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Summary and Key Points You Need to Know: The U.S. Army's new armored vehicle, the M10 Booker, is being introduced as a highly mobile, cost-effective support vehicle for light infantry units. While not officially designated as a "tank" by the Army, it shares many characteristics with tanks, including a 105mm cannon and armor protection.

-The Booker is designed to be easily transportable, fitting two units onto a C-17 Globemaster III without disassembly. However, its smaller size and lighter armor raise concerns about its effectiveness in modern combat, particularly against near-peer adversaries.

-Critics argue that while the Booker offers mobility, it may lack the firepower and protection necessary to survive on today's battlefields.

The US Army has a new 'tank'…but don’t you dare call it a tank. And it’s something more than an armored personnel carrier. In fact, like most tanks, the new tank, designated the M10 Booker, does not carry personnel other than the crew at all. What’s more, the Booker appears to be a miniaturized version of the M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank (MBT). 

According to the US Army the Booker will “add firepower and maneuverability to the Army’s mechanized brigades.”

Its smaller size does not mean it will not pack a punch. The size of the Booker simply helps to keep maintenance costs down (in terms of maintenance costs, size really does matter). Possessing a 105mm cannon (compared to the Abrams’ 120 mm cannon), with lighter armor than the Abrams, the Booker is not just like its older, bigger brother. 

However, the Army is quite pleased with the product and hopeful about its effectiveness in future combat missions.

That, by the way, should give most readers pause. The M10 Booker, unlike the Abrams, was designed to easily fit onto a C-17 Globemaster III transport plane without having to be disassembled. The Abrams can certainly fit on a C-17. Unfortunately, the M1 Abrams is so large only one can fit on a massive C-17 and it must be partly disassembled to fit. The Booker, on the other hand, can fit two units to a C-17 and can be easily rolled-on-and-rolled-off the aircraft intact.

Nonetheless, what should we make of the M10 Booker? Does it make sense to acquire this new 'tank' with so many other budgetary demands coming out of the U.S. military these days? 

What Role is the M10 Booker Filling? 

The specific purpose of this non-tank-tank is to support light infantry units that are in the midst of combat operations. Rather than having to wait for an M1 Abrams to be reassembled back at an airbase and then deployed to the frontline to support infantry on the move, the M10 Booker can move quickly to targets on the front. The point with these systems would be to ensure mobility while protecting light infantry forces.  

The Army’s leadership has insisted that the M10 Booker is not a “light tank,” as some in the press have described it. US Army General Glenn Dean explained to the Military Times that the M10 Booker is not a light tank because “the historical use of light tanks has been to perform reconnaissance functions. This is not a reconnaissance vehicle. It’s not actually a mission match [for a light tank].”

But, as Davis Winkie of the Military Times opined, “Stop gaslighting us. It’s a damn tank.”

A more interesting query would be to find out what kind of a tank it is. Obviously, it is not an MBT on the order of the M1 Abrams. And the level of armor, plus the fact that it is not designed to do recon missions, indicates that this vehicle is not, in fact, a light tank. It’s more akin to a medium tank. The M551 Sheridan was the Cold War equivalent to the M10 Booker (although the Army classified that vehicle as a light tank). Although, the Sheridans could be parachuted into combat. But as one former Army tanker I chatted with recently claimed, “The Booker is light enough that they’ll probably be able to parachute it into combat eventually.” 

The Army says that the first M10 Booker was scheduled to be deployed by the Army in February of this year. Each unit costs around $12 million, roughly half the cost of the M1 Abrams tank. The Army has spent a total of $257 million on the M10 Booker program. 

The real question is, though, will it be effective in protecting infantry? 

What is a Tank?

The Army says that they incorporated many lessons learned from the battlefields in Ukraine. Well, one of the lessons learned should have been that light tanks are not very effective in the kind of combat that is occurring in Ukraine. While antiquated, the French flooded the Ukrainian Army with their AMX-10RC light tanks. All these platforms did was get a lot of good Ukrainians killed. They were deemed “unsuitable” for combat by the Ukrainians. Basically, Russian anti-tank weapons and more powerful Russian tanks kept blasting through the French light tanks.

The Booker tanks, like all light or light, or in this case, “medium” tanks (to keep the nitpickers in the Army’s leadership happy) appear to be missing the fundamental point about tanks. The entire purpose is to get firepower to the frontlines and punch through enemy formations. An 105mm gun and light armor will not achieve this, no matter how new or fancy the M10 Booker appears to be. Yes, it is a tank. No, it is not the kind of tank that one fighting a modern war against a near-peer rival would need. 

Part of the problem is that the acquisition system in the United States Department of Defense is completely broken. It’s untethered from reality and reflects political preferences rather than battlefield needs. Infantry needs to be mobile, and they need maneuverable vehicles supporting them. But they also need tanks—which is what the M10 Booker is, no matter how hard the Army wants to say otherwise—that can pack a wallop and that won’t be blasted to smithereens because of weak armor and a small gun.

The Booker tank is the wrong vehicle for the wrong kind of war.

Author Experience and Expertise: Brandon J. Weichert

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock.

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Summary and Key Points: This article explores five military weapons systems that were canceled but might have had transformative effects if they had survived. These systems, including the AH-56 Cheyenne helicopter, B-70 Valkyrie bomber, A-12 Avenger stealth aircraft, Future Combat Systems (FCS), and Sea Control Ship (SCS), each represented innovative approaches to modern warfare.

-However, they fell victim to various challenges such as budget constraints, technological immaturity, inter-service rivalries, and changing military priorities.

-While their cancellations often made sense at the time, they also left lasting impacts on military strategy and procurement, sometimes leading to missed opportunities for advancements in warfare.

Five Canceled Military Projects That Could Have Changed Warfare Forever

Weapons die for all kinds of different reasons. Sometimes they happen at the wrong time, either in the midst of defense austerity, or with the wrong constellation of personnel. Sometimes they fall victim to the byzantine bureaucracy of the Pentagon, or to turf fights between the services. And sometimes they die because they were a bad idea in the first place. For the same reasons, bad defense systems can often survive the most inept management if they fill a particular niche well enough.

This article concentrates on five systems that died, but that might have had transformative effects if they had survived. These transformations would only rarely have changed the course of wars (countries win and lose wars for many reasons besides technology), but rather would have had ripple effects across the entire defense industrial base, altering how our military organizations approached warfighting and procurement. Not all the changes would have been for the best; sometimes programs are canceled for sound reasons.

AH-56 Cheyenne:

In the early 1960s, the Army was just beginning to appreciate the value of helicopter aviation. The Army had used helicopters at the end of World War II, and used them extensively in Korea for reconnaissance and evacuation purposes.  As the sophistication of the machines grew, however, the Army began to see the prospect for much more advanced helicopters that could conduct a wide variety of missions.

The star of the show was supposed to be the AH-56 Cheyenne, a radical design that combined high speed with punching power. The Cheyenne could escort other helicopters in transport mission, or conduct ground support and attack ops independently. In particular, it contained a magnificent propulsion system that could offer speeds of up to 275 miles per hour.

But the Cheyenne fell victim to its own promise. The technologies that made the Cheyenne possible weren’t yet mature, and the early prototypes suffered from teething problems, leading to a fatal crash. The Air Force hated the whole idea of the Cheyenne, believing that the Army was trying to steal close air support and interdiction missions for itself.  The Air Force went so far as to propose a fixed-wing attack aircraft (which would eventually become the A-10) in its effort to kill the program.  Finally, the Vietnam War put enormous pressure on the defense budget, both in terms of making it harder to sell particular programs, and in diverting funds to directly support the war effort.

And so the Cheyenne never happened. Although, a few years later, the Army would push forward with the AH-64 Apache. In this sense, the cancelation of the Cheyenne merely delayed an advanced attack helicopter capability. But the Apache was also a much safer machine than the Cheyenne, and going with the more conventional system has undoubtedly limited the horizons of Army aviation.

B-70 Valkyrie:

The B-70 Valkyrie deserves its own operatic cycle. Envisioned as the replacement for the B-52 Stratofortress and the B-58 Hustler, the B-70 was designed to penetrate Soviet airspace at high altitude, and upwards of Mach 3. Beloved of the “Bomber Mafia,” a generation of senior officers who had cut their teeth in World War II’s Combined Bomber Offensive, the B-70 represented, to many, the future of the Air Force.

And just to show I’m not a hard-hearted guy, and it’s not all dollars and cents, the B-70 was a beautiful aircraft. Long and sleek, the Valkyrie resembles a space ship more than an aircraft. The surviving prototype remains on display at the National Museum of the United States Air Force in Dayton, Ohio.

But the Valkyrie was enormously expensive, and this expense made it vulnerable. First President Eisenhower, then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara were less than enchanted with the idea of spending enormous sums on another heavy bomber when ICBMs showed great promise in delivering nuclear weapons to the Soviet homeland. Advances in Soviet interceptor and surface-to-air missile technology were also making the B-70’s mission considerably more dangerous than first anticipated.

After constructing only two prototypes (one of which was lost during a PR stunt), the Air Force shut production down. Fifteen years later, the B-1B, with some superficially similar characteristics, would enter service.

The effect of the B-70 on the Air Force would have, on balance, been quite negative. Devoting tremendous resources to the procurement of another strategic bomber would have drawn attention away from both the tactical air force and the missile force. B-70s might (in desperation) have been committed to the bombing of Vietnam during Operations Linebacker I and II, but they would likely have performed no more effectively than the B-52s they were replacing. And both the B-52 and the B-1B have proven remarkably flexible in terms of missions and update technologies, in part because they have space for a larger crew (4 and 5, respectively) than the Valkyrie (2).  McNamara saved the Air Force from itself by preventing a long, deep procurement chasm that would have lasted thirty years.

A-12 Avenger:

What if we had a stealthy strike bomber that could take off from aircraft carriers? In the mid-1980s, the Navy needed a replacement for the beloved-but-venerable A-6 Intruder.  Building on expectations about the progress of stealth technology, McDonnell Douglas developed the A-12 Avenger, a subsonic “flying wing” bomber that visually resembled a miniature B-2 Spirit. Combining stealth with the flexibility of carrier ops, the A-12 promised an unparalleled deep strike capability.  Even the Air Force expressed interest in the A-12 as a replacement for the F-111 Aardvark.

But there were problems. Early expectations about the stealth coating proved optimistic, and the fixes substantially increased the Avenger’s weight.  Expenses soared, but the aircraft did not.  The biggest problem, however, was that the Avenger entered the design and production cycle just as the Cold War came to a close.  Facing a tight defense budget, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney decided to kill the A-12 in favor of less risky programs.

The effects of the cancelation remain with us today. Instead of acquiring an advanced stealth bomber, the Navy settled on the Super Hornet, a significant, but conventional, upgrade on the F-18s it already possessed.  Eventually, the continuing need for a stealthy, carrier-borne strike aircraft would manifest in the F-35C, a program that continues to teeter between “disaster” and “epic disaster.” Even if the F-35C somehow works out, the Navy gave up the deep strike mission when it settled on the Super Hornet. The Air Force is now concentrating on the Next Generation Bomber, a project that closely resembles the A-12 in many ways. The death of the A-12, in effect, transformed the nature of the USN carrier wing for a generation or more.

Future Combat Systems:

In the early 21st century, the body of theory known as the Revolution in Military Affairs resulted in a major Army procurement plan known as “Future Combat Systems.”  In brief, the application of RMA theory to modern operations suggested that the combination of precision-guided munitions, high processing speeds, real time communications, and all-encompassing sensor capabilities would transform the way in which armies fought.  Future Combat Systems envisioned an integrated system of weapons, vehicles, and sensors that could prove lethal and decisive across the combat spectrum.  The Army expected every element of the system to support the goal of linking sensors to shooters, enhancing killing power while reducing footprint. Army planners also intended FCS to result lighter, more deployable brigades.

But then the Bush administration dropped the Iraq War on the US Army.  Iraq created major problems for the development of the FCS program.  Intellectual energy and material devoted to developing the FCS concept to its fullest went, instead, to fighting the war.  The conflict demanded systems (such as the MRAP) that did not fit into the FCS concept.  Perhaps most important, the course of the war threw RMA theory into question, with guerrilla fighters consistently bloodying the nose of their technologically sophisticated American foes.

And so FCS died a slow death.  The vision of a coherent system-of-systems surrendered to the need to get particular capabilities into the field in piecemeal fashion, regardless of their role in the larger puzzle.  The Army fought the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars with a mix of new and legacy systems, combined with weapons that had no place in its future expectations.  While individual parts of the FCS vision survive, the ideal has yielded to budgetary and military reality.

Sea Control Ship:

What if, instead of a few very large carriers, the United States Navy had undertaken to build a large number of small carriers?  In World War II, the Royal Navy and the US Navy (USN) employed large numbers of escort carriers, small flattops that could support anti-submarine and amphibious operations.

In the early 1970s, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt pushed the idea of the Sea Control Ship (SCS), a small carrier that would defend sea-lanes against long-range Soviet strike aircraft and Soviet submarines.  Faced with the growing expense of modern supercarriers (the first Nimitz class carrier would enter service in just a few years) and the impending retirement of the venerable Essex class carriers, Zumwalt sought a low cost option for air operations that did not demand the full capabilities of a major carrier group.  Escort carriers had helped win the Battle of the Atlantic, and Sea Control Ships might make a similar contribution in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict.

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The heavy losses of main battle tanks (MBTs) in the Russia-Ukraine conflict have sparked debate over their future viability. While tanks have proven crucial in Ukraine, their vulnerability to advanced anti-tank weapons raises questions about whether they are worth the investment.

-Despite these concerns, the U.S. is developing the AbramsX, a new hybrid-electric MBT designed to be lighter, faster, and more fuel-efficient.

-However, the reliance on large lithium battery packs introduces new vulnerabilities, leading some analysts to question whether the significant costs of developing such advanced tanks are justified, especially given the ease with which tanks can be destroyed in modern combat.

AbramsX: Is the U.S. Army’s New Hybrid-Electric Tank Worth the Risk?

The decimation of main battle tanks in the fighting between Russia and Ukraine has some analysts wondering whether these military systems are still worth the cost. 

Armored vehicles have played pivotal roles in warfare since their introduction to combat more than a century ago. Useful for breaking enemy lines in warfare, transporting troops, and providing unmatched versatility for ground forces, heavy cavalry is a vital component of an armored corps. 

Tanks play a leading role in Ukraine, proving they are not obsolete. But the mounting tank losses on both sides also suggests even the most modern MBTs struggle to survive against advanced anti-tank weaponry. Thousands of tanks have been lost since Russia invaded in February 2022. Despite this performance, the U.S. is determined, to develop a costly new hybrid-electric MBT in the near future.

Introducing the Abrams Series of MBTs

The U.S. Army is designing its new AbramsX tank series to be lighter, faster, and more fuel-efficient than its predecessors. 

The Abrams tank series has its roots in the Cold War-era MBT-70 program, which sought to develop a replacement for the legendary M60 Patton. 

A number of variants emerged over the years. When the M1A1 Abrams was introduced, perhaps its most significant attribute was its Chobham armor, which was made to perform extremely well against HEAT rounds and other shaped charges. It was equipped with a 120 mm main gun, armor-piercing capabilities, a 1,500 horsepower engine, and sophisticated tracking systems. 

The upcoming AbramsX is designed to outmatch its counterparts in future conflicts. With a reduced weight, the new variant will require half the fuel consumption. The tank will also reportedly feature an embedded artificial intelligence capability and a new lightweight XM360 gun.

Is the New AbramsX Worth the Cost?

While the AbramsX’s hybrid electric power source comes with plenty of advantages, analysts have pointed out potential drawbacks of running on battery power.

As explained by Stephen Bryen for Asia Times, the need for large lithium battery packs to power the new tank series could be consequential: “Battery packs are heavy and expensive and they also are dangerous because they can explode if hit by shrapnel or if a mine blows out the tank’s bottom. While we don’t know the size of the battery the Army will opt for, it will have to be big enough to power a heavy tank – meaning the battery could weigh a few tons. This creates a vulnerability that does not exist today and raises questions on whether it makes sense to go in the hybrid direction.” 

Regardless of the AbramsX model’s performance relative to rival MBTs, the Army may not be able to justify pouring so many funds into a military system, the tank, that can be so easily destroyed in combat.

About the Author: Maya Carlin, Defense Expert 

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons Photos. 

The European Commission announced on Tuesday (20 August) that import volumes of Ukrainian honey had exceeded the limit fixed in the regulation setting trade benefits for Kyiv, triggering the reintroduction of tariff quotas.

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Summary and Key Points: The war in Ukraine has underscored the continued relevance of main battle tanks in modern warfare, despite previous predictions of their obsolescence.

-The Russian military's heavy losses have led it to deploy outdated tanks from the 1950s and 1960s.

-Meanwhile, Russia's supposedly advanced T-14 Armata tank has been plagued by development issues and has seen limited deployment in Ukraine, likely due to fears of exposing its vulnerabilities.

-The T-14's future is uncertain, with the possibility that ongoing problems and high costs may lead to its abandonment or a complete redesign.

Russia's T-14 Armata: A High-Tech Tank with a Troubled Future

If the war in Ukraine has taught one lesson above all other, it is that main battle tanks are still very important in modern warfare.

Before Russia invaded in 2022, plenty of observers thought tanks would be irrelevant in a conflict between two states. Indeed, former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, a stalwart supporter of Ukraine, opined as recently as November 2021 about the end of the tank era. 

But tanks keep on rolling. Battlefield demand for the steel behemoths is so high that the Russian military is pushing into service ancient vehicles from the 1950s and 1960s to replace its more than 3,000 tanks destroyed thus far. To an outsider, this decision is that much odder given that Moscow has in its arsenal one of the most advanced tanks in the world: the T-14 Armata. 

Or does it? 

The T-14 Armata and Its Ongoing Problems 

The T-14 Armata is a main battle tank weighing approximately 55 tons and equipped with a 125 mm main cannon. It requires a crew of three men (commander, driver, and gunner) and uses an automatic loading system for the main gun, much like other Soviet- and Russian-made tanks. 

In development for over a decade, the T-14 Armata has been plagued by mechanical and technological issues. To date, the Russian military has only received a handful of T-14 tanks. 

The Kremlin has claimed at specific points in the conflict that its forces deployed the T-14 Armata in Ukraine. TASS ran a story about how the new Russian main battle tank was performing in Ukraine, highlighting that it was deployed for the sake of experimentation, to ensure the T-14’s features fit modern operational realities. 

“The Armata tank was used several times in the combat zone in Ukraine. Based on the results of the use in the special operation, the vehicle is now being finalized,” Russian defense officials told TASS. 

But Ukrainian officials and Western intelligence estimates dispute Russian claims about the T-14’s combat experience. Instead of seeing combat against the Ukrainian military’s Western weapons systems, a handful of T-14 Armatas were restricted to areas close to the battlefield. This is in line with how the Kremlin is seen treating other modern weapons like the S-500 Prometheus air defense system and Su-57 Felon fighter jet. Moscow has held these systems back, most likely fearing humiliation. 

With the Russian military mired in Ukraine and no hopes of a quick victory, it is becoming increasingly likely that the T-14 Armata won’t see the end of this decade unless something radically changes. The mounting costs of the Armata and its continuing mechanical and technological issues will likely force the Russian military to ditch the project or order a complete redesign that better matches the capabilities of the Russian defense industry. 

About the Author

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Over the past decade, the European Union has increasingly experimented with novel forms of public engagement, most recently as part of a New Push for European Democracy. A paradigm of deliberative and participatory innovation that envisages unmediated forms of citizen involvement is advocated by a network of political actors, civil society organisations, and academics. The European Commission in particular has sponsored processes that engage (small sets of) citizens in dialogues and mini-publics; institutional competition over a discourse of “citizen centred” democracy has the European Parliament propose a European Agora with citizens “deliberating on the EU’s priorities” on a regular basis. 

An important narrative justifying the salience of such institutional innovations is that Europeans want greater citizen involvement – which pertains to broader claims about shifting expectations towards democratic politics as citizens would seek more individualised and direct forms of participation. Initiatives such as the Conference on the Future of Europe are said to bolster the democratic legitimacy of the EU because participatory and deliberative innovations could answer such a demand. Crucially, this narrative is anchored in statistical evidence: the public resonance of participatory innovations are connected to (very) large majorities of survey respondents supporting notions such that “citizens should have a bigger say in EU decision making” (Bertelsmann; cf. Eurobarometer) – an empirical proposition that also features in domestic contexts such as the first citizens’ assembly of the German Parliament. 

However, political psychology and public opinion scholarship caution us against straightforward interpretations of this kind of survey data – least to infer strong expectations about the legitimation and trust-building value of participatory and deliberative innovations. Both regarding general statements about citizens’ “say” or “voice” as well as responses to specific forms of involvement such as mini-publics (e.g. PEW), it remains unclear what (different groups of) citizens mean when they react to these questions. The issue is exacerbated in the context of public perceptions of the EU which are mediated by ambivalence, misinformation, and the strong role of national frames for opinion formation. 

How do citizens form opinions on participatory innovations? 

Against this background, my research scrutinises the narrative about the public resonance of citizens involvement in the EU and poses the question: how do different groups of EU citizens form opinions about participatory innovations (PIs) such as mini-publics? While there is a growing body of scholarship that seeks to measure the effects or the external legitimacy of PIs, the state of the literature remains ambivalent: not only is there conflicting evidence but consistent findings e.g. about the influence of demographic or political factors are open to various theoretical interpretations. 

To get a better understanding of the way that citizens form opinions about PIs, I develop a qualitative empirical design that utilises (focus) group interviews to gauge the discourse of participants in three Western EU member states. 32 groups of three to four participants (n=120) were sampled in Germany, Ireland, and Italy on the basis of education, residence (urban/rural), and political vote choice (GAL-TAN). To further address methodological limitations of existing studies, video vignettes were developed which introduce a participatory and deliberative decision-making scenario in a realistic way. 

Fieldwork in Italy: group interviews 

The costly fieldwork was kindly supported by a UACES scholarship, which allowed us to host eight group interviews in the North and in the South of Italy. With my co-author, Elena Pro, we recruited participants in Tuscany and Campania and conducted the interviews in Florence and Naples – with further support at the EUI and Parthenope University. 

With a view to the practical requirements of the research design, I could not have realised the project without the additional support from UACES. It was crucial to travel to the field in-person: Outsourcing recruitment and/or moderation would not only have been beyond the budget of my doctoral research but also methodologically risky in that I would have lost significant control over the process. The scholarship subsidised expenses for two one-week field trips in April and July. 

Funding for doctoral research 

I am grateful for the support by UACES, which allowed me to study how Italian citizens form opinions about participatory and deliberative innovations in the EU. Dedicated research and fieldwork grants for doctoral students are scarce, while the possibilities to collect original empirical data as part of a PhD seem greater than in the past. Digital applications and connectivity lower the bar to implementing comprehensive research designs and the UACES grant allows early-career scholars like me to realise them as part of their PhD.

The post Forming opinions about participatory innovations in the EU – fieldwork in Italy, supported by UACES appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

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