“More than ever, Europe is facing huge challenges. Especially in times of crisis, our citizens must be able to recognize the value and benefits of being EU members. It is important to be able to guarantee internal security. This also implies an obligation to fight both the real threats and international Islamic terrorism in Europe”. These words are part of the Franco-German text presented on August 23 at the European Commission, in order to face the external and internal threats. A few days later, on September 11, at the eve of the Bratislava summit, another text was sent to the High Representative (HR) Federica Mogherini containing proposals to implement the Global Strategy of the European Union. The Global Strategy was presented during the first meeting without the United Kingdom, on June 28 in Brussels. After the referendum, it was clear that many balances should have been changed; however, a lot of people already speak about the Franco-German alliance, ready to take a leading role inside the European security and defense policy (ESDP). Firstly, this article will explain the content of the Lisbon Treaty’s articles which define the European common security and defense policy. Secondly, the path of the European security policy after Brexit will be presented. Finally, the objective consequences of this evolution will be analysed, in order to understand the implications of the Franco-German proposition.
The limits of the European security and defense policy (CSDP)
Before thinking about the creation of a European’s army, it needs to explain the parts of the Lisbon Treaty that discipline the CSDP. A depth analysis is provided by Stephan Keukeleire (Professor at the University of Leuven and at the College of Europe) and Tom Delreux (Associate Professor at the Catholic University of Louvain), in their book The Foreign Policy of the European Union.
The Lisbon Treaty is an international treaty, signed on 13 December 2007. It amended the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC). The first has kept the same name and the second was called « Treaty on the Functioning of the Union » (TFEU). According to the two authors, the conclusions on the CSDP can be drawn if we analyze some articles.
In the article 42 (paragraph 1 and 2), we can read:
The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.[…] The policy of the Union in accordance with this Section shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.
According to the two authors, this article shows that the Member states do not want the CSDP change neither their foreign policies nor the relationship already established with NATO. The CSDP is accepted if it supports the NATO or Member States policies. Then it is clear that any member State wants the CSDP to threaten its national interests.
However, paragraph 7 of that article states:
If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.
In addition, article 46 states:
In consideration of these articles, it can be highlighted that according to the TEU:
In the next paragraph we will examine the EU’s path in the field of security and defense since the presentation of the Global Strategy (on June 28), in order to explain its aims, hopes and limitations.
From the Global Strategy to Bratislava: the strong approach
On 28 and 29 June in Brussels, the 27 heads of State and Government held an informal meeting to discuss the policy and practical implications of Brexit. The leaders also launched a debate on the future of the European Union, in view of the Bratislava meeting on 16 September. The European Council focused on the policy implications of the referendum which took place in the United Kingdom. The leaders also discussed other urgent issues: the response to the migration crisis, the European market, employment, and cooperation with NATO. In fact, during this first meeting without the United Kingdom, Federica Mogherini presented the Global Strategy of the EU, the document containing the future directions of the security and defense policy.
In the text it is highlighted, for the first time, that there is the need to a Union that is independent from the strategic point of view. Foreign and security policy has to deal with global and local dynamics phenomena, planetary superpower and increasingly fragmented identities. For this reason the Union can only work to strengthen the partners. Particular attention is given to consolidating the transatlantic link and partnership with NATO. In fact, among the list of priorities (listed in the second paragraph of the Global Strategy), there is the security one. Terrorism and hybrid threats are among the top concerns. So there is an incentive to Member States in order to translate into policy actions that promote mutual assistance and solidarity, always in cooperation with NATO. In Brussels, the EU really showed that it wants to strengthen the security policy structures, both in the form of consultations among Member States, and with the Atlantic Alliance. The EU wants to systematically encourage cooperation in the defense and create a strong European defense industry, which is essential to ensure the European independence to act and decide. According to the Global Strategy the strengthening of cooperation between Member States, which could lead to a structured cooperation, is vital (Article 46).
On 8 and 9 July, a further step forward was made in Warsaw, during the NATO Summit. On that occasion Jens Stoltenberg (NATO Secretary General), Jean-Claude Juncker (President of the European Commission) and Donald Tusk (President of the European Council) signed a Joint Declaration on the stronger EU-NATO cooperation. Highlighting the common challenges, the two organizations decided to work together. A stronger European Union and a stronger NATO are mutually reinforcing. Together they can provide greater security in Europe and beyond. Cooperation in more areas is a strategic priority. For this reason, it was decided that the European External Action Service and the NATO International Staff, together with Commission services as appropriate, will develop concrete options for implementation, including appropriate staff coordination mechanisms, to be presented by December 2016.
These two phases show that in June, the EU expressed its willingness to increase its power and at the same time to step-up existing relationship with the Atlantic Alliance. These concepts have been underlined during the two meetings in Bratislava, the first on September 16 and the second on 26 and 27 September.
On 16 September, in a Joint Statement, the EU decided that it need to make an action plan in the field of security and defense in order to implement the TEU and the EU-NATO Joint declaration. On 26 September, the proposals of different States on practical measures have been discussed in order to implement the Global Strategy. The EU ministers reached a general agreement to proceed in parallel on three main aspects in the coming months. First on the implementation of the Global Strategy in the defense and security sector, using tools already provided by EU treaties, but never used before as the permanent structured cooperation. Secondly, the HR Federica Mogherini and the Ministers discussed about the European defense action plan, particularly in the field of industrial support related to research and technology. Thirdly, they discussed the strategic partnership with NATO through the implementation of the EU-NATO Joint Declaration signed last July in Warsaw.
In Conclusion, the EU is considering more paths, and listening countries’ proposals to increase both its power and cooperation with NATO. However, since few weeks, the European politics are discussing about the « special and feared » proposition advanced by France and Germany. People are talking about a future army, and many worries about the collapse of a Europe in which only two countries will have a monopoly of force. Before creating alarmism, it could be useful to explain the content of the Franco-German proposal, why it created so many concerns, which were the reactions of the EU member states, and what the consequences on European policy could be.
The Franco-German alliance and the fear of a European army
A proposal could scare, especially if it comes from the two most powerful countries of the European Union. This proposition is an occasion for Germany to gain space in European foreign policy. The two powers, combined, can change the EU’s history, or rather, that’s what the newspapers think, and that’s what scares other countries, which since September 11 yell in unison “not to a European army”.
On September 11, few days before the first summit in Bratislava, France and Germany submitted a proposal/notification to the High Representative Federica Mogherini, referring to Article 46 of the TEU. The full text of the document is not yet available to the public, however, the defense ministers of the two countries explained in a press conference the content of their request. While the two ministers presented the proposition in Bratislava (on 26-27 September), the practical measures for the implementation of the Global Strategy will be decided and voted in the coming Council meeting in December. The points of the proposition are as follows:
In the EU, these points have triggered a chain reaction based on mutual distrust and fear. Initial reactions have underlined the intention of creating an army commanded by the two strongest powers of Europe. It is important to note that after the Brexit there is a spirit of revenge by the two countries who could become the EU guides, and also because France and Germany are the two countries that now invest the most in the CSDP. However, there is an objective distinction between what reality is and what the other countries (aware of their limits and that for years have exploited the EU means and then used NATO structures) want to see.
In Bratislava, different proposals were submitted, most of which remain unknown because the most important has been done by France and Germany. The first form of opposition came from the UK. According to the English Minister Michael Follon (Secretary of State for defence) the idea carried out by the Franco-German would cause a duplication of NATO. In fact, for 43 years the UK has been putting its veto for the creation of a European army, and the reasons are known, especially now after Brexit: the UK is a strong NATO contributor. If the decision to carry on the Franco-German proposal goes ahead, , the United Kingdom will pay an amount twice for two different organizations. Italy, for its part, has put forward its proposal, a non-paper, based on soft power (research and technology, fiscal and financial incentives and supplies), which remains in the same line with the Franco-German proposal. The countries of Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries don’t agree with this position, except the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, which have a position closer to the Franco-German one, mitigated by the Italian non-paper.
However, taking into consideration the articles of the TEU mentioned above, the Franco-German proposal does not add anything new. Even Federica Mogherini, after the last informal meeting in Bratislava, said that the aim is not the creation of a European army, but to strengthen existing structures, such as the Battle group. The intensification of work on European defense does not mean the creation of a European army. It rather consists in the strengthening of cooperation to create a more effective European defense in full complementarity with NATO.
According to HR’s words no one has ever proposed the creation of an army, because it is not foreseen by the Lisbon Treaty. The proposals, including the France and Germany one, concerns the use of the means already provided in Article 46 TEU. Although, NATO is not afraid of the implementation of the European security and defense policy. Jens Stoltenberg stated that there is no contradiction between a strong European defense and a strong NATO, stressing that both are mutually reinforcing. He added that it is important to avoid duplication and ensure that the dialogue between the two organizations is transparent and open.
Conclusions
Whether the Franco-German proposal is fully accepted or not, it illustrates that the EU is moving towards an internal and external structural change. The EU wants to improve itself, and perhaps, within a framework characterized by Euroscepticism, the reform could start from the security and defense sector. The word « reform » may be inappropriate because despite the speculation of the public and of some Member States, no reform is yet planned. The Franco-German proposition aims at the application of articles contained in the Lisbon Treaty, which for a long time and for many subjects has been considered as a discretional document, such as terrorism and especially migration.
At this point, two questions are raised. The first relates to the fact that two powers have shown that together they know how to shake the foundations of a complex structure, even worrying the United Kingdom. This alliance does not shatter even if the proposal is not totally approved. The two countries now are the leaders, and have Italy and Spain’s supports. In the coming months, and at least until François Hollande and Angela Merkel will remain in charge of their governments, the centre of the European policy will be Paris and Berlin, especially the consultative referendum in UK.
The second question, related to the first, concerns the future of the European Union’s role on the international scene. If the Global Strategy is to become fully applied, the European Union’s role may change once again, fusing the soft to the hard power. The use of new means can be interpreted a turning point. Even the United States and NATO agree with the European power development in terms of security. Do not fear neither duplication nor overlap with NATO. A stronger Europe should reduce the workload of NATO and the United States commitment in the euro zone. Public opinion, after Brexit, has condemned the EU as an organization unable to standing on its pillars. But history teaches us that whenever the EU was on the verge of the abyss, it was able to keep from falling. If history continues its path, perhaps the proposal made by the alliance (and similar proposals) will really be an impetus for a new Europe.
Maria Elena Argano
For further information:
EEAS Site, Remarks by the High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini upon arrival at the Informal EU Defence Ministers meeting: http://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/10555/remarks-by-the-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-upon-arrival-at-the-informal-eu-defence-ministers-meeting_en NATO Site, NATO Secretary General welcomes discussion on strengthening European defence: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_135421.htmLa Croix Site, Les idées de la France et de l’Allemagne pour faire avancer la défense européenne: http://paris-international.blogs.la-croix.com/les-idees-de-la-france-et-de-lallemagne-pour-faire-avancer-la-defense-europeenne/2016/09/18/
Agenzia internazionale Stampa estero, Difesa comune europa: Pinotti al Vertice informale di Bratislava : http://www.aise.it/esteri/difesa-comune-europea-pinotti-al-vertice-informale-di-bratislava-/71737/126
NATO-UE Joint Déclaration : http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133163.htm?selectedLocale=en
The Bratislava Declaration: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/fr/meetings/european-council/2016/09/16-informal-meeting/
EEAS Site, 28 EU Defence ministers agree to move forward on European Defence: http://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/10669/28-eu-defence-ministers-agree-to-move-forward-on-european-defence_enThe Global Strategy of the European Union: https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/fr/strategie-globale-de-lunion-europeenne
Treaty of the European Union: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/IT/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012M%2FTXT
Initiative franco-allemande sur les enjeux clés de la coopération européenne dans le domaine de la sécurité intérieure 23 août 2016
Stephan Keukeleire and Tom Delreux (2014) The Foreign Policy of the European Union, Chapter 8 (The European Security and Defence Policy), pp. 174- 198
The Budgets Committee’s (BUDG) meeting to review the draft 2017 EU budget approved more funds to help young employment and to support economic growth. BUDG also debated migration and security related spending increases in order to mitigate the migration crisis.
MEPs decided yesterday to add €1.5 billion in commitment appropriations for boosting and supporting young people into jobs. The funds will be mainly destined to the Youth Employment Initiative.
After the vote, lead rapporteur Jen Geier(S&D, DE) declared, “Consequently we reinforced the budget lines to support jobs and growth and reversed the cuts made by the member states, who acted against their own priorities”.
Regarding assistance to third countries projects, MEPs discussed whether the funds are enough especially when considering the current refugees and migration crisis. Therefore, it was decided to reduce the Council’s cuts in this field and to reinstate the 2016 levels for the ENI Mediterranean aid. As result, €497.9 million was added for the commitment appropriations for this subject.
The BUDG’s draft resolution on the EU’s budget for 2017 was approved by 29 votes to 7, with 1 abstention. Additional funds will be financed through new appropriations obtained by the mid-term revision of the Multiannual Financial Framework.
REUTERS/Jacky Naegelen
Samedi, Marine Le Pen s’est une nouvelle fois lâchée sur l’Europe, son punching-ball favori avec l’immigration. « On sait très bien que la politique agricole commune (PAC) répond à des considérations idéologiques ultralibérales », a clamé la patronne du FN. Il faut donc « renationaliser la politique agricole », ce qui ne coutera strictement rien à la France, dixit la présidente du parti d’extrême droite, puisque la PAC est financée par « l’argent des Français qui transite par l’Union européenne ». Une accusation délirante, une apparence de solution, une ferme promesse de lendemain qui chante, l’immuable recette du succès électoral du FN.
Délirante, car accuser la PAC d’être « ultralibérale », c’est comme accuser les plans quinquennaux soviétiques d’avoir été inspirés par les « Chicago boys » de Milton Friedman. Car s’il y a une politique de l’Union qui n’est pas « ultralibérale », et même pas « libérale » du tout, c’est bien l’agriculture qui est l’exemple même du marché organisé et régulé par la puissance publique. Ce n’est pas un hasard si la PAC est une invention française, contrepartie négociée lors du traité de Rome de 1957 à l’abaissement des frontières douanières. Marine Le Pen semble ignorer que la Grande-Bretagne, le pays de « l’ultralibéralisme » depuis l’élection de Margareth Thatcher en 1979, a toujours eu en horreur cette PAC trop française. D’ailleurs, durant la campagne référendaire sur ce Brexit qui fait rêver la patronne du FN, la PAC a été brandie comme exemple même du dirigisme et du bureaucratisme de l’UE, ce « IVe Reich » dixit Boris Johnson.
Il faudrait que la députée européenne, dont les rares présences à Bruxelles expliquent sans doute autant d’ignorance, dise en quoi les 7 milliards d’euros de paiements directs versés aux agriculteurs français chaque année pour soutenir leur revenu sont « ultralibéraux » ? En quoi l’organisation des marchés agricoles est « ultralibérale » ? En quoi la protection du marché européen contre la concurrence internationale est « ultralibérale » ? En quoi les appellations d’origine destinées à protéger les produits européens sont « ultralibérales » ? En quoi le soutien à une agriculture de qualité est ultralibéral ? En quoi la protection des espèces de poissons en voie d’extinction est ultralibérale ? Etc., etc., etc..
La réalité, c’est que la PAC a contribué à protéger une agriculture française qui aurait disparu sans elle et à en faire un acteur mondial. Lors de sa création, l’Europe, encore affaiblie par la guerre, n’était absolument pas autosuffisante. Aujourd’hui, elle est non seulement devenue capable de se nourrir seule (y compris l’Allemagne pour la première fois de son histoire), mais elle est l’une des principales puissances agricoles du monde. Jacques Chirac avait coutume de parler de « l’arme verte » que représentent à la fois l’indépendance alimentaire et les exportations agricoles, une arme qui permet de peser dans le monde. Dans l’Union, la France est le premier producteur agricole européen, le premier exportateur vers les pays tiers (troisième intra UE) et affiche un excédent commercial de 10 milliards d’euros.
Renationaliser la PAC ? Pourquoi pas ? Ça serait égoïste, car, après avoir vu son agriculture financée pendant cinquante ans par l’Allemagne, elle claquerait la porte au nez des pays d’Europe de l’Est qu’elle doit aujourd’hui davantage aider qu’elle ne l’est. Mais après tout qu’importe, la solidarité avec des étrangers n’étant pas une valeur lepéniste. Le problème est que cela aura un prix : pourquoi la Pologne, qui aura moins les moyens d’aider ses agriculteurs que la France, accepterait-elle des produits français subventionnés qui feraient concurrence aux siens ? De même, la France pourra-t-elle demeurer sans réagir face aux aides allemandes, évidemment plus généreuses ? Le démantèlement du marché intérieur aura un coût énorme pour la puissance agricole hexagonale qui se retrouvera vite cantonnée dans ses frontières. Sans compter que, seule, la France ne pèsera plus grand-chose à l’OMC où elle devra faire face aux attaques en règle des États-Unis, de la Russie, de la Chine, du Brésil, etc., contre son système de subventions agricoles, ses protections aux frontières ou ses appellations d’origine contrôlées. Les paysans français regretteront vite « l’ultralibéralisme » de la PAC…
N.B. : version longue de mon éditorial paru dans Libération du 10 octobre
Can Dündar and fellow defenders of freedom of thought and expression in Turkey, the Crimean Tatar leader Mustafa Dzemilev, the Yazidi survivors and public advocates Nadia Murad Basee and Lamiya Aji Bashar are this year's finalists for the Sakharov Prize following a vote by the Foreign Affairs and Development committees on 11 October. The laureate will be selected by the EP President and the political group leaders on 27 October and the award ceremony will be held in Strasbourg on 14 December.