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Schweden überlegt, eine Meldepflicht für den irregulären Aufenthalt von Migranten einzuführen. Die Verschärfung der internen Einwanderungskontrollen sieht ebenfalls Stichproben und DNA-Tests vor.

Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

On 25 August 2023, the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe (the Office) organized the webinar titled “Countering Corruption in the Context of Border Security Management”. The event brought together 15 (eight women, seven men) participants from the border and customs agencies of 11 OSCE participating States (Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, North Macedonia, Poland and Tajikistan).

The webinar was led by experts from Moldova who introduced the participants to the identification and mitigation of major corruption risks at borders, the types and impact of corruption and the various strategies and tactics for combating it. Participants learned about a wide range of enabling factors of corruption at borders and explored possible countering measures.

The webinar was the third in a series on border security management delivered by the OSCE’s Border Management Staff College (BMSC). The BSMC was established in 2009 as a platform for the advanced education and empowerment of a new generation of senior executives and leaders in border security and management. It is part of OSCE’s broader work to strengthen the capacities of border-related agencies and to promote co-operation between them, in line with the OSCE Border Security and Management Concept and relevant Ministerial Council Decisions.

Les inscriptions à titre payant (ITP) dans les Lycées techniques professionnels sont protégées jusqu'au mercredi 06 septembre 2023. La direction de l'enseignement secondaire technique et de la formation professionnelle (DESTFP) sur instruction du ministre, informe le public à travers une note de service ce jeudi 31 août 2023.

Lire la note de service de la DESTFP

Sur le papier, le Kosovo dispose d'une justice moderne et efficace. En réalité, elle est lente et très soumise aux influences extérieures... Et les citoyens ne lui font pas confiance. Chronique d'un désamour.

- Articles / Une - Diaporama, Kosovo 2.0, Kosovo, Défense, police et justice

Sur le papier, le Kosovo dispose d'une justice moderne et efficace. En réalité, elle est lente et très soumise aux influences extérieures... Et les citoyens ne lui font pas confiance. Chronique d'un désamour.

- Articles / Une - Diaporama, Kosovo 2.0, Kosovo, Défense, police et justice

Die Europäische Kommission wird Belgien kontaktieren, da das Land alleinstehenden männlichen Asylbewerber keine Unterkunft mehr anbieten will. Belgien argumentiert mit einem Mangel an Übernachtungsplätzen, die für Familien mit Kindern freigehalten werden sollten.

Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

On 29 August, the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe (the Office) donated 9,800 liters of diesel and 4,500 liters of petroleum to the Committee of Emergency Situations and Civil Defense (CoESCD). The donation will be used to fuel CoESCD vehicles and equipment, which are used to protect and evacuate the population to safe areas during disasters.

The CoESCD is responsible for responding to natural disasters and other emergencies in Tajikistan. The most recent flooding in Tajikistan resulted in casualties, taking the lives of 21 person. Maintaining and increasing the operational capacity of CoESCD is thus vital and the Office will continue to support its efforts to save lives and mitigate the consequences of natural disasters.

This activity is in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 and Tajikistan’s Mid-term State Program for the Protection of population and Territories from Emergency Situations for 2023-2028. It is part of OSCE’s broader work to support disaster preparedness, prevention, response and recovery at community level as well as at national and transboundary levels.

« Il n’y a pas de négociations » sur un référendum d’indépendance de la Catalogne, a indiqué jeudi l’ancien Premier ministre de la région espagnole, Carles Puigdemont, réfutant les informations diffusées par les médias.

Der Bundesrat will sich einen Ultralangstreckenjet kaufen. Dumm nur, dass er diese Strecken von Bern aus gar nicht fliegen kann: Die Piste auf dem klassischen Regierungsflughafen Belp ist zu kurz.

L'Allemagne serait en mesure de subventionner les prix de l'électricité pour l’industrie en dépit des règles de l'UE en matière d'aides d'Etat, ont remarqué les Verts, partenaire de la coalition de gouvernement allemande, en soulignant les efforts de la France et de l'Espagne pour étendre leurs propres subventions.

It is now clear that extreme weather events will have a massive impact on our economies if we don’t transform them. Times have changed and the rules governing the coordination of national economic policies in the EU must adapt, argues Isabelle Brachet.

As the Parisian ban on self-service scooters enters into force on 1 September, the city hall calls the move revolutionary amid an urban jungle, while stakeholders remain divided on the pros and cons.

L’élaboration d’une politique européenne efficace à l’égard de la Chine est entravée par le fait que certains États membres sont trop dépendants du pays d’Asie de l’Est, estime la ministre néerlandaise du Commerce extérieur Liesje Schreinemacher.

FIFA-Präsident Gianni Infantino äussert sich erstmals zum Kuss-Skandal um Spaniens Verbandschef Luis Rubiales.

Bereits mit seinem Erstrundensieg gegen Yoshihito Nishioka schrieb Stan Warinka Geschichte, nun geht die Reise für den 38-Jährigen nach seinem Triumph über Tomas Martin Etcheverry noch weiter. Den Sieg feiert der Schweizer anschliessend ausgiebig mit dem Publikum.

An der Leichtathletikveranstaltung Diamond League im Zürcher Letzigrund-Stadion wurden am Donnerstagabend drei Mitglieder der Klimagruppe «Renovate Switzerland» daran gehindert, das Feld zu stürmen.

Vier Aktivisten haben am Donnerstagabend versucht, die Sportveranstaltung Diamond League im Zürcher Letzigrund-Stadion zu stören. Zahlreiche Sicherheitskräfte konnten die Störenfriede – unter ihnen auch der umstrittene Renovate-Sprecher Max Voegtli – schnell einfangen.

By Elias Yousif
WASHINGTON DC, Sep 1 2023 (IPS)

In what has become an all too familiar phenomenon, U.S.-trained security personnel have been implicated in the July 26th coup that deposed Niger’s democratically elected president, Mohamed Bazoum.

It is the fifth such putsch in the Sahel since 2020, and just the latest to, once again, upend Washington’s expansive counterterror operations in the region that seems to depend on questionable military partners.

As the Biden administration wrestles with how to respond, it should consider how this latest military takeover reflects on years of U.S. security cooperation in the Sahel and the efficacy of the approach that has defined U.S. engagement with the region.

Overview of U.S. Assistance to Niger and the Sahel

Over the last decade, U.S. security cooperation in the Sahel, and the western Sahel in particular, has grown substantially, reflecting widespread concern about the surge in Islamist militancy in the region.

A mix of armed groups, including those with affiliations with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, have proliferated in the region over the years, carrying out opportunistic attacks, engaging in illicit economic activity, and posing acute challenges to state authority.

Elias Yousif

The United States has responded to perceived threats in the region by investing heavily in its own counterterror operations and security assistance programs, amounting to more than $3.3 billion in military aid to the Sahel over the last two decades.

Programs like the Trans-Sahara Partnership Initiative, Department of Defense building partner capacity programs, and numerous foreign military training operations have been central pillars of the U.S. approach to the region.

Despite being paired with significant amounts of economic and humanitarian assistance, they have anchored bilateral relations between Washington and its Sahelian partners.

Between FY2001 and FY2021, the United States provided the countries of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal at least $995 million in direct security assistance, a figure which likely excludes much of the aid provided through large but opaque Department of Defense capacity building programs.

And between FY2001 and FY2020, the United States provided training to at least 86 thousand trainees in these countries, including 17,643 from Niger.

Substantial Aid But Little Progress

Unfortunately, this assistance has not resulted in commensurate improvements in the security landscape or acted as an effective bulwark against civil-military strife. Whatever tactical advances U.S. assistance has contributed to, on the part of Sahelian security forces, the presence, activity, and power of sub-state armed groups has continued to grow.

Terrorism-related activity in the region has increased by more than 2,000 percent over the past decade and a half, while militant organizations have pursued increasingly bold operations and pseudo-state activities.

At the same time, U.S. security assistance activities have provided material support to military officers who have both engaged in grave human rights abuses or who have gone on to support the overthrow of civilian governments.

In just the last three years, the Sahel has seen five coups, two each in Mali and Burkina Faso and now one in Niger, each of which has involved or implicated officers that received U.S. military training.

Unsurprisingly, these military coups have reflected poorly on U.S. security assistance efforts and exposed severe shortcomings in Washington’s approach to the region.

Although it would be difficult to identify a causal relationship between U.S. training and coup propensity on the part of recipients, repeated putsches by U.S.-backed forces show a lack of discretion in how the United States selects its security partners.

Indeed, the behavior of many of these U.S.-trained forces is far from unpredictable, especially in places where military figures have long played outsized political roles.

More robust, in-depth, and multidisciplinary pre-assessments should better inform the selection of U.S. security assistance beneficiaries and partners, and policymakers should have the courage to use that information to decline invitations to engage in security cooperation when the risk is too high.

More broadly, the highly securitized nature of U.S. engagement with the region places significant emphasis on addressing the symptoms of insecurity and distracts from other lines of effort aimed at issues of governance, peacebuilding, and conflict resolution.

Moreover, the rhetorical and political emphasis Washington has placed on counterterrorism, in addition to overshadowing significant humanitarian and development investments, can also risk securitizing local politics and elevating the political saliency of military leaders over their civilian counterparts.

Indeed, in nearly all of the most recent coups, their military leaders have cited militancy and counterterror imperatives as justification for removing civilian leaders. Without a greater emphasis on governance, civil-military reforms, and defense institution building as a prerequisite to combat-oriented assistance, the United States risks perpetuating conflict and political instability.

Finally, when U.S.-backed security forces engage in coups or grave human rights violations, the United States should be unequivocal in its response. Too frequently, the United States has been willing to voice rhetorical condemnation while discreetly sustaining security cooperation activities.

Invoking the need to address terrorism or the infiltration of other competing powers in the region, the familiar turning of the United States’ blind eye in the Sahel has both undermined any meaningful commitment to conditionality in U.S. assistance and sent a troubling signal about the consequences of predatory behavior on the part of U.S. security partners.

The United States should re-orient its strategic calculus and right size how it weighs the risks of shedding abusive security partners against the risks of continuing to partner with forces undermining good governance and human rights.

Elias Yousif is a Research Analyst with the Stimson Center’s Conventional Defense Program. His research focuses on the global arms trade and arms control, issues related to remote warfare and use of force, and international security cooperation and child-soldiers prevention. Prior to joining the Stimson Center, Elias was the Deputy Director of the Security Assistance Monitor at the Center for International Policy where he analyzed the impact of U.S. arms transfer and security assistance programs on international security, U.S. foreign policy, and global human rights practices.

Source: Stimson Center

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Tschechische Banken und die Prager Börse wurden von russischen Hackern ins Visier genommen. Die Angriffe richteten sich gegen die Websites der Banken oder Online-Banking-Dienste sowie gegen die Website der Börse. 

La Commission européenne a annoncé jeudi qu’elle prendrait contact avec les autorités belges pour obtenir des informations sur l’annonce faite par la secrétaire d’État à l’Asile et la Migration Nicole de Moor selon laquelle l’accueil des hommes seuls serait temporairement suspendu.