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Photo Credit: Kremlin Press and Information Office

Kyrgyzstan has canceled a two decades-old agreement governing U.S. economic aid in response to the State Department’s decision to recognize a jailed human rights campaigner with a prestigious commendation. The dispute concerns Azimjon Askarov, who was arrested in 2010 for “inciting ethnic hatred.” Askarov, a member of Kyrgyzstan’s Uzbek minority, filmed rioting by Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in June 2010 that claimed that lives of 400 people. The Kyrgyz-led government in Bishkek accused Askarov of encouraging the violence and handed him a life sentence. Since then, international NGOs and human rights groups have called for Askarov’s release, alleging he is the victim of political and ethnic persecution.

The State Department’s recent decision to bestow the Human Rights Defender Award on Askarov follows years of work to obtain his exoneration. In response to the award, Kyrghyz President Almazbek Atambayev accused the U.S. of “trying to stir up ethnic hatred,” and canceled the 1993 Bilateral Agreement governing American aid to the former Soviet republic. Atambayev suggested that Washington is deliberately destabilizing the country, darkly referencing unspecified “attempts to sow division [and] chaos.”

The move is part of a general trend in Central Asia that has seen U.S. influence decline and official commitment to human rights weaken, with Russia eagerly stepping into the vacuum.

Since 1993, Kyrgyzstan has received $2 billion in aid from the United States, mainly through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Under the terms of the 1993 Bilateral Agreement, USAID and other U.S. aid organizations are exempt from taxation and auditing requirements and their personnel are granted the same immunity from prosecution as diplomats.

Atambayev’s dark hints that the U.S. is trying to “sow division” may sound paranoid, but one needs only look to recent events in Ukraine to see their underlying logic. USAID provided unaccountable millions in funding to various organizations and news outlets opposed to former President Viktor Yanukovych prior to his overthrow in February 2014. There’s no doubt that the work these organizations played some role in the Euromaidan protests that ousted Yanukovych last year. Atambayev has taken the lesson to heart: seemingly innocuous aid organizations can act as catalysts for unwanted political change.

But Ukraine is just the tip of the iceberg. Russia and the United States are involved in a Cold War-esque struggle for influence across Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Kyrgyzstan is a political football that has been tossed between the two superpowers for more than a decade.

Kyrgyzstan is one of the most politically volatile states in the world today. The so-called Tulip Revolution in 2005 overthrew the country’s pro-Russian president, Askar Akayev, with support from the United States. Five years later, Russia allegedly supported yet another revolution to overthrow Akayev’s successor, Kurmanbek Bakiyev. After two revolutions in the last decade, Atambayev is seeking security by decisively entering the Russian camp.

For more than a decade, the country was the only in the world to host both a US air base and a Russian one.  The Manas Transit Center proved instrumental in supporting the troops fighting in Afghanistan – hundreds of thousands of passengers passed through Kyrgyzstan on their way to the frontlines. However, the base was closed in June 2014, coinciding with a $2 billion Russian loan for Kyrgyzstan.

Then, on Aug. 6, Kyrgyzstan officially joined the Eurasian Economic Union, becoming the fifth member of Russia’s response to the European Union. The EAEU now includes Russia and three other former Soviet republics: Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan’s entry into the EAEU marks a further step into Russia’s economic and political domain, away from the U.S. and the West.

In the realm of domestic policy, as well, Kyrgyzstan is increasingly modeling itself after Russia. On June 4, Kyrgyzstan’s parliament passed a “foreign agents” law modeled after Russia’s through the first stage of the legislative process. If successful, the law would require all NGOs that receive funding from foreign donors to register as “foreign agents” and submit to intrusive auditing by the state.

Russia’s own “foreign agents” law — passed in 2012 — has targeted NGOs and human rights groups including the GOLOS Association (Russia’s only independent election monitoring organizations), the Levada Center (the country’s only independent polling agency), and the Committee Against Torture, an investigative body that researches allegations of torture by Russian police and military forces. Since 2012, many Russian NGOs have been forced to close their doors or curtail important work to avoid scrutiny, fines and imprisonment by the state.

Kyrgyzstan looks to be following in Russia’s footsteps: the repeal of the 1993 Bilateral Agreement, the passage of its own “foreign agents” law, and its entry into the Eurasian Economic Union point to a decisive shift towards Russia and a further attenuation of U.S. influence in the former Soviet periphery. NGOs, aid workers and human rights groups will be the first to feel the wrath of Krygyzstan’s eastward slide.

Washington ugyanazt a módszer akarta felhasználni Oroszország gazdasági összeomlásának előidézésére, ami korábban a Szovjetunió összeomlásában is jelentős szerepet játszott. A szaúdiakkal viszont nem számoltak.

President Barack Obama has shown a recent willingness to engage forcefully on tough issues in a manner some found lacking earlier in his presidency. With re-election behind him, he discovered the value of the bully pulpit. His recent discussion of prison reform may be the initial steps of the long walk other social issues — like marriage equality — had to take before they were addressed fully. Presidents cannot resolve issues like these alone — no president can move gun control through an obstructive Congress, for example — but they can set down markers for action on an issue so that successors can approach it with the ball moved a little further down the field. In short, while it’s not an endgame, the bully pulpit adds value.

Since Obama uses the bully pulpit domestically, can he take it abroad? In a sense, he has. His trip to Africa last month aimed to clarify U.S. policy towards the continent’s major nations. His openness toward Cuba showed a willingness to take action to “unfreeze” American policy toward the country that was mired in Cold War thinking. Even in the waning months of his presidency, there is still more that he could accomplish abroad. In the remaining months before the 2016 presidential campaign kicks into high gear and soaks up all available media, here are three areas where Obama’s “foreign policy bully pulpit” could be useful.

NATO. Obama’s administration coined the term “leading from behind” in reference to U.S. participation in the ouster of Moammar Gadhafi from power in Libya, and the amount of responsibility it could shoulder for the results. “Leading from behind” positioned U.S. forces as facilitators of collective actions, but not as the spearhead they were for the Iraq War.

Such actions not only honor alliances they diffuse burdens to a U.S. military that is still looked to first as the global policeman. NATO now encompasses Central and Eastern Europe; its members are best positioned to counter Russian influence in the region. NATO’s rounds of enlargement and efforts to partner with Russia have not matched the level of strategic reassessment NATO undertook with the 1967 Harmel Report. That document outlined the alliance’s guiding principles during the Cold War. Some analysts have called for a repeat of the Harmel process to clarify NATO’s post-Cold War principles and mission. Obama’s motive to share alliance responsibilities more equally with European powers still applies.

Moreover, well into their second decade of NATO membership, rising Central European economies like Poland have increasing resources and strategic need for a revitalized alliance. Obama could call for a second Harmel process, led in part by NATO’s most recent Central and Eastern European members, to determine how the alliance will continue to ensure European security. A a second Harmel process could clarify circumstances under which NATO would take out-of-area action, such as the criteria for an equivalent of the Libya intervention.

Japan. Central to Obama’s foreign policy has been a “pivot” toward Asia. China commands a separate level of attention from U.S. policymakers; but the most important U.S. ally in Asia is Japan. It is the world’s largest economy behind the U.S. and China. Its financial contribution to the United Nations (close to $294 million in 2015) are second only to the U.S. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s new security legislation passed Japan’s lower house last month and is headed to its upper chamber.

The new security measures have been controversial in Japan and the U.S. for proposing to alter Article 9 of Japan’s post-World War II constitution to allow Japan to project military force. But they offer Obama an opportunity to move U.S.-Japan relations forward from its World War II-era posture in the way he pushed the U.S.-Cuba relations out of their Cold War stasis. Japan’s economic might, like Germany’s was long seen as a potential security threat; it is time that its economic power carry with it responsibilities to global security.

A reformed Article 9 could open options for Japanese contribution to security actions without encouraging unilateral action by Japan. Abe’s domestic critics pose the greater challenge, but Obama can make further steps towards getting Japan to shoulder more of Asia’s security burdens while incorporating Japan into global security leadership more directly (by endorsing its addition as a UN Security Council Permanent Member, for example.) A full course correction in policy will not be accomplished in the next year, but Obama can move it forward while he has time.

Germany. To paraphrase Henry Kissinger’s famous comment, when Obama has to “call Europe,” he has to call Germany. Chancellor Angela Merkel has directed Europe’s response to the Greek crisis, cementing Germany’s position as the guiding voice of the euro.

Germany, like Japan, has been run deliberately as a militarily rudderless economic engine. Any path to a common EU security policy, however, will go through Germany. Likewise, the EU’s response to Russian aggression has centered on Germany’s energy and economic relations with that country.

In short, if President Obama wants to be on good terms with Europe, he needs to leave office on good terms with Germany. The Obama administration has made efforts to clean up the mess of the NSA’s alleged tapping of Merkel’s cell phone, but it still stands that the U.S.’ standing in Germany has been dinged during Obama’s tenure. An effort on his part to cement good relations with Berlin would pay dividends for his successor and America’s ongoing ties with the EU.

It is hard to underestimate the power of the media in today’s politics. Obama is a master communicator, and his rhetorical gifts have played a key role in moving America forward on some key domestic issues. As he aims to cement his legacy, why not take his talents abroad?

Date: 13 SeptembreDate de fin: Lundi, Août 10, 2015Région: Nord Pas de Calais

Le Dauphin de la 35F fera une démonstration d'hélitreuillage avec la SNSM sur la plage de Sangatte-Blériot

Date: 6 SeptembreDate de fin: Dimanche, Septembre 6, 2015Région: Basse Normandie

Meeting aérien sur l'aérodrome de Bréville sur Mer avec exposition statique de l'EC-225 de la flottille 32F.

The failure of the 2009 Copenhagen climate conference marked a shift in international climate governance. As the system of agreeing international emissions reductions targets and then negotiating individual country contribution towards that target proved increasingly unworkable, there has been a drive towards a much more bottom-up form of climate governance. In preparation for the Paris summit later this year, countries are submitting Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) to the international community, hoping that together, these contributions will add up to limit global warming to two degrees Celsius. These national pledges are—at least in part—backed up by a range of decentralized activities by countries, regions, cities, as well as businesses, civil society and others, who have been taking their own initiatives to address climate change. But what do we know about this bottom-up approach to climate governance and can it work?

In a recent article published in Nature Climate Change[1], we seek to shed some light on the distribution, the origins and the consequences of these bottom-up approaches to addressing climate change. Past research highlights a proliferating number of initiatives at various levels and in various places. For example, studies have documented a great number of international initiatives, transnational approaches[2], as well as a significant growth in national legislation to address climate change with 500 laws and policies addressing climate change in 66 countries in 2013, up from only 40 in 1997. We also know that there is a range of motivations for politicians, business leaders and others to engage in mitigation of climate change – some financial, some non-financial incentives. However, while this body of knowledge has accumulated, we know comparatively little about the consequences, or effects, of these bottom-up approaches. A key question is does bottom-up climate governance add up to something significant? And does it deliver? And by which criteria should it be evaluated?

Evaluating the performance of these bottom-up forms of governance raises a range of technical and political challenges. The international climate regime has struggled to consistently evaluate performance, such that much depends on self-reporting by states and other actors. In these compliance exercises, the focus has often been on whole countries and sometimes whether certain country characteristics, such as institutions or democratic governance drive performance, but often not individual policies. For instance, while we know that the European Union has reduced its greenhouse gas emissions, much less is known about the causal factors behind this – was it simply a renewal of old industries (e.g., after German reunification or the switch from coal to gas in the UK), the economic crisis, carbon leakage to countries not bound by emission reductions or policies that created incentives for renewable energy, legislation for energy efficiency, emissions trading, or a combination of all these factors? The ever-increasing number of bottom-up approaches, with some reaching beyond national borders, exacerbates these evaluation challenges.

There is very little comparative data on individual climate policies and initiatives, particularly on a range of intended or unintended (and often important) side effects beyond greenhouse gas emission reductions. In particular, while the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) focuses on ex-ante predictions of actual policy effects, there is currently a dearth of information on ex-post (i.e., retrospective) evaluations of policy effects. Technical difficulties and low resources may partly explain this lack of knowledge. But policy-makers may lack incentives to provide such information, because it could potentially highlight the ineffectiveness of ‘their’ policies.[3]

We know even less about the effects of transnational approaches, where an energetic debate is underway regarding the criteria to use for evaluation. Evaluation research has taught us that complex activities need to be evaluated using multiple criteria.[4] ‘Hard outcomes’ such as greenhouse gas emission reductions are the ultimate proof, but they may not materialize immediately, and ‘soft’ outcomes such as building trust and learning may be necessary to create conditions for significant reductions of emissions. But to learn more we need to investigate effects from multiple perspectives and with multiple tools, including an examination of some very simple features, for example whether new initiatives incorporate monitoring and evaluation that support learning from all the new efforts. Another important question to ask is whether these approaches last long enough to have enduring effects.

Taken together, we conclude that much remains to be learned on the effectiveness of bottom-up climate governance. The jury is still out on whether it can fill the gaps left by the Kyoto-based international climate regime. To make robust conclusions possible we need a concerted research effort on the merits of these new approaches to climate governance. Policy-makers would be well advised to support new approaches, but not to abandon the more traditional international negotiation processes before we know more about what actually can be achieved through bottom-up climate governance.

[1] Jordan, A.J.; Huitema, D.; Hildén, M.; van Asselt,H.; Rayner, T.J.; Schoenefeld, J.J.; Tosun, J.; Forster, J.;  Boasson, E.L. Emergence of polycentric climate governance and its future prospects Nature Climate Change. Available at http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nclimate2725.html

[2] Bulkeley, H. (2014). Transnational climate change governance. New York: Cambridge University Press.

[3] Hildén, M., Jordan, A., & Rayner, T. (2014). Climate policy innovation: developing an evaluation perspective. Environmental Politics, 23(5), 884-905.

[4] Mickwitz, P. (2013). Policy evaluation. In A. Jordan, & C. Adelle (Eds.), Environmental policy in the EU: Actors, institutions and processes (pp. 267-286). London; New York: Routledge.

The post How Well Does Bottom-Up Climate Governance Work? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The political games are full of all sorts of tricks: a friend today can become an enemy tomorrow, the publication wrote. It is the political elite who hangs the labels of 'good' and 'bad', and it is common people who suffer. The "bad guys" have the oil that the "good guys" need to live the way they live now to roll in clover

Tekintettel az egyes EMVA beruházási jogcímeken támogatott elektromos áramtermelő projektek elszámolásánál tapasztalt hiányosságokra, az alábbi linken hívja fel az MVH a tárgykörben érintett, elszámolás előtt álló ügyfelei figyelmét.

MVH tájékoztató

Fin juillet 2015, la 3e compagnie du 31e régiment du génie (RG) a effectué deux semaines de mise en condition avant projection (MCP) pour préparer son départ en Martinique en septembre prochain.

2015. augusztus 31-én lejárnak az Európai Mezőgazdasági Vidékfejlesztési Alapból (EMVA) társfinanszírozott egyes beruházási jogcímekre vonatkozó megvalósítási illetve kifizetési kérelem benyújtási határidők.

Az MVH felhívja a figyelmet, hogy a kifizetési kérelmeket minél előbb nyújtsák be, ne várjanak a határidő végéig!

Le 1er août 2015, sur la base aérienne de Niamey au Niger, a eu lieu une relève d’avion ravitailleur de type C135 et de son équipage, sans affecter la conduite des opérations de la force Barkhane dans la bande sahélo-saharienne.

On Friday, May 15, the Project on International Order and Strategy hosted a discussion about the current state of geopolitics and international peacekeeping. The conversation, a part of the Foreign Policy program’s Order from Chaos project, featured Jean-Marie Guéhenno, former United Nations’ undersecretary-general for peacekeeping operations. Guéhenno discussed his new memoir "The Fog of Peace: How International Engagement Can Stop the Conflicts of the 21st Century" (Brookings Institution Press, 2015). In his role as the U.N.’s lead peacekeeper, Guéhenno oversaw the largest expansion of peacekeeping missions in U.N. history. His insights into peacekeeping, international diplomacy, and great-power relations illuminated some of the challenges we face today, including the crisis in Syria, Russian aggression in Ukraine, and the accommodation of rising powers in a new world order.

Alors qu’une tentative de coup d’Etat contre Pierre Nkurunziza, émanant de l’ex-chef d’état-major, Godefroid Niyombaré, est en cours au Burundi, Thierry Vircoulon chercheur à l'International Crisis Group, explique qui est le général putschiste et analyse, plus généralement, l'appareil sécuritaire du Burundi.

Cyrille P. Coutansais est directeur de recherches au Centre d’études stratégiques de la Marine. Il répond à nos questions à l’occasion de la parution de « Abysses » la publication du Centre d’études stratégiques de la Marine (Études marines, N°8 – Juin 2015) :
– Existe-t-il une compétition entre les États pour la conquête des abysses, à l’image de la course à l’espace que l’on a connu entre l’URSS et les États-Unis ?
– Quels sont les enjeux à venir des abysses et la place de la France ?
– Quid de la législation internationale pour encadrer l’exploitation des fonds marins, notamment en vue de leur préservation ? Existe-t-il une gestion collective de ce patrimoine commun de l’humanité ?

September 11, 2001, started in New York as a particularly beautiful September day: there was not a single cloud, the air was transparent, and the light was crisp. I was less than three weeks away from the first anniversary of my joining the United Nations and had no sense of the momentous global changes that would be set in motion by the tragic events of the day. In his acceptance speech for the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo three months later, Kofi Annan would say of September 11, with some flourish: “We have entered the third millennium through a gate of fire.” The historic importance of events is not always immediately perceived, but September 11 was almost immediately understood as the beginning of a new era.

A külföldi sajtó is reagált az új államfő beiktatási beszédére. A legélesebben az Economist brit magazin legújabb számában reagált:...

En Russie, la destruction des produits sous embargo suscite la colère. Un an après la promulgation de l’embargo visant les produits alimentaires des pays ayant adopté des sanctions contre la Russie, le Kremlin s’emploie à éradiquer de son territoire les marchandises interdites : celles qui passeraient entre les mailles du filet seront désormais détruites.

Patience jusqu'à la mi-septembre (au mieux) pour en savoir plus sur les dessous de l'accord franco-russe (ce qui nous laisse le temps de déterminer où seront ponctionnés les quelques 800 millions à rembourser).

En effet, le texte sur l'accord pour le règlement du dossier des deux BPC de type Mistral que la France ne va pas livrer à la Russie sera examiné "dès la rentrée" par le Parlement, qui reprend ses travaux le 14 septembre.

C'est ce qu'a annoncé ce lundi matin le président de l'Assemblée nationale Claude Bartolone (PS) sur RTL. "Nous recommençons nos travaux au début de la deuxième semaine de septembre. Très vite, dès la rentrée parlementaire, nous aurons à examiner ce texte (...). On connaîtra à la fois les conditions, sur quelles bases a été calculée cette indemnité, et on aura une discussion pour savoir ce que deviendront ces navires", a précisé le président Bartolone.

Paris et Moscou sont parvenus la semaine dernière à un accord sur l'épineux dossier des BPC, dont la livraison à la Russie avait été suspendue sine die en raison de la crise ukrainienne : Paris en récupérera la "pleine propriété" après avoir "intégralement" remboursé Moscou.

Szerbia légiereje a napokban jelentette be, hogy Franciaországtól és Oroszországtól 4 darab új helikoptert vásárolnának, melyből terveik szerint év végéig már kettő meg is érkezne. Az új forgószárnyasok a már kiöregedett Mi-8-asokat váltanák le.

When the Cold War ended in 1991, there was hope the U.N. Security Council would be able to take decisive action to create a more peaceful world. Early blue helmet successes in Cambodia, Namibia, Mozambique, and El Salvador seemed to vindicate that assessment. This optimism was tripped up by the tragedies that followed in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda. U.N. peacekeepers were bystanders to horrible atrocities. Peacekeeping shrank rapidly.