By CIVICUS
Feb 16 2026 (IPS)
CIVICUS discusses the recent protests in Iran with Sohrab Razaghi, executive director of Volunteer Activists, a Netherlands-based diaspora organisation empowering Iranian civil society.
Sohrab Razaghi
Protests triggered by economic grievances erupted across Iran on 28 December, quickly evolving into broader anti-regime protests. The crackdown that followed resulted in what may be the largest massacre in modern Iranian history.What sparked the protests, and in what ways were they different from previous ones?
Rising prices and the collapse of the national currency initially sparked the protests, but these quickly expanded beyond economic grievances. At least in part, this is because the economy is no longer seen as a purely technical issue but as a measure of the state’s ability to govern. A central question among social groups now is whether the government can manage crises and provide sustainable solutions.
Anger has built up, reflecting broken promises and lost futures. Over the past three decades, four major protest waves – in 2009, 2017, 2019 and 2022 – were met with repression, denial or superficial reforms. This pattern has produced a strong sense of humiliation and political voicelessness.
But perhaps the most decisive factor in the latest wave of protests has been the role of Generation Z, a generation that did not experience the 1979 revolution or the war with Iraq and does not have the ideological attachments of earlier generations. The dividing line is not just age but also expectations, lifestyles and values. While previous generations used to hope for gradual reform within the system, now many young people see no viable future within the current framework. For them, the most rational responses to what they perceive as a structural dead end are disengagement, migration or radical protest.
Recent protests, particularly those of 8 and 9 January, also reflected shifts in protest dynamics, with higher levels of violence visible in both rhetoric and practice. This escalation likely reflects accumulated frustration and political deadlock, but doesn’t necessarily indicate that the state has weakened. Security forces so far appear cohesive and operationally effective, and there are no clear signs of fragmentation inside the coercive apparatus.
But the rise in violence is troubling for democratic forces and civil society. When violent tactics become prominent, organised civic initiatives are marginalised and security-driven narratives prevail, weakening sustained civic action.
Additionally, Israeli and US statements expressing support for protesters and threatening military action had contradictory and largely negative effects.
While such rhetoric initially generated hope among some protesters, the lack of follow-up produced disillusionment and scepticism. Most importantly, statements by foreign governments, including Israel and the USA, strengthened the regime’s narrative. They enabled the authorities to frame protests as the products of foreign interference and protesters as instruments of external powers, including claims of involvement by Mossad agents. This narrative was very useful to justify securitisation and repression.
How have civil society and the media documented human rights violations amid internet shutdowns?
During near-total internet blackouts, local and community-based groups played crucial roles. They recorded the time and location of incidents, collected testimonies from multiple sources and preserved legal, medical and visual documentation while observing basic digital security principles.
When limited internet access became available, information was shared securely with international partners and diaspora networks. These networks helped archive data, liaise with human rights organisations and media and reduce pressure on activists operating inside Iran. International human rights organisations then cross-checked and verified reports before incorporating them into official documentation. Because communication shutdowns, security risks and restricted access to evidence prevented full documentation, they typically presented casualty figures and details of repression conservatively. At the same time, fake news and baseless casualty figures are also prevalent in diaspora and international media reports. It is essential to interrogate such reporting to preserve the credibility of fact-checked, evidence-based reports.
Under severe restrictions, independent and evidence-based documentation has been essential to preserve truth, counter denial and lay the groundwork for future accountability.
What’s limiting sustained pressure for change?
Recent protests have not expanded into broader forms of social organisation. Participation by labour unions, local networks and professional associations has been limited, restricting the potential for sustained institutionalised pressure. Without stronger organisational structures, documentation of abuses won’t necessarily translate into coordinated civic action. Social media-based coordination and mobilisation are effective for the start and first phase of protests, but on-the-ground leadership, networks and organising capacity are instrumental for sustaining protests and increasing pressure for change.
At the discursive level, significant attention has focused on appeals for foreign pressure rather than on building internal coalitions among social groups. In some cases, rhetoric has centred on state collapse rather than democratic transition, a framework that risks instability and further social fragmentation. The use of profanity and violent language – both inside Iran and among the diaspora community – has also alienated families and moderate groups, narrowing rather than broadening support.
Ultimately, for protests to evolve into movements capable of exerting sustained pressure for change, what’s needed is inclusive organisation, coalition-building and a unifying narrative.
What should the international community do to strengthen Iranian civil society?
Sustainable change will depend on domestic organisational capacity, leadership and representation, not external force. So international leaders should avoid war rhetoric and avoid engaging in any form of military intervention. Historical experience suggests that even limited foreign military intervention is unlikely to weaken domestic repression. Instead, it may well increase regime cohesion, at least in the short term, intensify nationalist sentiment and raise the costs faced by civil society activists, who can be easily portrayed as collaborators and traitors.
When supporting Iranian civil society, international allies should prioritise independent, nonviolent civil society organisations rather than opposition groups advocating violence. Narratives of ‘collapse at any cost’ marginalise civic initiatives and undermine the prospects of democratisation.
Long-term investment in capacity strengthening is essential. This includes supporting civic organising skills, digital security, democratic advocacy, nonviolent action and secure communication tools. Over recent decades, resources and repertoires for change within civil society have been weakened. Sustained engagement is required to rebuild these capacities, with up-to-date resources, techniques and tools.
Monitoring, documentation and evidence-based reporting grounded in credible local sources are among the most effective forms of support. Accurate reporting strengthens prospects for accountability and limits the space for propaganda.
Ultimately, sustainable democratic change in Iran will depend on civil society acting independently, rooted in domestic capacities and supported by context-aware, non-interventionist international engagement.
CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.
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In the latest newsletter of the Elders, Helen Clark reflects on Davos, President Trump’s Board of Peace, and the urgency of pushing back against “might is right.”
By Helen Clark
WELLINGTON, New Zealand, Feb 16 2026 (IPS)
2026 has begun on a deeply troubling note. International law, long regarded as the backbone of global peace and security, is being challenged in ever more brazen ways. Core principles of sovereignty and restraint are being flagrantly breached.
I have recently returned from the World Economic Forum in Davos, where President Trump unveiled his new Board of Peace. The UN Security Council had originally endorsed such a board to oversee the administration of Gaza ad interim. There, despite the declared ceasefire, the humanitarian situation remains critical and Palestinian civilians are still being killed by the occupying military on a near-daily basis.
But what was unveiled at Davos suggests something more worrying. There is not a single mention of Gaza in the charter of the announced board. It appeared to be positioned as an alternative to the UN Security Council.
Among the invited members of the Board of Peace are two indicted by the International Criminal Court. There is a $1 billion price tag for permanent membership of the Board. This is not a proper way to run international affairs. A Board of Peace should remain wholly and urgently focused on the continued crisis in Gaza as provided for in the Security Council’s time-limited mandate.
The framing of the Board of Peace is just one more challenge to a multilateral system whose legitimacy was already being questioned for many reasons.
The UN Charter is in its 81st year. The structures it established, particularly the Security Council, still reflect the world of 1945 rather than that of 2026. The abuse of the veto by permanent members – particularly when this shields violations of international law – has also been profoundly damaging to its credibility.
This has been evident, for example, in repeated use of the veto by Russia to block resolutions on Ukraine and by the USA to block resolutions on Israel-Palestine. Reform of the Security Council is both necessary and overdue. It has been achieved before – with meaningful change in 1965, and it must be achieved again.
At the Munich Security Conference last week, we engaged with decision-makers on how best to navigate a changing world order. I agree with Prime Minister Mark Carney of Canada that recent developments signal a serious rupture of the international order we have known. Countries of all sizes must act together to reject a world governed by raw power, and to safeguard a future grounded in international law.
The Elders will speak out against any attempt to override international law with a doctrine of “might is right”. We will reaffirm and defend an international order rooted in shared values and principles.
This is a moment of choice. Either the international community allows the values that have long underpinned global cooperation to erode through division and sabotage, or it comes together to defend and renew them.
Helen Clark is a New Zealand politician who served as the 37th prime minister of New Zealand from 1999 to 2008 and was the administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) from 2009 to 2017
Source: The Elders’ monthly newsletter.
The Elders is an international non-governmental organisation of public figures noted as senior statesmen, peace activists and human rights advocates, who were brought together by former president of South Africa Nelson Mandela in 2007.
IPS UN Bureau
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A female merchant in Bangkok using her phone as part of her business. Digital technology is a key accelerator of trade growth. Credit: Pexels/Faheem Ahamad
By Witada Anukoonwattaka, Yann Duval, Nikita Shahu and Niccolo Sainati
BANGKOK, Thailand, Feb 16 2026 (IPS)
Trade in the Asia-Pacific region has moved into a new strategic reality. The latest Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Trends (APTIT) highlights that rapid technological change and a strategic reconfiguration of supply chains are reshaping how economies in the region trade and compete.
Rather than pursuing cost efficiency alone, firms and governments are increasingly prioritizing supply chain resilience, diversification and digital readiness. These forces are altering export performance, changing the geography of trade, and accelerating the rise of digitally driven goods and services across the region
Digital-led trade growth
Export performance reflected this adjustment. Regional export growth slowed sharply from 7.9% in 2024 to 3.3% in 2025 (Figure 1). Additionally, persistent price compression, driven by weak global demand, excess supply and falling commodity prices, pushed the region’s share of global exports down to 39%, extending a decline underway since 2021.
Across subregions, gaps widened. Growth is increasingly concentrated among economies able to capitalize on digital opportunities. South-East Asia and East and North-East Asia outperformed in merchandise trade, supported by their expanding roles in semiconductors, AI-related hardware and advanced digital equipment.
By contrast, exports contracted in South and South-West Asia, where traditional industries remain the backbone of export structures.
A similar pattern emerged in services. In 2025, services exports rose by 5.4%, led overwhelmingly by digitally deliverable services such as ICT, telecommunications, computer services, and business and financial services. These are the functions that enable multinode production, data flows and the coordination of increasingly complex supply networks.
Traditional services such as travel and transport continued to grow but at a slower pace. East and North-East Asia again led regional services’ export expansion.
A shifting geography of trade
The geography of trade is also evolving. For goods, geopolitical risk mitigation is playing a larger role in determining trade routes and partners. Intraregional merchandise trade remains significant with 53% exports and 56% imports, but its share edged down in 2025 as businesses diversified toward extra-regional markets.
Export shares to the European Union and the rest of the world increased, while the United States became a rising destination for most subregions, with the exception of those most directly affected by geopolitical tensions.
Services trade remains more global, with only about 21% of services exports occurring within the region. However, ESCAP analyses point to gradually strengthening intraregional linkages. South-East Asia, for instance, has been redirecting a growing share of its services exports toward East and North-East Asia, reflecting that intra-regional demand for digital coordination functions is increasing within the services trade networks.
Outlook for 2026: Slower growth, higher uncertainty
Looking ahead, the outlook for 2026 remains cautious. Merchandise export volume growth is projected at around 0.6%. Developed economies’ exports are expected to contract by about 1.5% due to their exposure to high-tech supply chains under geopolitical strain and weaker demand in major markets.
Developing Asian economies may show more resilience, but outcomes will hinge on China’s performance and the strength of global technological demand.
Services trade is expected to remain comparatively steady. Digitally deliverable services, especially ICT, computer and business services are likely to continue driving growth. Travel and transport may see gradual improvement, but several risk factors, including policy and regulatory uncertainty in digital trade, climate-related disruptions and increasing compliance burdens for MSMEs, cloud the outlook.
A structural shift, not a temporary distortion
Together, these developments point to a structural transformation in the region’s trade rather than a temporary cycle. On the goods side, firms are reengineering supply chains to build resilience by diversifying markets, relocating stages of production and increasing the share of intermediate goods destined for assembly closer to end markets in the European Union and the United States.
Yet this transition remains delicate: volumes have slowed, margins are compressed, and the region’s global export share continues to slip.
On the services side, digitalization is reshaping growth patterns. The strong growth of ICT, communications, computer and business services reflects the expanding role in supplying digital services, such as data management, logistics platforms and remote business services that keep modern supply chains running
For Asia and the Pacific, particularly its developing economies, future gains will depend on pairing digital transformation with practical resilience strategies. ESCAP’s analyses drawing on RDTII and RIVA point to areas that deserve policymakers’ attention: persistent digital trade regulatory complexity and increasingly dense value chain connections that allow disruptions to spread widely.
These trends underscore the importance of strengthening digital trade cooperation, as well as building resilient logistics and trade facilitation systems to keep intermediate goods moving reliably along supply chains. In this context, increasing participation by countries in the regional UN treaty on facilitation of cross-border paperless trade is a welcome development.
Witada Anukoonwattaka is Economic Affairs Officer, ESCAP; Yann Duval is Chief, Trade Policy and Facilitation Section, ESCAP, Nikita Shahu is Consultant, ESCAP, Niccolo Sainati is Intern, ESCAP.
IPS UN Bureau
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Le nouveau conseil communal de Pobè a été installé ce dimanche 15 février 2026, avec le maire et ses adjoints.
Le nouvel exécutif de la commune de Pobè a été installé ce dimanche 15 février 2026. Clément Kouchadé a été porté à la tête de la commune.
Come Zinsou Koukpo occupe désormais le poste de premier adjoint au maire, tandis qu'Ibouraima Balogoun est deuxième adjoint.
La commune de Dangbo dispose d'un nouvel exécutif communal depuis dimanche 15 février 2026, à l'issue de l'installation du maire et de ses adjoints.
Hyacinthe Jesugnon Agon a été désigné ce dimanche maire de Dangbo. Il sera épaulé par David Bogninou, premier adjoint au maire, et par Paul Togbe, deuxième adjoint.
A Boukoumbé, ce dimanche 15 février 2026, le maire et ses adjoints ont été officiellement installés par le préfet dudépartement.
Ludovic Nambi a été désigné maire de la commune de Boukoumbé. Il travaillera aux côtés de Koupetah N'tcha Kouagou, premier adjoint au maire, et de Mathias Matadona Natta, nommé deuxième adjoint.
La commune de Tchaourou a installé, dimanche 15 février 2026, son nouvel exécutif communal à l'issue des élections communales du 11 janvier 2026.
Rafiou Owotche est installé ce dimanche au poste de maire de la commune de Tchaourou. Il est secondé dans ses fonctions par Sidic Ibrahim Yarou, premier adjoint au maire, et par Sani Tchabi Salifou, désigné deuxième adjoint.
Les conseils communaux d'Akpro-Missérété, de Sinendé et Klouèkanmè issus des élections du 11 janvier dernier ont été officiellement installés dimanche 15 février 2026, consacrant l'entrée en fonction des nouveaux exécutifs.
À Akpro-Missérété, Joseph Hounkanrin a été désigné maire lors de la séance d'installation du conseil communal. Casimir Koudjo occupe le poste de premier adjoint au maire, et Barthélémy Adigbonon celui de deuxième adjoint. Le nouvel exécutif a été installé, dimanche 15 février 2026.
Dans la commune de Sinendé, les conseillers ont porté leur choix sur Issifou Yacoubou comme maire. Machoudou Koto devient premier adjoint au maire et Adam Fousseni Zakari deuxième adjoint.
À Klouèkanmè, Lonlonto Gilchriste Dayalor a été installé au poste de maire. Il sera épaulé par Honfin Gabriel Togbevi, premier adjoint, et Dieudonné Gbedjekan, deuxième adjoint au maire.
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