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A Nitrogénművek Vegyipari Zrt. a Gazdaságfejlesztési Operatív Program „Komplex technológiai fejlesztés és foglalkoztatás támogatása” című konstrukciója keretében több mint 369 millió forint vissza nem térítendő uniós támogatást nyert el. A közel 1,7 milliárd forint összköltségű beruházás során az új üzemegység építése mellett új technológiafejlesztés és kapacitásbővítés valósult meg.

Az új ingás dolomitőrlő malom és befoglaló épület francia „Broyeurs Poittemill Ingenierie S.A.” általi alaptervekkel és szállított alap berendezésekkel, magyar „Bilfinger IT Hungary Kft.” fővállalkozó által történő kivitelezéssel 2014-ben megépült. Az új dolomitőrlő malom irányítástechnikai rendszere „Emerson Delta V” rendszerrel épült, mely jelenleg az egyik legmodernebb folyamatirányító rendszer.

Az üzemegység a magyar szabadalommal védett „Pétisó” műtrágyagyártásnak egyik nélkülözhetetlen alapanyagát gyártja, amely a kiváló minőségű sajátos dolomit ásványtani kőzet előnyeit használja ki. Ezt az alapanyagot jelenleg a Bakony hegység lábánál fekvő „Inota” bányájából szállítják az új Dolomitőrlő malomba. Az újonnan létesült üzemegység a jelenleg működő Pétisó üzem, majd a közeljövőben termelésbe álló Granuláló üzem műtrágyagyártásához szükséges dolomitpor alapanyag ellátását biztosítja.

A rendszerhez kapcsolódó dolomitpor pneumatikus porszállító rendszer az „IBAU mbH.” német cég által szállított alapberendezésekkel valósult meg.

A jelenleg megépült ingás dolomit malom kiváltja a 60 éves, leállított golyós malmot. A BAT-„Best Available Technology” a porkibocsátás tekintetében alatta van a 10 mg/Nm3h-nak. Az új üzemegység a régi készenlétre leállított golyósmalomhoz képest több mint dupla gyártási kapacitású, valamint energiahatékonyabb és a rugalmas porellátási kialakítása miatt a régi üzemegységeket is el tudja látni dolomitpor alapanyaggal, a meglévő malom 1 tükörüzem szállítócsigás átadáson keresztül.

A foglalkoztatást támogató komplex technológiafejlesztési projekt 2013. június 27-én indult és 2015. június 30-án zárult.

Lebanon’s much-vaunted resilience in the face of the regional turmoil around it conceals a disturbing complacency that simultaneously preserves and undermines its increasingly fragile state. The conflicts raging in neighbouring Syria and beyond have to some extent played to its advantage, shifting the locus of a Saudi-Iranian standoff away from Beirut. Syria’s civil war also offers powerful cautionary reminders to a country that recently went through 15 years of similar collective disaster. The military supremacy of Hezbollah, an Iranian-backed Shia armed movement and political party, has also deterred the latter’s domestic and regional foes from directly challenging it.

Dans une série d'articles consacrés à « L'après Sassou », LeMonde.fr (16/06) dresse le portrait de Jean­-Dominique Okemba, « l'homme de l'ombre » du dictateur congolais : « Décoré de la légion d'honneur, en 2011, sur demande Nicolas Sarkozy, le contre­-amiral est un habitué du palais présidentiel français. Surtout du bureau du secrétaire général. De Dominique de Villepin à Claude Guéant, ils ont été quelques­-uns à fréquenter cet homme à la grande silhouette d'ascète. Chef des services de renseignements, (...) - 248 juillet-août 2015 / Congo Brazzaville, Partis politiques francais, Brèves d'Afrique et d'ailleurs, Jean-Dominique Okemba

Si l'on en croit La Lettre du continent (19/06), le président béninois Boni Yayi aurait sollicité le chef de la diplomatie française pour convaincre Lionel Zinsou d'accepter le poste de Premier ministre. Ce Franco­-Béninois fut en effet le conseiller spécial de l'un comme de l'autre. Une bonne affaire pour le président béninois, qui pourra compter sur l'indulgence de la diplomatie française à l'égard de son régime en bout de course. Une meilleure affaire encore pour la « diplomatie économique » chère à (...) - 248 juillet-août 2015 / Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, Bénin, Brèves d'Afrique et d'ailleurs, Laurent Fabius

A lengyel sajtó Orbán tusványosi beszédéről

Chinese A300 Multiple Launch Rocket System

Un nouvel actionnaire et un nouveau navire à l’horizon… Ponant va poursuivre son développement avec un nouveau partenaire. Artémis, la holding de la famille Pinault, a confirmé le 27 juillet sa volonté d’acquérir la compagnie française créée à Nantes en 1988 par Jean-Emmanuel Sauvée et une dizaine d’officiers de la Marine marchande. « Le secteur de la croisière haut de gamme est en croissance soutenue depuis plusieurs années. L’activité est portée par l’intérêt grandissant de la clientèle internationale, particulièrement en Amérique du Nord et dans la zone Asie-Pacifique.  

• Lire la suite de Pinault officialise la reprise de Ponant

Amnesty International ist dagegen, die Briten sind dafür und die Österreicher wieder dagegen – beim Seminar EuroNet vom 28. bis 30. Juli 2016 in Wildbad Kreuth simulierten 35 Stipendiaten der Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, wie die EU möglicherweise mit der Aufnahme von Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der Ukraine umgehen würde.

(Own report) - With last weekend's arson attack on a refugee home, the bombing attempt on a supporter of refugees and the siege of a refugee hostel by a hostile mob of locals, Germany's recent wave of racist violence has taken on a new quality. It is only fortunate that no one was murdered in these recent attacks. At the same time, attacks on refugee housing are becoming dramatically more frequent. Already during the first half of 2015, the number of attacks has reached that of the entire year of 2014. For years, observers have been warning that initiatives against refugee hostels are firmly taking root locally and are increasing their abilities to mobilize. The political establishment and the media have regularly provided legitimization to the anti-refugee campaign, using racist clichés, for example, in the debate around the SPD politician Thilo Sarrazin's publications or with their derogatory insinuations about migrants. Last winter, the campaign against refugees was mobilizing tens of thousands for the "Pegida" street demonstrations. Moreover, in spite of the escalation of anti-refugee violence, the slander continues.

Rengeteg esemény történt Afrikában az elmúlt hétvégén, mégis egyszerűen kizárt, hogy ne a fekete kontinens két országa számára oly rendkívüli pillanatról, azaz az Egyesült Államok elnökének, Barack Obamának a látogatásáról írjunk, hiszen a politikus jelenleg történelmi afrikai körútjának második állomásán, Etiópiában tart, miután korábban felkereste ősei földjét, Kenyát. Nem volt kérdés előzetesen sem, hogy miért célpont Kenya és Etiópia, hiszen utóbbi egyrészt az afrikai kontinens eme régiójában igen fontos és stratégiai szövetségese Washingtonnak, másrészt pedig az etióp gazdaság fontosságáról, erősségéről és fejlődésének üteméről ódákat lehetne zengeni (persze lehetne beszélni a nyomorgó és szegénységében élő társadalmi rétegekről is, de a fejlődés megkérdőjelezhetetlen és látható).

Egyértelmű tehát, hogy Halemariam Desalegn etióp elnök és Obama mai (07.27.) megbeszélésének témalistája elég hosszú volt, gazdasági, kereskedelmi kérdések mellett hangsúlyosan helyet kapott a biztonság és a régiós stabilitás kérdése (főként a dél-szudáni polgárháború és a szomáliai szerepvállalás kapcsán) valamint a Washington által Etiópiának nyújtandó segélyek és fejlesztési támogatások kérdésköre is (a nyilvánosságra került ígéretek azonban elmaradnak a hatalmas kínai vállalásoktól).

Egy amerikai politikai elemző friss publikációja szerint egyébként elég sokan bíznak abban, hogy a zárt ajtók mögötti tárgyalások során Obama közbenjárt annak érdekében, hogy a régiós stabilitás megszilárdítása céljából Addisz-Abeba kezdjen hozzá az Eritreával hosszú évek óta fennálló feszült viszonya rendezéséhez, amely a történelmileg szorosan összekapcsolódó két állam közötti több mint 1000 kilométeres határvonal pontos helye miatt áll fenn Eritrea függetlensége óta és amely feszült viszony mindkét fél gazdaságára, társadalmi helyzetére komoly hatásokat gyakorol. Obama mindenesetre az etióp elnökkel a mai nap (07.27.) végén tartott közös sajtótájékoztatón erről nem ejtett nagyon szót, de kiemelte, hogy Etiópia igen fontos partner az Egyesült Államok számára a szélsőséges fundamentalisták elleni harcban, kiemelten Szomáliában.

Az amerikai elnök a margón reagált azokra a vádakra is, amelyeket etióp ellenzékiek és civil szervezetek fogalmaztak meg a látogatás kapcsán, azaz hogy Obama útjával legalizálja a független etióp sajtó és szabad ellenzék elleni harcot valamint a nemrégiben 100%-os szavazati aránnyal megnyert kormánypárti választási győzelmet, hiszen egészen nyíltan rámutatott, hogy van még mit tennie kollégájának a felelős kormányzás és sajtószabadság ügyében, hiszen egy szabad sajtó egy szabad társadalom alappillére. Utóbbira még az etióp elnök is kitért egy kérdés kapcsán, megemlítve, hogy Etiópiában civilizált újságírásra és nem terroristákkal kokettáló riporterekre van szükség, tehát tévedés elfojtott sajtószabadságról beszélni, hiszen Etiópia egy demokratikus ország.

A hangzatos nyilatkozatok és ígéretek mellett azért elég sok sajtóorgánum és szakértő, publicista támadta be az Egyesült Államok elnökét, főként két váddal, az egyik szerint Obama igazából csak azért látogatott el most Afrikába, hogy valamelyest próbálja ellensúlyozni a már 2009 óta egyre növekvő kínai előnyt a fekete kontinensen és megpróbálja egy stabil amerikai Afrika-politika képét megteremteni, a másik szerint pedig Washingtonnak igazából olyan támogatókra van szüksége Afrikában, akik Kenyához hasonlóan embereket is hajlandóak egy-egy válsággócba küldeni a nemzetközi érdekek védelmében (egyértelműen Szomáliára szólt az utalás), ráadásul erre még maga Obama is ráerősített, amikor hangsúlyozta, hogy az etióp és kenyai katonák nagyon jól ellátják a szükséges feladatokat a háborús övezetekben, így nincs szükség amerikai tengerészgyalogosok bevetésére. És az erős Afrika-politika további hangsúlyozása érdekében történelmi etióp útja (első amerikai elnökként látogatott el az országba) következő állomásaként szintén történelmi eseményeként Obama kedden (07.28.) az 54 tagú Afrikai Unió közgyűlésén fog beszédet mondani.

twitter.com/napiafrika

1 ember kedveli ezt a posztot.Tetszett az írás.Tetszett az írás.

A week or so ago, I gave a presentation at the Wilson Center on the current state and future development of the Russian Navy. Michael Kofman of the Kennan Institute was the moderator and Olga Oliker of RAND provided commentary. The audience was very well-informed and asked excellent questions. The Wilson Center has made a video recording of the event available on YouTube. For those interested in what the Russian Navy is up to, it’s worth watching.

Varoufakis, right, with his successor Euclid Tsakalotos in parliament last week

The London-based Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum, headed by an ex-Financial Times scribe – managing director David Marsh – on Monday released a 24-minute audiotape of a teleconference they held nearly two weeks ago with Yanis Varoufakis, the former Greek finance minister.

Details of the call were first revealed by the Greek daily Kathimerini, and much of most sensational revelations Varoufakis made were about a surreptitious project he and a small team of aides worked on to set up a parallel payments system that could be activated if the European Central Bank forced the shutdown of the Greek financial system.

But Varoufakis also made some other interesting allegations, including claims the International Monetary Fund believes the Greek bailout is doomed and that Alexis Tsipras, the Greek prime minister, offered him another ministry shortly after he was relieved as finance minister.

We’ve had a listen to the entire call, and transcribed most of it – excluding some inconsequential asides to the teleconference’s hosts, Messrs Marsh and Norman Lamont, the former UK finance minister.

The recording starts with an apparent interruption of the speakers; the teleconference operator announces that the call is now being recorded. Then Varoufakis begins:

The thing is, I have to admit we did not have a mandate for bringing Greece out of the euro. What we had a mandate to do was to negotiate for a kind of arrangement with the eurogroup, with the European Central Bank that would render Greece sustainable within the eurozone.

Read more

This week’s CCLKOW discussion looks at leadership. In this case, however, we remove the individual as the arbiter of its quality. Instead, our piece today argues for a perspective that takes account of external factors which define the limits of leadership. Using the contrasting narratives of two officers from the Chosin Campaign, the role of influences beyond the control of the individual emerges. Read, ponder the questions, and join the discussion on Twitter at #CCLKOW.

 

In the cold — wickedly cold, really — days at the end of November 1950, the epic drama of the Chosin Campaign played out in North Korea near the Manchurian border with China. Within the larger story, two sub narratives of triumph and disaster, redemption and destruction, life and death were also unfolding. These are the individual travails of two Lieutenant Colonels awarded the Medal of Honor in the campaign, Raymond G. Davis and Donald C. Faith. Davis led his unit to the successful completion of an overland, nighttime march to relieve Fox Co. and secure key terrain in the evacuation route south to Hagaru-ri for 5th and 7th Marines. By contrast, Faith gained at best an operational Pyrrhic victory for X Corps: his Task Force slowed the PLA advance towards the 1st Marine Division as it was defeated in its attempt to withdraw from the reservoir to Hagaru-ri.

How can we reconcile the entirely disparate outcomes of the units led by Faith and Davis at Chosin? Leadership provides a unifying theme by which to explain events, although in this case we must understand leadership to go beyond the standard definitions and transcend the individual as either agent or arbiter of quality. The differences in leadership, and hence outcomes, can be attributed only to fortune or fatal ambition if the assessment is limited to the individuals, as these details provide too little information to make sense of the full scope of events. For their actions at Chosin, each man would be reckoned a hero of the highest order, although that heroism must be described as triumphant and tragic in turn. As field grade officers with previous combat and/or command experience, at campaign’s start they would have been considered equals in anticipated capabilities. In sum, these were two officers similarly qualified as leaders to meet the challenges of command on the battlefield. And yet, not only were the outcomes different for each – success for Davis and failure for Faith – but the narrative clearly points to different qualities of leadership as well. Thus, factors well beyond the individuals, beyond their heroism or competence, determined the quality of leadership each man brought to bear in his respective battle.

The Faith/Davis narratives suggest that leadership’s manifestation in combat is determined by the individual in situ by the influence of external factors. Absent obvious incompetence or particular genius, the environment within which an officer must act will define the quality or effectiveness of his leadership, and therefore, ability to command. Taking consideration of their environments fully explains the leadership outcome for each officer, success and failure, notwithstanding the heroism displayed by either. These conclusions can be made without undue attack upon Faith, for as this analysis suggests, others determined his failed leadership. The paradox of Faith’s simultaneous heroism and failure is reconciled because, while the bulk of the former is derived from within the individual, leadership in action is largely determined from without. This point is true as well in Davis’ case, for if it is to have more than mythical importance it, too, is best understood within its proper context.

While definitions of leadership abound, their focus traditionally has been limited to the individual. From one compilation of essays on the subject of leadership we find this characterization: “Effective leaders create an environment in which people motivate themselves.” [1] In another similar compilation, published in large part for the benefit of teaching leadership to future Army officers at West Point, we find this explanation: “Leadership is the art of inspiring the spirit and the act of following. The following must be voluntary. The individual and the group of individuals must want to be guided by that person for the latter to be called a leader…. Leadership is about trust….”[2] If most discussions of leadership – and for this sake of this analysis I will stick with Kolenda’ Leadership: The Warrior’s Art, as a solid example of the literature – are limited to the narrow scope of what the individual as leader must do,  then they operate from the assumption that the individual is the arbiter or agent of leadership. The problem is that such a formulation ignores the long, arduous, and mundane process required to get the leader to the point where he can lift his head and eyes to the horizon, to function as a leader and exercise effective command. He must, in effect, be able to do nothing but think sometimes. So, yes, a young officer, according to one essay in Kolenda, needs to know what to do with the opportunity and responsibility to lead. [3] He should also learn those factors external to his control that can shape the experience. He should know that no matter how well prepared, it is very hard to run a race if your legs are broken at the start. Even if Kolenda et al. are correct and leadership is the warrior’s art, the individual can only work with what he is given; he is defined by his context, good or bad. Thus, individuals may manifest leadership, and are certainly responsible for its quality, but a multitude of other individuals and circumstances determine that quality. In battle, the individual is not in control of his own leadership. He may do everything right, or may know, especially in retrospect, what he should have done right, he may be imbued with every talent, and still his attempts at leadership can be undone by factors beyond his control. As with all other matters military, the individual is bound up in the group, the organization, and the events.

Given this situation, I propose this revised set of standards that take account of the external factors that influence: chain of command leadership (superior and subordinate), followership, and circumstances. These criteria provide the most comprehensive and comprehensible explanation for the leadership outcomes in the Chosin campaign, and may offer a perspective that is useful to contemporary considerations of leadership. To understand their role in these events, here is a very brief sketch of the contrasting external circumstances faced by each man:

 

What was the quality of the superior leadership shown to Faith and Davis?

The view from the top offer the first significant distinction between the two. Davis enjoyed an operational situation that saw him ensconced within the warm embrace of two levels of leadership directly above him. His regimental and divisional commanders, Colonel Litzenberg and General Smith, were close at hand, available to provide guidance, strength, and a general sense of operational security. Alternatively, neither of his two commanders was the sort to meddle overmuch, thus allowing Davis to exercise his discretion in the planning and execution of his mission. By contrast, Faith came to command at Chosin when the 31st RCT commander, Colonel MacLean, was killed in early and confusing contact with PLA forces. This meant that on the ground at Chosin Faith enjoyed no superior leadership. At further remove, the divisional and corps leadership did not seem to grasp the enormity of what was facing the task force. Appleman’s point in East of Chosin that Generals Barr (7th ID CG) and Almond (X Corps CG) could have sent General Hodes, 7th ID ADC, to take command of the task force, is ironically sustained by the extension of that criticism in other literature to General Smith, who could have spared one of his senior colonels to the cause. Finally, by comparison Davis’ direct chain of command served him better than Faith’s because Smith’s proximity to the fight gave him a clearer picture of the threat posed by the PLA’s offensive, whereas it would take the Army commanders (7th ID, X Corps) critical hours to come to understand the changed circumstances. The relevance of this distinction bears out in the movements of X Corps towards the Yalu River, where Smith had taken a relatively conservative approach to the attack which maintained the integrity of the division as a whole, in contrast with the almost head-long rush 7th ID took to get to the reservoir. Whereas the Marine division would retain its ability to act as a coherent and supporting whole when the mass of the Chinese attack opened, 7th ID was dispersed to the point that the sum of the parts were weaker than the measure of the whole.

What was the quality of the subordinate leadership shown to Faith and Davis?

Moving to the supporting network below, the disparities remain. Davis enjoyed a strong subordinate command presence. Many of his NCOs had prior service in WWII, and his junior officers were capable if untested. Furthermore, throughout the campaign he did not suffer significant losses within these ranks, thus maintaining a sound subordinate chain of command. The strength of Davis’ leadership would be transmitted through this web to the Marines. At the start of the campaign, the units that would comprise Faith’s task force did have their fair share of good subordinate leaders. However, the task force suffered throughout the battle a steady hemorrhage of these leader. Their loss would weaken the leadership web supporting Faith degraded the unit’s combat cohesion at every level and critically handicapped his ability to maintain the integrity of the withdrawal.

What was the quality of “followership” shown to Faith and Davis?

How the troops responded to their leadership would vary significantly as well. There is no greater affirmation of the Marines’ followership than the constant refrain from the overland march that the strength of Davis’ example motivated and inspired the already strong extant “Marine spirit.” [4] Alternatively, the fragility of the task force’s followership is made manifest with the rapid disintegration of unit coherence with every challenge and setback to the withdrawal. Where once Faith was able to rally the troops via threats of severe punishment, the second attempt at the same tactic reaped insignificant results, primarily because the troops could no longer sustain their “faith” in his leadership to change the circumstance. Furthermore, there is some indication that Faith’s lack of combat experience worked to the detriment of establishing good followership from the start. Contrast this with the sense of security Davis’ experience must have given his troops.

What were the circumstances facing each?

Although they diverged in degree, both men faced essentially the same situation. The Chinese offensive made their current positions untenable and necessitated withdrawal. And, as aptly framed by General Smith, this would be no administrative march to the rear, they really would be “fighting in the other direction.” [5] The grand plan of the Marine division’s attack to the south planned for the constant defense of the column in its progress, by control of flanking terrain and key feature with all units in mutual and coordinated support. [6] Necessary to secure a key junction in the route, Davis’ mission to relieve Fox Co. and reinforce the position they held atop Turkey Hill was by no means going to be a walk in the park, was not guaranteed to succeed. It demanded of the Marines two efforts not a part of the campaign or standard practice: cross-country and by night. However, as part of a larger campaign, whose objective was entirely achievable by the division, Davis was given a manageable piece of a larger plan whose rationality he could appreciate. Other intangible effects of the mission context was the difference made in the Marine mentality of the aggressive, offensive nature of the mission – rather than waiting for the enemy to bring the battle to them in the withdrawal, they were moving pro-actively to gain the upper hand against the enemy. This they would achieve, successfully making their way south to Colonel Puller’s position further south to reform the division as a whole for its continued exfiltration to the port at Hungnam. Task Force Faith, on the other hand, was destroyed as a unit and nearly in detail attempting the very same. Lacking the support to generate a plan of any consequence, as well as the subordinate officers to execute it, Faith was left to collect his men, wounded, and vehicles and hope that they could fight their way south directly. Little would be done to secure the flanks or the way ahead, and these omissions would allow the Chinese soldiers to defeat the column. Harrying the vehicles and men from the high ground surrounding the road throughout, which slowly weakened Faith’s collected force, the Chinese were also able move ahead roadblock the progress of the march at regular intervals. Blooded throughout, there were only so many obstacles the task force could overcome and regroup from before it was simply too weakened by casualties to continue as a whole. In the final hours of December 1, only 5 miles from where the march had begun, both Faith and his task force died.

 

Considering the terms of this leadership framework, the discussion for this week is driven by a single request:

Obviously there is little that can be done when one faces the worst of circumstances across every factor. However, singly these deficits can be mitigated, if not overcome. Looking at each of Faith’s challenges, imagine yourself as his only and capable staff officer, what would you recommend to him? How would you improve the quality of the factors or counteract the negative effect of their weakness?

 

 

 

[I am happy to provide a bibliography of the campaign to those interested.]

 

Notes

1. Military Leadership, Taylor and Rosenbach, eds., p. 2.

2.  Leadership: The Warrior’s Art, Kolenda, ed., p. xix.

3. Dardis and Brower, “Teaching Combat Leadership.”

4. I had the opportunity to meet many of those Marines, to include General Davis, at the 1/7 1999 reunion of the Chosin Marines. I will write more about them in November at the anniversary of the campaign. As well as the pathos of battle, there will be consideration of such subjects as frozen turkey bombs, life-saving Tootsie Rolls, a silver service, cooks with rifles, and a reminder of the provenance of the Rule of 4/6ths.

5. The misinterpretation of this quote is one of the greater sins of history. It was always a simple explanation of the martial terms of the withdrawal.

6. I will reissue my perennial call: Colonel Alpha Bowser’s quickly designed plan was a thing to behold, and more should be written on it.

A situation exceptionnelle, dispositif exceptionnel. En janvier 2015, le lancement de l’opération SENTINELLE, s’est traduit par le déploiement d’un volume sans précédent de forces sur le territoire national. Il s’agissait alors de réagir au plus vite face à la menace. Ce dispositif de protection étant appelé à durer, l’état-major des armées a décidé de prendre les dispositions matérielles visant à renforcer la qualité du soutien. Comme dans toutes les opérations, l’idée est de s’inscrire dans la durée, une fois passée la phase d’urgence. Le CEMA a décidé mettre en œuvre un plan d’actions  destiné à améliorer rapidement  les conditions de vie des militaires.