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Mondafrique - Alors que le sentiment anti-français croît de nouveau au sein des populations dans le Sahel, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, ancien ministre...

By Vladimir Popov and Jomo Kwame Sundaram
BERLIN and KUALA LUMPUR, Dec 10 2019 (IPS)

China’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 14%. Since then, its growth rate has declined by more than half to 6.6% in 2018. The five-year moving average growth rate is at its lowest since reforms began in 1978, although annual growth briefly fell lower during 1979, the year of the Tian An Men incident.

China’s growth slowdown
Economists have suggested various factors slowing China’s growth, including its lower population growth and ageing population. These demographic factors are real, but their significance has been exaggerated.

Vladimir Popov

The working age population and employment both grew at 2% annually at the end of the 20th century, but such growth started to decline early this century before ceasing in 2014. These factors can only explain up to two percentage points of its annual GDP growth rate decline.

Also, the advantages of economic backwardness have been exhausted: it is easier to catch up from a low base, while growth tends to slow in fast-growing economies approaching the technological frontier, especially as cutting-edge innovation is more difficult and costly than copying existing technologies, whether for free, or even by buying patents and copyrights.

Is rapid growth sustainable?
Developed economies rarely grew for extended periods at the pace of the East Asian ‘miracle’ economies ‘catching up’. After all, only five economies have successfully gone from ‘developing’ (i.e., less than a fifth of US per capita income) to ‘developed’ (over half the US level) status.

These were Japan and the first-generation newly industrialized economies (NIEs) during the 1950s-1980s, namely South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong (HK) and Singapore, although HK’s limited industrialization is moot and clearly past.

Marked growth slowdowns have only occurred in Japan and HK, after their per capita incomes were over half the US level, whereas the other ‘tigers’ have continued to grow, eluding the supposed ‘middle-income trap’.

As China’s per capita GDP (at purchasing power parity, i.e., even in comparable prices) is still under a quarter of the US level, a similar growth slowdown in China may still be a couple of decades away.

Exchange rate competitiveness
China’s growth slowdown also appears to be due to political choices. Many argue that its growth for four decades has been due to deliberate exchange rate depreciation, promoting exports and discouraging imports, thus rapidly accumulating foreign exchange (forex) reserves.

Jomo Kwame Sundaram

China’s exchange rate competitiveness may thus have been an unexpected outcome of efforts to achieve currency stability by informally pegging the renminbi (RMB) to the US dollar, following the example of the Hongkong dollar from 1983. This was deemed especially necessary following the Tian An Men incident and the failure of various earlier multiple exchange rate arrangements.

But as China’s rapid export-oriented growth with low wages was also due to rapid forex accumulation, keeping its exchange rate low, and raising exports, savings and investment. From around 2005, however, China gave in to US-led international pressures to let the RMB appreciate.

The real exchange rate of China’s RMB – the ratio of Chinese to international prices, as measured by the ratio of its dollar GDP at the official exchange rate to its purchasing power parity GDP – rose during 2003-2013, especially in 2006-2011, except for a brief re-peg right after the 2008 financial crisis started.

The People’s Bank of China (PBoC) tried in August 2015 to move towards a floating exchange rate regime, precipitating a 3% fall in three days against the US dollar. China’s central bank quickly abandoned the attempt, spending over a trillion dollars of forex reserves over the next two years alone to prop up the RMB.

Ironically, the August 2019 PBoC decision to let its currency sink below the RMB7/USD ‘psychological threshold’, consistent with greater exchange rate flexibility, has been portrayed by the Trump administration as currency manipulation although it does not meet US Treasury criteria.

Real exchange rate of Chinese renminbi, 1990-2017 (%)

Source: World Development Indicators

Improving wellbeing, not growth
The US – long dominant in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the G7 and the G20 – accused China of ‘currency manipulation’ to gain ‘unfair’ advantage in international trade, causing ‘global imbalances’, including the huge US current account deficit with China.

China’s exports as a share of GDP peaked at 35% in 2005, before beginning to fall. The 2008-2009 Great Recession saw RMB appreciation suspended briefly as China opted for a large domestic stimulus package, which accelerated the transition to greater domestic consumption and lower savings as wages rose with high employment and labour force utilization rates.

As the world experienced strong contractionary tendencies, China’s growth slowed from 14% in 2007 to a still high 9% in 2009. As domestic consumption rose, savings, investments and growth inevitably declined. The investment share of GDP peaked at 45% in 2013, before declining.

China also slowed forex accumulation, before stopping completely in 2010, resuming RMB appreciation. Its real exchange rate appreciated fastest during 2006-2011, ‘over-shooting’ and causing RMB over-valuation until its recent depreciation in response to US trade belligerence.

Hence, China has stopped relying on exchange rate competitiveness and low real wages for rapid export-oriented growth for well over a decade, resulting in rising real wages, higher domestic consumption, and perhaps slower growth.

This article draws upon: Slowdown of growth in China: Circumstances or choice? published by the Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute, Berlin.

The post Why Is Growth Slowing in China? appeared first on Inter Press Service.

Erfaringer fra Finland, Norge og Island

134 igen szavazattal elfogadta a kormánypárti többség az országgyűlésben a kormányzati igazgatásról szóló törvény módosítását.

The EU's gift of 250 camels to boost Mauritanian border security has been mocked online.

RTVS: Annak ellenére, hogy azonnal hatalmas figyelem irányult a gyilkossági ügyre, még mindig homály fedi annak körülményeit. A rendőrség azt állítja, felfedte az elkövetők kilétét, akik betörtek Valko házába, és a halála is az ő lelkükön szárad. Az elhunyt ügyvéd számos ismerőse azonban nem hisz a hivatalos álláspontnak.

Bosnie/ France : les polices s'attaquent à un réseau de traite d'êtres humains
Métro parisien : Fehim Hamidović et le gang des « petites voleuses » devant la justice
Bosnie-Herzégovine : le trafic de femmes, spécialité de Tuzla
Bosnie : la traite des êtres humains se développe toujours
Bosnie : de plus en plus de femmes du pays victimes de la prostitution forcée
Traite des êtres humains : les pays des Balkans « peuvent mieux faire »

/ Bosnie-Herzégovine, Radio Slobodna Evropa, Défense, police et justice, Société

Bosnie/ France : les polices s'attaquent à un réseau de traite d'êtres humains
Métro parisien : Fehim Hamidović et le gang des « petites voleuses » devant la justice
Bosnie-Herzégovine : le trafic de femmes, spécialité de Tuzla
Bosnie : la traite des êtres humains se développe toujours
Bosnie : de plus en plus de femmes du pays victimes de la prostitution forcée
Traite des êtres humains : les pays des Balkans « peuvent mieux faire »

/ Bosnie-Herzégovine, Radio Slobodna Evropa, Défense, police et justice, Société

Anatolij Jevgenyjevics Karpov orosz sakkozó is résztvett hétfőn a szlovák parlamentben rendezett 3. karácsonyi sakktornán. JUDr. Andrej Danko házelnök is megmérkőzött vele...

For Parliament’s negotiating team, the preliminary proposal by Finland's presidency of the Council for the next long-term budget of the EU would “condemn the European Union to failure”.
Committee on Budgets

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

For Parliament’s negotiating team, the preliminary proposal by Finland's presidency of the Council for the next long-term budget of the EU would “condemn the European Union to failure”.
Committee on Budgets

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

For Parliament’s negotiating team, the preliminary proposal by Finland's presidency of the Council for the next long-term budget of the EU would “condemn the European Union to failure”.
Committee on Budgets

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

For Parliament’s negotiating team, the preliminary proposal by Finland's presidency of the Council for the next long-term budget of the EU would “condemn the European Union to failure”.
Committee on Budgets

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

Bruxelles met la dernière main à un vaste plan de plantation de forêts. Objectifs : verdir les espaces urbains et périurbains, développer agroforesterie et stocker du carbone. Un article de notre partenaire, le Journal de l’environnement.

La Suisse a perdu sept rangs au classement climatique par pays et se voit devancer par le Maroc. WWF et Greenpeace se montrent critiques envers Berne.

Alors que le système de règlement des différends commerciaux devrait être paralysé à partir de ce mardi, l'Europe proposera dans les prochains jours des moyens de renforcer son arsenal de sanctions contre les pays qui adoptent des mesures commerciales illégales.

Luxembourg will implement a levy of €20 per tonne of carbon from 2021, as part of its efforts to slash greenhouse gas emissions by 55% by the end of the next decade.

Mások mellett a DJ Mag éllovasai, a Dimitri Vegas és Like Mike duó, Martin Garrix és Kygo is fellép a jövő évi Balaton Soundon 2020. július 8-12. között Zamárdiban - közölték a szervezők kedden az MTI-vel.

Concurrencés par le gaz, les réseaux de chaleur tardent à se développer en France. Pour atteindre les objectifs fixés par la loi de transition énergétique, les subventions publiques vont être revues à la hausse. Un article de notre partenaire La Tribune.

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week. The ninety-second Russian convoy crossed into Ukraine and returned through the Donetsk BCP.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 22 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                              

The profile of persons crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly persons and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits decreased from 10,485 to 10,180 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of 31 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience much more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 15 this week compared to 20 last week: nine of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and six into Ukraine (80 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles had tinted windows, and buses and minivans had drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families, sometimes with elderly persons and/or children, crossing the border at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, seven families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and seven families were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when no families were observed crossing to the Russian Federation and four into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses did not state their route; instead they had a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (433 compared to 457 observed during the previous week). There were 224 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 209 bound for Ukraine.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses did not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region and “LPR” plates.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” route or destination was noted: Luhansk-Kiev.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OTs observed 897 trucks (compared to 769 during the previous reporting week) crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs (469 at the Gukovo BCP and 428 at the Donetsk BCP); 481 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 416 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus, Lithuania and the Russian Federation and with “LPR” plates.

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks slightly increased from 59 to 65. These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks underwent systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which could include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 135 to 108; 90 trucks (83 per cent) were bound for Ukraine, the remaining 18 trucks (17 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased from 126 to 154 vehicles; 67 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 87 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 12 occasions; the OTs assessed that eight trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and four to Ukraine (more details are provided in the sections “trends and figures at a glance” below).

The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. The OTs also observed cars with “DPR” plates and licence plates from Georgia.

On 4 December at 20:50, the OT observed a police minivan with two police officers inside entering the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation. The police car parked in the checking area and was partially visible to the OT. At 20:48, the vehicle drove back towards the Russian Federation. One civilian was observed inside the vehicle, in addition to the police officers.

On 7 December at 23:31, an ambulance with Russian Federation licence plates arrived at the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation side. The ambulance bore the inscription “urgent medical help” (in Russian). Two paramedics and a driver were observed inside. The vehicle parked at the main building; the two paramedics then entered the building. At 23:40, they both returned to the vehicle and the ambulance left towards the Russian Federation. 

Convoy

On 5 December at 06:20 (Moscow time), the ninety-second[3] Russian convoy arrived at the Donetsk BCP. A total of ten vehicles were checked by Russian Federation border guards and customs officers prior to their crossing into Ukraine. All ten vehicles had crossed back into the Russian Federation by 12:35 on 5 December. Ukrainian border guards and custom officers were present during the checking processes. A Spot Report was distributed to participating States the same day.

See OM Spot Report of 5 December 2019: https://www.osce.org/observer-mission-at-russian-checkpoints-gukovo-and-donetsk/441206

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 5 November to 10 December 2019, please see the attachment here

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                  

[3] Based on the Observer Mission’s counting, this convoy is considered the ninety-second convoy that has crossed into Ukraine through the “Donetsk” or “Gukovo” BCPs. However, so far all these convoys crossed through the “Donetsk” BCP.