The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for July 2025.
The Trump administration’s nominee for the next U.S. Ambassador to Greece, Kimberly Guilfoyle, fielded questions at the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee confirmation hearing on July 9. The Committee has approved the nomination of Kimberly Guilfoyle to serve as U.S. Ambassador to Greece, with 13 to 9 in favor of advancing Guilfoyle’s nomination. The nomination now heads to the full Senate for a final confirmation vote.
According to Vassilis Nedos (Kathimerini), the U.S. has increased its use of key military facilities in Greece, including the strategically located Souda Bay and the northern port of Alexandroupoli, amid heightened tensions in the Middle East and shifting priorities in Washington. For Athens, the expanding US interest in Souda and Alexandroupoli reaffirms the long-term strategic importance of Greek territory in American defense planning.
The Greek government expressed hesitation and caution to comment on the EU-U.S. trade deal on tariffs reached between Ursula von der Leyen and Donald Trump on July 27. Greek Finance Minister Kyriakos Pierrakakis, speaking in the Hellenic Parliament, outlined the government’s thoughts on this critical issue. He noted that it puts an end to months of uncertainty following Trump’s election and the “back and forth” with the tariffs, and that is a positive thing. He stressed, however, that the government is studying the agreement to see how it can better manage the problems that will arise in areas of Greece’s commercial interest.
More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#
Analyses on de-Europeanization have lately flourished, re-opening the path to explore whether Europeanization is still relevant for how the European governance system evolves. This article, taking the European climate policy (and in particular the European Green Deal) as a case study, which has been the spearhead of the 2019–2024 European Commission term, suggests the said exploration to focus on the EU climate/green policy. It utilizes the case of Greece, which has set the goal of decarbonization by 2028. It analyses the Greek parties’ public stances during two election periods (national in 2023 and European in 2024) to test whether they are consistent with the EU apparatus and goals. The article concludes by showcasing that Greek parties are relatively distant from being Europeanized in the field of climate policy and suggests revisiting Europeanization to better understand European and Member States’ politics.
Read here the article by Emmanuella Doussis, Head of the Climate and Sustainability Programme, ELIAMEP; Professor, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens; George Dikaios, Senior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP, and Marianna Terezaki, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP.
The new issue of the Southeast European and Black Sea Studies Journal is available here.
Cover photo: Tania Malréchauffé, Unsplash
Calls for development policy to place greater emphasis on national self-interest are growing louder in many donor countries, including Germany. There are indeed good reasons to dovetail Germany’s international policies more effectively. Synergies between develop-ment cooperation (DC), foreign trade promotion and research partnerships have not been harnessed systematically to date, yet they could serve the interests of both Germany and its partner countries alike. Moreover, Germany is facing geopolitical competition from actors who have long been using their DC proactively to pursue strategic interests.
We advocate adopting a development policy that pursues German and European interests in those areas in which they are compatible with development policy objectives. Instead of focusing on the interests of individual companies, it is important to identify long-term ‘win-win’ potential, for example through a more strategic approach to planning DC offers that involves the private sector and ministries more actively prior to intergovernmental negotiations with the partner countries.
At the same time, we warn against subordinating DC to foreign economic policy objectives. Conditions such as tied aid provisions that link financial cooperation to business contracts for German/EU companies are expensive, inefficient and counterproductive in development terms. In addition, this approach would risk losing sight of Germany’s overarching interest in solutions to global problems, such as peacebuilding and climate and biodiversity protection.
We set out five guidelines for a development policy strategy that takes due consideration of Germany’s own interests without harming the partner countries:
1. Avoid strict tied aid provisions. These would be inefficient in development terms and would be of little benefit to German companies. As an export nation, Germany should comply with freedom of contract rules.
2. Pursue the interests of German society as a whole where they align with DC objectives. We distinguish between Germany’s global interests and those of individual companies. DC projects should align economic interests with the common good in the partner country.
3. Develop offers strategically prior to intergovernmental negotiations. The most effective synergies are generated if the private sector and other ministries are involved in preparing DC initiatives at an early stage. To do so, Germany needs to define joint national goals, coordinate ministerial instruments to achieve these goals and evaluate contributions by the private sector in advance.
4. Create strategic partnerships that serve as models. Germany has established a number of bilateral partnerships, especially on energy, raw material security and migration. None of these is exemplary in terms of effective interministerial coordination, private sector involvement or demons-trable benefits for both of the countries involved. At least one flagship project in each of the areas mentioned would make Germany attractive as a credible partner.
5. Expand minilateral formats with European states and influential third countries. Triangular and quadrilateral cooperation with ‘global partners’ and donor countries that share the same or similar interests can help advance Germany’s interests in international development for the common good.
Calls for development policy to place greater emphasis on national self-interest are growing louder in many donor countries, including Germany. There are indeed good reasons to dovetail Germany’s international policies more effectively. Synergies between develop-ment cooperation (DC), foreign trade promotion and research partnerships have not been harnessed systematically to date, yet they could serve the interests of both Germany and its partner countries alike. Moreover, Germany is facing geopolitical competition from actors who have long been using their DC proactively to pursue strategic interests.
We advocate adopting a development policy that pursues German and European interests in those areas in which they are compatible with development policy objectives. Instead of focusing on the interests of individual companies, it is important to identify long-term ‘win-win’ potential, for example through a more strategic approach to planning DC offers that involves the private sector and ministries more actively prior to intergovernmental negotiations with the partner countries.
At the same time, we warn against subordinating DC to foreign economic policy objectives. Conditions such as tied aid provisions that link financial cooperation to business contracts for German/EU companies are expensive, inefficient and counterproductive in development terms. In addition, this approach would risk losing sight of Germany’s overarching interest in solutions to global problems, such as peacebuilding and climate and biodiversity protection.
We set out five guidelines for a development policy strategy that takes due consideration of Germany’s own interests without harming the partner countries:
1. Avoid strict tied aid provisions. These would be inefficient in development terms and would be of little benefit to German companies. As an export nation, Germany should comply with freedom of contract rules.
2. Pursue the interests of German society as a whole where they align with DC objectives. We distinguish between Germany’s global interests and those of individual companies. DC projects should align economic interests with the common good in the partner country.
3. Develop offers strategically prior to intergovernmental negotiations. The most effective synergies are generated if the private sector and other ministries are involved in preparing DC initiatives at an early stage. To do so, Germany needs to define joint national goals, coordinate ministerial instruments to achieve these goals and evaluate contributions by the private sector in advance.
4. Create strategic partnerships that serve as models. Germany has established a number of bilateral partnerships, especially on energy, raw material security and migration. None of these is exemplary in terms of effective interministerial coordination, private sector involvement or demons-trable benefits for both of the countries involved. At least one flagship project in each of the areas mentioned would make Germany attractive as a credible partner.
5. Expand minilateral formats with European states and influential third countries. Triangular and quadrilateral cooperation with ‘global partners’ and donor countries that share the same or similar interests can help advance Germany’s interests in international development for the common good.
Calls for development policy to place greater emphasis on national self-interest are growing louder in many donor countries, including Germany. There are indeed good reasons to dovetail Germany’s international policies more effectively. Synergies between develop-ment cooperation (DC), foreign trade promotion and research partnerships have not been harnessed systematically to date, yet they could serve the interests of both Germany and its partner countries alike. Moreover, Germany is facing geopolitical competition from actors who have long been using their DC proactively to pursue strategic interests.
We advocate adopting a development policy that pursues German and European interests in those areas in which they are compatible with development policy objectives. Instead of focusing on the interests of individual companies, it is important to identify long-term ‘win-win’ potential, for example through a more strategic approach to planning DC offers that involves the private sector and ministries more actively prior to intergovernmental negotiations with the partner countries.
At the same time, we warn against subordinating DC to foreign economic policy objectives. Conditions such as tied aid provisions that link financial cooperation to business contracts for German/EU companies are expensive, inefficient and counterproductive in development terms. In addition, this approach would risk losing sight of Germany’s overarching interest in solutions to global problems, such as peacebuilding and climate and biodiversity protection.
We set out five guidelines for a development policy strategy that takes due consideration of Germany’s own interests without harming the partner countries:
1. Avoid strict tied aid provisions. These would be inefficient in development terms and would be of little benefit to German companies. As an export nation, Germany should comply with freedom of contract rules.
2. Pursue the interests of German society as a whole where they align with DC objectives. We distinguish between Germany’s global interests and those of individual companies. DC projects should align economic interests with the common good in the partner country.
3. Develop offers strategically prior to intergovernmental negotiations. The most effective synergies are generated if the private sector and other ministries are involved in preparing DC initiatives at an early stage. To do so, Germany needs to define joint national goals, coordinate ministerial instruments to achieve these goals and evaluate contributions by the private sector in advance.
4. Create strategic partnerships that serve as models. Germany has established a number of bilateral partnerships, especially on energy, raw material security and migration. None of these is exemplary in terms of effective interministerial coordination, private sector involvement or demons-trable benefits for both of the countries involved. At least one flagship project in each of the areas mentioned would make Germany attractive as a credible partner.
5. Expand minilateral formats with European states and influential third countries. Triangular and quadrilateral cooperation with ‘global partners’ and donor countries that share the same or similar interests can help advance Germany’s interests in international development for the common good.
The international landscape in mid-2025 is characterized by a retreat from liberal institutionalism, exemplified by the United States' withdrawal from the Sustainable Development Goals and its adoption of transactional, power-based international relations, as well as its potential withdrawal from some multilateral bodies. In this context, this paper argues that traditional models of universal multilateralism are increasingly untenable, and that new forms of collective action grounded in shared interests and normative alignment are both necessary and feasible. This paper revisits and applies the historically rooted concept of “like-minded internationalism,” arguing for its renewed relevance under current geopolitical conditions.
The international landscape in mid-2025 is characterized by a retreat from liberal institutionalism, exemplified by the United States' withdrawal from the Sustainable Development Goals and its adoption of transactional, power-based international relations, as well as its potential withdrawal from some multilateral bodies. In this context, this paper argues that traditional models of universal multilateralism are increasingly untenable, and that new forms of collective action grounded in shared interests and normative alignment are both necessary and feasible. This paper revisits and applies the historically rooted concept of “like-minded internationalism,” arguing for its renewed relevance under current geopolitical conditions.
The international landscape in mid-2025 is characterized by a retreat from liberal institutionalism, exemplified by the United States' withdrawal from the Sustainable Development Goals and its adoption of transactional, power-based international relations, as well as its potential withdrawal from some multilateral bodies. In this context, this paper argues that traditional models of universal multilateralism are increasingly untenable, and that new forms of collective action grounded in shared interests and normative alignment are both necessary and feasible. This paper revisits and applies the historically rooted concept of “like-minded internationalism,” arguing for its renewed relevance under current geopolitical conditions.
In its 80th year, the UN faces a significant crisis. Severe funding shortfalls are forcing the organisation to make cuts. However, the focus should not be solely on cost savings. Reform presents an opportunity to address unresolved challenges and to restructure the UN both institutionally and politically.
In its 80th year, the UN faces a significant crisis. Severe funding shortfalls are forcing the organisation to make cuts. However, the focus should not be solely on cost savings. Reform presents an opportunity to address unresolved challenges and to restructure the UN both institutionally and politically.
In its 80th year, the UN faces a significant crisis. Severe funding shortfalls are forcing the organisation to make cuts. However, the focus should not be solely on cost savings. Reform presents an opportunity to address unresolved challenges and to restructure the UN both institutionally and politically.
Motivation: In recent years, foreign aid donors have tried to becomemore transparent, often by sharing information digitally. However,the politicization of individual aid projects has resulted in biasedreporting, raising doubts about the legitimacy of aid in general. Wetherefore examine whether increased transparency leads to greatergovernment effectiveness and public trust. Purpose: Government agencies typically assume that greatertransparency in public administration improves understanding ofbureaucratic actions, thereby fostering trust in the government. Inforeign aid, openness is believed to enhance public confidence andimprove the effectiveness of governments. However, recent publicand political reactions to the disclosure of aid information cast doubton these optimistic assumptions. Approach and methods: Using our sender-mediator-receiver modelof a “fragile transparency loop,” we analyse how communicationbreaks down in German foreign aid. First, we focus on Germany as adonor that shares information through a digital transparency portal,examining the sender side. Second, we investigate the mediator sideby conducting a qualitative content analysis of German online mediaarticles. Third, we examine the receiver side by disaggregating theGerman public into several subgroups. Findings: Our empirical findings suggest that, while donors assumea virtuous transparency loop, the reality can resemble a fragiletransparency loop that is easily disrupted. The government maywithhold information; mediators may spread misinformation; and thepublic may not receive information neutrally. These dynamics explainwhy, despite increasing transparency, donors may not achieve theintended increases in government effectiveness and public trust. Policy implications: Donors should find a balanced approach toforeign aid transparency that upholds democratic accountabilitywhile avoiding information overload. Aid bureaucracies should tailortheir disclosure to serve different audiences, including professionalswith development expertise and the wider public, who may havepreconceptions or be uninformed about foreign aid.
Motivation: In recent years, foreign aid donors have tried to becomemore transparent, often by sharing information digitally. However,the politicization of individual aid projects has resulted in biasedreporting, raising doubts about the legitimacy of aid in general. Wetherefore examine whether increased transparency leads to greatergovernment effectiveness and public trust. Purpose: Government agencies typically assume that greatertransparency in public administration improves understanding ofbureaucratic actions, thereby fostering trust in the government. Inforeign aid, openness is believed to enhance public confidence andimprove the effectiveness of governments. However, recent publicand political reactions to the disclosure of aid information cast doubton these optimistic assumptions. Approach and methods: Using our sender-mediator-receiver modelof a “fragile transparency loop,” we analyse how communicationbreaks down in German foreign aid. First, we focus on Germany as adonor that shares information through a digital transparency portal,examining the sender side. Second, we investigate the mediator sideby conducting a qualitative content analysis of German online mediaarticles. Third, we examine the receiver side by disaggregating theGerman public into several subgroups. Findings: Our empirical findings suggest that, while donors assumea virtuous transparency loop, the reality can resemble a fragiletransparency loop that is easily disrupted. The government maywithhold information; mediators may spread misinformation; and thepublic may not receive information neutrally. These dynamics explainwhy, despite increasing transparency, donors may not achieve theintended increases in government effectiveness and public trust. Policy implications: Donors should find a balanced approach toforeign aid transparency that upholds democratic accountabilitywhile avoiding information overload. Aid bureaucracies should tailortheir disclosure to serve different audiences, including professionalswith development expertise and the wider public, who may havepreconceptions or be uninformed about foreign aid.
Motivation: In recent years, foreign aid donors have tried to becomemore transparent, often by sharing information digitally. However,the politicization of individual aid projects has resulted in biasedreporting, raising doubts about the legitimacy of aid in general. Wetherefore examine whether increased transparency leads to greatergovernment effectiveness and public trust. Purpose: Government agencies typically assume that greatertransparency in public administration improves understanding ofbureaucratic actions, thereby fostering trust in the government. Inforeign aid, openness is believed to enhance public confidence andimprove the effectiveness of governments. However, recent publicand political reactions to the disclosure of aid information cast doubton these optimistic assumptions. Approach and methods: Using our sender-mediator-receiver modelof a “fragile transparency loop,” we analyse how communicationbreaks down in German foreign aid. First, we focus on Germany as adonor that shares information through a digital transparency portal,examining the sender side. Second, we investigate the mediator sideby conducting a qualitative content analysis of German online mediaarticles. Third, we examine the receiver side by disaggregating theGerman public into several subgroups. Findings: Our empirical findings suggest that, while donors assumea virtuous transparency loop, the reality can resemble a fragiletransparency loop that is easily disrupted. The government maywithhold information; mediators may spread misinformation; and thepublic may not receive information neutrally. These dynamics explainwhy, despite increasing transparency, donors may not achieve theintended increases in government effectiveness and public trust. Policy implications: Donors should find a balanced approach toforeign aid transparency that upholds democratic accountabilitywhile avoiding information overload. Aid bureaucracies should tailortheir disclosure to serve different audiences, including professionalswith development expertise and the wider public, who may havepreconceptions or be uninformed about foreign aid.