When the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution to designate 25 May as World Football Day. Credit: UN Photo/Loey Felipe
By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Nov 28 2025 (IPS)
The 193-member General Assembly, the UN’s highest policy-making body, routinely designates “International Days” and “World Days” on a wide range of subjects and events—from the sublime to the ridiculous—described as “a sudden shift from something grand and awe-inspiring to something silly and unimportant.
The commemorations range from International Women’s Day and the International Day to Combat Islamophobia to International Moon Day and World Bicycle Day (not forgetting World Tuna Day, World Bee Day, International Day of Potato, World Horse Day, World Pulses Day and International Day of the Arabian Leopard).
According to the UN, the world body observes 218 international days annually (and counting).
One of the first designations came from the UN General Assembly’s declaration in 1947 that 24 October should be celebrated as United Nations Day, the anniversary of the adoption of the UN Charter that founded the Organization.
Since then, UN Member States have proposed more than 200 designations, presenting draft resolutions to the General Assembly so the entire membership, representing 193 nations, can vote.
But a new resolution aimed at revitalizing the work of the General Assembly “notes with concern the significant increase in the number of proposals to proclaim international days, weeks, months, years or decades.”
The resolution decides, on a trial basis, to put on hold consideration of new proposals for international days, weeks, months, years and decades during the eighty-first and eighty-second sessions.
The resolution also requests the President of the General Assembly, effective from the eighty-first session in 2026, to group all proclamation requests for international commemoration into a single resolution per agenda item, where each proposed commemoration contains its own operative paragraph focused on its establishment.
The upcoming International Days in March 2026 include:
1 March – World Seagrass Day
1 March – United Nations Zero Discrimination Day
3 March – International Day for Ear and Hearing Loss
3 March – World Wildlife Day
5 March – International Day for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Awareness
8 March – International Women’s Day
10 March – International Day of Women Judges
15 March – International Day to combat Islamophobia
20 March – International Day of Happiness
20 March – French Language Day
21 March – International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
21 March – World Poetry Day
21 March – International Nowruz Day
21 March – World Down Syndrome Day
21 March – International Day of Forests
21 March – World Day of Glaciers
22 March – World Water Day
23 March – World Meteorological Day
24 March – World Tuberculosis Day
24 March – International Day for the Right to the Truth concerning Gross Human Rights
25 March – International Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Slavery
25 March – International Day of Solidarity with Detained and Missing Staff Members
30 March – International Day of Zero Waste
The list for December includes:
01 Dec – World AIDS Day
02 Dec – International Day for the Abolition of Slavery (A/RES/317(IV)
03 Dec – International Day of Persons with Disabilities (A/RES/47/3)
04 Dec – International Day of Banks (A/RES/74/245)
04 Dec – International Day Against Unilateral Coercive Measures (A/RES/79/293)
05 Dec – International Volunteer Day for Economic and Social Development (A/RES/40/212)
05 Dec – World Soil Day (A/RES/68/232)
07 Dec – International Civil Aviation Day (A/RES/51/33)
09 Dec – International Day of Commemoration and Dignity of the Victims of the Crime of Genocide and of the Prevention of this Crime (A/RES/69/323)
09 Dec – International Anti-Corruption Day (A/RES/58/4)
10 Dec – Human Rights Day (A/RES/423 (V)
11 Dec – International Mountain Day (A/RES/57/245)
12 Dec – International Day of Neutrality (A/RES/71/275)
12 Dec – International Universal Health Coverage Day (A/RES/72/138)
18 Dec – International Migrants Day (A/RES/55/93)
18 Dec – Arabic Language Day
20 Dec – International Human Solidarity Day (A/RES/60/209)
21 Dec – World Meditation Day (A/RES/79/137)
21 Dec – World Basketball Day (A/RES/77/324)
27 Dec – International Day of Epidemic Preparedness (A/RES/75/27)
The workshop will open with a testimonial from Sakharov Prize Laureate 1992 Asociación Madres de la Plaza de Mayo. Prof.
Par Engstrom, from University College London will set the scene for each panel - providing first an overview of the situation of human rights in Latin America and then turning to human rights accountability mechanisms, seeking the best ways for the EU to engage - and Prof. Maria Garcia, from Bath university, will speak in the forward-looking panel.
Discussions will further bring together representatives from the International Federation for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch, as well as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the European External Action Service and the European Commission.
Newspaper headlines reflect the abductions of girls and others in Nigeria’s northern states. Credit: Hussain Wahab/IPS
By Hussain Wahab
ABUJA, Nov 28 2025 (IPS)
On the morning of 17 November 2025, darkness cloaked Maga town in the Danko/Wasagu Local Government Area, Kebbi State, until gunfire shattered the silence. It was around 4 am when armed attackers stormed the Government Girls Comprehensive Secondary School, firing into the air to terrify residents before heading to the staff quarters. There, they killed two, including Hassan Yakubu, the school’s Chief Security Officer and then abducted 26 female students.
Two later escaped, said Halima Bande, the state’s commissioner for Basic and Secondary Education. This brazen raid came less than 72 hours after the killing of Brigadier-General Musa Uba in an ambush by the insurgents.
A rescue mission by Nigerian soldiers to intervene in Kebbi’s abduction was itself ambushed and injured by the insurgents, heightening fears that such violence is spiraling beyond the reach of conventional security responses.
Since then, 24 girls have been released, Nigerian President Bola Tinubu announced.
Abubakar Fakai, whose nine nieces are among the 26 abducted schoolgirls, told IPS that his family and the entire community have been plunged into unbearable grief.
A father of four of the kidnapped girls, Ilyasu Fakai, is still in shock. Almost every household in the close-knit village has been affected. For more than a week they received no credible information about the girls’ condition or whereabouts, Abubakar said.
“Every night we try to sleep, but we can’t, because we keep thinking of the girls lying somewhere on bare ground, scared and cold. These are teenage girls, and we fear for their dignity and their lives. We just want the government to rescue them quickly and reunite them with us. This pain is too much for our community to bear,” he told IPS.
The Kebbi raid was one of several mass abductions that occurred within days of each other.
At least 402 people, mainly schoolchildren, have been kidnapped in four states in the north-central region—Niger, Kebbi, Kwara and Borno—since 17 November, the UN human rights office, OHCHR, said on Tuesday.
Call to Authorities
“We are shocked at the recent surge in mass abductions in north-central Nigeria,” OHCHR Spokesperson Thameen Al-Kheetan said in Geneva.
“We urge the Nigerian authorities—at all levels—to take all lawful measures to ensure such vile attacks are halted and to hold those responsible to account.”
A day after the Kebbi incident, a church was attacked in Eruku, Kwara; two were killed and about 38 abducted during a live church session. State Gov. AbdulRahman AbdulRazaq, in a statement, said President Bola Tinubu deployed an additional 900 troops to the community.
In Niger State, a St. Mary’s School in Papiri was also attacked on Friday, November 21, and 303 boys and girls, plus 12 teachers, were abducted; only 50 are said to have escaped as of Sunday, November 23. This number surpasses the number of girls kidnapped in Chibok, prompting an international “Bring Back Our Girls” campaign.
The same day, militants launched another deadly attack in Borno State. The list is not exhaustive, underscoring how Nigeria’s overlapping insurgency and banditry crises are converging in devastating ways.
Insurgency a Threat to Food Security
The rise in insurgent attacks is threatening regional stability and causing a spike in hunger, according to the the World Food Programme (WFP)
The latest analysis finds nearly 35 million people are projected to face severe food insecurity during the 2026 lean season from June to August—the highest number ever recorded in the country.
Insurgent attacks have intensified this year, the UN agency said.
Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliate, reportedly carried out its first attack in Nigeria last month, while the insurgent group Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) is apparently seeking to expand across the Sahel region.
“Communities are under severe pressure from repeated attacks and economic stress,” said David Stevenson, WFP Country Director and Representative in Nigeria.
“If we can’t keep families fed and food insecurity at bay, growing desperation could fuel increased instability with insurgent groups exploiting hunger to expand their influence, creating a security threat that extends across West Africa and beyond.”
Human-rights activist Omoyele Sowore drew national attention to the lawlessness in a viral post.
A Long Shadow Over Schools
Human-rights activist Omoyele Sowore drew national attention to the lawlessness in a viral post.
These recent incidents are not isolated—they are part of a deepening national crisis that has targeted schools for more than a decade. According to Save the Children, 1,683, schoolchildren have been kidnapped in Nigeria from April 2014 through December 2022. UNICEF similarly reports that over 1,680 schoolchildren have been abducted within that period and according to a SBM report, 4,722 people were abducted and N2.57 billion (about USD 1.7 million) was paid to kidnappers as ransom between July 2024 and June 2025.
These statistics reflect both past challenges and an enduring failure—despite Nigeria’s endorsement of the Safe Schools Declaration, the protections promised on paper have not reached many of its most vulnerable schools.
Experts and analysts say these incidents reflect a broader model: criminal gangs and insurgents are increasingly seeing schoolchildren as high-value targets. This surge underscores a chilling truth: educational institutions, especially in rural and poorly guarded areas, are no longer safe havens. They are strategic targets.
“This has now become a national and international discussion, giving Nigeria a very bad name,” said Colonel Abdullahi Gwandu, a conflict expert, in an interview with IPS, criticizing the government’s failure to anticipate such attacks and the slack competency of security forces, putting not only education but every sphere of the nation in mayhem.
Trauma, Trust, and Retreat
In the wake of the Kebbi abduction, fear rippled across communities. Uncertain of their children’s safety, parents in Maga and nearby areas rushed to withdraw their daughters from schools. Community leaders responded with grief and prayer. Maga’s traditional ruler announced a special prayer gathering, calling on God to bring the girls home safely.
Habibat Muhammad, a youth advocate, said it concerned her that these trends put the education of girls at risk.
“When you train a girl child, you train a nation but how do you train a nation when girls who should be sitting in class are dragged out of their hostels by people who have learned to exploit government negligence?”
She said many rural girls’ schools lack basic security infrastructure: trained guards, perimeter fencing, early-warning systems and proper lighting. She argued that this absence of protection contrasts sharply with the layered security given to public officials or financial institutions. “Education must be treated as a national priority, not a soft target,” she told IPS.
Why the State Can’t Seem to Stop Attacks
Security experts and community voices agree that the Kebbi attack exposed major systemic flaws. Gwandu described the incident as a stark reminder of how fragile rural school security has become. He noted that the deliberate killing of a school security officer signals a shift in tactics: attackers are now targeting authority figures in addition to students. He stressed the need for a more intelligence-driven strategy and urged the military to take firmer action. “
The Northwest Division, headquartered in Sokoto, should be given full authority and resources to respond quickly and aggressively by combining human intelligence with AI to track bandits and their informants while addressing poverty and poor education to reduce criminal recruitment, Gwandu said.
Beyond immediate security, he argues, the government must tackle root causes: poverty, lack of education, and widespread youth unemployment make banditry and kidnapping more appealing for disenfranchised young people.
The Cost Beyond the Kidnapping
Dr. Shadi Sabeh, an educationist and the vice-chairman of the Iconic University, argues that closing these wounds must be central to Nigeria’s recovery strategy.
“We have to be there for our children. Guidance and counselling are almost absent in our education system.” he calls for trauma-informed curricula, peer support groups, bravery training, and sustained mental health services within schools to help students cope, heal, and reclaim their futures. This highlights the need to keep youth productive.
“A hungry man is an angry man and an idle hand is a devil’s workshop.
Jeariogbe Islamiyyah Adedoyin, Vice President of the School of Physical Sciences, added a more personal plea.
“No child should ever have to go through something like that just to get an education. Our girls deserve to learn without fear. She said when schools are no longer safe, the future of the nation is at risk.”
What the Government Is Doing—And Why It’s Not Enough
In response to the crisis, authorities have initiated both immediate and longer-term measures. Short-term responses include deployment of troops to high-risk regions like Kebbi and Niger, search-and-rescue operations involving military, police, and local vigilantes, closure of some schools deemed vulnerable and public condemnation from religious and political leaders.
However, high levels of poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy, and lack of parental care make marginalized youth vulnerable to recruitment by armed groups and defeat these efforts.
A legal expert, Waliu Olaitan Wahab, told IPS that the roots of insecurity in northern Nigeria run far deeper than the activities of Boko Haram, herdsmen, or bandit gangs. He described the crisis as multifaceted, arguing that decades of neglect by northern elites have created a system where millions of children grow up without support, opportunity, or protection—making them easy targets for recruitment.
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En Macédoine du Nord, personne ne connaît son nom, mais il intrigue la presse américaine. Depuis Veles, Rumen Naumovski pilote Resist the Mainstream, un site ultra-conservateur lié à la droite trumpiste. Portrait d'un jeune homme qui a bâti un empire médiatique sans jamais mettre un pied aux États-Unis.
- Articles / Personnalités, Macédoine du Nord, Radio Slobodna Evropa, MédiasAccelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic and technological developments such as artificial intelligence, digital transformations affect almost all areas of social, economic, and environmental life. Emerging as a tool for addressing challenges – but also as a source of new problems or as an amplifier of existing challenges – digital transformation has increasingly become the focus of initiatives at the European Union (EU) level. Since 2015, the EU has developed a comprehensive digital agenda spanning various policy domains, ranging from bolstering the single market to addressing foreign and security policy concerns. This paper examines the evolving landscape of digitalisation-related EU policies through the lens of strategy documents and policy guidelines, with particular emphasis on developments between 2020 and 2025. It explores the EU’s overarching approach towards digitalisation – its conceptualisation, objectives, and self-defined role in shaping the digital revolution. The analysis reveals that the EU addresses digitalisation through a multitude of policy-specific strategies and guidelines, characterised by four predominant strategic narratives: A geopolitical (“digital sovereignty”), an environmental (“twin transitions”), a socio-political (“fundamental rights”), and an economic (“growth and competitiveness”) narrative.
Accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic and technological developments such as artificial intelligence, digital transformations affect almost all areas of social, economic, and environmental life. Emerging as a tool for addressing challenges – but also as a source of new problems or as an amplifier of existing challenges – digital transformation has increasingly become the focus of initiatives at the European Union (EU) level. Since 2015, the EU has developed a comprehensive digital agenda spanning various policy domains, ranging from bolstering the single market to addressing foreign and security policy concerns. This paper examines the evolving landscape of digitalisation-related EU policies through the lens of strategy documents and policy guidelines, with particular emphasis on developments between 2020 and 2025. It explores the EU’s overarching approach towards digitalisation – its conceptualisation, objectives, and self-defined role in shaping the digital revolution. The analysis reveals that the EU addresses digitalisation through a multitude of policy-specific strategies and guidelines, characterised by four predominant strategic narratives: A geopolitical (“digital sovereignty”), an environmental (“twin transitions”), a socio-political (“fundamental rights”), and an economic (“growth and competitiveness”) narrative.
Accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic and technological developments such as artificial intelligence, digital transformations affect almost all areas of social, economic, and environmental life. Emerging as a tool for addressing challenges – but also as a source of new problems or as an amplifier of existing challenges – digital transformation has increasingly become the focus of initiatives at the European Union (EU) level. Since 2015, the EU has developed a comprehensive digital agenda spanning various policy domains, ranging from bolstering the single market to addressing foreign and security policy concerns. This paper examines the evolving landscape of digitalisation-related EU policies through the lens of strategy documents and policy guidelines, with particular emphasis on developments between 2020 and 2025. It explores the EU’s overarching approach towards digitalisation – its conceptualisation, objectives, and self-defined role in shaping the digital revolution. The analysis reveals that the EU addresses digitalisation through a multitude of policy-specific strategies and guidelines, characterised by four predominant strategic narratives: A geopolitical (“digital sovereignty”), an environmental (“twin transitions”), a socio-political (“fundamental rights”), and an economic (“growth and competitiveness”) narrative.
Written by Astrid Worum and Ralf Drachenberg.
After ‘constructive discussions’ in Geneva on 23 November between representatives of the US, Ukraine, France, Germany and the UK to ‘update and refine’ the 28-point Russia–Ukraine peace plan proposed by US President Donald Trump, the President of the European Council, António Costa, called an informal meeting of EU leaders to take stock of the latest developments. The aim was to draw on the ‘new momentum for peace negotiations’ by carrying out ‘additional work’ on major issues left unresolved. EU leaders stressed that the solution should be just and lasting, and expressed their readiness to support the process by working closely with Ukraine, the US and NATO. While reiterating their commitment to provide Ukraine with all the diplomatic, military, economic and financial support it needs, they also insisted that issues concerning the EU directly, such as sanctions and immobilised assets, required an EU decision and its full involvement.
GeneralSince the COVID crisis, videoconferences have become a useful tool for EU leaders to convene at short notice to discuss urgent developments, and were used most recently in February and August 2025). However, for this meeting about half of the EU leaders were physically present in the same location, Luanda (Angola), while the other half were connected remotely, making it the first fully hybrid European Council meeting.
The meeting was a ‘meeting of the 27 EU leaders with the President of the European Commission’ and did not include the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, as is often the case when EU Heads of State or Government meet in the videoconference format. However, Costa briefed the European Parliament’s Conference of Presidents (Parliament’s President and political group leaders) on the discussions at the informal EU leaders’ meeting, as he had done on 10 November for the 23 October 2025 European Council meeting.
Background US 28-point Russia-Ukraine peace planThe US 28-point Russia-Ukraine peace plan leaked on 20 November – which the White House claimed was the result of a month of work between US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and US special envoy Steve Witkoff, ‘along with input from both Ukrainians and Russians’ – is considered by many observers to be too favourable to Russia. On the sidelines of the G20 summit in Johannesburg, 12 leaders – from Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the UK, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain and the Netherlands – as well as the European Council and Commission Presidents, adopted a statement expressing support for the ‘US efforts to bring peace in Ukraine’, but also concern at certain aspects of the draft. The statement notably underlines that ‘the initial draft of the 28-point plan includes important elements that will be essential for a just and lasting peace’, but that this ‘draft is a basis, which will require additional work’.
Concerns mainly relate to four points: i) territorial concessions; ii) limitation of Ukrainian military capacities; iii) sanctions and post-war reparations; and iv) NATO-related provisions.
Firstly, the statement recalls the principle that borders cannot be changed by force, representing a rebuke to the 28-point plan, which envisages significant territorial concessions from Ukraine to Russia, notably Donetsk.
Secondly, the proposal to limit Ukraine’s armed forces to 600 000 personnel ‘would leave Ukraine vulnerable to future attack’. EU leaders have only recently reiterated that ‘a Ukraine that is capable of defending itself effectively is seen as an integral part of any future security guarantees’; the provisions of the US plan are vague on security guarantees from the US and other Western allies – a point which Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has repeatedly demanded as a condition for peace.
Thirdly, the statement stresses that ‘elements relating to the EU and NATO would need the consent’ of their respective members. Thus, the proposals cannot prejudice decisions relating to EU sanctions and the use of immobilised Russian assets, which are largely held in Europe, notably by Euroclear, and which EU leaders are considering using for Ukraine’s reconstruction. Even if the details are vague, the US plan seeks to unblock immobilised assets and place them into two investment funds, one for Ukraine and the other for Russia. The US would benefit economically from both funds, while the EU would be called on to pay €100 billion for Ukraine’s reconstruction.
Fourthly, the US plan includes a ban on NATO membership for Ukraine, which is a matter for consensus between NATO members – not a decision for third parties, such as Russia – and for which there is no precedent. In that context, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz expressed scepticism that an agreement could be reached on the US plan in time for the deadline set by President Trump, and also rejected the re-integration of Russia into the G8, stating that ‘among the six current G7 members who are not the US, there is no willingness to readmit Russia’. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez called for a revision of the plan, stressing that ‘Ukrainians and Europeans must feel fully represented in any peace plan’, which affects the entire European security architecture.
Even if President Trump later said that the US 28-point plan was not ‘his final offer’, considerable pressure was put on Ukraine to accept the plan by Thanksgiving – 27 November. In a video address, President Zelenskyy told the Ukrainian people that ‘Ukraine may find itself facing a very difficult choice: Either loss of dignity, or the risk of losing a key partner. Either a difficult 28 points, or an extremely difficult winter.’ Russia indicated that the US plan was a potential basis for a peace agreement, and warned that, if Ukraine were to turn it down, Russian forces would advance further.
European counter-proposalIn that context, a group of countries led by France, Germany and the UK submitted a counter- proposal. While taking the US plan as a basis, it amends the draft on key points: i) the timing of territorial discussions, with a ceasefire to be reached first and the current front line to be set as the basis for any future discussions on territory; ii) on security guarantees, the counter-proposal envisages a NATO Article 5-like US security guarantee for Ukraine; iii) regarding Ukrainian sovereignty (which implies the right to choose alliances and make choices on its armed forces), the language on restrictions to NATO membership are softened and the number of personnel increased to 800 000 in peacetime; and iv) references to territorial concessions and recognition of occupation are removed, with European allies strongly rejecting the idea that Ukraine should be required to give up land by force. Russia, whose core demands were included in the US plan, rejected the counter-proposal.
Geneva meeting on 23 NovemberThe Geneva meeting on 23 November, which gathered together national security advisers from the US and Ukraine, as well as France, Germany and the UK, drew up an ‘updated and refined peace plan’. The heads of cabinet of the European Commission and European Council presidents, Bjoern Seibert and Pedro Lourtie, also attended. After the meeting, Secretary of State Rubio praised the ‘tremendous amount of progress’ made in Geneva. Having spoken with Zelenskyy ahead of the EU leaders’ summit, Finnish President Alexander Stubb described the Geneva negotiations as a ‘step forward’, but cautioned that ‘major issues remain to be resolved’, adding that decisions falling under the EU or NATO’s remit would be discussed ‘in a separate track’.
The informal meeting of EU leaders on 24 NovemberEmphasising the ‘new momentum for peace negotiations’, President Costa convened a special meeting of EU leaders on the sidelines of the EU-Africa Summit in Luanda, Angola, to take stock of the latest developments. The purpose was to discuss the state of play as well as ‘major issues, which still remain to be resolved’, to develop the peace plan into a sustainable solution. The meeting took place in a hybrid format, with 15 EU leaders attending in person, including Chancellor Merz, the Irish Taoiseach, Micheál Martin, the prime ministers of Croatia, Andrej Plenković, Poland, Donald Tusk, Slovakia, Robert Fico, and Spain, Pedro Sánchez, and Presidents Costa and von der Leyen, while other EU leaders joined by videoconference. Since the meeting was an informal one, no conclusions were adopted, but Costa and von der Leyen held a joint press conference afterwards outlining the main discussion points.
In his report after the meeting, Costa stressed that ‘peace cannot be a temporary truce, it must be a lasting solution’. Thus, while commending ‘the efforts of Presidents Zelenskyy and Trump and their teams’ and welcoming the ‘progress achieved [in Geneva] on several issues’, EU leaders underlined that ‘some issues remain to be resolved’.
EU leaders conveyed two central messages. Firstly, ‘the issues that concern directly the EU, such as sanctions, enlargement or immobilised assets, require the full involvement and decision by the EU’. Thus, certain points included in the draft peace plan cannot be decided by third parties in a peace treaty, but will need to be discussed in a separate framework. At the same time, they expressed their readiness to support the process by working closely with Ukraine, the US and NATO. Secondly, EU leaders reiterated the EU’s commitment to providing ‘President Zelenskyy with all the support he needs’ – diplomatic, military, economic and, in particular, financial support. On the latter point, Costa recalled the commitment made at the 23 October meeting, stressing that ‘we will [deliver] at the December European Council’, and said that ‘Ukraine has chosen Europe, and Europe will stand by Ukraine’. Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėdastressed the ‘need for the EU to actively participate in the discussions on the future of Ukraine, and also to keep pressuring Russia – the only side responsible for this unjust war’.
EU leaders also set three ‘core principles’ outlined by von der Leyen regarding the substance of a future peace deal, which is also ‘about the security of the entire [European] continent, now and in the future’. Firstly, Ukraine’s territory and sovereignty must be respected. Secondly, only Ukraine as a sovereign country can make decisions regarding its armed forces, and the choice of their destiny is in their own hands. Thirdly, Europe is central to Ukraine’s future. As Romanian President Nicușor Dan emphasised at the EU-27 meeting, ‘there is a direct link between the security of Ukraine and that of the Republic of Moldova and the region as a whole, and the current peace talks need to take this aspect into consideration’. Likewise, Bulgarian Prime Minister Rosen Jeliazkov emphasised that ‘the security of Ukraine is essential for EU security – close coordination between the US, the EU and Ukraine, and reliable long-term guarantees for Ukraine’s future, are key’.
Mirroring the principles set by EU leaders, in their joint statement on the same day, the chairs of the foreign affairs committees of 20 European countries’ parliaments emphasised that a just and lasting peace cannot be achieved by yielding to the aggressor; instead, it must be grounded in international law and respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty. On 26 November, the European Parliament held a debate on the proposed plan and the EU’s engagement for a just and lasting peace for Ukraine, with von der Leyen outlining again the core principles of the EU’s position in favour of a sustainable peace. These principles – together with the full involvement of EU and NATO members on decisions concerning them – also reflect the main lines set in the statement adopted by G20 and European partners, as well as the amendments made in the counter-proposal to the 28-point plan. They also served as a ‘solid basis’ for the 25 November videoconference call of leaders of the countries comprising the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ supporting Ukraine, whose co-chairs, French President Emmanuel Macron and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, issued a strong statement after the meeting.
Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the informal EU leaders’ meeting of 24 November 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.