SWP

There are growing concerns that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) may not hand over power peacefully. The AKP’s long history of investment in the criminal sector, its alliance with mafia organisations, the establishment of shadow paramilitary organisations such as SADAT, and the creation of new security forces such as the “night watchmen” – made up entirely of AKP loyalists – all raise suspicions that the AKP may be preparing a violent rejection of the election results if it does not win. Recent statements from the AKP leadership reinforce this fear. The experiences relating to other right-wing populists, such as Donald Trump in the United States and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, reinforce the fear that such populist politicians tend not to concede elections.

There are two different ways in which a defeated leader could refuse to concede the election results, depending on whether state institutions and the judiciary side with the incumbent. If Erdoğan loses the election but manages to force state institutions to declare him the winner, that would be Turkey’s “Belarus moment”, similar to when Alexander Lukashenko claimed victory amid widespread evidence of vote rigging.

Although it is conceivable to think that the AKP is preparing for a “Belarus scenario”, there are several factors that could disrupt the government’s plans. First, Turkey’s electoral system is very thorough, and opposition members can be present at all levels. Thus, committing large-scale fraud without getting caught is unlikely. In case of a dispute, the final decision would be made by the Supreme Election Board (YSK), which is vulnerable to government pressure and manipulation, as already demonstrated in its decision to repeat the 2019 Istanbul elections. However, it could only go so far as repeating the election rather than falsely declaring an AKP victory. Moreover, although Erdoğan may be an autocrat, his power is derived from the fact that he has the popular vote on his side. Without public support, he loses his legitimacy, signalling further weakness. Given the harsh sentences for electoral manipulation, public officials will tend not to approve the rigging of the elections, even if they have supported Erdoğan in the past. If Erdoğan pushes for such a scenario, there is a serious risk of Turkey descending into chaos. Assuming that the opposition takes its fair share of responsibility and demonstrates the credibility of its victory, it is likely that supporters of the opposition would take to the streets. The AKP may respond either by using the police or unleashing its own base onto the streets. In either case, the result would be skirmishes and street fights either between the police and the demonstrators or between supporters of the opposing political groups. Unleashing such a scenario is too risky and does not offer clear gains, and it is hard to predict how events might unfold.

Is Erdoğan afraid of being sent to court?

The second scenario would be similar to the cases in Brazil and the United States, where neither Trump nor Bolsonaro conceded the elections, despite the verdicts of the respective election authorities. However, such attempts have little to no chance of subverting the electoral process. Moreover, the assumption that Erdoğan cannot – and will not – concede defeat is based on a number of faulty assumptions. The main narrative is that defeat would be too risky for him and open the door to jailtime due to potential charges against him. However, this scenario does not account for Turkey’s current power configuration or the country’s specific legal aspects. From a political point of view, even if he is defeated, Erdoğan would still have the support of more than 40 per cent of the society. He would continue to be an important political figure.

Also, Erdoğan is under legal protection. Since he served as the president, he could only be tried by the Constitutional Court. For him to be sent to the Court first requires a two-thirds majority in the parliament: an unlikely vote share to ever be reached by the opposition. But more importantly, even if the opposition managed to send Erdoğan to the Court, he would be tried by 15 judges, all of them appointed by the AKP leadership. The opposition would have to wait until August 2028 to shape the court’s composition and appoint the majority of the judges.

Erdoğan is a shrewd politician with a keen sense of power balance and a penchant for not overplaying his hand. Since he is a fighter, he might prepare himself for a future comeback, just like Benjamin Netanyahu managed to do in Israel after losing the government in 2021. The potential hurdles the new government will face in trying to solve the country’s dire economic problems also encourage him to plan a comeback. In this context, Erdoğan would most likely consider that, not conceding the election would make it much harder for him to plan a comeback.

Moreover, the Turkish public – even though it is not keen on the irregularities of the electoral process and the lack of a fair playing ground tends to be very protective of its right to vote. Hence, attempts to alter the electoral process are often met with resistance, even from the party base. The 2019 Istanbul municipal elections demonstrated the political risks of not conceding the election. Although the election, which was later annulled by the YSK, resulted in a very narrow margin of 13,000 votes in favour of the opposition candidate, Ekrem İmamoğlu, in the repeat elections, the difference was more than 800,000. If Erdoğan does not acknowledge the election results, one can expect defections from the AKP rank and file as well as the AKP leadership.

From Erdoğan’s point of view, refusing to concede the elections would not just be hard to sustain and pointless, it would also not be wise politically, assuming that Erdoğan remains in politics after a potential defeat. The chances of success are limited, whereas the risks are many. Erdoğan may take this course of action only if he believes that the opposition has not fully secured the electoral process. Therefore, the decisive element is not Erdoğan’s respect for the election results, but the opposition’s ability to demonstrate its resolve and willingness to protect the vote.

The current wave of emigrants from Russia can play an important role in the country’s political transition in the long term. As Russia’s aggressive wars are a consequence of the personalist dictatorship that has embraced the imperialist idea, a regime change towards a more pluralistic model of rule would be in the West’s strategic interest.

Mit Sorge blickt die Weltgemeinschaft auf die nahende Präsidentschaft der Vereinig­ten Arabischen Emirate bei der diesjährigen Vertragsstaatenkonferenz (COP) der UN‑Klimarahmenkonvention (UNFCCC). Bisher glänzte der Ölproduzent nicht mit Anstrengungen für den Klimaschutz, und Sultan Al Jaber, der diesjährige COP-Vor­sit­zende, ist Chef der Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, einer der größten Ölfirmen der Welt. Um den Anstieg der durchschnittlichen Erdtemperatur gemäß Pariser Klima­abkommen möglichst auf 1,5 Grad Celsius über dem vorindustriellen Niveau zu be­grenzen, strebt die Staatengemeinschaft Klimaneutralität in der zweiten Hälfte des Jahrhunderts an. Dafür muss in globalen Energiesystemen der weitgehende Ausstieg aus den fossilen Energieträgern gelingen – wo diese jedoch nach wie vor dominieren. Eine Trendwende lässt sich nicht absehen. Dass ein vollständiger fossiler Ausstieg momentan nicht zu erwarten ist, geht in klimapolitischen Debatten oft unter. Er ist in den meisten Ländern weder politisch gewollt noch in Langfristplänen vorgesehen. Ein geordnetes, zügiges Herunterfahren ist allerdings nicht nur wünschenswert, son­dern absolut nötig, um die richtigen Investitionsanreize zu setzen und auch Sicher­heiten für fossile Produzenten zu schaffen. Entsprechende Politik- und Governance-Instrumente müssen dringend weiterentwickelt werden, denn die Zeit drängt.

On May 14, Turkey is heading to the polls to vote in what are deemed to be the most important elections of 2023. Most of the polls indicate it will be a tight race and that the opposition has a chance to unseat President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan after 20 years. Last week, Turkey’s Interior Minister described the elections as a “political coup plot” by the West to overthrow the government. Given that elections are not always fair in Turkey, such a statement raises concerns about the security of the elections. Yet, extensive electoral fraud seems highly unlikely.

According to the Freedom House’s electoral integrity index, Turkey scores only 33 out of 100. The media is under government control and heavily censured, and state resources are used exclusively to support the government’s election campaign. There is severe voter suppression in the rural areas under the pretext of security concerns. Finally, the government instrumentalises the judiciary to intimidate and suppress political opponents.

Given such authoritarian elements of the political regime in Turkey, there are serious concerns that the elections could be rigged. Despite some attempts by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), elections in Turkey are generally free, the process is transparent and vote rigging is difficult.

Possibility of election rigging on election day

Although citizen participation is very limited when it comes to political affairs, even at the local level, voter turnout never falls below 80 per cent, as elections are the main means for citizens to express their political views and hold elected officials to account.

Each citizen is allocated an electoral box, and the electoral rolls are announced by the Supreme Electoral Board (YSK) well in advance of elections. The YSK shares these electoral rolls with all competing political parties. For each ballot box there is an appointed electoral board, which is responsible for the safe conduction of the elections and the vote counting. The head of the board is a civil servant appointed by the government, and there are appointees from the top five political parties who are ranked according to their share of the vote in the previous elections. Other smaller parties may also have observers at the polling stations, but they have no official role.

Each citizen can only vote at their assigned polling station and must present an official ID before voting. The electoral board members check that the ID matches the name on the electoral roll to prevent double voting and also ensure that votes are cast in private. The vote count is made available to the public and citizens are usually present for this. After the votes have been counted, a report on the results is drawn up and signed by all members of the electoral board. Each political party representative on the board receives a copy, and a final copy is placed on the door of the polling station. Any citizen can take a photograph of this copy. It is the most important official document, and the remaining vote counting calculations are based on it.

These reports are collected at the district and provincial polling stations and combined into a single report, which is sent to the YSK for final tabulation and the declaration of the election results. Six-member electoral boards at the district and provincial levels undertake the process of combining the documents. The board consists of a judge, a second public official and four representatives of the top four political parties, determined according to the results of the last election. 

Overall, the system is very thorough and open to public scrutiny at all levels. It is a paper-based system that limits issues relating to cyber security. There are also severe penalties for attempts to influence election results. For example, the penalty for falsifying an electoral register is eight years in prison.

Questionable past elections and the opposition’s learning curve

The relative security of the electoral system in Turkey does not mean that the AKP has not tried to rig elections. There have been serious concerns over the integrity of certain elections. In the past, the opposition parties often failed to appoint members to the electoral board for every ballot box. Furthermore, since the 2014 elections, Anadolu Agency (AA), Turkey’ official news agency, has falsely announced landslide AKP victories very early on, leading disgruntled opposition observers to abandon the ballot boxes without retrieving the election reports. As mentioned, the crucial document for electoral security is the election report kept by each observer. The only way for opposition parties to control and prove any possible irregularities is to compare the results with the election reports. This also leads to an inability to shape the public discourse. Once the government declares itself the winner and the opposition fails to respond on election night, the opposition is faced with a fait accompli and their follow-up objections have little impact.

But past elections have also served as a learning curve for the opposition. This was apparent in the 2019 Istanbul municipal elections. The opposition appeared to have properly organised all ballot boxes and their observers did not leave early, despite AA’s declaration of an AKP victory. The rapid collection of election reports enabled the opposition candidate, Ekrem İmamoğlu, to openly and legitimately confront the AA’s results throughout the night by regularly sharing his own data. The government was thus unable to shape the public discourse as it had in previous elections. As a result, despite an extremely narrow margin, the government was unable to manipulate the election results.

For the upcoming elections, the opposition states that they are prepared as a result of these past experiences and that a member is being assigned to observe each ballot box. Furthermore, civil society has mobilised and established successful election monitoring organisations, most famously Oy ve Ötesi (Vote and Beyond), which can reliably assess the integrity of the election results. As long as the opposition succeeds in appointing observers to the electoral boards – thereby collecting results quickly and efficiently, and then sharing the data with the public – it will be very difficult for the government to steal an election it has lost. But if the opposition fails in any respect, then there is a serious possibility of electoral fraud. It is therefore crucial that international election observers remain vigilant and request information from the opposition.

Die Covid-19-Pandemie gilt nicht mehr als »gesundheitliche Notlage von internationaler Tragweite«. Das verkündete der Generaldirektor der Weltgesundheitsorganisation (WHO), Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, am vergangenen Freitag in Genf. Die Erklärung stützt sich auf Artikel 12 der Internationalen Gesundheitsvorschriften von 2005. Die Länder sollten sich nun auf eine längerfristige Strategie zur Bewältigung des Virus vorbereiten, so der WHO-Generaldirektor. Bislang wurden nach Daten der John Hopkins University weltweit mehr als 6,8 Millionen Covid-19-Todesfälle gemeldet – nach neuen WHO-Angaben liegt die tatsächliche Todesrate jedoch bei mindestens 20 Millionen Menschen.

Aus völkerrechtlicher Sicht bringt die Erklärung keine wesentliche rechtliche Änderung mit sich, da jedes Land selbst entscheidet, welche Schutzmaßnahmen es ergreift. Die WHO spricht lediglich Empfehlungen aus. Doch wie könnte eine längerfristige Strategie gegen Covid-19 und künftige Gesundheitsbedrohungen aussehen? Trotz der vorherrschenden geopolitischen Brüche muss der Multilateralismus im Bereich der globalen Gesundheit gestärkt werden, um bei der Pandemieprävention, -vorsorge und -bekämpfung voranzukommen.

Auch wenn die Welt die akute Phase der Covid-19-Pandemie hinter sich gelassen habe, gebe das Risiko schwerer Varianten weiterhin Anlass zur Sorge, so der WHO-Generaldirektor. Es sind weitere Forschungen erforderlich, zum Beispiel um die Auswirkungen von Long-Covid zu ermitteln. Die Regierungen sollten die Erklärung daher nicht als Vorwand nutzen, um präventive Maßnahmen im Bereich der öffentlichen Gesundheit aufzuheben, einschließlich der Schließung der verbleibenden Impflücken und der Gewährung von Arbeitsfreistellung im Falle positiver Testergebnisse.

Notwendigkeit einer wirklich globalen Gesundheitspolitik

Der Mangel an Solidarität während der Covid-19-Pandemie - »ein Beispiel der Nichtzusammenarbeit« - muss ein Weckruf für die internationale Staatsgemeinschaft sein. Verständlicherweise war jedes Land und jede Region bestrebt, in erster Linie seine eigene Bevölkerung zu schützen. Die unmittelbare Folge war jedoch, dass Länder mit geringeren Ressourcen bei der Verteilung lebensrettender medizinischer Güter ins Hintertreffen gerieten.

Mittlerweile hat sich auf der Ebene der internationalen Politik eine »Pandemiemüdigkeit« eingestellt. Dabei bleibt mit Blick auf die Weltgesundheitsversammlung im Mai 2024, auf der ein neuer Pandemievertrag und eine Reform der Internationalen Gesundheitsvorschriften vorgelegt werden sollen, noch viel zu tun.

Wenn die Bundesregierung ihre Führungsrolle im Bereich der globalen Gesundheit konsolidieren will, muss sie den Umgang mit langfristigen Folgen von Covid-19 und anderen wachsenden Gesundheitsbedrohungen planen. Sie kann hier jedoch nicht im Alleingang handeln. Für eine bessere Pandemieprävention, -vorbereitung und -reaktion ist ein stärkeres multilaterales Engagement erforderlich. Zwei Strategien können helfen, diese Ziele zu erreichen.

Klare Regeln und eine nachhaltige Finanzierung

Erstens sind klare völkerrechtliche Regeln erforderlich, um die Verantwortlichkeiten zwischen den Staaten aufzuteilen. Das Völkerrecht ist nach wie vor die beste Option, um klare Parameter für die Reaktion der Staaten auf Pandemien festzulegen. Dies bedeutet nicht unbedingt, dass der WHO mehr Befugnisse übertragen werden müssen. Zumindest aber sollten die Verantwortlichkeiten zwischen den Staaten geregelt sein, zum Beispiel für eine gerechte Verteilung medizinischer Güter oder einen transparenten Datenaustausch. Die nächste Pandemie könnte schon vor der Tür stehen. Doch ohne verbindliche Regeln gibt es keine klaren politischen Zusagen, dass künftige Reaktionen von mehr zwischenstaatlicher Solidarität geprägt sein werden.

Zweitens ist eine nachhaltige Finanzierung der WHO für eine längerfristige Perspektive erforderlich. Es ist kein gangbarer Weg, Finanzmittel zu sammeln, nachdem eine gesundheitliche Notlage eingetreten ist. Deutschland hat eine führende Rolle bei der Erhöhung der Pflichtbeiträge für die WHO gespielt. Die Verhandlungen über die genauen Bedingungen dieser Erhöhung werden auf der kommenden Weltgesundheitsversammlung Ende des Monats fortgesetzt. Eine größere Unabhängigkeit und Stabilität der WHO hängt vom Erfolg dieser Verhandlungen ab.

Die WHO stieß bei der Covid-19 Pandemiebekämpfung an ihre Grenzen. Dazu gehörten verwirrende oder verspätete Mitteilungen zu wichtigen Fragen wie dem Tragen von Masken, Reisebeschränkungen und der Übertragung von Covid-19. Aber sie hat für alle Mitgliedstaaten auch umfassende Beratung geleistet und war ein Ort, an dem politische Maßnahmen zwischen den Staaten erörtert wurden. Für diese Aufgaben gibt es keine alternative internationale Institution. Die Gewährleistung der Unabhängigkeit und Kontinuität der Arbeit der WHO durch ihre Finanzierung könnte daher dazu beitragen, sie vor aktuellen und künftigen geopolitischen Konflikten zu schützen. Letztlich ist der Multilateralismus die beste Garantie dafür, dass sich viele der globalen Debakel, die während der Covid-19-Pandemie auftraten, nicht wiederholen.

With the publication of its Synthesis Report in March 2023, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has completed its work programme for the sixth assess­ment cycle. The IPCC reports, and in particular the respective Summary for Policy Makers (SPM), provide a scientific basis for negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). They are a key reference in the global climate debate. The most recent Synthesis Report (SYR) is considered one of the most important sources of information for the first Global Stocktake under the Paris Agreement, which is to be concluded at the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP28) in Dubai in December 2023. The knowledge politics surfacing in controversies that were visible during the report’s adoption reflect the conflicting interests that will shape the upcoming round of new emission reduction and financing pledges.

How has Germany's enlargement policy changed since Russia's aggression against Ukraine? Can the war revive the EU’s enlargement agenda for the Western Balkans? Discussion with Margit Wunsch Gaarmann and Heinrich Kreft, Head of the Centre for Diplomacy at the Andrássy University Budapest.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan führt die Türkei seit 20 Jahren. Doch die Wirtschaftskrise, die Folgen des Erdbebens und eine geschlossene Opposition könnten ihm bei den anstehenden Wahlen gefährlich werden.

Die Klimapolitik in der Europäischen Union und in Deutschland hat sich mit der Verabschiedung von Netto-Null-Zielen deutlich verändert. Eine neue Entwicklung ist die Bedeutung von Carbon Management. Der Sammelbegriff umfasst neben der Ab­scheidung und Speicherung von CO2 (Carbon Capture and Storage, CCS) auch die CO2‑Abscheidung und Nutzung (Carbon Capture and Utilization, CCU) sowie die Ent­nahme von CO2 aus der Atmosphäre (Carbon Dioxide Removal, CDR). Es ist wichtig, Klarheit in Bezug auf die Abgrenzung dieser einzelnen Ansätze zu schaffen und ihr Verhältnis zu den sogenannten Restemissionen und schwer vermeidbaren Emissionen zu identifizieren. Dies ist insbesondere deshalb ratsam, weil davon das generelle Ambitionsniveau der Klimapolitik, die zukünftige Ausgestaltung der Politikdesigns sowie deren Verteilungswirkungen abhängen. Aktuelle Politik- und Gesetzgebungsprozesse sollten genutzt werden, um darauf hinzuwirken, dass Carbon Management den Ausstieg aus fossilen Energieträgern nicht verlangsamt. Die neuen Initiativen bieten die Gelegenheit, die Schnittstelle zwischen ambitioniertem Klimaschutz und Industriepolitik aktiv zu gestalten.

Das Soziale Europa ist zurück auf der politischen Agenda – als Folge schwerer Wirtschaftskrisen, der einstigen Austeritätspolitik und eines Wandels im europäischen Diskursrahmen. Fünf Jahre nach ihrer Proklamation ist die Europäische Säule sozialer Rechte – obwohl rechtlich unverbindlich – zum zentralen Bezugspunkt sozialpolitischer Vorhaben auf EU-Ebene geworden. Langsam, aber stetig verbessert sich die soziale Situation der EU, wobei es weiterhin große Divergenzen gibt. In den Mitgliedstaaten werden die Säule und das sie begleitende Social Scoreboard nur erratisch genutzt. Sozialinvestitionen und ‑reformen, die mithilfe der Aufbau- und Resilienzfazilität finanziert werden, orientieren sich nur in Teilen an sozialen Defiziten. Zugleich hat das europäische Krisenmanagement in der Pandemie dazu beigetragen, die Säule sozialer Rechte umzusetzen. Mit ermöglicht haben diesen Erfolg finanzunterlegte Instrumente wie das Kurzarbeitergeld SURE. Durch eine Reihe von Maßnahmen ließe sich die Umsetzung der Säule stabilisieren. Zu empfehlen wäre, die Indikatoren des Scoreboards gezielter auch auf nationaler Ebene zu nutzen, SURE zu einer Europäischen Arbeitslosenversicherung weiterzuentwickeln, ein Verfahren zu sozialen Ungleichgewichten einzurichten sowie Freiräume für Sozialinvestitionen im Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt zu schaffen.

Die Republikaner greifen Joe Biden mit einem durch künstliche Intelligenz generierten Video an. USA-Experte Johannes Thimm sieht eine neue Qualität der Täuschung – Lügen und Manipulation habe es jedoch immer gegeben.

No other bilateral relationship has comparable significance for the future of the international order as that between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. Domestic political and social structural factors have a significant influ­ence on the conflict behaviour of the two states. These factors are contributing towards the deterioration of the bilateral relationship and making it crisis-prone. Vulnerabilities arise from the interdependencies between the two soci­eties and economies. An awareness of this fact can provide an incentive for cooperation. Efforts made to avoid the risk of escalation can also pro­mote cooperation. Both states are dependent on a functioning international order. However, this insight is all too easily overshadowed by the conflictual aspects of the bilateral relationship. This is the task – and at the same time an opportunity – for German and European policy, which should strengthen European participation in world governance to gain more weight and exert a moderating influence on China and America.