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President Trump’s economic policy has disrupted global trade by imposing high tariffs and generating sustained uncertainty for partners. The European Union is among the most exposed actors. To assess its strategic options, this policy note interprets this trade policy as an interactive reform process rather than a coherent economic doctrine.

That tariff policy follows a non-linear pattern, characterised by abrupt shifts, shifting coalitions of domestic winners, and limited reliance on institutional expertise. Rather than reflecting a stable economic strategy, tariffs function as a tool of political realignment and bargaining leverage. This dynamic creates persistent analytical uncertainty, complicating the response of allies and markets.

By following a reform-process approach, the note identifies the political logic, distributional effects, and structural weaknesses of the tariff strategy. Understanding these features will help assess and inform the EU’s policymaking strategy and frame the broader policy discourse in an unstable trade order.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Angelos Karayannopoulos, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP.

Introduction

Emanating from this uncertain landscape, policies associated with “Trump Tariffs” have been challenging to analyse, as they represent a rather ongoing process.

The Trump Administration 2.0 trade policy has been defined by uncertainty. Uncertainty was first generated in the first months of the Administration by the unprecedented shift in the global economic order, adopting a protectionist-leaning trade policy that questioned the very foundations of the world trade system. Along the way, uncertainty was fuelled by repeated, often contradictory announcements, delays in implementing decisions, revisions, ongoing negotiations, and relapses in escalations of aggression vis-à-vis trade partners and competitors. Emanating from this uncertain landscape, policies associated with “Trump Tariffs” have been challenging to analyse, as they represent a rather ongoing process.

Several studies have tried to estimate the economic implications. According to modelling by Yale’s Budget Lab, the tariffs implemented through October 2025 are projected to result in a short-term increase in consumer prices of approximately 1.3%. Furthermore, it is anticipated that annual GDP growth will decrease by approximately 0.5% between 2025 and 2026. The impact of these tariffs varies across sectors, with prices for clothing, leather goods, and metals rising by 28% to 40%. In the long term, the economy is forecast to be approximately 0.4% smaller, equivalent to about $125 billion annually. By the end of 2025, unemployment is expected to increase by 0.3 percentage points, with a further 0.7 percentage point increase by 2026.

Figure 1: U.S Average Effective Tariff Rate Since January 1, 2025

Source: The Budget LabSource: The Budget Lab analysis. Created with Datawrapper

Although this process appears to have entered by October 2025 a more structured phase, where actors involved already expect at least minimum consequences from the new era of US-led trade protectionism, it is necessary to put this process into a frame in which we can better analyse the associated consequences and response strategies from actors directly affected. Regarding the EU, the European Commission had initially drafted a €26 billion counter-tariff package but froze it amid a temporary 90-day truce announced by Washington. The “Turnberry deal” that followed capped US tariffs on most European exports at 15 per cent, half of what had been threatened, but kept the 50 per cent duties on steel and aluminium firmly in place. Brussels framed the compromise as “the best possible under the circumstances”, though few viewed it as a victory. France’s then Prime Minister called it “a dark day for transatlantic trade”, while Germany and Italy quietly accepted it as damage control. The asymmetry of the arrangement, Europe cautious, Washington defiant, seems to reflect a broader strategy within Trump’s circle, which leverages uncertainty and unpredictability.

Equally salient is the tariff regime’s standing under the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Several measures are plainly inconsistent with US obligations under WTO rules, and that institutional mismatch matters for two reasons. First, it signals to other actors that rules can be subordinated to unilateral leverage, thereby amplifying global uncertainty. Second, it also opens a parallel front of response, allowing partners to challenge the policy through WTO litigation, to coordinate pressure via new coalitions, or even to pursue alternative rule-making outside the traditional multilateral framework.

By breaking from previous tariff norms, the US signals both a shift in bargaining strategy and an intention to reshape the underlying logic of global trade engagement.

So while many viewed the Turnberry deal as a setback for Europe, its more profound significance is that it represents a fundamental rupture in the post-war global economic order, one whose elements remain blurry and purpose ambiguous. This rupture challenges the post-1945 framework of multilateral trade rules, embedded reciprocity, and predictable dispute-resolution mechanisms that have historically underpinned transatlantic commerce and investment flows. By breaking from previous tariff norms, the US signals both a shift in bargaining strategy and an intention to reshape the underlying logic of global trade engagement.

Understanding this rupture and its purpose, however, first requires taking a step back: how did this policy come about in the first place? Who supports this policy, whose interests are at stake? How, then, is this reform of the fundamental trade dogmas evolving, and what lessons can friends and foes acquire from this process? Answering these questions is critical because reforms of this magnitude cannot be assessed solely through economic metrics; they are embedded in complex political dynamics, institutional constraints, and the distributional consequences that define domestic and international legitimacy. It is not easy to assess both the US emerging context and the EU’s response strategy without first answering these fundamental questions. Failing to identify actors, coalitions, and underlying motivations risks misinterpreting both the policy’s logic and its potential outcomes.

It is thus crucial to frame the new tariff policy within a reform-process approach, assessing not only the policy instruments themselves but also how they were conceived, communicated, and implemented. Viewing the policy in this way allows for a nuanced understanding of how reforms evolve under uncertainty.

Reform Assessment 

Characteristics 

Like taxes, tariffs redistribute economic resources across sectors, firms, and households, creating both beneficiaries and those who bear direct or indirect costs. […] Its success thus depends not only on technical design but also on credible leadership and public trust.

Changes in tariffs resemble tax reforms, and tax reforms are “inherently difficult and a politically charged process”[1]. Like taxes, tariffs redistribute economic resources across sectors, firms, and households, creating both beneficiaries and those who bear direct or indirect costs. They are not neutral interventions; instead, they restructure incentives, alter market signals, and can produce knock-on effects across supply chains and consumer prices. This kind of reform encounters resistance from entrenched interests, including both domestic producers and import-dependent industries, which may lobby vigorously to protect their positions. Its success thus depends not only on technical design but also on credible leadership and public trust. In the US, where trust in public institutions stands at around 34% (OECD, 2024), this creates an additional obstacle: low confidence in governance amplifies scepticism, encourages political polarisation, and increases the likelihood of compliance gaps or public backlash. Consequently, any attempt to impose fundamental tariff reforms must begin with precise attention to both policy design and the clarity of its stated purpose. Clear objectives are essential to overcoming institutional friction and aligning stakeholders around a shared understanding of the reform’s objectives.

Donald Trump’s electoral victory in November 2024 reshaped the political landscape, creating the conditions for a new wave of policy experimentation. Among these, tariff reform emerged through a “window of opportunity”[2] in which public dissatisfaction with globalisation (problem), protectionist ideas (policy), and a nationalist political climate (politics) converged.

Donald Trump’s electoral victory in November 2024 reshaped the political landscape, creating the conditions for a new wave of policy experimentation. Among these, tariff reform emerged through a “window of opportunity”[2] in which public dissatisfaction with globalisation (problem), protectionist ideas (policy), and a nationalist political climate (politics) converged[3]. These “windows” are critical junctures in reform theory, representing periods when political, societal, and economic conditions align to allow for initiatives that entrenched interests might otherwise block. Trump, acting as a “policy entrepreneur”, seized this moment with a symbolic solution of high political appeal but low economic coherence, illustrating how political incentives often outweigh technocratic rationality in such contexts. Policy entrepreneurs are actors who mobilise attention and resources to attach specific policy ideas to these moments, shaping both the content and timing of reforms in ways that resonate with their political base. Such reforms rarely succeed. Trump Tariffs, too, seem unlikely to achieve the economic goals the Administration attaches to them in the short- to medium-term. Still, they serve as a strategic move to generate negotiation leverage. 

Figure 2: Trump’s Window of Opportunity

 

 Source: Author’s illustration, based on Kingdon (1984) and Aberbach & Christensen (2014).

 

The reform’s uncertainty stems from a lack of a coherent strategy understood by both experts and the actors involved. Uncertainty in this context arises from both the ambiguity of stated goals and the erratic sequencing of policy measures, leaving stakeholders unable to anticipate outcomes or plan accordingly. In his political economy framework, Rodrik (1993) emphasises that “identifying who benefits and who bears the costs is essential while assessing a reform”[4]. Without this mapping, policymaking risks misallocating support, generating opposition, and undermining credibility. For tariffs, this translates into narrow, fragmented domestic coalitions: producers of protected goods may celebrate immediate gains, while consumers, downstream industries, and exporters face hidden or delayed costs. When this distribution is unclear, reforms are often blocked, diluted, or derailed entirely, as competing interests contest both the measure’s legitimacy and its impact.

Trump’s policy design and objectives appear less economic than political, aimed at creating leverage in international trade negotiations and consolidating support from key domestic actors.

Furthermore, economists tend to attribute deviations from efficiency to vague “political motives”[5], thus overlooking the complex political dynamics that actually shape reform adoption and durability. In this case, however, Trump’s policy design and objectives appear less economic than political, aimed at creating leverage in international trade negotiations and consolidating support from key domestic actors. In other words, tariffs act less as calibrated economic instruments and more as signals to allies, competitors, and the domestic base, serving as a deliberate policy to structure perceptions and incentives rather than to correct market failures.

…“bring back manufacturing” can therefore gain traction not because it resolves a clearly defined economic problem, but because it fits a political narrative, is available at the right moment, and mobilises relevant constituencies.

These characteristics reflect what Aberbach and Christensen (2014) describe as a “high-ambiguity reform model”, often referred to in the academic literature as the “garbage-can” model of policymaking. The term is not normative but technical, denoting decision-making processes in which problems, solutions, and political attention move in parallel rather than sequentially. In such environments, solutions are often pre-packaged, and policy choices emerge when these elements temporarily coincide. A measure such as “bring back manufacturing” can therefore gain traction not because it resolves a clearly defined economic problem, but because it fits a political narrative, is available at the right moment, and mobilises relevant constituencies. This places the reform closer to a symbolic or narrative-driven act than a carefully calibrated economic intervention. Tariffs, in this sense, function performatively, shaping public discourse, signalling resolve internationally, and activating domestic coalitions even when their economic effects remain uncertain.

Altogether, the US Administration appears to clearly follow a highly “interactive model” of reform, in which policies evolve during implementation and are prone to being shaped by reactions from key stakeholders[6]. And this is a key understanding for friends and foes: in this interactive framework, policymaking is iterative rather than linear. This means that initial designs are adjusted in response to feedback from markets, industry lobbies, unions, or foreign governments. Here, the stated goals are vague but politically salient: restore domestic manufacturing, reduce trade deficits, decouple from China, and negotiate better deals with strategic partners. However, consistent with interactive models, implementation has been non-linear, marked by continuous redefinition, resistance, and episodes of market turbulence. Internationally, such unpredictability pressures partners to return to the negotiating table, potentially increasing the US’s bargaining power, as observed in engagements with the EU, among others. Domestically, however, outcomes are uneven. The interactive process produces winners and losers who may not align neatly along predictable lines, leaving policy outcomes contingent on power, influence, and negotiation skill. Who, then, are the key actors shaping this interactive process? Understanding their networks, incentives, and access to the administration is critical to forecasting the trajectory of Trump’s trade policy.

Actors and coalitions

Tariffs activated interest groups according to their economic and political leverage. Table 1 outlines the key leading actors and stakeholders in this process, illustrating their positions and the tensions that define the interactive model.

But who actually holds influence over the President? To understand the political motivations behind this reform, it is necessary to identify and monitor the coalition driving it.

Table 1: Key Actors and Coalitions Overview

Category Group/Actor Interest/Position Relevance Winners Certain US manufacturers (e.g., steel, aluminium) Support protectionist policies to reduce foreign competition Gain temporary market advantage; politically vocal Certain labour unions (e.g., UAW) Tentative support; hope to preserve jobs in targeted sectors Provide political legitimacy to tariffs Losers Consumers Face higher prices and a reduced variety of goods Broad-based economic impact, especially on low-income groups Retailers (e.g., Walmart, Amazon) Disrupted supply chains; higher costs Large employers and lobbyists are against tariffs Automotive industry (e.g., Ford, GM) Costlier production due to tariffs on parts Influence industrial policy and public debate Farmers Victims of retaliatory tariffs on exports Politically sensitive group Key Stakeholders Financial Sector (e.g., investment banks, Wall Street) Oppose trade instability; favour predictability and open markets Indirect but consequential influence through market reactions and lobbying E-commerce platforms (e.g., Shein, Temu) Affected by the de minimis rule changes Pushback through lobbying and legal channels US government/trade agencies Set and enforce tariff policy Shape the direction of the protectionist agenda

In theory, competing coalitions shape reform by leveraging resources and legitimacy to promote solutions and influence institutional arenas[7]. In this case, traditional pro-trade voices, such as consumer groups, major retailers, and the automotive industry, have been sidelined. Instead, a new “design coalition”[8] has emerged, uniting protectionist advisors, domestic steel and aluminium manufacturers, and labour unions like the United Auto Workers. This coalition strategically framed the tariffs as a patriotic move to revive American manufacturing, aligning with Trump’s agenda. Their ability to displace established advisory bodies and bypass expert consultation equally reflects the shift toward the interactive model, one that rewards salience, symbolism, and strategic positioning over traditional deliberation. Yet, it does not guarantee success.

At the centre of Trump’s new trade coalition stands Peter Navarro, reinstated as Senior Counsellor for Trade and Manufacturing. Navarro functions less as a bureaucrat than as a strategic ideologue. His framing of “reciprocal tariffs” as a question of fairness rather than efficiency has again struck a chord with the president. In practice, Navarro supplies both the conceptual blueprint and the political language of protectionism. His constant proximity to Trump, through Oval Office briefings and media coordination, gives him unparalleled access and agenda-setting power.

Around him operates a small circle of ideologues, including Miran, whose recent work provides the intellectual scaffolding for the new tariff rationale. In his paper “A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System” in November 2024, Miran outlined a comprehensive plan to redesign global trade rules. His approach treats tariffs not as fiscal tools but as instruments of structural correction, meant to revive America’s industrial capacity, which he argues has been hollowed out by decades of asymmetric globalisation. At the core of his diagnosis lies a perceived distortion in the international monetary order: the US dollar’s reserve status, while conferring global privilege, simultaneously undermines US competitiveness by sustaining an overvalued currency. The outcome, in his view, is a chronic trade imbalance that erodes manufacturing and widens socio-economic divides in America’s industrial heartlands.

It is worth noting, however, that Miran’s blueprint ends with a sober caveat, stating that “[t]here is a path by which the Trump Administration can reconfigure the global trading and financial systems to America’s benefit, but it is narrow, and will require careful planning, precise execution, and attention to steps to minimise adverse consequences. This disclaimer matters because the administration’s rollout shows the opposite mix, and the mismatch between a disciplined intellectual roadmap and ad hoc managerial practice helps explain why a fragile path to systemic change has, so far, become a broad avenue of organisational failure.

Going back to the actors behind the new tariff regime, implementation largely falls to Howard Lutnick, the new Secretary of Commerce. A financier by background, Lutnick serves as the operational pillar of the administration’s trade structure. Once Navarro’s concepts gain presidential approval, they are translated into policy through the Commerce Department. Lutnick oversees the tariff schedule, exemption mechanisms, and enforcement procedures. He also maintains regular contact with industrial lobbies, particularly in autos, steel, and energy, to apply pressure and align protectionist measures with domestic business interests. Less ideological than Navarro but equally loyal to Trump, Lutnick’s strength lies in execution. His role ensures that ideology becomes administrative and that campaign slogans become regulatory instruments.

Bridging these two spheres is Jamieson Greer, the US Trade Representative (USTR). A veteran of the first Trump administration, Greer now serves as the system’s legal and diplomatic interface. His office formalises tariff actions in more proper language, manages negotiations, and integrates political objectives into trade agreements. In the July 2025 deal with the EU, Greer coordinated the partial rollback of auto tariffs in exchange for European concessions on LNG imports and investment flows.

Navarro dominates moments of escalation, crafting slogans and recasting Europe as an “unfair trader”. Greer intervenes during negotiations to codify those impulses into agreements. Lutnick, meanwhile, ensures continuity by translating presidential instinct into policy routines. Together they form a vertically integrated chain of influence: Navarro provides doctrine, Greer manages diplomacy, and Lutnick enforces implementation. 

Navarro dominates moments of escalation, crafting slogans and recasting Europe as an “unfair trader”. Greer intervenes during negotiations to codify those impulses into agreements. Lutnick, meanwhile, ensures continuity by translating presidential instinct into policy routines. Together they form a vertically integrated chain of influence: Navarro provides doctrine, Greer manages diplomacy, and Lutnick enforces implementation. This inner circle has marginalised moderating voices from the National Economic Council and the Treasury, both of which were diminished in Trump’s second term. The balance of power has thus shifted decisively toward the protectionist bloc. This configuration makes further tariff escalation with the EU not only plausible but structurally embedded in the administration’s policymaking logic. In this structure, however, it is worth remembering that Trump remains the final arbiter, shaping policy-making through personal, isolated decisions, often controversial and often isolated from expert advice.

In addition, by sidelining the dominant channels of economic expertise and despite a broad consensus on the tariffs’ economic harm, this coalition has already achieved a significant political and paradigmatic shift in the US economic policymaking. 

In addition, by sidelining the dominant channels of economic expertise and despite a broad consensus on the tariffs’ economic harm, this coalition has already achieved a significant political and paradigmatic shift in the US economic policymaking. This raises questions about the policy’s stability, as in democratic settings, experts serve dual roles: they inform decisions and foster clarity in public debate[9]. Both functions have been absent here. Beyond this coalition, key actors around economic and trade policy oppose the reform, and others, including  Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent, have struggled to justify the policy or predict its distributional effects. This cleavage creates further confusion about the policy’s implications, raising questions about the polarised, highly top-down nature of the reform strategy. Moreover, reform political theory shows that this kind of exclusionary policymaking rarely delivers sustainable outcomes. In particular, citizen participation[10] and local knowledge[11] help legitimate such complex reforms, such as tariffs. In the US, due to low levels of trust, such inclusive mechanisms were more necessary but absent, with decisions driven by a closed executive circle. Taken together, the lack of deliberation, marginalisation of experts, and political opacity already undermine the reform’s legitimacy and long-term success as much as its questionable economic rationale.

Domestic and Ideological Ecosystem

Beyond the White House’s inner circle, Trump’s trade strategy rests on a broad and uneven domestic ecosystem, an assemblage of industrial lobbies, labour organisations, and ideological networks that together provide legitimacy, pressure, and political reinforcement. 

Beyond the White House’s inner circle, Trump’s trade strategy rests on a broad and uneven domestic ecosystem, an assemblage of industrial lobbies, labour organisations, and ideological networks that together provide legitimacy, pressure, and political reinforcement. This coalition functions less as a single bloc than as a layered structure in which manufacturing, energy, and conservative policy circles converge around a shared narrative.

At its foundation lie the manufacturing and energy sectors, the backbone of Trump’s tariff constituency. Groups such as the Coalition for a Prosperous America (Zach Mottl) and the Alliance for American Manufacturing (Scott Paul) have welcomed the 2025 measures as a long-overdue “reset” to restore industrial competitiveness. Steel producers were among the first to rally. The Steel Manufacturers Association (Philip Bell), the American Iron & Steel Institute (Kevin Dempsey), and major firms, including US Steel, Nucor, and Cleveland-Cliffs, all endorsed the revival of Section 232 tariffs, describing them as essential to counter global overcapacity. Their alignment with the administration has not been incidental: the sector’s strategic and symbolic role as “industrial America reborn” anchors Trump’s economic narrative. Support has also come from adjacent industries. The United Auto Workers union, representing roughly 400,000 workers, called tariffs “a victory” in the effort to reshore jobs. In contrast, construction, energy, and agricultural associations are more wary of this reform, with different interests taking different approaches towards the White House. Finally, the labour union federation AFL-CIO expressed caution, warning that “tariffs without a plan will lead to economic harm” and insisting on parallel industrial and labour-market policies.

Behind this patchwork of sectoral interests lies an organised intellectual infrastructure that sustains the administration’s economic nationalism. The Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025 serves as its doctrinal anchor, describing the trade policy central to the renaissance of the American manufacturing and defence industrial base, and advocating a tariff regime built on “reciprocity”. Similar lines emerge from another key think-tank behind Trump’s agenda, the American Compass, led by economist Oren Cass, which hailed the tariff plan as proof that “the disastrous WTO era” has ended.

A combination of actors inside and outside the government has created the coalition driving this delicate reform, which aims at changing the very foundations of the post-war economic apparatus.

Hence, we can monitor how the driving coalition’s coordination across this ecosystem unfolds through both formal and informal channels. A combination of actors inside and outside the government has created the coalition driving this delicate reform, which aims at changing the very foundations of the post-war economic apparatus. Still, the coalition remains largely fragile. Market reactions to new tariffs have been volatile, and consumer groups, investors, and US allies continue to express unease. Even sympathetic voices warn that protectionism without parallel industrial policy risks hollowing out its own social base. The architecture of Trump’s trade coalition shows adequate coherence at the top but fragmentation below, confirming the hypothesis that the system is held together less by institutional design than by political momentum.

Collective assessment

Having mapped the key actors and interests driving the tariff agenda, the next step is to consolidate this information within an analytical framework that can capture both the politics and the process. The framework developed by Marsh and McConnell (2010)[12] offers precisely such a lens. Conceived to evaluate public policy success in multidimensional terms, it moves beyond the binary of “success or failure” to assess how political, programmatic, and process elements interact over time. Rather than treating outcomes as fixed, it sees them as fluid, being constantly shaped by institutions, coalitions, and shifting perceptions of legitimacy. This approach is beneficial for analysing reforms like Trump’s tariff programme, whose logic is as much political as it is economic.

In this model, political success reflects a policy’s ability to generate and sustain support among key constituencies. Tariff reform meets this criterion only partially. It resonates with Trump’s electoral base by framing trade as a question of sovereignty and fairness, yet polls show declining approval among moderates and business-oriented Republicans. Programmatic success, in turn, refers to the policy’s effectiveness in achieving its stated goals and addressing the problem it was designed to solve. Here, the record is weaker: the tariffs have increased costs and uncertainty, while their contribution to reshoring remains limited. Implementation thus becomes crucial, weighing as both a technical and a political variable in our assessment. In a context of multiple rates, country-specific carve-outs, and intricate rules of origin, customs administrations face heavy demands that strain their systems. Where capacity gaps exist, complexity invites uneven enforcement, discretionary arbitrage, and, in extreme cases, rent-seeking; incoherence thus mutates into additional risk. Finally, process success measures the quality of governance, such as the degree of consultation, coherence, and institutional learning involved. By this standard, the reform fares poorly. Decision-making has been top-down, consultation selective, and interagency coordination has often been bypassed.

It reminds policymakers that responding to the tariff agenda requires considering, or even engaging with, all three fronts: political, programmatic, and procedural. 

Understanding these three dimensions helps decode the apparent contradictions of the tariff regime. It reveals how a policy can be politically salient yet analytically fragile, adequate in narrative terms, but deficient in design and execution. For international observers and engaged partners, especially within the EU, this framework also has a strategic value. It reminds policymakers that responding to the tariff agenda requires considering, or even engaging with, all three fronts: political, programmatic, and procedural. In other words, in a comprehensive counter-strategy, purely economic arguments will remain inadequate. Recognising that Trump’s trade policy functions as an ongoing political process rather than a fixed economic doctrine will thus allow European actors to perceive it more accurately and, therefore, craft adaptive responses and measures that are less vulnerable to sudden shifts in US strategy. In this sense, the framework is not only diagnostic but also prescriptive, providing the conceptual discipline needed to command policy strategy in an inherently volatile policy environment.

Table 2: Assessment of Trump Tariffs’ Success

Dimension Assessment of Trump’s Tariffs Process Success Weak: Top-down, opaque, lacking consultation and public engagement Programmatic Weak: unclear goals, rising costs, retaliation risks Political Moderate: energises base, builds new coalition, frames foreign competition as a national threat

Based on: Marsh & McConnell (2010): “Towards a framework for establishing policy success”[13]

Conclusion

Internationally, tariffs function more as a negotiating instrument than a coherent trade policy; domestically, they operate as a narrative device, reinforcing Trump’s political messaging about restoring manufacturing and protecting American jobs.

The US tariff reform has been designed and implemented in ways that reform theory suggests are unlikely to succeed. Setting aside the risks it poses to the global economy, its economic rationale is weak, its objectives unclear, and its execution inconsistent. Yet these very weaknesses illustrate how power, ideology, and uncertainty now interact in the making of American trade policy, creating a coalition driving a highly disputed reform. Internationally, tariffs function more as a negotiating instrument than a coherent trade policy; domestically, they operate as a narrative device, reinforcing Trump’s political messaging about restoring manufacturing and protecting American jobs, thereby regaining economic sovereignty.

 

Recent judicial developments should also be taken into consideration when assessing the reform holistically. Lower federal courts have already found core elements of the tariff scheme unconstitutional, and the pending Supreme Court review could convert legal contestation into a decisive political variable. Judicial pushback does more than test legality; it can alter tactical choices within the administration (appeals, selective implementation, and legal workarounds), recalibrate bargaining leverage abroad, and create deadlines and windows for negotiation that political actors must account for.

The result is a system that is at once personalised and unpredictable, a policy arena that privileges immediacy over institutional coherence.

The reform process reflects elements of both the aforementioned high-ambiguity and interactive models of policymaking. As in the high-ambiguity reform model, solutions precede problems, so tariffs emerge as pre-packaged answers to diffuse labelled grievances such as economic decline, deindustrialisation and trade deficits. The interactive elements lie in how these policies mutate through feedback loops of crisis, shifted coalitions and opposition, and negotiation. Rather than linear policy design, we see a process of continuous adaptation, in which actors improvise around presidential impulses and external reactions, insulated primarily from expert advice. The result is a system that is at once personalised and unpredictable, a policy arena that privileges immediacy over institutional coherence. Or, in other words, a chaotic and conflict-prone policy environment, where outcomes are contingent on political manoeuvring rather than strategic design.

Framing this process through the proposed multidimensional framework clarifies why this reform endures politically despite its fragility. Politically, it speaks to the core constituencies and re-anchors Trump’s electoral narrative, even as broader public approval erodes. Programmatically, it remains weak, producing short-term symbolic victories but slight measurable improvement in economic performance. Process-wise, it shows minimal coordination and consultation, driven more by loyalty networks than by bureaucratic or expert procedure. Taken together, these dimensions depict a reform that succeeds in communication inside the party’s electoral base but fails as national policy.

For Europe, this analysis carries immediate strategic implications. To adapt to this new transatlantic relationship and respond effectively to future additional trade negotiations, EU policymakers must treat US actions not as static measures to be countered, but as interactive processes to be handled carefully. Tariff levels, exemptions, and bilateral deals will likely continue to fluctuate because the system that generates them is inherently unstable. Negotiators and analysts should therefore build strategies premised on volatility, crafting flexible instruments to manage recurrent shifts, such as rapid-response mechanisms, conditional retaliation frameworks, and coordinated communication channels[14]. The objective is not to mirror US escalation, but rather to remain salient within it, to anticipate rather than react.

Figure 3: Handling Unstable US Trade Policy

 

Source: Author’s illustration, synthesising insights from policy analysis and reform theory.

 

By reading US trade politics through the frameworks presented here, negotiators can better distinguish performative conflict from substantive negotiation, thereby reducing the risk of overreacting to symbolic measures.

Moreover, understanding the dynamics behind the tariff regime helps disentangle intent from outcome. Recognising that Trump’s trade policy operates simultaneously as an electoral project, an ideological statement, and a negotiating tactic could enable Europeans to prioritise engagement where material interests align and to contain disputes where they do not. By reading US trade politics through the frameworks presented here, negotiators can better distinguish performative conflict from substantive negotiation, thereby reducing the risk of overreacting to symbolic measures.

Capturing this concept is essential. Codifying the reform’s nature as a policy process reveals that it is interactive, unpredictable, and highly non-linear – qualities that ensure volatility will persist even after temporary deals, such as the July compromise. This unpredictability could also explain why criticism of the EU’s response often misses the bigger picture: the very object of that response is unstable, fragmented, and subject to sudden shifts.

Understanding trade reform in this way provides a firmer foundation for assessing policy choices in this new global economic landscape. The US is no longer operating within a stable, rules-based framework. This makes traditional forecasting inadequate. Instead, analytical capacity must now focus on process-tracking, which involves monitoring better networks of influence, institutional signals, and domestic political incentives. Policymakers should expect reversals, disputes, and evolving coalitions to shape their trajectory. Only by situating Europe’s options within this broader context of how the US trade policy is formulated can public debate and strategic planning become more coherent. In short, understanding the how of Trump’s tariff policy is now as important as understanding the what. Ultimately, this perspective not only helps interpret the current turbulence but also anticipates future disruptions in the global trade order.

[1]J. Martinez-Vazquez, Successful tax reforms in the recent international experience: Lessons in political economy and the nuts and bolts of increasing country tax revenue effort, ICEPP Working Papers, Paper 214, 2021.

[2] J. Kingdon, Agendas, alternatives, and public policies, Boston: Little, Brown, 1984.

[3] J.D. Aberbach & T. Christensen, Why reforms so often disappoint, The American Review of Public Administration, 44(1), 2014, pp. 3–16.

[4] D. Rodrik, The positive economics of policy reform, The American Economic Review, 83(2), 1993, pp. 356–361.

[5] Ibid.

[6] J. Kingdon, Agendas, alternatives, and public policies, Boston: Little, Brown, 1984. See also J.W. Thomas & M.S. Grindle, After the decision: Implementing policy reforms in developing countries, World Development, 18(8), 1990, pp. 1163–1181.

[7] K. Orach, M. Schlüter & H. Österblom, Tracing a pathway to success: How competing interest groups influenced the 2013 EU Common Fisheries Policy reform, Environmental Science & Policy, 76, 2017, pp. 90–102.

[8] L. Haelg, S. Sewerin & T.S. Schmidt, The role of actors in the policy design process: Introducing design coalitions to explain policy output, Policy Sciences, 53(2), 2020, pp. 309–347.

[9] M. Schudson, The trouble with experts – and why democracies need them, Theory and Society, 35, 2006, pp. 491–506.

[10] A. Michels & L. De Graaf, Examining citizen participation: Local participatory policy making and democracy, Local Government Studies, 36(4), 2010, pp. 477–491.

[11] F. Fischer, Citizen participation and the democratization of policy expertise: From theoretical inquiry to practical cases, Policy Sciences, 26(3), 1993, pp. 165–187.

[12] D. Marsh & A. McConnell, Towards a framework for establishing policy success, Public Administration, 88(2), 2010, pp. 564–583.

[13] D. Marsh & A. McConnell, Towards a framework for establishing policy success, Public Administration, 88(2), 2010, pp. 564–583.

[14] A more comprehensive strategy for the EU was initially proposed by T. Gehrke, in “Brussels hold’em: European cards against Trumpian coercion”, ECFR/576, 2025. Available at: https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Brussels-holdem-European-cards-against-Trumpian-coercion.pdf

Több rendőri egység kivonult a Nyitrai járásba, Lapásgyarmatra. Mivel kényes ügyről van szó, a rendőrség egyelőre nem ad további tájékoztatást.

Richard Linklater Nouvelle Vague című, a francia újhullám születésével foglalkozó filmje kapta a legtöbb, 10 jelölést szerdán a francia filmakadémia César-díjaira - számolt be róla a The Hollywood Reporter.

Pavol Gašpar, a Szlovák Információs Szolgálat (SIS) igazgatója azt állítja, négy kilométer/órával lépte túl a megengedett sebességet a nyitrai baleset során.

Peter Pellegrini köztársasági elnök fegyelmi eljárást indított Pavol Gašpar, a Szlovák Információs Szolgálat (SIS) igazgatója ellen – tájékoztatta szerdán a TASR hírügynökséget az elnöki hivatal kommunikációs osztálya. (tasr)

Les conflits contemporains connaissent de profondes mutations qui ne traduisent pas un retour mais plutôt un changement de nature de la notion de puissance. Si depuis 1945 gagner une guerre pouvait encore signifier « être le plus fort » ou disposer de « plus de moyens » que l’adversaire, « faire la guerre » ne correspond plus aujourd’hui à la conception de la guerre moderne héritée de Clausewitz. Comme le souligne Bertrand Badie, « ni les États-Unis au Vietnam, en Irak ou en Afghanistan, ni la Russie post-soviétique en Ukraine, ni la France en Afrique, ni l’armée israélienne à Gaza n’ont réussi à imposer l’ordre et la stabilité comme le faisait autrefois la puissance. ». L’« énergie sociale » qui émerge de la société civile est au cœur de cette transformation de la puissance. Elle fait émerger un paradoxe : plus la puissance montre ses muscles, plus la société civile se mobilise et échappe au contrôle des États, refaçonnant ainsi les relations internationales et les rapports de force. Comment comprendre cette reconfiguration des relations internationales ? Que recouvre exactement cette notion d’« énergie sociale » ? En quoi permet-elle d’éclairer l’impasse israélo-palestinienne ou encore la posture internationale face aux États-Unis ?

Bertrand Badie, professeur émérite et spécialiste des relations internationales, aborde ce sujet. Il est l’auteur de « Par-delà la puissance et la guerre : la mystérieuse énergie sociale », publié aux Éditions Odile Jacob.

L’article Guerre et puissance : malheur aux vainqueurs. Avec Bertrand Badie est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Le Moyen-Orient vit aujourd’hui une restructuration des rapports de force, en particulier entre trois puissances régionales, l’Iran, la Turquie et Israël, avec des conséquences profondes sur les autres acteurs. La région avait connu une première redistribution à la suite de l’entrée des troupes américaines en Irak en 2003, qui avait eu pour conséquence l’éclatement du pays en entités confessionnelles. En outre, si l’arrivée des printemps arabes fin 2010 avait été saluée comme un événement libérateur, elle avait cependant provoqué une série de crises voire de guerres civiles dans plusieurs pays. Cette déstructuration de nombreux états arabes avait ainsi fragilisé l’architecture régionale (le « système des états arabes » basé sur les frontières héritées du colonialisme européen) et permis le retour en force des anciennes puissances impériales, la Turquie et l’Iran. Si la République islamique d’Iran élargit alors sa sphère d’influence, en Irak, en Syrie, au Liban, au Yémen et à Gaza, la Turquie, de son côté, elle met également le pied en Libye, en Syrie, en Irak, au Yémen, en Somalie et au Qatar (où elle dispose d’une base militaire), sans oublier Gaza où le Hamas, issu de la mouvance des Frères musulmans, n’est pas éloigné, dans ses fondements idéologiques, du parti AKP du président Erdoğan.

La région vit cependant aujourd’hui un nouveau basculement avec l’entrée en scène d’Israël à la suite de l’attaque du 7 octobre 2023, dont les conséquences se font sentir bien au-delà de Gaza. C’est en effet à une vaste montée en puissance d’Israël que l’on assiste, de la Méditerranée jusqu’au golfe d’Oman et à l’océan Indien, sans oublier le Caucase. Tel-Aviv a mis ainsi en place des accords sécuritaires avec la Grèce et Chypre, avec la possibilité de déploiements conjoints de troupes en cas de crise. Il entretient également des liens avec le Kurdistan irakien, ainsi qu’avec l’Azerbaïdjan, lequel constitue, de par sa position géographique, un pivot central entre l’Iran et la Turquie. Si les alliances négociées par Tel-Aviv semblent ainsi entourer l’Iran (à travers l’Azerbaïdjan et le Kurdistan irakien), elles enveloppent en outre la Turquie par son flanc occidental et oriental, tandis que Tel-Aviv tente également de faire pression sur la Turquie par le sud, en Syrie où il frappe régulièrement les infrastructures et les capacités militaires du nouveau régime syrien adoubé par Ankara. Tel-Aviv a soutenu par ailleurs en Syrie les factions druzes et kurdes, ce qui ne peut qu’alarmer la Turquie pour laquelle tout séparatisme en Syrie (notamment kurde et alaouite) ne peut qu’encourager les particularismes en Turquie, en particulier concernant les Kurdes, et ce, pendant qu’Israël continue de frapper en parallèle le Hezbollah pro-iranien au Liban. Enfin, après avoir largement neutralisé le Hamas et frappé la bande de Gaza, Israël continue de cerner la Cisjordanie, soumise à une colonisation soutenue tandis que l’Autorité palestinienne est contrainte, elle, de coopérer étroitement avec l’état hébreu en matière de sécurité.

Israël mène également une coopération sécuritaire étroite avec les Émirats arabes unis, lesquels entretiennent un vaste réseau d’alliances en Libye (les forces du maréchal Haftar) et au Soudan (les Forces de soutien rapide), un dispositif qui contourne l’Égypte par l’ouest et le sud, tandis qu’Israël fait lui-même face à cette dernière sur son flanc Est. En outre, la récente crise au Yémen, avec la manœuvre opérée par le Conseil de transition du Sud, allié aux Émirats, en direction de la région yéménite du Hadramaout, conjointement avec la reconnaissance par Israël du Somaliland voisin, situé en face du Yémen et du détroit stratégique de Bab el-Mandeb (lequel commande la mer Rouge et le canal de Suez), a menacé également d’envelopper l’Arabie saoudite par le sud, cependant qu’Israël se positionne, lui, sur le flanc Nord du royaume saoudien. Si l’Arabie saoudite s’est empressée d’intervenir face à ces développements au Yémen, la question du futur de ce pays se pose ainsi avec acuité. Enfin, l’attaque israélienne sur l’Iran lui-même en juin 2025 a constitué le point d’orgue de cette montée en puissance de Tel-Aviv.

Le déploiement régional israélien rappelle ainsi la carte du Moyen-Orient brandie par Benyamin Netanyahou à l’ONU, où il suggérait de frapper « l’axe du mal » mené par l’Iran, pour le remplacer par un autre axe allant de la Méditerranée à la mer d’Oman et de l’Europe à l’Inde, avec Israël en son centre. Une construction régionale que Tel-Aviv semble poursuivre aujourd’hui en plaçant méthodiquement ses pions à l’échelle du Moyen-Orient et de la Méditerranée orientale. La question centrale est donc : cette manœuvre est-elle le prélude à une dynamique de paix, ou n’est-elle qu’un simple renversement du rapport de forces en faveur d’Israël ?

La réponse à cette question se trouve essentiellement en Iran et dans les développements futurs dans ce pays, ainsi que dans l’attitude américaine. Trois scénarios se profilent ainsi. Le premier serait celui d’un changement qui amènerait au pouvoir à Téhéran un régime proche des États-Unis. L’ensemble de la région, de la Turquie jusqu’en Iran et d’Israël jusqu’en Égypte, en Arabie saoudite et dans le Golfe, serait alors composé d’États amis, alliés ou clients de Washington. Il serait alors peut-être possible d’envisager un rapprochement voire une paix régionale, avec des garanties sécuritaires que l’ensemble des États, aujourd’hui en proie à une forte instabilité, appellent de leurs vœux. Mais il faudrait pour cela que Washington s’investisse massivement dans cette construction régionale et dans l’octroi de garanties de long terme. Les États-Unis, absorbés par leur rivalité avec la Chine, sont-ils prêts pour cela ? En ont-ils réellement la capacité ?

Le deuxième scénario serait de voir perdurer à Téhéran le régime des mollahs, voire un successeur qui conserverait la posture défiante de l’Iran envers les États-Unis et Israël. Le Moyen-Orient entrerait alors dans une nouvelle « guerre froide » et se structurerait autour de l’opposition entre pôles régionaux, la Turquie, l’Iran et Israël se tenant mutuellement en respect, tandis que Tel-Aviv œuvrerait, lui, pour consolider son rapprochement avec les pays du Golfe. L’Arabie saoudite se retrouverait dans une position délicate, entre un Iran défiant et Israël qui chercherait à tout prix à consacrer son influence auprès du royaume saoudien, clé de voûte de son déploiement régional. Tandis que le Liban, la Syrie et l’Irak, qui forment un « glacis » central séparant Israël, la Turquie et l’Iran, risqueraient de conserver le statut de zones tampons, voire, au pire, d’États faillis.

Enfin, le troisième scénario, celui d’un éclatement de l’Iran (dont la population est fortement hétérogène et formée pour 40 % de minorités azéries, kurdes, arabes, tadjikes, arméniennes ou baloutches), à la suite de de puissantes frappes israéliennes ou américaines, ou à la suite de  l’agitation intérieure, serait également risqué, car il porterait en lui les germes de l’instabilité, et pourrait contaminer potentiellement les pays voisins de l’Iran.  Les conséquences d’une frappe sur ce pays ne sont donc pas à sous-estimer.

L’article La montée en puissance d’Israël et les enjeux qu’elle pose au Moyen-Orient est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Central Asia has emerged as a key region where the convergence of geopolitics and development cooperation is most visible. Major powers are redefining their approaches: Japan combines official development assistance (ODA) with commercial partnerships to advance connectivity and reform; the EU is emphasising a sustainable infrastructure and governance-oriented approach; the US is expected to catalyse private investment rather than direct aid; China deepens its regional presence through the Belt and Road Initiative; while Russia leverages historical and security ties to maintain influence. Meanwhile, middle powers – countries that do not wield vast influence like major powers but possess substantial capacity to shape international events – are exploring new opportunities for engagement. Türkiye positions itself as a bridge between advanced economies and the Global South, emphasising connectivity and energy cooperation through the Middle Corridor and the Organization of Turkic States.
South Korea’s 2025 ODA Strategy for Central Asia identifies the region as a strategic partner for shared growth, integrating pragmatic diplomacy with value-based cooperation. By leveraging their soft power and policy experience, these middle powers offer a distinctive model for development partnership. Central Asian governments are responding to a changing international environment by diversifying partnerships through regional integration and more strategic engagement with development  partners.

Hyeyoung Woo is a specialist at the Center for International Development (CID), Korea Development Institute (KDI). From July to October 2025, she served as a guest researcher at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). She holds a Ph.D. in Development Policy from the KDI School of Public Policy and Management, where her dissertation examined transition countries, including those in Central Asia. Over the past years, she has contributed to policy consultations through Korea’s Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) with Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, particularly in fintech regulatory sandbox development and official development assistance (ODA) evaluation.

Central Asia has emerged as a key region where the convergence of geopolitics and development cooperation is most visible. Major powers are redefining their approaches: Japan combines official development assistance (ODA) with commercial partnerships to advance connectivity and reform; the EU is emphasising a sustainable infrastructure and governance-oriented approach; the US is expected to catalyse private investment rather than direct aid; China deepens its regional presence through the Belt and Road Initiative; while Russia leverages historical and security ties to maintain influence. Meanwhile, middle powers – countries that do not wield vast influence like major powers but possess substantial capacity to shape international events – are exploring new opportunities for engagement. Türkiye positions itself as a bridge between advanced economies and the Global South, emphasising connectivity and energy cooperation through the Middle Corridor and the Organization of Turkic States.
South Korea’s 2025 ODA Strategy for Central Asia identifies the region as a strategic partner for shared growth, integrating pragmatic diplomacy with value-based cooperation. By leveraging their soft power and policy experience, these middle powers offer a distinctive model for development partnership. Central Asian governments are responding to a changing international environment by diversifying partnerships through regional integration and more strategic engagement with development  partners.

Hyeyoung Woo is a specialist at the Center for International Development (CID), Korea Development Institute (KDI). From July to October 2025, she served as a guest researcher at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). She holds a Ph.D. in Development Policy from the KDI School of Public Policy and Management, where her dissertation examined transition countries, including those in Central Asia. Over the past years, she has contributed to policy consultations through Korea’s Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) with Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, particularly in fintech regulatory sandbox development and official development assistance (ODA) evaluation.

Central Asia has emerged as a key region where the convergence of geopolitics and development cooperation is most visible. Major powers are redefining their approaches: Japan combines official development assistance (ODA) with commercial partnerships to advance connectivity and reform; the EU is emphasising a sustainable infrastructure and governance-oriented approach; the US is expected to catalyse private investment rather than direct aid; China deepens its regional presence through the Belt and Road Initiative; while Russia leverages historical and security ties to maintain influence. Meanwhile, middle powers – countries that do not wield vast influence like major powers but possess substantial capacity to shape international events – are exploring new opportunities for engagement. Türkiye positions itself as a bridge between advanced economies and the Global South, emphasising connectivity and energy cooperation through the Middle Corridor and the Organization of Turkic States.
South Korea’s 2025 ODA Strategy for Central Asia identifies the region as a strategic partner for shared growth, integrating pragmatic diplomacy with value-based cooperation. By leveraging their soft power and policy experience, these middle powers offer a distinctive model for development partnership. Central Asian governments are responding to a changing international environment by diversifying partnerships through regional integration and more strategic engagement with development  partners.

Hyeyoung Woo is a specialist at the Center for International Development (CID), Korea Development Institute (KDI). From July to October 2025, she served as a guest researcher at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). She holds a Ph.D. in Development Policy from the KDI School of Public Policy and Management, where her dissertation examined transition countries, including those in Central Asia. Over the past years, she has contributed to policy consultations through Korea’s Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) with Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, particularly in fintech regulatory sandbox development and official development assistance (ODA) evaluation.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development – the global framework establishing 17 universal and interconnected goals to guide sustainable development efforts – was adopted in 2015 following a uniquely participative and ambitious process. A decade on, it is increasingly evident that most of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are unlikely to be achieved by 2030 as originally envisioned. Discussions about a follow-up framework beyond 2030 are gaining momentum ahead of the SDG Summit in September 2027. This paper evaluates the process design, inclusiveness, negotiating strategies, fora and fault lines in 2015 and discusses to what extent the lessons learned can be applied to negotiations for a potential follow-up framework. We find that several process design elements and negotiation strategies, as well as actor composition, fostered trust and ownership, reduced polarisation and enabled agreements on ambitious targets. In particular, the process benefited from the inclusion of diverse, non-hierarchical actor communities, a long, science-based stocktaking phase, the breaking up of traditional negotiating blocks, transparency, and emphasis on common interests. We also identify several recurring fault lines that are overwhelmingly still relevant today. Apart from the above best practices of the process leading to the adoption of the SDGs in 2015, we identify several shortcomings that should be addressed in the beyond-2030 negotiations: inefficiencies due to competing tracks for the development of the goals; top-down agenda-setting processes leading to less ambitious outcomes; barriers to participation of and accountability towards some marginalised and informal actors; and the watering down of goals and indicators – including non-tangible targets and unresolved inconsistencies and trade-offs within the agenda. Finally, the paper argues that the beyond-2030 negotiations will take place in a context that is similar to the process that led to the SDGs but is nevertheless in many ways more challenging than in 2015, amidst intensifying crises, political shifts and loss of trust.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development – the global framework establishing 17 universal and interconnected goals to guide sustainable development efforts – was adopted in 2015 following a uniquely participative and ambitious process. A decade on, it is increasingly evident that most of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are unlikely to be achieved by 2030 as originally envisioned. Discussions about a follow-up framework beyond 2030 are gaining momentum ahead of the SDG Summit in September 2027. This paper evaluates the process design, inclusiveness, negotiating strategies, fora and fault lines in 2015 and discusses to what extent the lessons learned can be applied to negotiations for a potential follow-up framework. We find that several process design elements and negotiation strategies, as well as actor composition, fostered trust and ownership, reduced polarisation and enabled agreements on ambitious targets. In particular, the process benefited from the inclusion of diverse, non-hierarchical actor communities, a long, science-based stocktaking phase, the breaking up of traditional negotiating blocks, transparency, and emphasis on common interests. We also identify several recurring fault lines that are overwhelmingly still relevant today. Apart from the above best practices of the process leading to the adoption of the SDGs in 2015, we identify several shortcomings that should be addressed in the beyond-2030 negotiations: inefficiencies due to competing tracks for the development of the goals; top-down agenda-setting processes leading to less ambitious outcomes; barriers to participation of and accountability towards some marginalised and informal actors; and the watering down of goals and indicators – including non-tangible targets and unresolved inconsistencies and trade-offs within the agenda. Finally, the paper argues that the beyond-2030 negotiations will take place in a context that is similar to the process that led to the SDGs but is nevertheless in many ways more challenging than in 2015, amidst intensifying crises, political shifts and loss of trust.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development – the global framework establishing 17 universal and interconnected goals to guide sustainable development efforts – was adopted in 2015 following a uniquely participative and ambitious process. A decade on, it is increasingly evident that most of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are unlikely to be achieved by 2030 as originally envisioned. Discussions about a follow-up framework beyond 2030 are gaining momentum ahead of the SDG Summit in September 2027. This paper evaluates the process design, inclusiveness, negotiating strategies, fora and fault lines in 2015 and discusses to what extent the lessons learned can be applied to negotiations for a potential follow-up framework. We find that several process design elements and negotiation strategies, as well as actor composition, fostered trust and ownership, reduced polarisation and enabled agreements on ambitious targets. In particular, the process benefited from the inclusion of diverse, non-hierarchical actor communities, a long, science-based stocktaking phase, the breaking up of traditional negotiating blocks, transparency, and emphasis on common interests. We also identify several recurring fault lines that are overwhelmingly still relevant today. Apart from the above best practices of the process leading to the adoption of the SDGs in 2015, we identify several shortcomings that should be addressed in the beyond-2030 negotiations: inefficiencies due to competing tracks for the development of the goals; top-down agenda-setting processes leading to less ambitious outcomes; barriers to participation of and accountability towards some marginalised and informal actors; and the watering down of goals and indicators – including non-tangible targets and unresolved inconsistencies and trade-offs within the agenda. Finally, the paper argues that the beyond-2030 negotiations will take place in a context that is similar to the process that led to the SDGs but is nevertheless in many ways more challenging than in 2015, amidst intensifying crises, political shifts and loss of trust.

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L’empire émancipateur contre les colonisations

Les visées américaines sur le Groenland et, d’une façon générale, sur les territoires jugés indispensables à leurs intérêts, ne sont pas récentes. Dès la signature du traité de Paris, le 3 septembre 1783, marquant la fin de la guerre d’indépendance, la Confédération des treize colonies s’élance hors des frontières qui lui sont définies par le traité. Par la guerre, l’achat ou le troc, les treize colonies quadruplent leur taille, expulsent les populations indigènes, chassent les puissances européennes puis repoussent le Mexique nouvellement indépendant (1821). Cette réussite dans l’expansion territoriale, la puissance croissante du nouvel État et la conscience que le paysage politique du continent américain va changer avec les indépendances en cours ou à venir, pousse le président Monroe à énoncer en 1823 le principe fondamental de sa politique extérieure, appliqué sans discontinuité par les présidents suivants : « Aux Européens le vieux continent, aux Américains le Nouveau Monde ». Cette « doctrine Monroe » destinée à empêcher les Européens de tenter de recoloniser l’Amérique, est renforcée en 1904 par le corollaire Roosevelt par lequel le président affirme le droit des États-Unis « d’exercer un pouvoir de police international » dans l’espace américain. Visant d’abord à dissuader les Européens d’agir en Amérique, l’usage de ce corollaire conduit les États-Unis à s’ingérer dans les affaires intérieures des États américains pour en obtenir soumission politique et économique. Donald Trump s’inscrit clairement dans cet héritage : constituer autour des États-Unis un espace soumis et protecteur depuis l’Antarctique jusqu’à l’Arctique. Le troc de la colonisation contre l’imperium américain.

La longue bataille politique pour le Groenland

La volonté de la Russie de vendre l’Alaska (1867) offre la première occasion de pousser vers l’Arctique, d’avoir la capacité de contrôler le détroit de Béring et d’être présents dans le cercle des Nations arctiques : des positions anticipatrices. Dans l’immédiat, l’intérêt était de menacer les Britanniques au Canada, d’où l’idée de compléter l’encerclement en achetant la colonie danoise du Groenland.

Le refus danois ne les décourage pas de proposer à nouveau l’achat en 1910, 1946, 1955, 2019 et 2025. En 1910, il s’agit d’un troc, refusé, avec des possessions américaines aux Philippines. Pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, les États-Unis occupent le Groenland pour empêcher les Allemands, qui occupent le Danemark d’y accéder. À la fin de la guerre, il leur parait évident de pouvoir conserver leurs bases pour prévenir toute intrusion de l’URSS, nouvelle ennemie et voisine par l’Arctique. La proposition d’achat est refusée, mais l’armée américaine reste en place et le gouvernement obtient, par l’accord de défense de 1951, toute liberté pour implanter des installations militaires, des troupes et leurs familles sur le territoire et la liberté d’action militaire dans les espaces terrestres, aériens et maritimes associés, tout cela en exemption de contrôle et de taxes et sous l’unique juridiction américaine. Ce traité, placé dans le cadre du traité de l’Atlantique nord, doit rester actif pour la durée de l’Alliance. En 2004, le traité reçoit un additif pour y inclure le gouvernement local du Groenland institué en 1979. Il est à noter que l’accord de défense signé en 2023 entre le Danemark et les États-Unis exclut le Groenland autonome qui reste lié par l’accord de 2004. Les textes sont en place pour permettre, dans le respect du droit, une augmentation de l’emprise militaire américaine au Groenland. Cependant en 2004, l’urgence ne se fait pas sentir. Mais en 2009, un traité dano-groenlandais reconnait l’autonomie de l’île et concède l’accession possible à l’indépendance sur la demande des autorités groenlandaises appuyée par un référendum sur l’île. Simultanément, l’animosité entre Russie et États-Unis prend de l’ampleur et s’exprime clairement dans le discours de Poutine à Munich (2007) et la Chine s’est « réveillée ».

Dès lors, la donne stratégique et politique change pour les États-Unis.

La situation sécuritaire se tend en Europe, la montée des tensions et revendications trouve sa catharsis avec la guerre en Ukraine. L’amitié indéfectible entre la Russie et la Chine, dont la puissance militaire est manifeste, laisse présager un affrontement des blocs, avec une première friction en Ukraine qui peut être suivie ou concomitante à une seconde autour de Taïwan. L’examen d’une carte montre clairement que le lien entre les deux blocs, point faible du bloc occidental est l’Arctique, porte ouverte sur son flanc et les routes maritimes de l’Atlantique nord.

• D’une part la puissance russe dans la zone est importante avec la flotte du Nord qui est une composante stratégique majeure de sa marine avec des bâtiments de surface et des sous-marins dont des lanceurs d’engins nucléaires. Pour faciliter la navigation civile et militaire dans ces espaces, la Russie dispose de la plus puissante flotte de navires brise-glace (34 à propulsion diesel et huit à propulsion nucléaire) auxquels s’ajoutent deux frégates brise-glace armées de missiles longue portée Kalibr. La flotte du Nord a pour rôle de permettre l’accès à « l’océan mondial » par les passages entre le Groenland, l’Islande et le Royaume-Uni (GIUK). Le contrôle étroit du GIUK est vital en cas d’affrontement avec la Russie, possiblement soutenue par la Chine, ou épaulant la Chine par une manœuvre de diversion via l’Arctique alors que celle-ci attaque Taïwan. La Navy aurait alors à se dédoubler pour conduire la bataille dans le Pacifique et dans l’Atlantique nord pour protéger ses approches, s’affaiblissant d’autant.
• D’autre part, l’espace arctique est le plus court chemin aérien balistique ou avion entre la Russie et les États-Unis. 

L’Arctique est donc bien redevenu un espace stratégique vital pour la sécurité des États-Unis et de l’Alliance atlantique. Un renforcement des moyens militaires pour sa défense est ressenti comme indispensable. Les buts des États-Unis sont donc de déployer un double dispositif de défense sur la ligne du Grand Nord.

• Il s’agit d’abord des moyens de combat classiques. En 2018, la Navy recrée la 2e flotte (« Second Fleet »), dissoute en 2011, et étend sa compétence de l’Atlantique nord à l’Arctique dans le but de faire face à l’accroissement de la puissance navale russe. En octobre 2025, totalement démunie de cette capacité, elle passe commande de 11 brise-glaces à la Finlande. L’OTAN remanie de son côté ses commandements et déploiements pour faire face à la menace russe. Pour la défense maritime, des forces navales permanentes OTAN sont établies depuis les années 1970. Un commandement interarmées (JFC) est créé à Norfolk (EU) en 2019 pour défendre l’Atlantique et le Grand Nord, avec une priorité sur les lignes de communication transatlantiques. En 2025, il reçoit le renfort de la Suède, de la Finlande et du Danemark. Mais en réalité les efforts de l’OTAN sont plus concentrés sur la ligne Baltique-Méditerranée et la communication transatlantique tant pour les dispositifs aéroterrestres que navals. C’est pourquoi le but des États-Unis est de pousser les pays européens de l’Alliance à plus s’investir sur la défense du GIUK.
• Il s’agit ensuite de la défense antimissile du territoire américain, un problème de sécurité nationale dont la solution passe par l’utilisation des avantages qu’offre la situation géographique du Groenland. Les États-Unis y disposent d’un droit d’utilisation à des fins militaires (voir ci-dessus). La base de Pituffik à l’extrême nord remplit trois missions : la surveillance, l’alerte et le guidage de la riposte à une attaque de missiles balistiques intercontinentaux ; le contrôle du réseau de satellites américains (et de certains alliés) ; l’entretien d’un port en eau profonde. Elle est vitale pour les États-Unis qui considèrent cependant que la séquence alerte/détection des missiles doit être complétée par la phase destruction au plus près du lancement de l’attaque et donc l’implantation de sites de lancement antimissiles (concept du Dôme d’or). Elle est enfin le seul port côté occidental permettant d’accueillir des bâtiments de guerre pour la surveillance/défense de l’océan Arctique.

Les enjeux commerciaux

Le changement climatique qui va étendre les périodes de navigation transocéanique Pacifique-Atlantique via l’Arctique, aujourd’hui limitées à deux/trois mois sans brise-glace, permet de favoriser les manœuvres militaires et de densifier le trafic commercial.

Le trafic par la route du Nord, via le détroit de Béring puis dans l’Océan Arctique au large des côtes russes, monte en puissance, tout en restant à un faible niveau (35 millions de tonnes transportées en 2025). Les Chinois y sont des acteurs majeurs et ont développé d’étroites coopérations avec les Russes, allant jusqu’à s’intégrer dans les infrastructures russes matérielles et immatérielles de la route maritime du Nord. Les rivages russes sur l’Arctique, les seuls peuplés, actifs tant sur le plan de l’exploitation de ressources, que de la production industrielle et de l’activité militaire font aujourd’hui de l’Arctique une « mer russe » dont la Russie contrôle le trafic.

Pour le Groenland lui-même, au-delà des considérations stratégiques majeures, son intérêt réside dans ses ressources minières, pétrolières, halieutiques et son climat, propice à l’installation des immenses et énergivores centres de traitement de l’intelligence artificielle. Ressources pour lesquelles la Chine manifeste depuis 2012 un intérêt au point de fournir par ses investissements plus de 11 % du PIB groenlandais. Chine qui se présente en outre comme un « État proche de l’Arctique » avec un projet de « Route de la soie polaire » qu’elle développe dans son Livre blanc sur l’Arctique dans lequel elle affirme que les États extérieurs à la région ont des droits dans de nombreux domaines dans cette région et s’affirme déterminée à avoir sa place dans la « gouvernance de l’Arctique ». Les États-Unis partagent naturellement les mêmes intérêts, mais s’y sentent plus légitimes et surtout veulent anticiper toute montée en puissance de la Chine dans cette zone.

L’Arctique est un champ potentiel d’affrontement russo-chinois contre américains (occidentaux), tout autant que l’Ukraine ou Taïwan, voire concomitant.

Winner-takes-all

Avoir la capacité d’interdire si nécessaire le débouché vers l’Atlantique est donc un atout majeur pour les États-Unis, mais aussi pour l’Europe qui pourrait être prise à revers. Le constat fait par les États-Unis est que les Européens, voire l’OTAN, ne sont pas arrivés à prendre conscience de cette menace. Paradoxalement c’est la menace américaine de saisie du Groenland par la force qui les a réveillés. En ce sens la tactique de négociation de Trump a secoué les esprits : demander l’impossible pour avoir le souhaitable autrement dit « Think big and kick ass [1]». Le secrétaire général de l’Alliance Mark Rutte, comme la Première ministre danoise, déclare le 22 janvier 2026 que l’OTAN (dont font partie les États-Unis !) « doit augmenter ses engagements dans l’Arctique. Car la défense et la sécurité dans l’Arctique sont de la responsabilité de toute l’Alliance » et pour ce qui est du rôle des États-Unis, le traité de 1951 va être élargi et approfondi. Le 22 janvier, le comité militaire de l’OTAN reconnaissait la réalité d’une menace grandissante dans le Grand Nord et le besoin de se préparer à y faire face, déclarant néanmoins attendre les objectifs politiques poursuivis.

Aux regards des enjeux de sécurité, économiques et de sécurisation des ressources pour le siècle à venir, l’objectif des États-Unis est bien d’être un acteur majeur et reconnu dans la zone et avec le soutien des pays européens de l’OTAN. Un soutien qu’ils ne savent solide que si ces pays développent des capacités militaires à la hauteur des défis sécuritaires. C’est tout le sens des menaces sur un désengagement qu’ils ont fait peser sur les pays européens avec pour résultat d’obtenir de l’OTAN en 2014 un engagement à fournir un effort de défense à hauteur de 2 % des PIB, porté en 2025 au sommet de la Haye à 5 %.

Une partie de ces budgets doit maintenant être consacrée à l’Arctique. La National Defense Strategy 2026 le demande clairement: « U.S. partners throughout the Western Hemisphere can do far more […] to prevent U.S. adversaries from controlling or otherwise exercising undue influence over key terrain, especially Greenland, […] ».

Après cette crise, un épilogue se dessine selon les étapes suivantes :

• L’OTAN (partie européenne) convient qu’elle doit renforcer ses capacités en Arctique pour défendre les approches du GIUK, elle renforcera donc le bouclier défensif conventionnel américain ;
• Les États-Unis obtiennent l’engagement de discussions avec Danemark/Groenland en vue de modifier l’accord de défense de 1951 (déjà très favorable) et vont y introduire des assurances de pouvoir y installer leur système de défense anti-missiles (dôme d’or) de façon pérenne ;
• Cette augmentation des effectifs militaires leur permettra aussi d’accompagner voire d’orienter le processus d’évolution vers l’indépendance et de s’assurer de liens solides avec le futur État ;
• Ils se positionneront comme défenseur, pourvoyeur de fonds[2], support du développement de cet État, certes sous souveraineté contrainte. Mais un État de 56 000 habitants sous ces latitudes extrêmes pourrait-il vivre sans protecteur ? Le mariage de raison s’imposera.
• Il leur sera alors temps à l’échéance d’au moins une décennie de se pencher sur les prises de bénéfices économiques. En ce domaine, la stratégie américaine est de garantir le futur lointain en sécurisant au plus vite des ressources potentielles.

En finir avec les contes de fées

Conclure sur cette crise en affirmant que la détermination de l’Europe a fait reculer Trump tient du conte de fées et nous conduit vers d’autres crises et désillusions.

La réalité est différente :

• Face à la montée en puissance des blocs géopolitiques, l’Europe tout comme les États-Unis ont besoin de l’OTAN ; l’épilogue décrit ci-dessus est bénéfique pour les deux, faute d’avoir vu un réel engagement européen sur la protection de l’Arctique ; à moins que l’Europe ne veuille basculer leur alliance vers le bloc sino-russe ?
• L’Europe doit renforcer ses positions dans cette alliance, en commençant par des analyses stratégiques fondées sur la réalité géopolitique, avec une vision mondiale, en partageant ses conclusions avec son allié et en adaptant ses capacités militaires aux menaces ; 
• C’est en raison et à partir de cette position géostratégique affirmée que l’Europe peut trouver la volonté de s’affranchir des fourches caudines américaines multisectorielles, qu’elles soient imposées par Trump ou par les présidents passés et à venir ; 
• L’autonomie stratégique de l’Europe est un projet indispensable à sa survie, mais doit être précédée d’une appréciation de situation stratégique centrée sur les faits, sans concession aux jugements de valeur sur les acteurs.

[1] “Think big and kick ass in business and life” par Donald Trump et Bill Zanker, Harper Collins, 2007

[2] Aujourd’hui, la contribution du Danemark au budget du Groenland est d’environ 600 millions d’euros. Les États-Unis n’auront aucun mal à l’augmenter.

L’article Groenland – États-Unis : vers un mariage de raison ? est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Chaque mardi, Pascal Boniface reçoit un membre de l’équipe de recherche de l’‪‪IRIS‬ pour décrypter un fait d’actualité internationale. Aujourd’hui, Hadjar Aouardji, directrice de la recherche à l’IRIS, revient sur le Conseil de la Paix lancé par Donald Trump à Davos le 22 janvier 2026. Dans quelle mesure ce « Board of Peace » vient-il concurrencer l’ONU ? Quelles sont ses chances de succès ? Et comment se positionnent les différents États à son sujet ?

L’article Board of peace , le “machin” de Trump | Les mardis de l’IRIS est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Die Europäische Union und Indien haben ein umfassendes Freihandelsabkommen beschlossen. Welche Bedeutung das hat, kommentiert die Handelsexpertin des DIW Berlin, Sonali Chowdhry:

Das Freihandelsabkommen zwischen der Europäischen Union und Indien ist von großer Bedeutung. Die bilaterale Partnerschaft gewinnt nach einem langen Verhandlungsprozess, der 2007 begann und wiederholt ins Stocken geriet, die nun dringend benötigte Dynamik. Indien wird bis 2026 voraussichtlich um 7,3 Prozent wachsen und in den kommenden Jahren zu einer der drei größten Volkswirtschaften der Welt aufsteigen. Die EU kann es sich kaum leisten, ihre Präsenz auf diesem Markt nicht auszubauen.

Das Abkommen baut auf den bilateralen Handelsbeziehungen zwischen der EU und Indien auf, die bereits mehr als 170.000 Käufer-Lieferanten-Beziehungen zwischen indischen und EU-Unternehmen umfassen. Durch den Abbau von Zöllen und anderen Handelshemmnissen in Schlüsselindustrien eröffnet das Abkommen EU-Exporteuren in vielen Sektoren wie Automobil, Maschinenbau und Getränken neue Möglichkeiten. Gleichzeitig wird sich der Marktzugang für indische Exporte wie Arzneimittel, IT-Dienstleistungen und Textilien verbessern.

Über diese unmittelbaren wirtschaftlichen Vorteile hinaus erfüllt das Abkommen eine weitere wichtige Funktion, die nicht unterschätzt werden sollte: Es ist eine Versicherungspolice in der derzeitigen unsicheren Lage. Denn die im Rahmen von Freihandelsabkommen eingegangenen Verpflichtungen sorgen für Transparenz und Vorhersehbarkeit im internationalen Handel und in der globalen Governance, die anderswo untergraben werden. Solche Freihandelsabkommen schützen das globale Handelssystem und verhindern, dass es in eine Spirale des Protektionismus gerät.

This study examines portrayals of marine mammal celebrities (MMCs) in popular culture over the past 70 years, reflecting evolving public attitudes toward ocean conservation. It identifies four main types of MMCs, each linked to a specific era and shaped by changes in media landscapes, perceptions of marine mammal agency and welfare, and conservation priorities: (1) Hollywood MMCs (ca. 1960–1990s)—wild animals captured and exhibited in aquaria, cast as celebrities based on their roles in traditional mass media (blockbuster movies); (2) MMCs in human care (ca. 1990s–2010s)—animals housed in aquaria whose fame stemmed from public concern about their welfare and calls for their release; (3) rescued MMCs (ca. 1980s–present)—marine mammals cared for by humans after they were injured in the ocean; and (4) endangered and dangerous MMCs (2010s–present)—wild animals that approach humans, demonstrate human‐like behaviours, or interact with boats. Introducing the method of “following the animal,” the article provides examples of celebrity animals that illustrate each of the four categories, such as the dolphin Flipper and the walrus Freya. The study contributes to the thematic issue on "Ocean Pop: Marine Imaginaries in the Age of Global Polycrisis" by highlighting the mutual influence of media, animal celebrity, and conservation, and urges further research into how shifting representations shape global engagement with marine life and the environment.

This study examines portrayals of marine mammal celebrities (MMCs) in popular culture over the past 70 years, reflecting evolving public attitudes toward ocean conservation. It identifies four main types of MMCs, each linked to a specific era and shaped by changes in media landscapes, perceptions of marine mammal agency and welfare, and conservation priorities: (1) Hollywood MMCs (ca. 1960–1990s)—wild animals captured and exhibited in aquaria, cast as celebrities based on their roles in traditional mass media (blockbuster movies); (2) MMCs in human care (ca. 1990s–2010s)—animals housed in aquaria whose fame stemmed from public concern about their welfare and calls for their release; (3) rescued MMCs (ca. 1980s–present)—marine mammals cared for by humans after they were injured in the ocean; and (4) endangered and dangerous MMCs (2010s–present)—wild animals that approach humans, demonstrate human‐like behaviours, or interact with boats. Introducing the method of “following the animal,” the article provides examples of celebrity animals that illustrate each of the four categories, such as the dolphin Flipper and the walrus Freya. The study contributes to the thematic issue on "Ocean Pop: Marine Imaginaries in the Age of Global Polycrisis" by highlighting the mutual influence of media, animal celebrity, and conservation, and urges further research into how shifting representations shape global engagement with marine life and the environment.