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On Thursday, Parliament supported the nominations of Nikolaos Milionis from Greece and Pierre Moscovici from France for the European Court of Auditors (ECA).
Committee on Budgetary Control

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Ricardo Borges de Castro & Leopold Schmertzing, Non-Resident Fellows on Strategic Foresight, ELIAMEP

In recent years, the European Union has increased its investment in strategic foresight capabilities. Within its institutions – the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of the EU, and the European External Action Service – and collectively through the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS), an EU inter-institutional network focused on global trends, there has been a concerted effort to boost Europe’s anticipatory edge. Yet, recent events show that these processes and insights have not sufficiently permeated the EU and, especially, national policymaking and preparedness. There is now a window of opportunity for Europe to review and strengthen its strategic capabilities.

No One Saw it Coming?

This year once again revealed how unprepared much of European politics remains for plausible events and crises. Donald Trump’s re-election and its implications for global politics and trade, Moscow’s ever-evolving forms of aggression towards Ukraine and intimidation towards Europe, and the recent Nexperia’s chip supply-chain shock: what else needs to happen before Europe stops being caught on the back foot and finally acts instead of reacting?

It does not have to be this way. While there are no crystal balls in policymaking and the future cannot be predicted, there are ways to improve how governments and European institutions respond, prepare and, if possible, mitigate or avert future crises. It is called strategic foresight and anticipation. This should not be a policy luxury item, but an established practice.

Preparation and resilience building begin with anticipation: identifying plausible, high-impact developments, before thinking them through systematically – from their origins and implications to ways to potentially avoid them. This needs political and real capital, but this is money well spent: the reality is that the current levels of uncertainty, volatility, and geopolitical and geoeconomic upheaval are likely to remain or even increase.

Crisis Management or Smart Democracy?

Europe cannot rely on emergency summits or improvised backroom negotiations to define its place in a changing international system, ensure its security and autonomy, or rebuild its economic and political strength. The EU needs to move from the constant crisis management of the last decade to anticipatory democracy.

Over the last years, the European Union and several European countries have built up their anticipatory and planning capabilities by setting-up and mainstreaming foresight units and departments into policy- and decision-making cycles. Today, the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of the EU, the EEAS, and the Committees have more robust foresight and anticipatory tools and processes than in the past and the ESPAS network continues to provide a forum for EU institutions, bodies and agencies to informally collaborate and share their perspectives on future challenges and opportunities, as well as strengthen their internal foresight and preparedness mechanisms.

Likewise, countries such as Spain or Portugal have joined others like Finland, Estonia or Slovenia in embedding foresight into their governance or parliamentary systems by creating new, whole-of-government departments for planning and strategic anticipation. The recent establishment of a Foresight Unit in the new German National Security Council is an additional relevant sign that  could be a blueprint for other European nations.  What is more, since the early 2020s there exists an EU-wide ministers for the future (and their sherpas) network that seeks to address key issues for Europe’s future.

Despite these positive developments and the potential of the existing work and capabilities for futures thinking and planning, European policymakers continue to be surprised or confounded by unexpected events and uncertainty. More foresight is certainly welcome in Europe, but what the EU needs is better foresight, more effective and agile foresight, and, above all, more honest foresight.

Europe’s Window of Opportunity?

There is a window of opportunity for the EU to strengthen its strategic and anticipatory capabilities and to become a global hub for strategic foresight.

The EU institutions  should do a ‘lessons learned’ exercise to assess what has worked and what did not work over the last ten years in building anticipatory and preparedness capabilities. While these processes are more common in the US, it is crucial that the EU understands what needs to be improved, where the unnecessary and costly overlaps and duplications are, and where collaboration or division of labour is needed or more effective.

A few of the problems in the European context are common to other parts of the world such as the fragmentation of foresight work across or within institutions, processes that shun politically charged topics, poor linkage to decision-makers, or the discontinuity of foresight functions after new electoral cycles. But it would be worth to study and understand what are EU-specific challenges that have undermined the impact of foresight and anticipatory efforts. Knowing the weaknesses is the first step to strengthen the EU’s culture of preparedness.

The needed overhaul of EU foresight capabilities is more important than ever because it happens at a time when close partners such as the United States – known for its strong foresight work and traditions – is scaling back its outreach, or shutting down important processes such as the Global Trends report, while competitors like China link anticipation, planning, and prioritisation in their next, the fifteenth, Five-Year Plan.

Since 2019, Singapore has also not organised its traditional International Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning Symposium (IRAHSS). This opened a gap for what used to be the premier global policy gathering for meaningful exchanges on strategic foresight, risks, and future opportunities among strategists, policy- and decision-makers from around the world.

Just do It

Although the EU cannot replace the US or Singapore, the ESPAS network should seize this moment to become a policy-oriented, international strategic foresight hub. As it did during President Trump’s first mandate, ESPAS could provide a global common good, strengthening long-term multilateralism and collaboration, and improving European resilience and strategic capabilities.  Today’s 2025 ESPAS Annual Conference should be the starting point for a strengthened foresight ambition in Europe and beyond.”

On Thursday, plenary supported a proposal to mobilise EU funds to help Spain and France following devastating floods and cyclones.
Committee on Budgets

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The next meeting of the Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) is scheduled to take place on Monday, 17 November 2025 from 15.00 - 18.30 in Brussels (room ANTALL 4Q1).

Further information about the SEDE meeting can be found here.

_______________________

SEDE missions 2025:

• Djibouti - 27-29 October 2025
  
• Greenland - 15-19 September 2025
  
• Norway - 27-30 May 2025
• Moldova and Ukraine - 14-17 April 2025
  
• Bosnia and Herzegovina - 24-27 February 2025
• Israel and Palestine - 5-8 February 2025

SEDE missions 2024:

• United Kingdom - 28-30 October 2024
• Ukraine - 25-26 October 2024

SEDE Committee meetings' calendar 2025
SEDE Committee meetings' calendar 2026
EP calendar 2025
EP calendar 2026
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Russian recruitment networks are targeting Kenyans with fake job offers, authorities say.

This policy brief examines Athens’ approach to migrant inclusion within Greece’s highly centralised governance system. It finds that the municipality lacks clear mandates and stable funding for migrant integration. The local authority tends to treat migrants as temporary guests rather than long-term residents. Migrant policies remain fragmented, reactive, and short-term, largely shaped by shifting political leadership. Civil society and migrant communities play an important yet mostly symbolic role, with limited participation in decision-making. Sustainable inclusion requires institutionalised responsibilities, multi-annual funding, and stronger participatory mechanisms to ensure policy continuity and protect progress from political change.

Read here in pdf the Policy brief by Sofia Ntaliou, Researcher, PhD in Social Justice, University College Dublin.

Introduction

Historically a country of emigration, Greece’s approach to immigration has consistently been characterised by exclusion and hostility, driven by the foundational principles of ethnic and religious homogeneity, a weak formal economy, and the politicisation of migration[1]. Greece is one of the most centralised countries within the OECD, together with Ireland, Chile, and New Zealand[2]. As Greece’s capital and largest urban centre, Athens has long served as a key entry point to the European Union and a major hub for migrants.

In Athens, the municipality tends to approach migrants as temporary visitors: their presence is tolerated but not actively supported through long-term inclusion strategies.

Drawing from document analysis and interviews, this policy brief analyses Athens’ approach to migrant inclusion and offers actionable recommendations to strengthen local governance capacity and promote sustainable, inclusive migrant policies. The analysis is based on 12 semi-structured interviews with municipal officials, civil society representatives, and migrant organisations, conducted between May 2022 and July 2023, and on a review of national, regional, and municipal policy and legal documents. These materials include key migration and citizenship laws, national and regional integration strategies, Athens’ municipal integration plan and reports, as well as NGO reports. In Athens, the municipality tends to approach migrants as temporary visitors: their presence is tolerated but not actively supported through long-term inclusion strategies. Services tend to address immediate needs rather than promote integration, and local policies often change depending on the priorities of the current municipal leadership[3].

These short-term service responses reflect the city’s dependence on shifting political priorities and the absence of institutional safeguards that ensure policy continuity. Athens’ experience illustrates how even within centralised states, local political leadership can influence migration governance, yet over-reliance on political will renders policies vulnerable to change. To move beyond short-term and fragmented responses, Athens must institutionalise inclusion mechanisms and build sustainable collaborations with civil society and migrant communities. Athens’ experience offers lessons for other cities operating under centralised national frameworks—including Dublin[4]—highlighting both the constraints and opportunities of local governance in promoting migrant inclusion.

Context

Greece has a highly centralised governance system, with the national government retaining control over legislation, funding, and key integration frameworks.

Greece has a highly centralised governance system, with the national government retaining control over legislation, funding, and key integration frameworks. Over the past decade, national policy has oscillated between crisis response, securitisation, and selective inclusion, reflecting the highly politicised nature of migration in the country[5]. Municipalities have limited autonomy and fiscal capacity. While Athens’ status as the capital and largest municipality has, at times, positioned it as a key counterpart in discussions with national authorities, its ability to shape and sustain long-term migrant inclusion strategies remains limited by its structural dependence on the central government.

Athens lacks stable, institutionalised mechanisms for migrant inclusion.

Within this framework, Athens operates under poorly defined municipal responsibilities and heavy financial dependence on the central government. Despite its size and strategic role as both an arrival and transit city—where, according to the 2011 census, non-Greek nationals accounted for 22.8% of the population[6]—Athens lacks stable, institutionalised mechanisms for migrant inclusion. The proportion of migrants in the city is likely higher today, reflecting continued migration to Greece and the city since 2011. Yet, local authorities remain neither legally mandated nor financially supported to engage in migrant integration, leaving municipal action discretionary and shaped by shifting political priorities, as discussed in the next section.

Political Will and Policy Fluctuations 

For decades, Athens largely mirrored national policy by neglecting the presence and needs of migrants. However, shifts in municipal leadership, particularly between 2011 and 2019, created space for more progressive policies. During this period, the city introduced several notable initiatives, including the appointment of a Deputy Mayor for Migration, the creation of the Department for the Support and Social Inclusion of Migrants and Refugees, the establishment of advisory and service structures such as the Migrant Integration Council (MIC) and the Migrant Integration Centre (KEM[7]), and the development of Greece’s first local integration strategy. Collaboration with civil society organisations and other municipalities led to the creation of coordination structures like the Athens Coordination Centre for Migrant and Refugee Issues (ACCMR)[8] and the Cities Network for Integration (CNI)[9].

Athens also engaged in a range of integration projects, including the establishment of the Elaionas refugee camp and the development of EU-funded housing programmes coupled with integration services, such as ESTIA, Welcommon, and Curing the Limbo developed in partnership with NGOs and international organisations. Participation in European and international initiatives, such as ‘100 Resilient Cities’, EUROCITIES, Solidarity Cities, and the European Coalition of Cities Against Racism, further supported these efforts, providing access to expertise, resources, and policy exchange. While these initiatives largely focused on asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international protection, with broader migrant populations receiving less targeted attention, they nonetheless marked a significant step forward. This period of activity was facilitated by EU funding, international support, collaboration with civil society actors which contributed resources, knowledge, and service infrastructure. A relatively more supportive national policy environment during these years also helped enable municipal initiatives.

…political will can, to some extent, compensate for structural limitations in Greece’s centralised governance system.

Crucially, the role of local political leadership was central in advancing these developments, demonstrating how political will can, to some extent, compensate for structural limitations in Greece’s centralised governance system. However, this reliance also introduced significant vulnerabilities. Following the 2019 municipal elections, Athens shifted towards a more reactive and limited approach to migration. The dedicated Deputy Mayor position was downgraded to a special advisor, key services were reduced, collaboration with civil society actors weakened, and the municipality withdrew from several international networks. Partnerships and projects were disrupted, and service provision delayed or halted, highlighting how over-reliance on political leadership undermines policy continuity and stability.

But the municipal authority changed, and then the way the program was dealt with changed a lot. I mean, when the municipal authority changed, we had a big problem for a year…The program was intended to last for three years, so losing a year and losing the Municipality’s support for a year is very serious. Especially [since] this happened when…implementation [was just starting]…                                             

Expert3, 2023, interview, 06 July

 

When the municipal authority changes, so does the policy towards immigration…the staff members do not stay; they are usually relocated. This is what happens in Greece, and that is the big problem that everyone, depending on their…party affiliation, finds themselves in a [job] position, and that is the big challenge we have                     

Greek Forum for Migrants (GFM), 2022, interview, 13 October 

Athens’ experience highlights the risks of over-relying on political will to sustain migrant inclusion policies. With politically appointed officials controlling key municipal positions, policy continuity remains vulnerable to electoral shifts. Migrants’ exclusion from local voting rights further weakens their political influence, reducing incentives for sustained investment in inclusion policies. While local political leadership can act as a catalyst for progressive change, Athens’ experience demonstrates that without institutional safeguards, these gains remain fragile and easily reversible.

The ‘Pragmatic Guest-Resident’ Paradigm 

Responses tend to be ‘reactive’, addressing immediate needs during moments of, whether perceived or real, crises, rather than developing sustained inclusion policies.

Discussing a consistent policy paradigm in Athens is challenging as priorities fluctuate with changes in ‘political will’. Nevertheless, the city appears to have evolved from a ‘non-policy’ phase to what might be described as a ‘pragmatic guest-resident’[10] approach. In this model, migrants are viewed as temporary visitors whose presence is tolerated but not structurally supported. Responses tend to be ‘reactive’[11], addressing immediate needs during moments of, whether perceived or real, crises (e.g. the 2015 migration, Covid 19 pandemic), rather than developing sustained inclusion policies.

Service delivery under this approach remains fragmented and project-based (projectisation). Migrant-related activities are largely confined to specific municipal departments, such as the KEM, without integration into the city’s broader services.

‘It’s like operating separately, as if it doesn’t affect us’         

HPEDSSD, 2023, interview, 23 January 

Municipal actions rely on externally funded, short-term projects, rather than systematic, city-wide strategies. Inclusion mechanisms, where they exist, are informal and lack legal safeguards or institutional permanence, leaving them vulnerable to political shifts. Moreover, access to services depends heavily on the capacity of NGOs.

Consulted but Not Heard: Civic Participation in Athens

…civil society organisations play a crucial role in delivering services to migrants, yet their participation in municipal planning or decision-making remains limited.

In Athens, civil society organisations play a crucial role in delivering services to migrants, yet their participation in municipal planning or decision-making remains limited[12]. NGOs are primarily treated as service providers rather than strategic partners. While initiatives such as the Athens Coordination Centre for Migrant and Refugee Issues (ACCMR) have helped create a bridge between the municipality and civil society, this engagement largely remains operational rather than political. NGOs contribute resources and expertise but are seldom included in shaping policies or long-term strategies. Their involvement is typically confined to the implementation of short-term, externally funded projects, leaving them structurally dependent on municipal leadership and vulnerable to political shifts.

Migrant voices are typically mediated through NGOs rather than directly represented, leaving communities structurally sidelined from decision-making. 

Migrant communities themselves are even further marginalised. Migrants’ political agency is constrained by the absence of voting rights in local elections, limiting their ability to influence municipal priorities. While migrant associations could help bridge this gap by representing community interests, they too are largely absent from municipal planning processes and decision-making spaces. Migrant voices are typically mediated through NGOs rather than directly represented, leaving communities structurally sidelined from decision-making. Despite the establishment of the MICs, intended as advisory bodies to represent migrant voices, their role is widely criticised. Their role and visibility depend heavily on the priorities of each municipal administration: some political leaderships engage them actively, others marginalise them, or ignore them altogether. Even when active, MICs function as purely advisory bodies without any formal decision-making power. Both municipal officials and civil society actors questioned their relevance and effectiveness, with many viewing them as symbolic structures that lack influence and a clear function within the municipal system.

[The municipality could] support the very communities themselves [but] there is no interaction at all; this, I believe, is the major issue-whether there is this participation or, in any case, collaboration at this level. Not just the kind of ‘ah we’re doing this, come and dance’ or ‘we’ll have a meeting, come join us to show that we have a black person in the group’. This thing becomes a bit…we are not a wandering circus to be displayed left and right. There needs to be a meaningful conversation at some point, and although this had started, along the way, it seems that it hasn’t [continued].”

GFM, 2022, interview, 13 October

Policy Recommendations

Based on the analysis, the following recommendations aim to support Athens in transitioning from reactive, fragmented responses to a stable, inclusive, and sustainable governance framework.

1. Strengthen Institutional Frameworks

• Establish legal mandates requiring municipalities to engage in migrant integration, with clearly defined responsibilities and multi-annual dedicated budgets to reduce project-based fragmentation.
• Formalise permanent municipal roles (e.g. Inclusion Officers) and integrate structures like the ACCMR into the city administration to ensure coordination across departments and policy continuity.
• Institutionalise and strengthen participatory structures such as the MIC, clearly mandating their role in municipal decision-making. Define their functions, ensure consistent operation across political administrations, and protect them from political shifts to guarantee stable, meaningful input from migrant communities. 

2. Enhance Local Autonomy and Capacity

• Advocate for increased municipal autonomy in areas critical to migrant inclusion, such as housing, social services, and community support.
• Pursue direct access to EU funding to reduce dependency on national government allocations and enhance financial stability. 

3. Develop and Mainstream an Inclusive City-wide Integration Strategy

• Create a comprehensive integration strategy with clear targets, evaluation mechanisms, and a focus on all migrant groups—not only asylum seekers and beneficiaries of protection, including undocumented and underdocumented immigrants.
• Transition from short-term, project-based interventions to multi-annual strategic planning for migrant inclusion.
• Develop integrated service hubs (similar to KEP) accessible to all residents, reducing administrative segregation and bureaucratic barriers.
• Provide intercultural training for municipal staff to improve understanding of migrant needs and enhance inclusive service delivery across departments.

 4. Foster Civic Participation and Community Engagement

• Engage civil society organisations and migrant communities as partners in co-designing the city’s integration strategy and local initiatives, moving beyond consultation towards shared decision-making.
• Facilitate community-driven initiatives by allocating municipal spaces directly to migrant communities for activities such as language classes, legal clinics, and cultural events.

 5. Promote Data-Driven Policy Making and Accountable Policy Making

• Establish regular data collection and analysis on migrant demographics, needs, and service access to inform evidence-based policies.
• Introduce regular independent evaluations of inclusion initiatives to monitor progress, ensure accountability, and guide continuous improvement.

Conclusions

Without institutional safeguards, the city’s capacity to serve its diverse population will remain unstable and vulnerable to political shifts.

Athens’ experience highlights both the potential and the limits of local migrant governance within a highly centralised state. The city lacks the institutional structures, financial autonomy, and legal responsibilities needed to develop consistent, long-term inclusion strategies. Migrants are treated largely as temporary visitors, with municipal responses focused on short-term needs rather than structural integration. Service delivery remains fragmented, project-based, and heavily dependent on political will. Civic participation mechanisms remain weak and largely symbolic, leaving migrant communities without a meaningful role in local policy-making. While progressive leadership enabled important initiatives, subsequent reversals exposed the fragility of Athens’ migrant inclusion efforts. Without institutional safeguards, the city’s capacity to serve its diverse population will remain unstable and vulnerable to political shifts. 

At the same time, Athens shows that local agency is possible—even within a centralised governance system—when political will exists. However, political will alone cannot substitute for structural reform. Relying on individual leadership risks reinforcing cycles of progress and regression. To move beyond reactive and fragmented responses, migrant inclusion must be embedded within stable municipal structures. Legal mandates, permanent municipal roles, dedicated funding, and strengthened participatory mechanisms are essential to protect inclusion policies from political turnover. Equally important is fostering meaningful collaboration with civil society and ensuring direct engagement with migrant communities themselves.

Athens’ experience offers valuable lessons for other European cities operating in similarly centralised systems, such as Ireland or Portugal: without embedded, institutionalised inclusion mechanisms, progress will remain fragile, and exclusion will persist.

 

[1] Maroukis, T., Iglicka, K. and Gmaj, K. (2011) ‘Irregular Migration and Informal Economy in Southern and Central- Eastern Europe: Breaking the Vicious Cycle?’. International Migration, 49(5); Triandafyllidou, A., (2014) ‘Greek migration policy in the 2010s: Europeanization tensions at a time of crisis’. Journal of European Integration, 36(4), pp.409-425; Kandylis, G. (2017) ‘Urban scenes of citizenship: inventing the possibility of immigrants’ citizenship in Athens’. Citizenship Studies, 21(4), pp. 468–482. doi: 10.1080/13621025.2017.1307606.

[2] UCLG and OECD (2016) ‘Country Report: Ireland Unitary Country’. Available at: http://www.uclg-localfinance.org/sites/default/files/IRELAND-EUROPE-V3.pdf  (Accessed: 23 February 2021).

[3] Ntaliou, S. (2025) ‘Politics of Governance or Governance of Politics? Exploring Migrant Policies in the City of Athens’. In H. Bauder & M. B. Setrana (eds), Urban Migrant Inclusion and Refugee Protection – Volume 2. IMISCOE Research Series. Springer.

[4] Ntaliou, S. (2025) ‘In the shadows: Dublin’s immigrant policies in the context of highly centralized governance’. Cities, 163, p.106057.

[5] Triandafyllidou, A. (2014). ‘Greek migration policy in the 2010s: Europeanization tensions at a time of crisis’. Journal of European Integration, 36(4), pp.409-425; Frangiskou, A. et al. (2020) ‘From reception to integration: migrant populations in Greece during and in the aftermath of the crisis’. National Centre for Social Research (EKKE).

[6] At the time of writing, 2021 census data disaggregated at the municipal level had not yet been published by the Hellenic Statistical Authority. Hellenic Statistical Authority (2011) ‘Migration Census 2011’. Available at: https://www.statistics.gr/en/statistics/-/publication/SAM07/ – (Accessed: 28 April 2021).

[7] Migration Integration Centres/Κέντρα Ένταξης Μεταναστών (ΚΕΜ). I use the Greek abbreviation ‘KEM’ instead of MIC to avoid confusion with the Migrants Integration Council (MIC). KEM were a national initiative of ‘One-stop Shops’ designed to provide a diverse range of services for migrants, including psychosocial support, career counselling, and language courses. ΚΕΜ serve as community hubs, with municipalities designated as implementing bodies and funded through the European Social Fund.

[8] Operating under the municipality’s jurisdiction, ACCMR coordinates services and facilitates immigrants’ incorporation with over 90 different civil society organisations.

[9] CNI, initiated by Athens and Thessaloniki, includes 17 municipalities nationwide, aiming to exchange best practices and collaborate on joint initiatives.

[10] Alexander, M. (2007) ‘Cities and labour immigration: comparing policy responses in Amsterdam, Paris, Rome and Tel Aviv’. Research in migration and ethnic relations series; Schiller, M. (2015) ‘Paradigmatic pragmatism and the politics of diversity’. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 38(7), pp. 1120–1136. doi: 10.1080/01419870.2014.992925.

[11] van Breugel, I. (2020) ‘Towards a typology of local migration diversity policies’. Comparative Migration Studies, 8(1). doi: 10.1186/s40878-020-00179-0.

[12] OECD. (2018). ‘Working together for local integration of migrants and refugees in Athens’.

Paris. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264304116-en; Frangiskou, A., et al. (2020). ‘From reception to integration: Migrant populations in Greece during and in the aftermath of the crisis’. National Centre for Social Research (EKKE); Leivaditi, N., et al. (2020). ‘Working papers global migration: Consequences and responses integration policies, practices and experiences’. Greece country report, RESPOND working papers, global migration: Consequences and responses (#770564, Horizon2020) Report Series. University of the Aegean. Available at: www.respondmigration.com.

La présidente de la Commission européenne a présenté jeudi 13 novembre trois pistes pour soutenir l’effort de guerre de l’Ukraine, réaffirmant sa préférence pour l’utilisation des avoirs souverains russes gelés, malgré l’opposition de la Belgique.

The post Le prêt de réparation est le moyen « le plus efficace » de soutenir l’Ukraine, insiste Ursula von der Leyen appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Parliament wants to introduce a temporary proxy voting option for MEPs during late pregnancy and early motherhood to promote equal participation.
Committee on Constitutional Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Parliament wants a 90% reduction target for emissions by 2040 compared with 1990 levels, to achieve a climate neutral EU by 2050.
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

La plateforme de réseaux sociaux X d’Elon Musk fait l’objet d’une enquête de l’autorité irlandaise Coimisiún na Meán pour d’éventuelles violations du règlement européen sur les services numériques (Digital Services Act, DSA), a annoncé le régulateur mercredi 12 novembre.

The post Modération de contenu : la plateforme X d’Elon Musk visée par une enquête en Irlande appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Solid waste management is one of the most pressing urban governance issues in low- and middle-income countries. Because waste volumes are increasing, the associated fiscal, environmental and health costs will also rise. The idea of working with informal waste workers to address this problem is often suggested but rarely implemented. Based on the case of Irbid, Jordan’s second-biggest city, we show why it was successful there and draw recommendations for other municipalities. 
Irbid used an approach that combined what we call “frontloading trust” and “prioritising integration over training”. First, the mayor and municipal managers invited informal waste worker representatives to a structured dialogue about waste management challenges in the city, about the role of informal workers, and about potential solutions. During this months-long process, they overcame class differences, stigma and distrust and agreed on how to work together in the future. Then, rather than requiring extensive prior training of informal workers, they started to work together, which allowed workers to show what they were able to contribute (“prioritising integration over training”). 
Based on this process, the municipality and informal worker representatives signed the first Memorandum of Understanding of its kind in Jordan, legalising the work of informal workers, providing them with official badges and safety equipment and piloting their integration into municipal sorting facilities. After only a few months, data showed that the integration of informal workers had reduced landfill waste, had saved the municipality a lot of money, had improved waste services for residents, and had increased respect, protection and income for informal waste workers. 
This case shows that challenges like urban waste management require not only technical but social and governance innovations that include rather than exclude informal workers, and that can thereby contribute to improved livelihoods for all concerned.

 

Solid waste management is one of the most pressing urban governance issues in low- and middle-income countries. Because waste volumes are increasing, the associated fiscal, environmental and health costs will also rise. The idea of working with informal waste workers to address this problem is often suggested but rarely implemented. Based on the case of Irbid, Jordan’s second-biggest city, we show why it was successful there and draw recommendations for other municipalities. 
Irbid used an approach that combined what we call “frontloading trust” and “prioritising integration over training”. First, the mayor and municipal managers invited informal waste worker representatives to a structured dialogue about waste management challenges in the city, about the role of informal workers, and about potential solutions. During this months-long process, they overcame class differences, stigma and distrust and agreed on how to work together in the future. Then, rather than requiring extensive prior training of informal workers, they started to work together, which allowed workers to show what they were able to contribute (“prioritising integration over training”). 
Based on this process, the municipality and informal worker representatives signed the first Memorandum of Understanding of its kind in Jordan, legalising the work of informal workers, providing them with official badges and safety equipment and piloting their integration into municipal sorting facilities. After only a few months, data showed that the integration of informal workers had reduced landfill waste, had saved the municipality a lot of money, had improved waste services for residents, and had increased respect, protection and income for informal waste workers. 
This case shows that challenges like urban waste management require not only technical but social and governance innovations that include rather than exclude informal workers, and that can thereby contribute to improved livelihoods for all concerned.

 

ÄNDERUNGSANTRÄGE 1 - 123 - Entwurf eines Berichts zur Änderung der Verordnungen (EG) Nr. 1907/2006, (EG) Nr. 1272/2008, (EU) Nr. 528/2012, (EU) 2019/1021 und (EU) 2021/697 hinsichtlich der Verteidigungsbereitschaft und der Erleichterung von Investitionen im Verteidigungsbereich und der Bedingungen für die Verteidigungsindustrie
Ausschuss für Umweltfragen, öffentliche Gesundheit und Lebensmittelsicherheit
Ausschuss für Industrie, Forschung und Energie
Ausschuss für Sicherheit und Verteidigung
Antonio Decaro, Aura Salla, Sven Mikser

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2025 - EP

Le refus du président Karol Nawrocki d'approuver des dizaines de nominations de juges marque une nette escalade dans son bras de fer avec le gouvernement pro-européen de Donald Tusk.

The post Le président polonais bloque les nominations judiciaires et défie le gouvernement de Donald Tusk  appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Le Parti populaire européen (PPE) s’apprête à faire adopter de nouvelles règles de durabilité pour les entreprises avec le soutien du groupe libéral Renew et du camp d’extrême droite Patriotes pour l’Europe, en vue d’un vote ce jeudi 13 novembre au Parlement européen.

The post Au Parlement européen, le PPE prêt à s’allier à l’extrême droite pour faire passer une loi sur la durabilité des entreprises appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Bassirou Diomaye Faye a annoncé la désignation de Mme Aminata Touré pour restructurer la coalition qui l’a amené au pouvoir, le bureau politique du PASTEF dirigé par Ousmane Sonko, s’est opposé à ce choix estimant ‘’ne partager ni les valeurs, ni les principes’’ avec la personne choisie par le président.

Bassirou Diomaye Faye a annoncé la désignation de Mme Aminata Touré pour restructurer la coalition qui l’a amené au pouvoir, le bureau politique du PASTEF dirigé par Ousmane Sonko, s’est opposé à ce choix estimant ‘’ne partager ni les valeurs, ni les principes’’ avec la personne choisie par le président.

By External Source
Nov 13 2025 (IPS-Partners)

 
Violence against women is a human rights emergency in every country.

One in three women worldwide experience physical and/or sexual violence in their lifetime.

Most survivors are harmed by an intimate partner.

Every ten minutes, a woman or girl is killed by a partner or family member.

Around sixty percent of female homicides are committed by partners or relatives.

In 2023, an estimated 612 million women and girls lived within 50 kilometres of conflict, and their risk skyrockets.

Conflict related sexual violence is used strategically, and reports are rising.

The 2025 UNiTE theme calls us to end digital violence against all women and girls.

Studies indicate that between sixteen and fifty eight percent of women and girls face technology facilitated abuse.

Seventy three percent of women journalists report online violence, and one in four receive threats of physical harm.

Online abuse silences voices, distorts public debate, and often spills into offline harm.

Data matters, and the UN is strengthening global measurement of femicide to make every case count.

Many countries have laws, but real protection requires enforcement and survivor centred services.

Prevention works when we change harmful norms, fund services, and hold perpetrators to account.

Wear orange, speak up, and support survivors during the 16 Days of Activism from November 25 to December 10.

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By Mary Assunta
BANGKOK, Thailand, Nov 13 2025 (IPS)

The 183 Parties to the global health treaty, WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) will convene in Geneva from 17 – 22 November with one objective – to strengthen their efforts to arrest the No.1 preventable cause of disease and 7 million deaths annually – tobacco use.

Credit: Global Center for Good Governance in Tobacco Control

The WHO FCTC is unique in that it serves to regulate a unique industry that produces and markets a uniquely harmful product.

In October, the WHO FCTC Secretariat issued an alert to Parties preparing to head to Geneva for the eleventh session of the Conference of the Parties (COP11) urging them to stay vigilant against the industry’s tactics and misinformation.

According to the Andrew Black, the Acting Head of the Secretariat of the WHO FCTC, “This is not just lobbying; it is a deliberate strategy to try to derail consensus and weaken measures to further the treaty’s implementation.”

Despite government efforts to implement the treaty adopted 20 years ago, the tobacco industry is a lucrative business. It is projected to generate a revenue of more than US$988 billion in 2025. Low- and middle-income countries bear the bulk of the tobacco burden where 80% of the world’s 1.2 billion tobacco users live.

Governments have identified tobacco industry interference as their biggest barrier to implementing tobacco control measures to save lives.

But the tool to address tobacco industry meddling is in governments’ hands. Known as Article 5.3, this obligatory clause in the FCTC, is based on principles of good governance and outlines specific actions governments can take to limit their interactions with the tobacco industry to only when strictly necessary for regulation.

The Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index 2025, a civil society report card on governments’ implementation of this article, found many governments were lacking in protecting public health. The Index covering 100 countries has exposed how the tobacco industry targeted and persuaded willing senior officials, especially from the non-health sectors, to protect its business and lobby on its behalf.

The newly released Index found the industry has not only become more aggressive in its meddling, but it is also more blatant and lobbied legislators including parliamentarians, ministers and governors who as elected officials can influence policy at the legislature.

Parliamentarians in 14 countries filed pro-industry bills, accepted industry input that resulted in delayed adoption of tobacco control laws or promoted legislation to benefit the industry.

The Index revealed very senior officials had accepted sponsored study trips to tobacco company facilities, the most common facility visited being the Philip Morris International’s research facility in Switzerland.

The tobacco industry has also used its charity to lure public officials and governments to endorse its activities and whitewash its public image. While 32 countries have banned tobacco-related CSR activities, 18 governments from LMICs, such as Bangladesh, Bolivia, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Jamaica and Zambia, collaborated and endorsed industry activities such as tree planting, community programs, assistance to farmers and cigarette butt cleanups.

Evidence shows tax increases on tobacco products is the silver bullet to reduce tobacco use. The Index found more than 60 of 100 countries were persuaded to not to increase tobacco tax, delay tax increases, lower tax rates, or give tax exemptions for certain products.

Over 40 countries resisted the tobacco industry’s misleading narrative on so called harm reduction and have banned e-cigarettes and heated tobacco products. However, when a government prevails with stringent legislation, the industry has used the courts to challenge the law. In Mexico for example, when the government banned e-cigarettes in 2023, Philip Morris Mexico obtained an injunction from the Supreme Court to allow it to continue sales of these products.

Industry interference has obstructed tobacco growing countries such as Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia from even having basic bans on cigarette advertising and promotions. Now Big Tobacco is pushing new nicotine products in these countries and others, and creating the next generation of nicotine addicts.

The lack of transparency in governments’ interactions with the industry has provided a breeding ground for interference. The absence of lobby registers and disclosure procedures, and the failure to inform the public about meetings with the industry lets this interference continue.

But there is hope and positive outcome for public health when governments acted without compromise. Botswana, Ethiopia, Finland, Netherlands and Palau all show low levels of interference by protecting their bureaucracy. These countries are a testament to standing up to a powerful industry and arresting interference so they can fulfill their mandate to protect public health.

Dr Mary Assunta is the head of Global Research and Advocacy at the Global Center for Good Governance in Tobacco Control

IPS UN Bureau

 

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