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In this chapter we draw on our research with displaced people, conflict, violence, gender, and humanitarian aid between 2006 and 2024 in different African countries, which we conducted separately but were brought together by these shared research interests. We address the nexus between conflict, peace, and forced migration using examples from Africa. We situate the discussion within the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial eras, which we take not as mere footnotes but as salient periods in the continent’s history that have influenced current conflicts and forced displacement in Africa. We therefore emphasize the role of history in understanding contemporary conflicts and forced migration on the continent. In doing so, we critique Western research perspectives on forms of violence and their ahistorical explanations of contemporary violent conflicts in Africa. We explain the role of colonial borders not only in engendering conflict but also in creating structural obstacles for refugees to contribute to transformation in countries of origin. We also critique the separation of peacebuilding in the countries of origin from refugee protection in host countries and highlight this as a limitation of global (i.e., Western) perspectives on peacebuilding.

In this chapter we draw on our research with displaced people, conflict, violence, gender, and humanitarian aid between 2006 and 2024 in different African countries, which we conducted separately but were brought together by these shared research interests. We address the nexus between conflict, peace, and forced migration using examples from Africa. We situate the discussion within the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial eras, which we take not as mere footnotes but as salient periods in the continent’s history that have influenced current conflicts and forced displacement in Africa. We therefore emphasize the role of history in understanding contemporary conflicts and forced migration on the continent. In doing so, we critique Western research perspectives on forms of violence and their ahistorical explanations of contemporary violent conflicts in Africa. We explain the role of colonial borders not only in engendering conflict but also in creating structural obstacles for refugees to contribute to transformation in countries of origin. We also critique the separation of peacebuilding in the countries of origin from refugee protection in host countries and highlight this as a limitation of global (i.e., Western) perspectives on peacebuilding.

Critical minerals (CMs) have become a strategic priority for the European Union (EU) amid the green and digital transitions. These resources – including lithium, cobalt, rare earths and nickel – are essential for clean energy technologies, defence systems and electronics. Yet, their processing and refining are highly concentrated in a few countries, leaving the EU especially vulnerable to supply disruptions and fuelling geopolitical tensions.

Recent shocks, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, have further exposed the fragility of supply chains. At the same time, extracting and trading CMs pose severe environmental and social challenges, from high carbon footprints to local community impacts. EU trade policy is therefore confronted with a trilemma: how to safeguard economic competitiveness, ensure en­vironmental sustainability and enhance security of supply.

This policy brief summarises research tracing how the Euro­pean Commission’s trade discourse on CMs has evolved to address the trilemma (Laurens, 2025). Initially, com­muni­cations focused narrowly on free trade and market access for raw materials. Gradually, sustainability and security considerations entered the narrative. Most recently, the EU has embraced a hybrid framing, simultaneously highlighting economic, environ­mental and security objectives in its trade discourse on CMs.

Although this hybrid discursive approach can help build broader support for CM policies and agreements by appealing to diverse stakeholders, it also demands careful policy design to minimise trade-offs and deliver on its promises. Without credible implementation and genuine integration of economic, environmental and security objectives, hybrid framing risks remaining largely rhetorical and failing to steer policy in practice.

Key policy messages:

• The EU should adopt an integrated approach that effectively addresses economic, sustainability and security goals together while anticipating trade-offs to support more robust CM policies. This requires strong coordination across trade, industry, environ­ment and security-related directorates-general to align CM strategies, avoid policy conflicts and maximise synergies. It may also require short-term economic sacrifices for long-term resilience.
• Early and meaningful engagement with research institutions, civil society, local communities and industry should move beyond formal consultation and enable genuine co-creation of solutions. Dialogue should begin before key decisions on CMs are finalised, incorporate stakeholder input trans­parently, and respond to concerns about sustain­ability and security of supply.
• CM policies and agreements should provide for binding obligations and concrete implementation plans to ensure environmental and labour pro­tection, local value addition, skills development and technology transfer in resource-rich but eco­nomically vulnerable regions. Listening to partner governments and local communities as well as investing in the knowledge of local political, social and environ­mental contexts are essential for building trust and long-term partnerships.
• International cooperation on CMs should be strengthened through inclusive arrangements that involve both major consumers and producing countries. Clubs composed primarily of resource-poor but wealthy economies risk being perceived as exclusionary.

Critical minerals (CMs) have become a strategic priority for the European Union (EU) amid the green and digital transitions. These resources – including lithium, cobalt, rare earths and nickel – are essential for clean energy technologies, defence systems and electronics. Yet, their processing and refining are highly concentrated in a few countries, leaving the EU especially vulnerable to supply disruptions and fuelling geopolitical tensions.

Recent shocks, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, have further exposed the fragility of supply chains. At the same time, extracting and trading CMs pose severe environmental and social challenges, from high carbon footprints to local community impacts. EU trade policy is therefore confronted with a trilemma: how to safeguard economic competitiveness, ensure en­vironmental sustainability and enhance security of supply.

This policy brief summarises research tracing how the Euro­pean Commission’s trade discourse on CMs has evolved to address the trilemma (Laurens, 2025). Initially, com­muni­cations focused narrowly on free trade and market access for raw materials. Gradually, sustainability and security considerations entered the narrative. Most recently, the EU has embraced a hybrid framing, simultaneously highlighting economic, environ­mental and security objectives in its trade discourse on CMs.

Although this hybrid discursive approach can help build broader support for CM policies and agreements by appealing to diverse stakeholders, it also demands careful policy design to minimise trade-offs and deliver on its promises. Without credible implementation and genuine integration of economic, environmental and security objectives, hybrid framing risks remaining largely rhetorical and failing to steer policy in practice.

Key policy messages:

• The EU should adopt an integrated approach that effectively addresses economic, sustainability and security goals together while anticipating trade-offs to support more robust CM policies. This requires strong coordination across trade, industry, environ­ment and security-related directorates-general to align CM strategies, avoid policy conflicts and maximise synergies. It may also require short-term economic sacrifices for long-term resilience.
• Early and meaningful engagement with research institutions, civil society, local communities and industry should move beyond formal consultation and enable genuine co-creation of solutions. Dialogue should begin before key decisions on CMs are finalised, incorporate stakeholder input trans­parently, and respond to concerns about sustain­ability and security of supply.
• CM policies and agreements should provide for binding obligations and concrete implementation plans to ensure environmental and labour pro­tection, local value addition, skills development and technology transfer in resource-rich but eco­nomically vulnerable regions. Listening to partner governments and local communities as well as investing in the knowledge of local political, social and environ­mental contexts are essential for building trust and long-term partnerships.
• International cooperation on CMs should be strengthened through inclusive arrangements that involve both major consumers and producing countries. Clubs composed primarily of resource-poor but wealthy economies risk being perceived as exclusionary.

Critical minerals (CMs) have become a strategic priority for the European Union (EU) amid the green and digital transitions. These resources – including lithium, cobalt, rare earths and nickel – are essential for clean energy technologies, defence systems and electronics. Yet, their processing and refining are highly concentrated in a few countries, leaving the EU especially vulnerable to supply disruptions and fuelling geopolitical tensions.

Recent shocks, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, have further exposed the fragility of supply chains. At the same time, extracting and trading CMs pose severe environmental and social challenges, from high carbon footprints to local community impacts. EU trade policy is therefore confronted with a trilemma: how to safeguard economic competitiveness, ensure en­vironmental sustainability and enhance security of supply.

This policy brief summarises research tracing how the Euro­pean Commission’s trade discourse on CMs has evolved to address the trilemma (Laurens, 2025). Initially, com­muni­cations focused narrowly on free trade and market access for raw materials. Gradually, sustainability and security considerations entered the narrative. Most recently, the EU has embraced a hybrid framing, simultaneously highlighting economic, environ­mental and security objectives in its trade discourse on CMs.

Although this hybrid discursive approach can help build broader support for CM policies and agreements by appealing to diverse stakeholders, it also demands careful policy design to minimise trade-offs and deliver on its promises. Without credible implementation and genuine integration of economic, environmental and security objectives, hybrid framing risks remaining largely rhetorical and failing to steer policy in practice.

Key policy messages:

• The EU should adopt an integrated approach that effectively addresses economic, sustainability and security goals together while anticipating trade-offs to support more robust CM policies. This requires strong coordination across trade, industry, environ­ment and security-related directorates-general to align CM strategies, avoid policy conflicts and maximise synergies. It may also require short-term economic sacrifices for long-term resilience.
• Early and meaningful engagement with research institutions, civil society, local communities and industry should move beyond formal consultation and enable genuine co-creation of solutions. Dialogue should begin before key decisions on CMs are finalised, incorporate stakeholder input trans­parently, and respond to concerns about sustain­ability and security of supply.
• CM policies and agreements should provide for binding obligations and concrete implementation plans to ensure environmental and labour pro­tection, local value addition, skills development and technology transfer in resource-rich but eco­nomically vulnerable regions. Listening to partner governments and local communities as well as investing in the knowledge of local political, social and environ­mental contexts are essential for building trust and long-term partnerships.
• International cooperation on CMs should be strengthened through inclusive arrangements that involve both major consumers and producing countries. Clubs composed primarily of resource-poor but wealthy economies risk being perceived as exclusionary.

Le PE et le Conseil ont conclu un accord pour que le secteur des services de paiement soit plus ouvert, plus compétitif et assorti de garanties contre la fraude et les violations de données.
Commission des affaires économiques et monétaires

Source : © Union européenne, 2025 - PE

The world is moving away from a single, post-2000 consensus around multilateralism and poverty reduction. What replaces it depends on which coalition wins the argument, and then bakes that argument into institutions and finance. So what are the visions for the global development architecture in 2030 that we see? One is ‘Aid Retrenchment with Nationalist Conditionality’. Assistance is folded into foreign, trade, and interior policy. Grants shrink, multilateral agencies are sidelined, and cooperation becomes bilateral deals tied to migration control, geopolitical alignment, or access to minerals. Rights, gender, and climate justice recede. A second world is ‘Strategic Multilateralism’. The multilateral development banks stay central, but their remit narrows to macro-stability, crisis response, and “risk containment”. Concessional finance is rationed to countries seen as fragile or geostrategic. Aid rhetoric turns technocratic and securitised and health framed as biosecurity. A third vision is ‘Pluralist Development Cooperation’. There is no single system, but many partially overlapping regimes: Chinese, Indian, Gulf, regional, and club initiatives. Low and middle income countries gain bargaining space by choosing across offers. The trade-off is fragmentation. Rules on debt workouts, safeguards, and transparency diverge, and global public goods struggle for predictable funding. Finally, a fourth vision is ‘Global Solidarity 2.0’. Development cooperation is rebuilt around shared risks such as climate stability, pandemics, antimicrobial resistance, and debt contagion. North and South co-lead a pooled Global Public Goods Facility. Contributions reflect income and carbon profile, and access reflects exposure to cross-border risk. The donor-recipient binary fades, even if frictions persist.

The world is moving away from a single, post-2000 consensus around multilateralism and poverty reduction. What replaces it depends on which coalition wins the argument, and then bakes that argument into institutions and finance. So what are the visions for the global development architecture in 2030 that we see? One is ‘Aid Retrenchment with Nationalist Conditionality’. Assistance is folded into foreign, trade, and interior policy. Grants shrink, multilateral agencies are sidelined, and cooperation becomes bilateral deals tied to migration control, geopolitical alignment, or access to minerals. Rights, gender, and climate justice recede. A second world is ‘Strategic Multilateralism’. The multilateral development banks stay central, but their remit narrows to macro-stability, crisis response, and “risk containment”. Concessional finance is rationed to countries seen as fragile or geostrategic. Aid rhetoric turns technocratic and securitised and health framed as biosecurity. A third vision is ‘Pluralist Development Cooperation’. There is no single system, but many partially overlapping regimes: Chinese, Indian, Gulf, regional, and club initiatives. Low and middle income countries gain bargaining space by choosing across offers. The trade-off is fragmentation. Rules on debt workouts, safeguards, and transparency diverge, and global public goods struggle for predictable funding. Finally, a fourth vision is ‘Global Solidarity 2.0’. Development cooperation is rebuilt around shared risks such as climate stability, pandemics, antimicrobial resistance, and debt contagion. North and South co-lead a pooled Global Public Goods Facility. Contributions reflect income and carbon profile, and access reflects exposure to cross-border risk. The donor-recipient binary fades, even if frictions persist.

The world is moving away from a single, post-2000 consensus around multilateralism and poverty reduction. What replaces it depends on which coalition wins the argument, and then bakes that argument into institutions and finance. So what are the visions for the global development architecture in 2030 that we see? One is ‘Aid Retrenchment with Nationalist Conditionality’. Assistance is folded into foreign, trade, and interior policy. Grants shrink, multilateral agencies are sidelined, and cooperation becomes bilateral deals tied to migration control, geopolitical alignment, or access to minerals. Rights, gender, and climate justice recede. A second world is ‘Strategic Multilateralism’. The multilateral development banks stay central, but their remit narrows to macro-stability, crisis response, and “risk containment”. Concessional finance is rationed to countries seen as fragile or geostrategic. Aid rhetoric turns technocratic and securitised and health framed as biosecurity. A third vision is ‘Pluralist Development Cooperation’. There is no single system, but many partially overlapping regimes: Chinese, Indian, Gulf, regional, and club initiatives. Low and middle income countries gain bargaining space by choosing across offers. The trade-off is fragmentation. Rules on debt workouts, safeguards, and transparency diverge, and global public goods struggle for predictable funding. Finally, a fourth vision is ‘Global Solidarity 2.0’. Development cooperation is rebuilt around shared risks such as climate stability, pandemics, antimicrobial resistance, and debt contagion. North and South co-lead a pooled Global Public Goods Facility. Contributions reflect income and carbon profile, and access reflects exposure to cross-border risk. The donor-recipient binary fades, even if frictions persist.

Heßler/ Kommission
Beamtenstatut
EU-Beamte: Der Anspruch auf einen Steuerfreibetrag für ein in Ausbildung befindliches Kind erlischt spätestens mit Vollendung des 26. Lebensjahres des Kindes

Heßler v Commission
Staff Regulations of Officials
EU officials: entitlement to a tax abatement for a child receiving training ends at the latest on the child’s 26th birthday

Heßler kontra Bizottság
Tisztviselõk személyzeti szabályzata
EU officials: entitlement to a tax abatement for a child receiving training ends at the latest on the child’s 26th birthday

Heßler / Commission
Statut des fonctionnaires
Fonctionnaires de l’Union européenne : le droit à un abattement fiscal pour un enfant en formation prend fin au plus tard au 26e anniversaire de l’enfant

Today, the Council and the European Parliament reached a provisional political agreement to bolster EU legislation on payment services to better fight payment fraud, boost transparency on fees, and increase consumer protection in this area.

Council agrees position on simplification package to boost Europe’s defence industry and readiness.

Main agenda items, approximate timing, public sessions and press opportunities.

The press briefing ahead of the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council (Employment, social policy and health) will take place on Thursday, 27 November 2025 at 14.30.

The Council agreed its negotiating mandate on a draft law preventing and combating child sexual abuse online.

Press briefing ahead of the upcoming Foreign Affairs Council (Defence) will take place on 27 November 2025 at 15.30.

On November 25, 2025, the President of the European Council, António Costa, participated in the closing session of the EU-Africa Summit, held on November 24 and 25, 2025, in Luanda, Angola.