: communication is focused on what won’t happen – free movement of people, membership of Customs Union or Single Market – and on the nebulous ‘reset’.

This needs more thought and reflection, because there are several things going on here, all of them consequential and none of them clearly determinant.

First up, we need to be a bit clearer about what we’re/I’m talking about. In the broadest terms, there’s a difference between what we might term a vision, a strategy and a plan.

David Henig’s fine piece speaks to this difference by noting that we know what the UK wants of working with the EU; namely cooperation in any and all areas within the envelope of non-membership of the Customs Union, Single Market or full EU membership. That includes the usual litany of items such as an SPS agreement, fisheries access and security.

That is a plan (or rather, a series of plans); specific and localised actions to take. But it’s not really a strategy or a vision.

The UK has long failed to settle on – or even consciously discuss – its vision for relations with the EU and its predecessors. The point of relations sits uneasily in the wider uncertainties of how the UK wants to position itself in the wider world or of what kind of place it wants to be. You can insert your favourite Dean Acheson quote here [although seeing the other two ascribed to him, it might become my least favourite one].

Below any high-minded vision of who we are and what’s our place in the world, there is strategy, which starts to translate down towards the broad thrust of activity. In this case,  the questions are whether the current red lines are fixed and whether they derive from some higher purpose or instead are a function of party politics of the last few years.

Put differently, there’s nothing wrong with red lines, but you need to be able to understand why they exist and what purpose they serve if you are to defend them and to use them in your negotiations with the EU.

In this, I’m rather old-fashioned in thinking that party politics most usefully stops at the water’s edge and that external relations should speak to the needs of the country as a whole. But your mileage may vary on this.

At present, the defining mechanism seems to be one informed by the imperatives of trying to neutralise a tricky topic in party political terms, while also recognising specific needs and asks, combining to produce the external relations version of the Woolie’s pick and mix: lots of choice, lots of things you’ve never seen before and not the most sustaining of diets.

Secondly, we have to be alive to why people talk about wanting a vision/strategy/plan.

Clearly, the lack of strategy or vision is not for lack of ideas out there. The absence of a more articulated Labour policy has left groups from across the political spectrum to offer programmes and priorities (this is a good place to get some overview).

Because these are typically isolated from the need to attend to the party politics that the government has decided to be hemmed in by, they come with their own visions and strategies.

Right now, a lot of that comes from pro-European voices that take doing (much) more with the EU as A Good Thing. The youth mobility impasse has been a recent rallying point for them, both on what they see as intrinsic merits and on wider signalling or a desire to multiply connections.

Even my own position – that the government needs its own vision and strategy to create a durable relationship with the EU – still comes with an agenda of wanting to avoid big swings in policy.

From the government’s perspective, this is a complication: moving on a specific point risks opening up broader implications for relations just at the point when they seem to wish to hold off such things. Hence, havering on youth mobility despite very broad backing from interested groups and public opinion.

Again, this comes back to the lack of a robust vision and strategy that the government can lean on as justification for what it’s doing.

Finally, we have to separate rhetoric and action.

Just because politicians and pundits talk in a particular way, it doesn’t mean that they follow through on that in their action. In the present case, there is clearly a huge amount of interaction and activity between the UK and EU (again, a good overview here).

Last year’s fun over EV car batteries is a case in point, where lots of work went into avoiding a mutually-damaging situation: exactly the kind of issue that bubbled along in the specialist media, but which would have been a much bigger problem if not addressed.

To that extent, lacking a strategy hasn’t held back a lot of work, on things that need dealing with now.

But working towards any kind of relationship that is robust and resilient requires more than just reactive management of stuff that pops up. As the 2000-2010s showed very vividly, lots of small choices and steps can lead to radical outcomes: ‘not banging on about Europe’ became ‘let’s not talk about it’, leaving others to fill the gap.

—

To pull all this together, Labour’s issue appears to be not that dissimilar to David Cameron in the 2000s: a desire to park the ‘Europe’ issue and deal with other things that needed attention (and don’t cause so much anguish) leaves the field open to others to make their play for agenda-setting, which probably results in outcomes that are ultimately more adverse for the government than would otherwise have been the case.

This points to the need for finding a happier medium between obsessing and ignoring EU relations. Like any other significant part of public policy, there has to be sufficient engagement to follow through on agendas/visions if that is not to become a point of instability.

Knowing what you aim to achieve – and why – would be a helpful start in determining that level. To delay will only reduce options and make it harder to impose order and stability over the relevant activity.

The post Visions, strategies and plans: Deconstructing Labour’s EU policy appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Akár 20 millió forint támogatás igényelhető alacsony digitális intenzitással rendelkező KKV-k digitális versenyképességének javítására a DIMOP PLUSZ 1.2.3/A-24 kódszámú hitelprogram keretében. A finanszírozási összeg maximum 50%-a igényelhető vissza nem térítendő támogatás formájában.

A Nemzeti Irányító Hatóság 2024.10.-18-i közleményében közzétette az Állattartó telepek megújításának támogatása című pályázat várható lezásárát.

Abstract 

This paper examines the European Union’s (EU) approach to artificial intelligence (AI) governance, focusing on the period from the publication of Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI (2019) onwards. It explores the EU’s strategy to address its “digital gap” in AI development and adoption. The study employs a theoretical framework synthesizing concepts of AI policy as a “horizontal area” (Niklas and Dencik 2020), “tentative governance” (Kuhlmann and Rip’s 2018), and an “ethics first” approach (Floridi 2018). The analysis reveals and discusses the EU’s distinctive prioritization of ethical considerations in AI development, manifested through substantial public investments and flexible regulatory interventions. 

 

Introduction and Theoretical Framework 

“Europe’s digital gap”: this is how analysts at the McKinsey Global Institute in 2019 described Europe’s lagging behind global leaders such as the USA in the realm of AI development and adoption. They cautioned that while digitization is essential for the advancement of AI, Europe continues to lag approximately 35% behind the United States; a trend that has not diminished in recent years. More recently, the State of the Digital Decade 2024 report highlights both progress and challenges in Europe’s digital transformation, including in AI adoption. While there has been advancement in areas such as 5G coverage and digital skills, the report notes that the percentage of enterprises using AI increased by a mere 0.4% in 2 years, from 7.6% in 2021 to 8.0% in 2023, significantly below the 75% target for 2030 (see State of the Digital Decade Report, 2024, Annex 2). The analysis emphasizes the need for European Union (EU) countries to strengthen their actions and be more ambitious in achieving the Digital Decade’s goals, in order to ensure EU’s future economic prosperity. 

Europe’s technological divide is not only evident in the slow adoption of AI technologies but also in the stark disparities in AI investment between Europe and global leaders, like North America. A European Commission’s (EC) 2018 report illustrates the severity of this investment disparity, revealing that private AI investments in Europe totalled only €2.4-3.2 billion, compared to a much higher €12.1-18.6 billion in North America. This significant difference in investment underscores Europe’s struggle to foster a competitive AI ecosystem, one capable of stimulating innovation at the same pace as its counterparts. Scholars, such as Mazzucato (2017) caution about the impact of chronic underinvestment in high-risk, early-stage research, emphasizing the importance of public investment in fostering innovation, and warning that underfunding in these critical areas can lead to stagnation in technological advancement and economic growth. In the case of AI this gap is particularly concerning, because the transition from basic research to practical application can be extraordinarily short (Sepp Hochreiter, 2023), and many European enterprises still lag behind global competitors due to challenges in rapidly translating research into practical applications (State of the Digital Decade Report, 2024, Annex 2). 

The persistent digital divide underscores the critical importance of pan-European AI policy initiatives in accelerating AI adoption. To analyse this complex landscape, the present discussion adopts a theoretical framework that synthesizes three key theoretical concepts from existing literature and policy approaches. First of all, this is Niklas and Dencik (2020) theorization of AI policy as a “horizontal area” that spans multiple domains and sectors. The scholars highlight the dual role of state intervention in this process, which encompasses both public funding for research and regulatory oversight for industry. Secondly, Kuhlmann and Rip’s (2018) concept of “tentative governance” refers to flexible and adaptive regulatory approaches needed to address the dynamic and rapidly evolving nature of AI technologies. Thirdly, the “tentative governance” policy concept is extended by drawing upon Floridi’s (2018) guidance about “ethics first” approach to AI development and governance.  

The EU’s regulatory stance distinctively prioritizes ethical considerations in AI development and deployment, a principle firmly established by the 2019 Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI, which have laid the foundation for subsequent AI policy frameworks. Thus, the subsequent brief chronological analysis will examine key European AI-related policies and programs from 2019 onwards through these three theoretical lenses, focusing on how these initiatives aim to bridge the digital divide while adhering to principles of responsible and ethical AI development through flexible and adaptive “tentative governance” approaches. 

In accordance with the theoretical guidance about the dual role of state intervention in AI policy, the discussion will first explore public funding as a catalyst for ethical AI innovation, followed by an assessment of key recent EU AI policy interventions. This structure reflects the complementary nature of research funding and regulatory measures in shaping the European AI landscape. 

 

Public Funding as Catalyst of AI innovation 

In response to the challenge of the “digital gap,” Europe has increasingly relied on public funding and collaborative research initiatives as strategic tools to bridge this divide. Importantly, these funding initiatives integrate the ethics-first approach, ensuring that ethical considerations remain at the forefront of EU’s AI development strategy. 

Horizon Europe, with its substantial budget of €93.5 billion for 2021-2027 (note that this total includes all areas of research and innovation, not just AI), serves as the centrepiece of this strategy, deliberately committing to “act as a synergetic force across the EU funding programmes.” Within this, a significant portion is allocated to digital technologies, including AI. For instance, the “Digital, Industry and Space” cluster, which encompasses AI research, has been allocated €15.3 billion. Public investment acts supports innovation in critical technologies, while also emphasizing the development of ethically aligned AI systems. For example, Horizon Europe’s Ethics Appraisal Process is designed to ensure compliance with ethical standards throughout EU-funded research projects and now includes a mandatory ethics appraisal procedure for proposals that raise ethical issues. 

This approach is complemented by other initiatives within the European AI ecosystem. The Digital Europe Programme (DIGITAL), while separate from Horizon Europe, synergizes with it by focusing on building strategic digital capacities and deploying digital technologies. DIGITAL has an overall budget exceeding €7.9 billion for 2021-2027. The programmes will collectively invest €1 billion per year in AI, which totals €4 billion over four years (2021-2027). Both Horizon Europe and Digital Europe require ethics review procedures, even though they are more robustly defined within Horizon Europe compared to DIGITAL. This integrated funding strategy aims to establish a seamless continuum of support from foundational research to market deployment, with ethical considerations embedded throughout.  

European initiatives emphasize not only funding for research projects but also support for training and mobility programs. For instance, the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions, with a budget of €6.6 billion under Horizon Europe, specifically targets researchers in AI and other cutting-edge fields, while also promoting ethical awareness in AI research. Additionally, the European Innovation Council (EIC) has allocated €10.1 billion to promote breakthrough innovations, including AI, from laboratory settings to market products, with a focus on responsible and ethical development.  

Individual member states are also making substantial investments in AI. For example, the German Federal Government (2020) has pledged €3 billion for its AI strategy up to 2025, which includes a strong emphasis on “AI made in Europe” that adheres to European ethical standards. France’s National Strategy for AI (SNIA) had a budget of €1.5 billion in public funds for five years (2018-2022). The second phase of France’s national AI strategy (promulgated in 2021) dedicated a total of €2.22 billion for AI over the next 5 years, of which €1.5 billion in public funding and €506 million in private co-financing, with ethical AI development as a key priority. 

Collectively, the investments discussed in this section represent a substantial commitment to AI advancement. In its Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence Review (2021), the European Commission estimates that the combined public and private investments in AI in Europe could reach €20 billion per year over the next decade. This level of investment represents a significant step towards closing the AI investment gap and fostering a thriving AI ecosystem in Europe that prioritizes ethical considerations. 

 

Regulatory Interventions 

The ensuing brief overview will discuss key European AI-related policies and programs promulgated since 2019.  

The analytical exposition begins with the publication of the Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI by the High-Level Expert Group on AI. These guidelines laid the ethical foundation for Europe’s approach to AI development. An emphasis was placed on principles such as human agency, privacy, and non-discrimination, reflecting an “ethics-first” approach to AI governance. This initial step was of great importance in establishing the foundation for future policies. It signalled Europe’s commitment to developing AI systems that not only push technological boundaries but also align with fundamental European values. The guidelines has served as a compass, guiding subsequent regulatory efforts and shaping the European vision of “trustworthy AI.” 

Recognizing that AI development is intrinsically linked to data availability, the EU launched the European Strategy for Data in 2020. This strategy aimed to create a single market for data and envisioned a future where data flows freely within the EU while adhering to strict privacy and data protection rules. Moreover, it sought to democratize AI development by ensuring fair access to data, preventing the concentration of power in the hands of a few large tech companies.  

In 2021, the EU launched the Digital Decade policy program, setting ambitious targets for Europe’s digital transformation by 2030. This program recognized AI as a key technology for achieving these goals and emphasized creating a “secure and performant sustainable digital infrastructure.” The Digital Decade program marked a shift from isolated policies to a more comprehensive vision of Europe’s digital future. It contextualized AI within broader digital transformation goals, highlighting the interconnectedness of various technological advancements and societal changes. 

Proposed in 2021, the AI Act is a landmark legislation that would become the cornerstone of European AI regulation. As analysed by Veale and Zuiderveen (2021), it adopts a risk-based approach, categorizing AI systems based on their potential societal impact and implications for individual rights. This nuanced approach allowed for stringent oversight of high-risk applications while fostering innovation in lower-risk areas. Therefore, the act exemplifies the concept of tentative governance, providing a flexible framework that could adapt to the rapid pace of AI development.  

In 2022, the EU introduced the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act. While not AI-specific, these acts played a crucial role in shaping the regulatory environment for AI technologies in Europe. They set rules for online platforms and digital markets, indirectly influencing the development and deployment of AI technologies. These acts demonstrate tentative governance through their layered approach to regulation, with different rules applying to different sizes and types of digital platforms, allowing for adaptability as the digital landscape evolves. 

Running parallel to these regulatory efforts is Horizon Europe, the EU’s key research and innovation program for 2021-2027. While not exclusively focused on AI, Horizon Europe provides significant funding for AI research and development, fostering collaboration between academia, industry, and the public sector. Horizon Europe embodies tentative governance through its adaptive funding mechanisms and focus areas, which can be adjusted to address emerging AI challenges and opportunities. 

As seen from this brief exposition, from the ethical guidelines of 2019 to the risk-based approach of the AI Act and the adaptive research funding of Horizon Europe, there is a consistent pattern of flexible, adaptive governance strategies, which prioritise ethical considerations. These strategies allow the EU to navigate the complex and uncertain landscape of AI development while maintaining a balance between technological innovation and ethical considerations.  

 

Conclusions 

The EU must proactively harness the potential of AI to prevent becoming merely a consumer of solutions developed elsewhere and to capitalize on the transformative opportunities this technology presents. The EU’s approach to AI governance combines increased public funding with increasingly more flexible and adaptive regulatory frameworks. It aims not only to close the AI gap with global leaders but to establish Europe as a pioneer in human-centric, trustworthy AI that balances innovation with ethical considerations and societal needs.

The post The European Union’s AI Governance Agenda: Ethical Investment and Flexible Regulatory Approaches appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

 

The sum total of all human knowledge, spanning hundreds of thousands of years or more, is an amazing feat.

But there is no single human on earth who knows all this knowledge, nor any group of humans who could assimilate or understand it all, not even the tiniest fraction of it.

Artificial intelligence, however, is on track not only to eventually assimilate all knowledge ever gathered by humans, but also to understand it, analyse it, and uncover new knowledge yet to be discovered by humanity.

Professor Geoffrey Hinton, known as the “Godfather of AI” and who recently won the Nobel Prize for Physics, recently said that in future AI will always win any argument with a human because AI will be vastly more intelligent and knowledgeable than any human or humans.

That of course represents both an opportunity and a threat to all Homo sapiens.

Already, AI knowledge and intelligence have made dramatic strides in rapid time, with more enormous developments anticipated soon.

With that in mind, I asked AI (Chat GPT 4o) to write a hypothetical essay imagining, “What would Europe be like today if the EU never existed?”

It produced a 1,200-word article in just five seconds, which I am publishing below.

I could not have written it better, and certainly not in five seconds. (I now feel redundant!)

• EUROPE WITHOUT THE EU? – written by Artificial Intelligence

The European Union (EU), born out of the ashes of two devastating world wars, has reshaped the continent’s political, economic, and cultural landscape over the last seven decades.

Imagining Europe today without the EU requires rethinking the history of post-war integration, cooperation, and peace, all of which are tied closely to the Union’s existence.

This hypothetical essay explores the possible political, economic, and social outcomes of a Europe where the EU never came into being. Such a scenario likely would have featured more nationalist tensions, economic fragmentation, and weakened global influence.

• Political Fragmentation and Rising Nationalism

One of the EU’s greatest achievements has been maintaining peace among European nations, especially between historical rivals such as France and Germany.

Without the EU, it is possible that Europe’s political landscape would have remained far more fragmented, and nationalist sentiments, which have historically fueled conflict, might have taken a stronger hold.

The post-war period was a fragile time, and without the push for cooperation through institutions like the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and later the European Economic Community (EEC), the continent might have experienced ongoing territorial disputes and rivalries.

In this scenario, the absence of the EU would have likely led to a weaker and less coordinated approach to political crises.

European countries might have formed smaller, more regional alliances based on shared interests or historical ties, such as between France and the Benelux countries or between Scandinavian nations.

However, without the overarching EU framework, these alliances could have been less stable and more prone to collapse in the face of diplomatic challenges or economic downturns.

Moreover, individual countries might have pursued more inward-looking policies, potentially leading to heightened xenophobia, ethnic tensions, and populist movements, especially in response to crises like migration.

• Economic Instability and Trade Barriers

The EU has been instrumental in fostering economic cooperation, trade, and development across Europe.

Without it, Europe’s economy would likely be more fragmented, with less integrated markets and higher barriers to trade.

The Single Market, which allows goods, services, capital, and people to move freely across borders, would not exist, resulting in numerous customs checks, tariffs, and different regulatory standards between countries.

The economic powerhouses of Europe, like Germany and France, may have dominated trade agreements, potentially sidelining smaller nations.

Southern and Eastern European countries, which have benefitted enormously from EU development funds, might have struggled to modernise their economies and infrastructure without access to this financial support.

Regions that are today economically aligned with stronger economies through EU mechanisms would be left more vulnerable to recessions and financial crises.

Moreover, the absence of the euro would likely result in a patchwork of national currencies, which would be subject to frequent fluctuations and speculative attacks. Exchange rate instability could cause market volatility, hampering investment and long-term growth across the continent.

Countries that might have otherwise adopted the euro would remain vulnerable to currency crises, similar to what some European nations experienced in the early 1990s before deeper monetary integration began.

• Weakening of European Global Influence

Today, the EU stands as one of the world’s largest economic blocs and an influential political entity in global affairs.

Without the EU, Europe’s ability to project influence on the world stage would likely be diminished. Individually, European countries, even major players like Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, would have less leverage in global institutions such as the United Nations, World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The EU’s collective bargaining power has allowed it to negotiate favourable trade agreements with other major economies, such as the United States, China, and Japan.

Without this united front, European nations would have to rely on their individual negotiating power, which would vary significantly between large and small countries.

Smaller nations, in particular, would struggle to secure favourable terms in bilateral agreements with economic giants like the US and China.

Additionally, the EU’s strong stance on environmental protection and human rights would be much weaker without its existence.

Many of the region’s most progressive policies on climate change and digital privacy, for instance, have come from the EU’s ability to implement regulations that transcend national boundaries.

A Europe without the EU could mean less ambitious climate goals and fragmented environmental policies, hindering global efforts to combat climate change.

• Social and Cultural Divide

The EU has also played a significant role in promoting cultural exchange, education, and the free movement of people, which has fostered a greater sense of European identity.

Programs such as Erasmus, which allow students to study abroad in different European countries, have enriched lives and increased understanding between cultures.

Without the EU, the free movement of people would likely be restricted, making it harder for Europeans to work, study, or live in other countries.

A Europe without the EU might have maintained stricter immigration controls, not only between EU members but also between other European countries, such as those in the Balkans or Eastern Europe.

This could lead to fewer cultural exchanges and less intermixing of ideas and traditions across borders. Countries would be more inward-looking and nationalistic, which could deepen cultural divides and reduce the cohesion that the EU has sought to foster.

Furthermore, the EU has been at the forefront of human rights and democratic values, pushing countries to improve their governance in exchange for membership or access to its market.

In a scenario where the EU never existed, there would be less incentive for countries in Eastern Europe, for example, to embrace democratic reforms after the fall of the Soviet Union.

This could lead to more authoritarian regimes in Europe and potentially a rollback of the democratic principles that have flourished since the end of the Cold War.

• Security Concerns and Fragmented Defence

One of the EU’s most significant, if sometimes underappreciated, roles is its contributions to collective security.

Through the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and its coordination with NATO, the EU has helped maintain peace and stability in Europe. Without the EU, defence cooperation between European nations would be less integrated, potentially making Europe more vulnerable to external threats.

The continent would likely rely more heavily on NATO, but the absence of EU-led initiatives for crisis management and peacekeeping could lead to a weaker, more disjointed response to security challenges.

Without the EU, European nations might have pursued more individualistic defence policies, which could have strained relations between countries, leading to a less secure and less cooperative region.

Countries in Eastern Europe, which today benefit from EU support in facing pressure from Russia, might have faced greater vulnerability without the backing of a united Europe.

• Conclusion

A Europe without the European Union would likely be a more divided, unstable, and economically fragmented region.

Without the EU’s framework for political and economic integration, European nations might have struggled to maintain peace, coordinate on global issues, and compete in the global economy. Fragmentation, both political and economic, could have deepened, making the continent more susceptible to internal tensions and external threats.

While it is impossible to predict every outcome in this hypothetical scenario, the EU’s contributions to peace, prosperity, and cooperation are undeniable.

Without the EU, Europe today might resemble the fractured and conflict-prone continent of the early 20th century, rather than the relatively peaceful and prosperous one we know today.

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The post What would Europe be like if the EU never existed? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The European Defence Agency (EDA) brought together military experts, researchers, and industry professionals in October to shape the future of testing and evaluation of military capabilities. 

The development of testing and evaluation (T&E) centres for defence systems has been a priority for the EDA since its inception in 2004. Ensuring that testing across the EU follows the same procedures is crucial for interoperability among European forces and for equipment, where interoperability must be established from the ground up.

Over the three days of the conference from 8 October 2024, more than 100 participants from 18 EU Member States, EDA partner countries, EU institutions, and other relevant stakeholders gathered for the Fourth Test and Evaluation Community Days Conference in Linköping, Sweden.

In Linköping, delegates reflected on lessons learned from the war in Ukraine, the impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on defence testing capabilities, the influence of big data on decision-making within T&E organisations, and what testing and evaluation may mean for a new generation of experts.

As multidomain operations become a crucial element of modern warfare, understanding the interplay between air, land, maritime, space, and cyber operations is essential for building interoperability. In Sweden, experts shared case studies on international cooperation, illustrating how countries can collaborate to overcome common challenges, such as differing testing requirements and procedures across jurisdictions.

Part of the discussions was the IT platform developed for the European Defence Test and Evaluation Base (DTEB). This platform aims to identify test centres across EU Member States, highlighting available resources and challenges in the domains of land, maritime, air, space, and cyber defence. This initiative could play a pivotal role in addressing gaps in testing and evaluation resources across Europe, leading to more integrated and efficient efforts.

The event was co-organised with the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration, and delegates visited two test centres, one for land in Karlsborg and the other for air in Linköping. 

Event Video 
Photos

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IPI in partnership with the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, and the Permanent Mission of Denmark to the UN, cohosted the launch event of the 2024 Multilateralism Index on October 17th.

IPI and IEP launched the Multilateralism Index in September 2022. Two years later, we launched a refined and updated version of the index to assess changes in international cooperation over the decade between 2013 and 2023. By providing a quantitative assessment of the multilateral system, the Index provides an analytic tool to inform decision-making and guide political attention.

This launch event presented the key findings of the 2024 Multilateralism Index. It also considered concrete ways to create a stronger, more nimble multilateral system.

Opening remarks:
H.E. James Larsen, Permanent Representative of Australia to the UN
Erik Laursen, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Denmark to the UN

Presentation of the 2024 Multilateralism Index:
Albert Trithart, Editor and Research Fellow, International Peace Institute

Panelists:
H.E. Maritza Chan, Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the UN
Minh-Thu Pham, Co-founder and CEO at Project Starling, Nonresident Scholar at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Moderator:
Adam Lupel, Vice President and COO, International Peace Institute

Closing remarks:
Volker Lehmann, Senior Policy Analyst, The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) New York Office

The post Tracking the Past to Chart the Future Through the 2024 Multilateralism Index appeared first on International Peace Institute.