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IPI, together with the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations, co-hosted a public discussion on “Peace Operations and Peacebuilding: Supporting Effective UN Transitions for Sustaining Peace” on March 3rd.

Mission transitions represent an important opportunity for the UN to reconfigure its presence and strategy to support peacebuilding objectives, as articulated in Resolution 2594, adopted unanimously in 2021. Well-planned and integrated transition processes that place peacebuilding at the center require strong coordination and coherence between host governments, missions, resident coordinators, country teams, and civil society. In addition, both the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) can play valuable roles in supporting national and inclusive ownership in transition processes. To that end, the twin resolutions adopted in November 2025 on the review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture encourage the secretary-general to consider how the PBF can further enhance its support to countries undergoing transitions from peace operations and to strengthen cooperation between the Security Council and the PBC on transition processes.

Over the past two decades, the Secretariat has developed policies and guidance aimed at promoting more effective transitions that support peacebuilding objectives. However, many transitions take place amid political and security challenges that make it difficult to implement the good practices outlined in the guidance. Against this backdrop, IPI and the Permanent Mission of Japan to the UN hosted a panel discussion on how peacebuilding gains can be sustained during and after mission transitions.

Overall, the discussion identified ways to strengthen coordination and coherence between partners on transition processes, both within and outside the UN, to bridge gaps between humanitarian, development, and peace activities. Panelists also explored opportunities to enhance the roles of the PBC and the PBF in supporting effective UN transitions.

Several speakers discussed the critical importance of ensuring that peacebuilding processes are inclusive, consultative, and nationally owned. Noting the ambiguity of the term “national ownership,” one speaker shared their view of the essential elements that constitute nationally owned peacebuilding, highlighting the centrality of a social contract that narrows the gap between legitimacy and legality, strong national capacity, a locally determined definition of a successful peace process, and financial resources, including national resource mobilization. Others echoed this point, underscoring the importance of integrating lived experiences in decision-making and recognizing that institutional reforms alone cannot sustain peace.

During the discussion, speakers also addressed the UN’s capacity to support transitions. In a context of limited resources, speakers emphasized the need to enhance planning and coordination to more effectively sustain peacebuilding gains during and after UN mission transitions. Many highlighted the role of UN agencies, funds, and programs, which often leverage greater in-country capacity to support peacebuilding efforts before, during, and after transitions. There was also broad consensus on the importance of leveraging the UN peacebuilding architecture, namely the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), Peacebuilding Fund, and Peacebuilding and Peace Support Office. Encouraging the PBC to hold more regular dialogue on transition contexts, speakers and participants stressed the need to integrate the peacebuilding architecture into UN mission mandates from their inception. While pointing to these different UN instruments, some highlighted the need to develop a common operational framework to advance work on the ground in a coherent manner.

Welcoming Remarks:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations and Peacebuilding, International Peace Institute

Opening Remarks:
H.E. Yamazaki Kazuyuki, Permanent Representative of Japan to the UN

Panelists:
Adedeji Ebo, Director and Deputy to the High Representative, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs
Turhan Saleh, Deputy Director, Crisis Bureau, UN Development Programme
Robert Pulver, Chief, Justice and Corrections Service Branch, UN Peacebuilding and Peace Support Office
Ai Kihara-Hunt, Professor at the Graduate Program on Human Security and Deputy Director of the Research Center for Sustainable Peace, University of Tokyo (VTC)
Cedric de Coning, Research Professor, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (VTC)

Moderator:
Lauren McGowan, Policy Analyst, International Peace Institute

The post Peace Operations and Peacebuilding: Supporting Effective UN Transitions for Sustaining Peace appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Dans un contexte de recomposition des équilibres géopolitiques et de priorisation accrue des dépenses sécuritaires et militaires, comment l’UNICEF analyse-t-il la marginalisation progressive des droits de l’enfant dans les stratégies d’aide internationale des États donateurs ? Face à l’émergence de nouveaux acteurs influents de l’aide (pays du Sud, puissances régionales, financements conditionnés), comment l’UNICEF préserve-t-il l’universalité et l’indivisibilité des droits de l’enfant, sans les subordonner à des intérêts géopolitiques ou diplomatiques ? Un an après les coupes de l’Agence des États-Unis pour le développement international (USAID) et la baisse significative des financements européens, comment l’UNICEF adapte-t-il sa stratégie pour continuer à défendre les droits de l’enfant sans sacrifier les programmes essentiels ? Face à la concurrence accrue entre crises humanitaires, comment l’UNICEF hiérarchise-t-il ses interventions tout en garantissant le respect des droits fondamentaux des enfants, notamment dans les pays les plus fragiles ? Enfin, quel rôle peuvent jouer la société civile, le secteur privé et les citoyens pour compenser la baisse des financements publics et contribuer à remettre les droits de l’enfant au cœur de l’agenda international ?

Entretien avec Aïda Ndiaye, chargée plaidoyer et programmes internationaux à UNICEF France.

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L’article Les droits de l’enfant : comment en faire une priorité de l’aide internationale dans un contexte de baisse des financements ? est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

This chapter traces the evolution of bus rapid transit (BRT) and examines its implications for urban mobility policymaking, particularly in cities in the Global South. It reviews BRT’s historical origins and global diffusion, its socio-economic and environmental impacts, as well as the distinct political dynamics that characterize the system’s implementation and operations. The chapter posits that BRT has undergone three key transformations since the 1960s-70s. The system originally emerged as a cost-effective alternative to urban rail projects, in the 2000s it then reinvented itself as a tool for sustainable urban development, and most recently it has started to reinvent itself yet again as a planning instrument for transportation formalization. Despite these changes in the policy objectives underpinning BRT initiatives, the system’s core innovation has remained unchanged: its modular flexibility. This flexibility has enabled the system’s widespread adoption and adaptation. The chapter argues that BRT offers policymakers an instructive case of how context-sensitive transit planning can help cities build more efficient, inclusive, and sustainable urban mobility systems.

This chapter traces the evolution of bus rapid transit (BRT) and examines its implications for urban mobility policymaking, particularly in cities in the Global South. It reviews BRT’s historical origins and global diffusion, its socio-economic and environmental impacts, as well as the distinct political dynamics that characterize the system’s implementation and operations. The chapter posits that BRT has undergone three key transformations since the 1960s-70s. The system originally emerged as a cost-effective alternative to urban rail projects, in the 2000s it then reinvented itself as a tool for sustainable urban development, and most recently it has started to reinvent itself yet again as a planning instrument for transportation formalization. Despite these changes in the policy objectives underpinning BRT initiatives, the system’s core innovation has remained unchanged: its modular flexibility. This flexibility has enabled the system’s widespread adoption and adaptation. The chapter argues that BRT offers policymakers an instructive case of how context-sensitive transit planning can help cities build more efficient, inclusive, and sustainable urban mobility systems.

This chapter traces the evolution of bus rapid transit (BRT) and examines its implications for urban mobility policymaking, particularly in cities in the Global South. It reviews BRT’s historical origins and global diffusion, its socio-economic and environmental impacts, as well as the distinct political dynamics that characterize the system’s implementation and operations. The chapter posits that BRT has undergone three key transformations since the 1960s-70s. The system originally emerged as a cost-effective alternative to urban rail projects, in the 2000s it then reinvented itself as a tool for sustainable urban development, and most recently it has started to reinvent itself yet again as a planning instrument for transportation formalization. Despite these changes in the policy objectives underpinning BRT initiatives, the system’s core innovation has remained unchanged: its modular flexibility. This flexibility has enabled the system’s widespread adoption and adaptation. The chapter argues that BRT offers policymakers an instructive case of how context-sensitive transit planning can help cities build more efficient, inclusive, and sustainable urban mobility systems.

Luther Bois Anukur, Regional Director of IUCN ESARO, interviewed at the IUCN Regional Headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya. Credit: Isaiah Esipisu/IP

By Isaiah Esipisu
NAIROBI, Mar 3 2026 (IPS)

As the global community marks 2026 World Wildlife Day today (March 3), this year’s focus is on Medicinal and Aromatic Plants: Conserving Health, Heritage and Livelihoods. However, beneath these celebrations, a difficult question emerges: who will bear the cost of conservation when traditional donor funding becomes uncertain and in the face of climate change?

With geopolitical shifts causing traditional funders to tighten their budgets, conservation across Africa has reached a critical juncture.

In an exclusive interview with Luther Bois Anukur, the Regional Director for the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Eastern and Southern Africa, we explore how governments must now go further by creating space for community-led biodiversity conservation initiatives to evolve into sustainable enterprises. We discuss why protecting biodiversity matters as much as maintaining roads or power grids and why national budgets should consider it a priority.

IPS: With conservation donors tightening their budget, how serious is this funding shift for Africa, and what risks does it create for biodiversity protection?

Anukur: Overall, there has been a shrinking of financing for biodiversity conservation, especially with the closing of USAID, which was a big financier for biodiversity work in Africa. This came as a shock and certainly slowed down the work of biodiversity conservation in Africa because some organisations have gone under, and some projects have closed altogether.

However, having said that, there is a huge opportunity for Africa to relook at biodiversity financing models. Indeed, relying on donor funding is not the right way to finance biodiversity conservation. Biodiversity is not a charitable cause. It is actually part of the sovereign natural assets, and so we need to look at ways in which countries can link their economies to biodiversity conservation.

For example, you’ll find that what underpins our economies in Africa is fresh water, agriculture, tourism, and energy, and all these form the backbone of biodiversity conservation.

IPS: African communities often live with wildlife and bear the costs of conservation. How possibly can this be turned into community-led initiatives that can evolve into sustainable enterprises?

Anukur: First and foremost, people in Africa have lived alongside wildlife for many years. However, the cost of living with wildlife has been very high, because you find there’s crop loss, there’s loss of livestock, and even loss of lives. Yet, we have not seen benefits go to communities in a proportional manner.

To change this, there is certainly a need to rethink and redesign our conservation efforts so that communities can be right at the centre. We need to see benefits going to communities in an equitable manner that is commensurate to the services and the sacrifices they provide by living alongside wildlife.

We need to stop seeing communities as beneficiaries but as leaders of conservation efforts. And when we do that, then we will go a long way in conserving wildlife.

IPS: Why should finance ministries in Africa treat conservation as a core national investment rather than an environmental afterthought

Anukur: In many cases, ministers of finance look at risks, they look at assets, and they look at returns. That is what they usually understand. But very clearly, nature is Africa’s largest asset. And so investing in our environment basically means that we are supporting our water systems, our agriculture, our fisheries, and our ecosystems. That basically means that we are strengthening our economies.

The reverse is true. If we do not support that, we will face disasters. We are going to have a higher impact from climate change, and we are going to get into food imports. When you balance the books, investing in conservation makes sense, as it will ultimately affect national economies. So investing in natural assets will greatly support the GDPs of our countries and the livelihoods of our people.

IPS: Can you share examples of models that governments should be using to support protection of biodiversity as well as community-led conservation initiatives?

Anukur: There have been good examples in Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Kenya, among other countries, which have been able to demonstrate that community-led conservation can generate not only ecological recoveries but also economic returns.

But the key thing with these models is that you need to secure the land rights, make sure that there is accountable governance, and that revenue flows directly to communities. There is also a need to have partnerships with multi-stakeholders, especially the ethical private sector.

IPS: Tools like the IUCN Red List and Green List provide data on species and protected areas. How can governments better use these frameworks to move beyond reactive conservation decisions toward long-term, evidence-based policies?

Anukur: IUCN has got quite a number of tools; we have the red list of species, which basically looks at extinction risk, but we also have the green list, which looks at how effectively we manage our ecosystems. Governments have extensively used these tools as reference documents.

However, we would want to see these tools being used to build evidence for planning. This is because when you plan well, then you are able to avert risks. For instance, you need these tools to plan roads, infrastructure, agriculture, and mining.

IPS: Many African governments face pressure to expand infrastructure, agriculture, and extractive industries. What strategies can realistically balance economic development with ecosystem protection, especially for communities living closest to nature?

Anukur: There has been a big debate for a very long time about whether Africa should prioritise development or whether it should be conservation. But that debate is now very old. What we are focusing on is moving from extractive growth to generative growth. We also need to balance everything. For example, you can do agriculture but ensure that you have healthy soils. You can do energy transition in a manner that is not degrading to the environment. Or even create infrastructure that avoids critical ecosystems.

The most important thing is that there should be cross-sectoral collaboration. We have seen environmental and conservation issues treated as an afterthought. We would want the environment to be right at the centre of budget projections, as well; communities should also be brought to the centre for people to benefit from natural assets.

IPS: As we celebrate World Wildlife Day, what message would you give to African governments regarding the conservation of biodiversity?

Anukur: This time is an opportune moment when the world is changing. At the moment we have a lot of geopolitical change. We also do have a lot of geo-economic change. If Africa is to look at itself, the biggest asset is already what we have. The continent is viewed as poor, but the truth is that Africa is not poor. All we need is to connect with our natural assets and use them for development.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Excerpt:

Relying on donor funding is not the right way to finance biodiversity conservation. Biodiversity is not a charitable cause. It is actually part of the sovereign natural assets, and so we need to look at ways in which countries can link their economies to biodiversity conservation. - Luther Bois Anukur, IUCN Eastern and Southern Africa

• In the contemporary environment, economic diplomacy encompasses four key dimensions: a) trade/investment diplomacy, b) the diplomacy of international rules and agreements, c) development cooperation, and d) economic security diplomacy.
• In Greece, the system of economic diplomacy is organised around the General Secretariat of International Economic Relations and Openness of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the same time, other ministries and government services also play an important role, creating a complex institutional ecosystem in which coordination is necessary in order to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the relevant actions.
• Although the importance of economic diplomacy is recognised and relevant initiatives have been undertaken in the right direction, both at the level of organisation and at the level of actions, the main challenges that Greek economic diplomacy continues to face are: a) the absence of a holistic approach and strategy, b) the tackling of bureaucracy and business barriers, c) limited resources, and d) insufficient recognition of its value.
• International practices, such as the Team Finland network, the French model of special representatives for economic diplomacy, as well as the national strategies of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom for the creation of a national economic identity, constitute some good practices followed in Europe and may, under certain conditions and with appropriate adjustments, inform relevant Greek initiatives.
  • The policy recommendations are structured on the basis of three categories:
  • Structure and organisation:
    • Strengthening Enterprise Greece,
    • Reorganisation of the recruitment and training system for officials of the Offices of Economic and Commercial Affairs (OEY).
  • Operations and adaptability:
    • Enhancing relations with local and sectoral chambers of commerce,
    • Establishing a formal consultation mechanism for direct interaction with the “users” of economic diplomacy,
    • Modernising procedures, following a detailed mapping of the needs and obstacles faced by the stakeholders involved,
    • Providing tailored services by Offices of Economic and Commercial Affairs based on the size, and therefore the needs, of businesses,
    • Better utilising the Greek diaspora and Greek communities abroad.
  • Formulation of a strategy for economic diplomacy:
    • National dimension:
      • Creation of a National Strategy for Economic Diplomacy with a horizon beyond 2030, with a central role given to the geoeconomic dimensions of economic diplomacy,
      • Raising the visibility of a unified Greek “brand name”.

• European Dimension:
  • Promoting the idea of establishing a European Export Credit Agency, while recognising the relevant reservations expressed by our partners in the EU – the Greek Presidency of the Council of Ministers in 2027 could provide an opportunity to further explore this idea,
  • Achieving a positive “pillar assessment”, in order for Greek institutions to become eligible for the financing of actions in third countries,
  • Promoting and implementing, particularly during the Greek Presidency of the Council of the EU in 2027, measures aimed at completing the Single Market, on the basis of the Draghi and Letta reports,
  • Increasing the number of Greeks serving in key positions in European institutions, as well as hosting new European agencies in cities across Greece.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Spyros Blavoukos, Professor, Athens University of Economics & Business; Senior Research Fellow and Head of the ‘Ariane Condellis’ European Programme, ELIAMEP; Panos Politis Lamprou, Research Fellow, European Institutions & Policies, ELIAMEP; Panagiota Pagoni, Research Assistant Trainee (January–September 2025).

Lors de son déplacement à l’île Longue en Bretagne, le 2 mars 2026, le président de la République Emmanuel Macron a délivré un discours consacré à l’avenir de la dissuasion nucléaire française, qui a lieu une fois par mandat présidentiel.

Entre guerre en Ukraine, incertitudes sur la garantie américaine et montée des tensions internationales, le président a présenté le concept inédit de « dissuasion avancée ». Que signifie cette évolution ? S’agit-il d’une européanisation de la force nucléaire française ? Cette nouvelle orientation signifie-t-elle que la France partage sa doctrine ou conserve-t-elle le contrôle exclusif de la décision ?

Mon analyse des enjeux stratégiques que soulève ce discours.

L’article Macron annonce la dissuasion avancée est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

The effects of Typhoon Odette in Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu, Philippines, 2021. Credit: Unsplash/Carl Kho

By Anne Cortez
MANILA, Philippines, Mar 3 2026 (IPS)

Communities globally are increasingly exposed to overlapping threats. Extreme weather, health emergencies and cyberattacks are occurring more frequently and simultaneously, often interacting in ways that amplify risks and strain response systems.

Experts describe this as a polycrisis, where threats converge, creating a complex pressure point for governments, businesses and communities.

Today, a polycrisis is brewing at the intersection of climate change and cybersecurity. The latest Global Risks Report by the World Economic Forum ranks extreme weather and natural disasters among the top global threats, while risks linked to digital and artificial intelligence have climbed up the list.

Over the next decade, these environmental and technological dangers are expected to dominate, underscoring how deeply intertwined they have become.

Asia and the Pacific is increasingly becoming a hotspot for these twin threats. The world’s most disaster-prone region, it faced the highest number of disasters and deaths in 2023, with 66 million people affected and annual losses reaching an estimated US$780 billion. At the same time, the region has become the new ground zero for cybercrime, fuelled by rapid digital transformation during and after the pandemic.

In 2024, it accounted for over one-third of all global cyber incidents, including roughly 135,000 ransomware attacks in Southeast Asia alone, costing the region an average of US$3.05 million per attack. The Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam were among the most affected.

Asia’s geographic exposure and rapid digital growth have turned its climate vulnerability into a growing cyber vulnerability, especially across critical infrastructure and information systems.

As essential services including health, communications and energy depend on digital networks, climate-driven disruptions such as typhoons and floods can force systems into manual workarounds or less secure channels, creating openings for digital breaches at the worst possible moment.

The 9.1 magnitude earthquake and tsunami in Japan in 2011 provided an early glimpse into the interconnected climate-cyber risks. In weeks following the earthquake, cyber criminals exploited the chaos with phishing and malware schemes disguised as disaster relief efforts, stealing data and hindering recovery.

So far, cases in the region have largely involved natural hazards, but climate change is intensifying these events, increasing their frequency and severity and placing sustained stress on digital infrastructure, which in turn creates more openings for cyber attacks.

Some researchers suggest that, contrary to prevailing beliefs, climate change is expected to increase the frequency and severity of earthquakes and volcanic eruptions in addition to other extreme weather events, and all of these events have been linked to spikes in cyber incidents.

Research shows that the likelihood of cyberattacks increases dramatically during natural disasters, as defensive systems and attention are compromised. In the United States, for instance, government agencies and researchers have warned the public of heightened digital threats including scams following hurricanes and wildfires, demonstrating how climate hazards can create openings for malicious actors.

When these vulnerabilities are exploited, response and recovery efforts can be paralysed at the very moment they are most needed.

This convergence of vulnerabilities changes the nature of disaster risk. The UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction now includes cyber threats in its hazard taxonomies because losses of connectivity and cyber incidents reshape exposure and coping capacity. Treating these threats separately leaves significant gaps in preparedness and response.

Across the Caribbean, interest in the climate-cyber convergence has grown, with governments and partners conducting assessments, dialogues and scenario planning to strengthen shared resilience and ensure that physical and digital systems can withstand compounded shocks. In Europe, researchers are drawing lessons from environmental law to inform and strengthen cybersecurity policies.

Given these global developments, it is concerning that the recent COP30 focused heavily on how technology can support climate adaptation, yet paid less attention to how the same systems become vulnerable during climate-driven disruptions.

Even more worrying is that Asia and the Pacific, despite being highly exposed to both disaster and cyber risk, has not yet shown the same level of integrated response or public alarm seen elsewhere.

The region has robust frameworks for disaster and climate resilience under the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, implemented through regional action plans, financing facility and cooperation programs.

At the same time, ASEAN and its partners have cybersecurity policy guidelines that cover digital governance, data management and response to transboundary cyber threats. However, these tracks largely operate in parallel, missing opportunities for integration.

Reports highlight gaps in how climate and cyber risks are managed and financed. Agencies still work in silos, with little joint analysis or shared data, and insufficient tools, financing and capacity to manage combined climate-cyber risks.

Asia and the Pacific has the institutions and expertise to respond, but what is missing is a mindset that treats climate and cyber threats as interconnected. As climate extremes and cyberattacks accelerate, the region cannot continue fighting on two fronts with divided defences.

Building climate-cyber resilience in the region requires integrated planning, strengthened continuity systems and regional cooperation.

First, joint climate-cyber assessments and exercises are needed to map interdependent failures and strengthen coordinated response.

Second, critical services need strong backups, diversified connectivity and tested recovery plans that anticipate physical damage to digital infrastructure, ensuring continuity even during disasters.

Third, financing and cooperation should harmonise reporting for compound events, require safeguards and build pooled insurance, supported by development banks and donors.

The convergence of climate and cyber risks is changing the nature of crises worldwide. Future disasters are likely to involve multiple, interacting shocks rather than isolated events. As this reality enters discussions in platforms such as Davos and ASEAN 2026, attention is turning to the Asia and Pacific region to advance integrated resilience as a policy priority. Delaying action will only compound impacts and put far more lives and futures at risk.

This article was originally published online at Devpolicy Blog. The Blog is run out of the Development Policy Centre housed in the Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University.

Anne Cortez is a knowledge and communications consultant for the Asian Development Bank’s climate and health portfolio. She also advises the APAC Cybersecurity Fund, an initiative of The Asia Foundation, on strategic communications and policy priorities. Learn more about her work here.

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Die USA haben gemeinsam mit Israel den Iran angegriffen. Als Gründe nennt US-Präsident Donald Trump unter anderem das iranische Atomprogramm, das iranische Raketenprogramm und die Grausamkeit des Regimes.

Le 24 février, le président Donald Trump a prononcé son discours annuel sur « l’État de l’Union » devant les deux chambres du Congrès, un an après le début de son second mandat. Le discours était long et décousu, rempli d’autosatisfaction euphorique et d’attaques hyperboliques contre son opposition, dans un style qui lui est propre. Les thèmes abordés n’ont surpris personne parmi ceux qui suivent cette administration : les droits de douane, l’immigration, la possibilité d’une « fraude électorale » perpétrée par les démocrates, les succès économiques du président, la criminalité dans les villes dirigées par des démocrates, les risques posés par le régime iranien, les guerres que Trump aurait « terminées », la puissance militaire américaine sous son mandat, etc., etc. Comme à son habitude, le président s’est vanté de toutes les « victoires » remportées par le peuple américain sous sa direction.

Le même soir, les démocrates ont prononcé leur propre discours en réponse. Contrairement au discours présidentiel sur l’« état de l’Union », qui répond à une exigence constitutionnelle obligeant le président à faire « de temps à autre » un rapport au Congrès, la réplique de l’opposition relève d’une tradition relativement récente. Depuis 1966, alors que la télévision devenait un média politique de plus en plus puissant, le parti qui n’occupe pas la Maison-Blanche présente une réponse au discours officiel du président. Cette année, la porte-parole des démocrates, la gouverneure de Virginie Abigail Spanberger, a été chargée de cette tâche par la direction du parti au Congrès. Le discours de Trump, d’une durée de près de deux heures, fut le plus long de l’histoire de la République. La réponse de Spanberger — d’environ douze minutes — fut directe et concise.

L’intervention de la gouverneure dans l’enceinte de la chambre basse de la législature de Virginie en dit long sur la manière dont les démocrates comptent se positionner dans les mois à venir. Qu’avons-nous appris ?

Premièrement, la direction démocrate au Congrès ne semble pas vouloir faire de vagues. Spanberger représentait un choix relativement sûr et modéré pour s’exprimer au nom du parti. Ancienne agente de la CIA, la gouverneure de Virginie est une centriste issue d’un État du Sud devenu progressivement plus favorable aux démocrates ces dernières années, et elle a remporté l’élection haut la main l’an dernier. Le Parti démocrate traverse une période difficile, et ses dirigeants hésitent à prendre des risques à l’ère des bouleversements trumpiens. Or, de nombreux dirigeants plus jeunes, déçus par les résultats mitigés de leur parti lors des élections de 2024, ont plaidé pour une approche plus dynamique et populiste. Des progressistes combatifs et sans concession, comme la députée new-yorkaise Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez et le maire de New York Zohran Mamdani, incarnent l’avant-garde de cette orientation. Le chef de la minorité au Sénat, Chuck Schumer, et le chef de la minorité à la Chambre des représentants, Hakeem Jeffries, ont toutefois décidé de ne pas s’engager dans cette voie pour l’instant.

Pourquoi ? En partie parce que l’attention se porte clairement sur les élections de mi-mandat en novembre prochain. La majorité républicaine à la Chambre ne tient plus qu’à une voix, et les démocrates espèrent reprendre le contrôle de cette assemblée. Ils entrevoient même une voie étroite, quoique difficile, pour reconquérir le Sénat. Trump obtient de mauvais résultats dans les sondages, y compris sur des thèmes qui lui ont souvent été favorables comme l’immigration et l’économie, et traditionnellement le parti du président en exercice perd des sièges lors des élections de mi-mandat. Les démocrates ont récemment remporté plusieurs succès électoraux, notamment l’élection de Spanberger et celle de son homologue gouverneur dans le New Jersey. Ce n’est pas le moment, semble-t-il avoir été décidé par les dirigeants du Congrès, de mettre en péril ce qui s’annonce comme une performance prometteuse. Cela ne signifie pas pour autant que le débat soit clos à l’approche de l’élection présidentielle de 2028.

Le discours de Spanberger a également mis en évidence le plan d’attaque des démocrates. La gouverneure a posé trois questions fondamentales à son auditoire : « Le président travaille-t-il à rendre la vie plus abordable pour vous et votre famille ? Le président œuvre-t-il à assurer la sécurité des Américains, ici et à l’étranger ? Le président travaille-t-il pour vous ? » Il n’est pas surprenant qu’elle ait commencé par la question du « coût de la vie », talon d’Achille de Biden et qui promet de l’être aussi pour Trump. Le président était manifestement sur la défensive sur ce point et s’est longuement étendu sur la baisse des prix sous son administration, affirmant que les démocrates étaient responsables du problème. Elle a soutenu que les droits de douane imposés par Trump constituaient en réalité une taxe massive sur les Américains, renchérissant le coût des biens pour les consommateurs. Spanberger a également insisté sur les risques liés au déploiement d’agents de l’immigration dans les villes américaines et mis en garde contre les dangers des politiques de Trump à l’égard de l’Iran ou de la Chine. Elle a en outre dénoncé la corruption personnelle du président. Autant de thèmes que l’on entendra probablement tout au long de la campagne.

Retrouvez régulièrement les éditos de Jeff Hawkins, ancien diplomate américain, chercheur associé à l’IRIS, pour ses Carnets d’un vétéran du State Department.

L’article L’autre « État de l’union » est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Seit ihrer Gründung verweist die BRICS-Gruppe immer wieder auf die Vereinten Nationen als zentralen Rahmen der internationalen Ordnung. Trotz des Gewichts einzelner BRICS-Mitglieder gelingt es BRICS als Gruppe aufgrund interner Diskrepanzen aber bisher nicht, etablierte Ordnungselemente zu unterminieren oder alternative Ordnungsvorschläge zu lancieren.

Seit ihrer Gründung verweist die BRICS-Gruppe immer wieder auf die Vereinten Nationen als zentralen Rahmen der internationalen Ordnung. Trotz des Gewichts einzelner BRICS-Mitglieder gelingt es BRICS als Gruppe aufgrund interner Diskrepanzen aber bisher nicht, etablierte Ordnungselemente zu unterminieren oder alternative Ordnungsvorschläge zu lancieren.

Seit ihrer Gründung verweist die BRICS-Gruppe immer wieder auf die Vereinten Nationen als zentralen Rahmen der internationalen Ordnung. Trotz des Gewichts einzelner BRICS-Mitglieder gelingt es BRICS als Gruppe aufgrund interner Diskrepanzen aber bisher nicht, etablierte Ordnungselemente zu unterminieren oder alternative Ordnungsvorschläge zu lancieren.

As the world approaches global warming tipping points, local climate engagement aims at climate actions that are equitable, effective and aligned with local needs. Strengthening and scaling up these initiatives can amplify impact, though efforts are often fragmented and require strengthened coordination. This policy brief identifies barriers and enablers of local climate action, how it is best scaled up, and how international actors – donors, policymakers, city and research networks, businesses and others – can support this process. 
Building on these insights, the following points outline key conditions for strengthening, scaling up and sustaining locally led climate action:
•    community-centred co-creation – investing in participatory, culturally grounded processes that map local needs, integrate diverse knowledge, and establish a common language;
•    predictable, flexible funding – providing long-term resources for locally led climate action, and planning additional finance to scale up solutions, including those involving knowledge sharing platforms and coordi-nation capacity;
•    private-sector engagement – creating incentives aligned with climate and community priorities, such as collaboration in the development of green products, in facilitating their market access and assisting with certification and value-chain regulations.
•    multilevel coordination and data sharing – establishing clear institutional pathways, monitoring mechanisms and interoperable data platforms to connect local action with national and international policies, leveraging synergies, and increasing accountability; and
•    just international partnerships – supporting local and Southern priorities through green development opportunities, ensuring fairness and co-benefits for the partners involved.

 

As the world approaches global warming tipping points, local climate engagement aims at climate actions that are equitable, effective and aligned with local needs. Strengthening and scaling up these initiatives can amplify impact, though efforts are often fragmented and require strengthened coordination. This policy brief identifies barriers and enablers of local climate action, how it is best scaled up, and how international actors – donors, policymakers, city and research networks, businesses and others – can support this process. 
Building on these insights, the following points outline key conditions for strengthening, scaling up and sustaining locally led climate action:
•    community-centred co-creation – investing in participatory, culturally grounded processes that map local needs, integrate diverse knowledge, and establish a common language;
•    predictable, flexible funding – providing long-term resources for locally led climate action, and planning additional finance to scale up solutions, including those involving knowledge sharing platforms and coordi-nation capacity;
•    private-sector engagement – creating incentives aligned with climate and community priorities, such as collaboration in the development of green products, in facilitating their market access and assisting with certification and value-chain regulations.
•    multilevel coordination and data sharing – establishing clear institutional pathways, monitoring mechanisms and interoperable data platforms to connect local action with national and international policies, leveraging synergies, and increasing accountability; and
•    just international partnerships – supporting local and Southern priorities through green development opportunities, ensuring fairness and co-benefits for the partners involved.

 

As the world approaches global warming tipping points, local climate engagement aims at climate actions that are equitable, effective and aligned with local needs. Strengthening and scaling up these initiatives can amplify impact, though efforts are often fragmented and require strengthened coordination. This policy brief identifies barriers and enablers of local climate action, how it is best scaled up, and how international actors – donors, policymakers, city and research networks, businesses and others – can support this process. 
Building on these insights, the following points outline key conditions for strengthening, scaling up and sustaining locally led climate action:
•    community-centred co-creation – investing in participatory, culturally grounded processes that map local needs, integrate diverse knowledge, and establish a common language;
•    predictable, flexible funding – providing long-term resources for locally led climate action, and planning additional finance to scale up solutions, including those involving knowledge sharing platforms and coordi-nation capacity;
•    private-sector engagement – creating incentives aligned with climate and community priorities, such as collaboration in the development of green products, in facilitating their market access and assisting with certification and value-chain regulations.
•    multilevel coordination and data sharing – establishing clear institutional pathways, monitoring mechanisms and interoperable data platforms to connect local action with national and international policies, leveraging synergies, and increasing accountability; and
•    just international partnerships – supporting local and Southern priorities through green development opportunities, ensuring fairness and co-benefits for the partners involved.

 

Just Transitions (JT) toward sustainable, equitable, and low-carbon futures have become a central focus of global climate policy, exemplified by initiatives such as Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JET-Ps) and the UNFCCC Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP). For some actors, JT is understood in sectoral terms, focusing on energy transitions. Others emphasise more transformative approaches grounded in global structural reform and climate justice. Although existing scholarship has mapped JT framings in the literature, across national climate policy and non-academic frameworks, no study has yet examined how individuals shaping global climate policy themselves understand and prioritise JT. Approximately 130 Blue Zone-accredited attendees (i.e. those with access to the formal negotiations) were surveyed at COP28 in Dubai, including party delegates, policy-makers, civil society representatives and others. The survey was structured around five JT typologies – from least to most transformative – drawn from existing literature, as well two novel typologies: one centered on energy, another on sustainable development. Results indicate a strong preference for approaches extending beyond energy to encompass broader sustainable development concerns, with policy coherence identified as a crucial governance principle. Respondents also favour more transformative policies around global structural reform and climate finance for lower-income countries, while the most prioritized justice dimension is accountability and responsibility for climate change. The results also show differences in preferences between participants from high- and lower-income countries, with the latter favouring more transformative notions of JT. However, overall, JT preferences straddle multiple typologies, suggesting that policy mixes delivering broader sustainable development outcomes could provide an effective and politically viable way to reconcile competing views. By exploring the perspectives of those shaping global climate policy, the paper enriches scholarly discussions on JT framings, while offering guidance and directions for the ongoing JTWP negotiations amidst the latest COP30 decision to establish a global just transition mechanism.