Europäische Union

Phnom Penh denounced the capture of the vessel and its crew as “an unauthorized incursion” into Cambodian territorial waters.

Earlier, government permission was required to sack 100 employees or more. Now, no permission is required for sacking up to 300 employees.

Tommy Schaefer, who was convicted for the 2014 murder of socialite Sheila von Wiese-Mack, is likely to face further charges once back on U.S. soil.

In December 2025, the European Commission published a communication entitled Strengthening EU economic security as a follow-up to its 2023 economic security strategy. Economic developments – whether related to trade, investment or industry – are increasingly viewed through the lens of security. From a foresight perspective, this development can be analysed as the result of three overlapping and partly reinforcing trends. The first is the weakening of a value-based approach to the economy, as exemplified by fair trade agreements and the EU Green Deal. The second is the rise of geo-economics, which places the interests of countries and regional blocks at the forefront, increasing the need for mitigating policies such as economic security. The third is the growing interaction between defence policy and economic policy, with military security influencing economic decisions and the defence sector growing in importance in the EU economy. This briefing argues that these combined trends are transforming the EU's economic policy and economy, and that the growing prominence of security as a guiding principle of economic and trade policies is bringing the question of EU strategic autonomy back to the centre of EU policy. Although the increasing importance of economic and defence security appears to be mutually reinforcing, with both trends potentially enhancing EU strategic autonomy, synergy between them is not a given. The raw materials and finances needed to reinforce the EU defence industrial base require a strong and open economy. However, concerns about foreign influence require economic decoupling from certain countries (e.g. Russia) and de-risking from others (e.g. China). Moreover, the EU faces unexpectedly difficult choices in its relations with the United States (US), where its dependence on US support in defence and security reduces its capacity to act independently as an economic player and rule-maker.
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Academic freedom is widely recognised as a fundamental value of contemporary higher education and research, and as a prerequisite for well-functioning democratic societies. However, in recent years, major concerns have been expressed by various stakeholders about the state of academic freedom in the European Union. The European Parliament annual Academic Freedom Monitor aims to improve the promotion and protection of academic freedom in the EU. The 2025 edition is organised in two parts. The first part consists of an update of existing measures of academic freedom in all EU Member States, an updated overview of public debate and studies of the state of academic freedom in four selected EU Member States, and an examination of the EU's state of academic freedom in a global context. The second part contains a thematic analysis of the potential impact of selected trends in academic freedom within the EU, namely political polarisation, recent developments in the US higher education and research system, the commercialisation of academia, and foreign interference. Furthermore, EU-level policy options are proposed for possible legislative and non-legislative initiatives to enhance the support for academic freedom in the EU Member States.
Study : ENAnnex 1 : EN
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

In December 2025, the European Commission published a communication entitled Strengthening EU economic security as a follow-up to its 2023 economic security strategy. Economic developments – whether related to trade, investment or industry – are increasingly viewed through the lens of security. From a foresight perspective, this development can be analysed as the result of three overlapping and partly reinforcing trends. The first is the weakening of a value-based approach to the economy, as exemplified by fair trade agreements and the EU Green Deal. The second is the rise of geo-economics, which places the interests of countries and regional blocks at the forefront, increasing the need for mitigating policies such as economic security. The third is the growing interaction between defence policy and economic policy, with military security influencing economic decisions and the defence sector growing in importance in the EU economy. This briefing argues that these combined trends are transforming the EU's economic policy and economy, and that the growing prominence of security as a guiding principle of economic and trade policies is bringing the question of EU strategic autonomy back to the centre of EU policy. Although the increasing importance of economic and defence security appears to be mutually reinforcing, with both trends potentially enhancing EU strategic autonomy, synergy between them is not a given. The raw materials and finances needed to reinforce the EU defence industrial base require a strong and open economy. However, concerns about foreign influence require economic decoupling from certain countries (e.g. Russia) and de-risking from others (e.g. China). Moreover, the EU faces unexpectedly difficult choices in its relations with the United States (US), where its dependence on US support in defence and security reduces its capacity to act independently as an economic player and rule-maker.
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President (in French and English):

English EU-Mercosur agreements

In December 2025, the European Union (EU) and the Mercosur countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) finished negotiating a partnership agreement. The agreement covers trade and also political dialogue and cooperation in matters such as the environment and human rights.

On 9 January 2026, the Council of the European Union (the governments of EU countries) authorised the European Commission to sign the agreement. The agreement was signed on 17 January.

For the agreement to enter into force, the European Parliament must vote on it. Parliament must either approve or reject the deal, but it cannot change it. All EU countries will also have to approve it.

The EU and Mercosur also signed an interim agreement. This will allow the trade aspects of the deal to be implemented before the partnership agreement as a whole enters into force, which could take several years. Since trade policy is exclusively an EU competence, the interim agreement does not need approval from individual EU countries. It only needs approval from the European Parliament.

Parliament’s position on the EU-Mercosur agreement

On 21 January 2026, Parliament decided to ask the EU Court of Justice to review the agreements’ compatibility with EU Treaties. Parliament will have to wait for the Court of Justice’s decision before taking a final vote on the agreements. The Court of Justice could take over a year to deliver an opinion.

In an October 2025 resolution, the European Parliament highlighted that the agreement would strengthen EU-Mercosur cooperation on common challenges, while counteracting the growing influence of authoritarian actors in the region. Parliament also considered that the agreement would help the EU diversify its supply of critical raw materials.

In a previous resolution in April 2025, the European Parliament expressed concern over the agreement’s potentially negative impact on EU sustainability and safety standards, as well as on the EU agricultural and food sector’s competitiveness.

Provisional application of the partnership and interim agreements

Under the EU Treaties, the Council can decide on the provisional application of international treaties before Parliament approves them.

Before now, Parliament has regretted the Council’s decision to allow the provisional application of international agreements in areas which are subject to Parliament’s consent, such as trade.

Safeguard clause

The European Parliament and the Council have agreed on rules for applying the safeguard clause included in the partnership agreement. This clause allows the EU to suspend trade preferences on imports of agricultural products from Mercosur countries if such imports harm EU producers.

French Accords UE-Mercosur

En décembre 2025, l’UE et les pays du Mercosur (Argentine, Brésil, Paraguay et Uruguay) ont achevé la négociation d’un accord de partenariat. L’accord couvre non seulement le commerce, mais aussi le dialogue politique et la coopération dans des domaines tels que l’environnement et les droits de l’homme.

Le 9 janvier 2026, le Conseil de l’UE (les gouvernements des pays de l’UE) a autorisé la Commission européenne à signer l’accord. La signature a eu lieu le 17 janvier.

Cependant, pour que l’accord entre en vigueur, le Parlement européen doit se prononcer par un vote. Il doit soit approuver soit rejeter l’accord, mais il ne peut pas le modifier. Tous les pays de l’UE devront également l’approuver.

L’UE et le Mercosur ont signé également un accord intérimaire. Celui-ci permettra de mettre en œuvre les aspects commerciaux de l’accord avant l’entrée en vigueur de l’accord de partenariat dans son ensemble, ce qui pourrait prendre plusieurs années. Étant donné que la politique commerciale relève exclusivement de la compétence de l’UE, l’accord intérimaire n’a pas besoin de l’approbation de chaque pays membre. Il requiert seulement l’approbation du Parlement européen.

Position du Parlement sur les accords UE-Mercosur

Le 21 janvier 2026, le Parlement a décidé de demander à la Cour de justice de l’UE d’examiner la compatibilité des accords UE-Mercosur avec les traités de l’Union. Le Parlement doit maintenant attendre la décision de la Cour de justice avant de procéder au vote final sur les accords. La procédure devant la Cour de Justice pourrait durer plus d’un an.

Dans une résolution d’octobre 2025, le Parlement européen a souligné qu’un accord renforcerait la coopération UE-Mercosur face aux défis communs, tout en contrant l’influence croissante des acteurs autoritaires dans la région. Le Parlement a également estimé qu’un accord aiderait l’Union à diversifier ses sources d’approvisionnement en matières premières critiques.

Dans une résolution précédente d’avril 2025, le Parlement européen s’est dit préoccupé par les conséquences potentiellement négatives de cet accord sur les normes de durabilité et de sécurité de l’UE et sur la compétitivité du secteur agricole et alimentaire de l’UE.

Application provisoire des accords de partenariat et intérimaire

En vertu des traités de l’UE, le Conseil peut décider d’appliquer provisoirement des traités internationaux avant que le Parlement ne les approuve.

Par le passé, le Parlement a regretté la décision du Conseil d’autoriser l’application provisoire d’accords internationaux dans des domaines qui sont soumis à l’approbation du Parlement, tels que le commerce.

Clause de sauvegarde

Le Parlement européen et le Conseil se sont mis d’accord sur les règles d’application de la clause de sauvegarde figurant dans l’accord de partenariat. Cette clause permet à l’UE de suspendre les préférences commerciales sur les importations de produits agricoles en provenance des pays du Mercosur si ces importations nuisent aux producteurs de l’UE.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Zurückhaltende Reaktionen nach US-Gerichtsurteil zu Zöllen

Welche Auswirkungen hat das Zoll-Urteil in den USA auf Europa? Expertin von Daniels sieht in möglichen Neuverhandlungen eine Chance für die EU - unter bestimmten Bedingungen.

Written by António Vale with Paul Anton Albrecht.

Lasers have a wide range of current applications, in manufacturing, medicine or communications. Their characteristics vary across different fields and they remain under continuous development, with the academic sector pushing the limits of the technology. One field of interest is laser pulse time acontrol and questions about the shortest processes in nature. These ultrashort processes govern our lives and happen all around us: biological processes are driven by protein folding and enzymatic reactions, the movements of molecules and bond breaking create chemical reactions, and the interaction with light leads to different radiation processes. Most of these can be observed in the ‘femtosecond’ regime. One femtosecond is 10‑15 seconds – if a second was as long as the distance from earth to the sun, we would measure at the scale of a hairs’ width – which would be a single femtosecond.

Huge progress has been made in observing this timescale with ultrashort pulses of light, creating snapshots, or even movies of hitherto unseen processes. The light sources behind such discoveries are often particle accelerators such as synchrotrons or newer XFELs. The latter are very long accelerators that are used to bring free electrons close to the speed of light; these then undulate as they go through an array of magnets, causing them to emit, high-energy light pulses in the form of X-rays. Some of these state-of-the-art facilities are European, such as the European XFEL (EuXFEL, which opened at the Deutsches Elektronen-Synchrotron (DESY) in Hamburg in 2017). XFEL is 3.4 km long and incorporates superconducting accelerator technology. This is a key example of European cooperation hosting a world-leading science centre and connecting scientists across nationalities and disciplines.

Future development could lead to interesting possibilities: chemical reactions and the movement of molecules are still much slower than the electronic processes underlying them – their natural timescale is in the attosecond range (a thousandth of a femtosecond – 10-18s). If we return to our metaphor of a second being equal to the distance of the earth to the sun, we are now considering an entity the size of a microscopic virus. This timescale can be reached with methods such as high-harmonic generation (HHG), which led to Agostini, Krausz and L’Huillier’s award of the 2023 Nobel prize for physics for their work on methods to resolve electron dynamics. However, these are limited to lower intensity pulses, achieving this timescale only at ‘small scale’ (tabletop) and under technical compromises. Theoretical studies on these timescales continue, but experimental limits make a direct comparison quite difficult.

Potential impacts and developments

The idea behind investigating any dynamic is most often to make a video of the action. For extremely fast processes, this becomes very difficult, as it is like repeated stop-motion photography using a long-exposure camera and imperfect timing. An investigation is therefore significantly easier with improved camera timing.

To reach the attosecond scale, with high-intensity, high-quality light pulses, several new technological ideas exist, which promise to improve XFELs. These include wakefield acceleration, which accelerates the electrons initially with an additional laser or plasma, reaching high speeds at short length, and technologies that improve the properties and intensity of the resulting laser, such as self-/laser-seeding or enhanced self-amplified spontaneous emission (ESASE). These are already partially implemented in existing and new facilities, such as the Chinese SHINE facility (expected to open in 2026), or the Compact XFEL being built in the United States. Europe relies on existing facilities and established strengths, with plans to improve and upgrade them including an improved electron beam at DESY.

Combining several of these next-generation technologies may allow science to attain the ambitious goal of achieving a reliable resolution of significantly below 100 attoseconds, which could compete with HHG. This would be enough, for example, to precisely track the steps of an electron within a molecule, giving us insight into electronic movements and transitions. This could allow scientists to observe the key steps in light absorption and conversion, charge migration, or chemical reactions. Better understanding of these processes could unlock a range of scientific applications, such as tracing the light-driven path of electrons in photosynthesis, or establishing a new conceptual basis for chemistry by naturally linking structure and dynamics. It could also help drive innovation by, for example, allowing the development of more powerful and energy efficient optoelectronic components, helping overcome production barriers to unlock the potential of quantum device technologies, or a deeper understanding of the charge transfer mechanisms in batteries.

This positions XFELs as a classic example of a research infrastructure which, even if not geared towards immediate innovation outcomes, can be leveraged to progress a wide range of research, which could have a significant potential economic impact. Furthermore, new developments in compact XFELs, which may ultimately allow them to be shrunk to tabletop size, may open the door to direct commercial application in chip manufacturing. Such development would be particularly relevant for EU competitiveness, given the current European monopoly on high-end chip lithography machines through ASML.

Anticipatory policymaking

X-ray free electron lasers demonstrate the challenges involved in closely tracking the shortest processes in nature: it is difficult, but possible. Better control of the attosecond regime is in reach with existing technology but requires upgrading existing facilities (affecting operation) or creating new ones. The high investment required for such projects makes XFELs a poster case for the need for a European strategy on research and technology infrastructures, as recently launched by the European Commission. Cutting-edge infrastructures like this are attractive sites for research: congregating skills and talent, offering unique opportunities, making such centres the first address for EU scientific cooperation, and not only help promote European researcher mobility, but also attract researchers currently based elsewhere.

Given a renewed European focus on competitiveness, it makes sense to design such projects as cross-cutting initiatives, and to seek opportunities to involve the private sector. An ambitious effort to attain high attosecond precision could develop the EU high-tech supply chain (in fields such as electron sources, superconductor technology, or detectors), helping to secure a leading role for Europe in these sectors, as in the case of projects such as the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER). Combining both attractive centres of excellence and scientific fields and more investment in high-tech industry could also be a potential idea for a moonshot project under the next Horizon Europe programme. This could advance research in a plethora of scientific fields, from quantum science over chemistry to biology. In addition, the potential direct commercial viability of this technology, such as in semiconductor manufacturing, could attract innovative funding. This would perpetuate the tradition of European excellence in this field and enable development of a next-generation technology industry in Europe.

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘What if we could track an electron’s every step?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Vasco Guedes Ferreira with Oona Lagercrantz.

Quantum technologies have transformative potential and are already exerting a significant impact on global economies and society. The European Union (EU) supports the development of these technologies through initiatives such as the Quantum Flagship and Horizon Europe, as well as through national initiatives and programmes. However, the specific role of quantum technologies in supporting the EU’s energy and climate goals has so far received limited and fragmented policy attention. This briefing explores how the emerging quantum ecosystem could help accelerate decarbonisation and address the existing innovation gap that must be bridged to achieve climate neutrality (i.e. net-zero emissions) by 2050. Achieving this goal requires technological breakthroughs in sectors that are currently difficult to decarbonise.

Quantum computing has the potential to transform these areas by, for example, simulating complex molecular interactions that classical computers cannot handle efficiently. Such capabilities could fast-track the development of more efficient batteries, green hydrogen catalysts and carbon capture materials. Quantum sensing is already providing precise tools for monitoring greenhouse gas emissions, and quantum communication has the potential to secure the critical digital infrastructure of future electricity grids. Available evidence indicates that, while the EU is investing seriously in quantum research, it currently lacks a coordinated strategy linking these technologies explicitly to decarbonisation. With the European Commission expected to adopt a quantum act in 2026, policymakers have a unique window of opportunity to address this gap. By integrating long-term decarbonisation objectives into the research and innovation framework, the EU can leverage its scientific leadership to drive the next generation of clean technologies.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Quantum technologies: Can they boost Europe’s decarbonisation?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

La guerre-éclair promise par M. Vladimir Poutine au premier jour de l'invasion de l'Ukraine, en février 2022, entame sa cinquième année. Elle s'est transformée en guerre d'usure. Moscou, avec désormais la complicité américaine, exige la reddition de fait de Kiev, capitale réputée « nazie ». L'armée ukrainienne, bien que décimée et épuisée, tient le choc, au moins pour le moment. La situation militaire comme diplomatique paraît inextricable, en dépit des palinodies de M. Trump.

- Défense en ligne / Russie, Ukraine, Armée, Conflits

Five years after the bloody military coup and amid a civil war, elections have taken place in Myanmar. They were neither free nor fair, nor was any attempt made to keep up an appearance of even minimum democratic standards. From the outset, the main purpose of the elections was not political participation but an authoritarian-led tran­sition from military rule to a “civilian” government. The country’s new executive is intended to appear legitimate both nationally and internationally (on account of the ballot) and at the same time consolidate the military’s dominance. For its part, Myan­mar’s military leadership claims the elections mark a “new beginning” to restore political stability in the country and break its international isolation. The reference here is, among others, to the European Union (EU) and its member states, which have imposed sanctions against Myanmar. However, they should not believe the myth of a “civilian” elected government and a “return” to constitutional order; and, accordingly, they should not seek to normalise relations with Myanmar for the time being.

DRAFT REPORT on the 2025 Commission report on Georgia
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Rasa Juknevičienė

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Digitale und auf Künstlicher Intelligenz (KI) basierende Systeme prägen mittlerweile alle Phasen internationaler Migration – von der Vorauswahl von Anträgen und Profi­len über das Grenzmanagement bis zur Integration von Migrant:innen. Staaten, inter­nationale Organisationen und private Anbieter setzen digitale Plattformen, biometrische Systeme und algorithmische Verfahren ein, um Migration gezielter zu steuern. Zugleich nutzen auch Migrant:innen selbst digitale Tools, um Informationen zu erhal­ten, Entscheidungen vorzubereiten und Zugang zu Arbeit oder Unterstützung zu fin­den. Diese Entwicklung verändert Migration nicht nur operativ, sondern auch struk­turell: Sie fördert neue Formen digitaler Arbeitsmobilität, verschiebt Macht- und Abhängigkeitsverhältnisse und bindet Migration in eine globale Datenökonomie ein. Für Deutschland und die EU stellt sich die Frage, wie Digitalisierung und KI migra­tions-, außen- und entwicklungspolitisch so gestaltet werden können, dass sie Effi­zienzgewinne in Verwaltung und Verfahren ermöglichen, ohne Datenschutz, Gleich­behandlung und menschenrechtliche Standards zu unterminieren.

ENTWURF EINER STELLUNGNAHME zu dem Vorschlag für eine Verordnung des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates zur Schaffung der Fazilität „Connecting Europe“ für den Zeitraum 2028-2034, zur Änderung der Verordnung (EU) 2024/1679 und zur Aufhebung der Verordnung (EU) 2021/1153
Ausschuss für Sicherheit und Verteidigung
Petras Auštrevičius

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

As the EU prepares to redefine its external financing instrument for the next Multiannual Financial Framework, the Commission’s proposal for a new Global Europe Instrument marks a key political moment. This workshop will assess how this instrument reflects, and potentially reshapes, the EU’s commitment to promoting democracy, accountability, and human rights, and how the European Parliament can ensure these principles remain central pillars of the EU’s global engagement.
For more info go to Workshops page
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

We replied to those who took the time to write to the President.

Main elements of our reply Violence in north‑east Syria may amount to war crimes

In its resolution of 12 February 2026 on the situation in north‑east Syria, the European Parliament expresses concern over credible reports of human rights violations, particularly against the Kurdish population – which may constitute war crimes.

Parliament calls for swift investigations into crimes against civilians by government forces and militias, and urges the Syrian authorities to grant full access to UN bodies.

The European Parliament welcomes the agreement between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian transitional government, calling on all parties to respect the ceasefire. It denounces Turkey’s continued military intervention in north‑east Syria.

Parliament recalls the decisive contribution of Kurdish forces against Daesh and expresses grave concern over Daesh fighters who have escaped from detention.

It calls on Syrian authorities to protect all ethnic and religious communities, ensuring full recognition, participation and rights for Kurds.

A press release about this resolution is available on the European Parliament’s website. Parliament also adopted resolutions on Syria and the Kurdish community in May 2025, July 2025 and January 2026, during its current mandate.

European Union foreign policy

Although the European Parliament takes political positions on world developments, it is the governments of EU countries that decide the EU’s common foreign and security policy in both the European Council (heads of government) and the Council of the EU (government ministers). The European External Action Service, led by High Representative Kaja Kallas, implements the EU’s foreign and security policy.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

Dreißig Jahre nach Gründung der Zollunion mit der Europäischen Union (EU) sieht Ankara durch die Freihandelsabkommen der EU mit Drittstaaten, zuletzt mit Indien, wachsende wirtschaftliche Risiken. Während die Verhandlungen zum EU-Indien-Freihandels­abkommen Ende Januar abgeschlossen wurden und nun ebenfalls die Sicher­heits­kooperation zwischen der EU und Indien ausgeweitet werden soll, bleibt Ankara außen vor. Aus Sicht der Türkei könnte das Abkommen zudem ihr Gewicht im strate­gischen Kalkül der EU schwächen. Mit Nachdruck fordert Ankara daher die Modernisierung der Zollunion. Denn nicht auszuschließen ist, dass sich die struk­turellen Asymmetrien in der Zollunion zu seinen Lasten weiter verfestigen: Markt­integration ohne politische Mitgestaltung kann eine dauerhafte Benachteiligung der Türkei bedeuten und belastet ihre Beziehungen zur EU. Mit Inkrafttreten des Frei­handels­abkommens werden indische Produkte leichter auf den tür­kischen Markt gelangen, türkische Produkte aber nicht nach Indien. Aufgrund geo­politischer Diver­genzen mit Indien bestehen aus türkischer Perspektive überdies Risiken für eigene regionale Interessen. Brüssel und Berlin könnten diese Konstellation nutzen, um die Koopera­tion mit Ankara auf eine tragfähige institutionelle Grundlage zu stellen.