Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Africa has become import-dependent for staple food cereals over the past five decades. It is an ongoing dispute if increasing import dependency in Africa is causing food security risks for its population fueled by recent increases of uncertainties around international trade caused by geopolitical tensions and global trade policy disruptions. We call for an all-African approach based on regionally coordinated domestic support policies to increase Africa’s self-sufficiency and reduce international imports. We argue that the recent trend towards self-sufficiency as the overarching goal is not a sufficient strategy to improve food security because domestic support policies distort markets, increase prices, and set wrong incentives. Trade distorting policies risk undermining the benefits of regional and international trade for food security because often only trade can provide an efficient insurance mechanism against local supply shocks. A regional policy coordination is required for country-specific policy decisions framed by an all-African trade policy framework to balance production and imports primarily at the continental level. If a food self-sufficiency approach — for political reasons — is to be pursued, it should be in a way that is less distortive of the domestic and regional markets.

Africa has become import-dependent for staple food cereals over the past five decades. It is an ongoing dispute if increasing import dependency in Africa is causing food security risks for its population fueled by recent increases of uncertainties around international trade caused by geopolitical tensions and global trade policy disruptions. We call for an all-African approach based on regionally coordinated domestic support policies to increase Africa’s self-sufficiency and reduce international imports. We argue that the recent trend towards self-sufficiency as the overarching goal is not a sufficient strategy to improve food security because domestic support policies distort markets, increase prices, and set wrong incentives. Trade distorting policies risk undermining the benefits of regional and international trade for food security because often only trade can provide an efficient insurance mechanism against local supply shocks. A regional policy coordination is required for country-specific policy decisions framed by an all-African trade policy framework to balance production and imports primarily at the continental level. If a food self-sufficiency approach — for political reasons — is to be pursued, it should be in a way that is less distortive of the domestic and regional markets.

There is increasing recognition that significant hidden costs associated with agrifood systems are not reflected in market prices. Coffee is among the three most traded agricultural commodities in the world and supports the livelihoods of more than 30 million smallholder households. This study quantifies the environmental and social hidden costs of coffee value chains in three countries in Eastern Africa (Ethiopia, Uganda, and Tanzania) to guide interventions to address them. We apply and refine simplified True Cost Accounting (TCA) methodologies to quantify environmental hidden costs associated with climate, soil, water, and biodiversity, as well as social hidden costs associated with child labour, gender inequality, and the living income gap. We use the marginal damage cost approach of Lord (2023) to monetize externalities and quantify significant social and environmental hidden costs that add up to USD 5–7 per kilogram of coffee. These hidden costs equal 70%–125% of the farm gate price for Arabica and about twice the farm gate price for Robusta, relative to average prices at the time of the surveys. Hidden costs associated with the living income gap constitute the largest share, particularly in Ethiopia. Large variations in hidden costs across different production systems and regions underscore the importance of detailed value chain assessments to take action to address these hidden costs.

There is increasing recognition that significant hidden costs associated with agrifood systems are not reflected in market prices. Coffee is among the three most traded agricultural commodities in the world and supports the livelihoods of more than 30 million smallholder households. This study quantifies the environmental and social hidden costs of coffee value chains in three countries in Eastern Africa (Ethiopia, Uganda, and Tanzania) to guide interventions to address them. We apply and refine simplified True Cost Accounting (TCA) methodologies to quantify environmental hidden costs associated with climate, soil, water, and biodiversity, as well as social hidden costs associated with child labour, gender inequality, and the living income gap. We use the marginal damage cost approach of Lord (2023) to monetize externalities and quantify significant social and environmental hidden costs that add up to USD 5–7 per kilogram of coffee. These hidden costs equal 70%–125% of the farm gate price for Arabica and about twice the farm gate price for Robusta, relative to average prices at the time of the surveys. Hidden costs associated with the living income gap constitute the largest share, particularly in Ethiopia. Large variations in hidden costs across different production systems and regions underscore the importance of detailed value chain assessments to take action to address these hidden costs.

There is increasing recognition that significant hidden costs associated with agrifood systems are not reflected in market prices. Coffee is among the three most traded agricultural commodities in the world and supports the livelihoods of more than 30 million smallholder households. This study quantifies the environmental and social hidden costs of coffee value chains in three countries in Eastern Africa (Ethiopia, Uganda, and Tanzania) to guide interventions to address them. We apply and refine simplified True Cost Accounting (TCA) methodologies to quantify environmental hidden costs associated with climate, soil, water, and biodiversity, as well as social hidden costs associated with child labour, gender inequality, and the living income gap. We use the marginal damage cost approach of Lord (2023) to monetize externalities and quantify significant social and environmental hidden costs that add up to USD 5–7 per kilogram of coffee. These hidden costs equal 70%–125% of the farm gate price for Arabica and about twice the farm gate price for Robusta, relative to average prices at the time of the surveys. Hidden costs associated with the living income gap constitute the largest share, particularly in Ethiopia. Large variations in hidden costs across different production systems and regions underscore the importance of detailed value chain assessments to take action to address these hidden costs.

We contribute to the understanding of household resilience to shocks by using high-frequency data collected in short spans of two to three months. We examine three issues: first, whether frequent shocks within the year affect households’ food security in short periods of two to three months. Secondly, whether Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis (RIMA II) can be used to measure the resilience capacity of households to shocks using high-frequency data, and whether the accumulation of shocks erodes this resilience. Thirdly, whether the resilience estimation using RIMA II compares closely with the subjective resilience measure. Our study reveals that (1) shocks specifically drought and theft of agriculture produce within the year affect the food security of the households, (2) RIMA-II metrics can be used to measure the resilience capacity of households with high-frequency data collected in six months duration, (3) the asset pillar is a crucial factor in ensuring the resilience of households within short periods (4) RIMA II and the subjective resilience measure are moderately comparable and each may identify different factors that constitute resilience. The results highlight the need for development and humanitarian agencies to consider supporting asset building and non-farm income-generating activities to moderate the effects of shocks on resilience.

We contribute to the understanding of household resilience to shocks by using high-frequency data collected in short spans of two to three months. We examine three issues: first, whether frequent shocks within the year affect households’ food security in short periods of two to three months. Secondly, whether Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis (RIMA II) can be used to measure the resilience capacity of households to shocks using high-frequency data, and whether the accumulation of shocks erodes this resilience. Thirdly, whether the resilience estimation using RIMA II compares closely with the subjective resilience measure. Our study reveals that (1) shocks specifically drought and theft of agriculture produce within the year affect the food security of the households, (2) RIMA-II metrics can be used to measure the resilience capacity of households with high-frequency data collected in six months duration, (3) the asset pillar is a crucial factor in ensuring the resilience of households within short periods (4) RIMA II and the subjective resilience measure are moderately comparable and each may identify different factors that constitute resilience. The results highlight the need for development and humanitarian agencies to consider supporting asset building and non-farm income-generating activities to moderate the effects of shocks on resilience.

We contribute to the understanding of household resilience to shocks by using high-frequency data collected in short spans of two to three months. We examine three issues: first, whether frequent shocks within the year affect households’ food security in short periods of two to three months. Secondly, whether Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis (RIMA II) can be used to measure the resilience capacity of households to shocks using high-frequency data, and whether the accumulation of shocks erodes this resilience. Thirdly, whether the resilience estimation using RIMA II compares closely with the subjective resilience measure. Our study reveals that (1) shocks specifically drought and theft of agriculture produce within the year affect the food security of the households, (2) RIMA-II metrics can be used to measure the resilience capacity of households with high-frequency data collected in six months duration, (3) the asset pillar is a crucial factor in ensuring the resilience of households within short periods (4) RIMA II and the subjective resilience measure are moderately comparable and each may identify different factors that constitute resilience. The results highlight the need for development and humanitarian agencies to consider supporting asset building and non-farm income-generating activities to moderate the effects of shocks on resilience.

Les médias en ligne et journaux parus ce jeudi 19 février à Kinshasa, commentent largement l’initiative de mettre en place la commission « vérité et réconciliation » afin de baliser le chemin au dialogue national inclusif en République démocratique du Congo proposée par Conseil interreligieux Congolais (CIC).

Le Gabon est toujours privé de réseaux sociaux. Mardi soir, la Haute autorité de communication a décidé de leur suspension « jusqu'à nouvel ordre ». « Atteinte à la cohésion sociale, à la stabilité des institutions de la République et à la sécurité nationale ». Ce sont les quelques arguments avancés par la HAC pour justifier sa mesure. Qui n'a pas manqué de faire réagir autant dans l'opposition que dans le monde de la presse et celui des milieux économiques. Pour expliquer cette décision prise sans préavis, Théophane Nzame-Nze Biyoghe, porte-parole de la présidence gabonaise répond à RFI. Il est le Grand Invité Afrique de Sidy Yansané.

À l'université de Gondwana City, les étudiants révisent leurs illusions à la baisse. Les étudiants gondwanais aimeraient bien manger à la cantine universitaire.

À Uvira, dans l'est de la République démocratique du Congo (RDC), les habitants et les commerçants implorent la réouverture de la frontière avec le Burundi. Un mois après le retrait de l’AFC/M23 de la ville, le crépitement des balles a cessé mais la frontière reste toujours fermée. Le ministre burundais des Affaires étrangères rappelle que les conditions de sécurité ne sont pas encore réunies pour une réouverture.  Sur le terrain, le gouverneur du Sud-Kivu a été interpellé directement par la population, impatiente et inquiète. 

Écartant l'hypothèse d'un décès consécutif à des violences policières, le procureur de la République de Dakar a indiqué, mardi 17 février, qu'Abdoulaye Ba s'était tué en sautant par une fenêtre de sa résidence étudiante pour échapper à un incendie parti d'une chambre voisine. Une version des faits à laquelle la famille du jeune homme, comme les représentants des étudiants, ont du mal à souscrire.

Une nouvelle attaque imputée à un groupe jihadiste a fait entre 60 et 70 morts dans l'est du Burkina Faso, samedi 14 février. Elle a visé cette fois une base des Unités combattantes des eaux et forêts.

Le général Philémon Yav Irung est soupçonné d’avoir entretenu des contacts avec des membres de l’entourage de l’officier rwandais James Kabarebe.

Les avocats de la défense ont réagi en affirmant qu’aucune preuve ne démontre l’existence d’une relation entre leur client et le « pays aux mille collines ».

Depuis 2020, le général mis en cause avait été porté à la tête de la troisième zone de défense, couvrant les provinces du Nord-Kivu, du Sud-Kivu, de l’Ituri, du Maniema et de la Tshopo.

L’hôpital général d’Oicha, chef-lieu du territoire de Beni (Nord-Kivu), ne dispose pas de morgue fonctionnelle et son unique ambulance, vieille d’une dizaine d’années, est hors service.

Cette situation complique la gestion des corps ainsi que l’évacuation des malades, notamment des blessés par balles ou par armes blanches, dans une zone régulièrement ciblée par les attaques des rebelles ADF.

Une dizaine d’organisations du Nord-Kivu appellent les belligérants à cesser le recrutement d’enfants dans cette partie du pays.

Elles ont lancé cet appel en marge de la Journée internationale des enfants-soldats, commémorée chaque 12 février.

Après plusieurs années de procédure et dix jours de plaidoiries finales, la justice internationale s'apprête à trancher dans un dossier majeur lié à la guerre du Kosovo. Les juges ont entamé leur délibéré mercredi 18 février dans la soirée. Les accusés, eux, ont livré leurs derniers mots devant le tribunal.