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Demonstrating Europe’s steadfast commitment to partners in the region, European Parliament President Roberta Metsola officially opened the EP’s office in Chișinău.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

ENTWURF EINES BERICHTS über Global Gateway: Folgen und künftige Ausrichtung
Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Entwicklungsausschuss
Hildegard Bentele, Chloé Ridel

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2025 - EP

BERICHT über Maßnahmen gegen die länderübergreifende Unterdrückung von Menschenrechtsverteidigern
Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Chloé Ridel

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2025 - EP

In Brüssel wird in Kürze die Ratifizierung eines modernisierten EU-Mexiko-Handelsabkommens erwartet.

Parmi les têtes d'affiche, on retrouvera des joueurs expérimentés comme Mohamed Salah (Égypte), Achraf Hakimi (Maroc) ou Victor Osimhen (Nigéria) mais aussi de nouveaux visages prêts à bousculer la hiérarchie.

ÄNDERUNGSANTRÄGE 1 - 314 - Entwurf eines Berichts Umsetzung der Gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik – Jahresbericht 2025
Ausschuss für Sicherheit und Verteidigung
Thijs Reuten

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2025 - EP

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2025 - EP

À partir du 1er janvier prochain, M. Mamdani, un « démocrate-socialiste » assez éloigné des sociaux-démocrates européens, dirigera la capitale financière du monde. Et ce musulman solidaire de la Palestine sera également le maire d'une ville qui compte une population juive à peu près égale à (…) / États-Unis, Élections, Ville

Plus de 84 % des exportations du Mexique se dirigent vers les États-Unis, mais avec la guerre commerciale menée par Donald Trump, le pays pourrait être tenté de trouver de nouveaux débouchés au sein de l’Union européenne.

The post Pour échapper à Trump, le Mexique jette un œil vers l’Europe appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Willkommen bei Rapporteur! Jeden Tag liefern wir Ihnen die wichtigsten Nachrichten und Hintergründe aus der EU- und Europapolitik. Das Wichtigste: Omnibus: EVP und Sozialdemokraten in letzter Verhandlungsrunde, um Lieferketten-Regeln zu retten Budget: EU-Hauptstädte uneins über Zusammenlegung von Agrar- und Regionalfonds im nächsten Siebenjahreshaushalt Parlament: EU-Bürgerbeauftragte Teresa Anjinho wegen Beförderung ihrer engsten Vertrauten in der Kritik […]

How do Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) involved in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects navigate international pushback, balance political directives with commercial objectives, and comply with intensified Party oversight? This article addresses a key gap in party-state capitalism literature by exploring the under-examined role of reputational governance in shaping the operations of Chinese SOEs abroad. Drawing on interviews and fieldwork in China, Ethiopia, Zambia and Tanzania, we analyze the reputational governance practices of a SOE that spearheaded two flagship railway projects: the Tanzania–Zambia Railway and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway. We argue that reputational governance is a core feature of party-state capitalism, with overseas SOEs serving as examples of this unique model, where elements of party loyalty and capitalism coexist.

How do Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) involved in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects navigate international pushback, balance political directives with commercial objectives, and comply with intensified Party oversight? This article addresses a key gap in party-state capitalism literature by exploring the under-examined role of reputational governance in shaping the operations of Chinese SOEs abroad. Drawing on interviews and fieldwork in China, Ethiopia, Zambia and Tanzania, we analyze the reputational governance practices of a SOE that spearheaded two flagship railway projects: the Tanzania–Zambia Railway and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway. We argue that reputational governance is a core feature of party-state capitalism, with overseas SOEs serving as examples of this unique model, where elements of party loyalty and capitalism coexist.

How do Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) involved in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects navigate international pushback, balance political directives with commercial objectives, and comply with intensified Party oversight? This article addresses a key gap in party-state capitalism literature by exploring the under-examined role of reputational governance in shaping the operations of Chinese SOEs abroad. Drawing on interviews and fieldwork in China, Ethiopia, Zambia and Tanzania, we analyze the reputational governance practices of a SOE that spearheaded two flagship railway projects: the Tanzania–Zambia Railway and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway. We argue that reputational governance is a core feature of party-state capitalism, with overseas SOEs serving as examples of this unique model, where elements of party loyalty and capitalism coexist.

The accelerating pace of digitalisation - driven by artificial intelligence (AI), e-commerce, cloud computing, and cryptocurrencies - has significantly increased the global demand for data centres. While these facilities underpin the digital economy, their rapid expansion has created substantial challenges in energy consumption and sustainability. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that data centres accounted for approximately 1–2% of global electricity use in 2022, excluding the additional energy required for associated infrastructure. With the continuing proliferation of AI-driven applications, this trend is expected to intensify dramatically, raising critical concerns regarding carbon emissions, energy security, and the broader environmental impact of digital transformation. As nearly 90% of global data centres are located within G20 countries, the group holds a pivotal position in addressing these challenges. However, considerable disparities exist in the distribution of data centres between and within the members of the group. The United States alone accounts for approximately 46% of global data centres while China follows with ten times fewer facilities. Such concentration amplifies energy consumption pressures and risks deepening global digital and economic inequalities. This policy brief examines the relationship between digitalisation and energy use through the lens of data centre distribution within the G20. It highlights the uneven concentration of data infrastructure and energy demand, revealing significant imbalances in data power and resource allocation. The brief concludes with policy recommendations for fostering climate- and resource-efficient digitalisation, enabling G20 members to align data-driven growth with global sustainability and net-zero objectives.

The accelerating pace of digitalisation - driven by artificial intelligence (AI), e-commerce, cloud computing, and cryptocurrencies - has significantly increased the global demand for data centres. While these facilities underpin the digital economy, their rapid expansion has created substantial challenges in energy consumption and sustainability. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that data centres accounted for approximately 1–2% of global electricity use in 2022, excluding the additional energy required for associated infrastructure. With the continuing proliferation of AI-driven applications, this trend is expected to intensify dramatically, raising critical concerns regarding carbon emissions, energy security, and the broader environmental impact of digital transformation. As nearly 90% of global data centres are located within G20 countries, the group holds a pivotal position in addressing these challenges. However, considerable disparities exist in the distribution of data centres between and within the members of the group. The United States alone accounts for approximately 46% of global data centres while China follows with ten times fewer facilities. Such concentration amplifies energy consumption pressures and risks deepening global digital and economic inequalities. This policy brief examines the relationship between digitalisation and energy use through the lens of data centre distribution within the G20. It highlights the uneven concentration of data infrastructure and energy demand, revealing significant imbalances in data power and resource allocation. The brief concludes with policy recommendations for fostering climate- and resource-efficient digitalisation, enabling G20 members to align data-driven growth with global sustainability and net-zero objectives.

The accelerating pace of digitalisation - driven by artificial intelligence (AI), e-commerce, cloud computing, and cryptocurrencies - has significantly increased the global demand for data centres. While these facilities underpin the digital economy, their rapid expansion has created substantial challenges in energy consumption and sustainability. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that data centres accounted for approximately 1–2% of global electricity use in 2022, excluding the additional energy required for associated infrastructure. With the continuing proliferation of AI-driven applications, this trend is expected to intensify dramatically, raising critical concerns regarding carbon emissions, energy security, and the broader environmental impact of digital transformation. As nearly 90% of global data centres are located within G20 countries, the group holds a pivotal position in addressing these challenges. However, considerable disparities exist in the distribution of data centres between and within the members of the group. The United States alone accounts for approximately 46% of global data centres while China follows with ten times fewer facilities. Such concentration amplifies energy consumption pressures and risks deepening global digital and economic inequalities. This policy brief examines the relationship between digitalisation and energy use through the lens of data centre distribution within the G20. It highlights the uneven concentration of data infrastructure and energy demand, revealing significant imbalances in data power and resource allocation. The brief concludes with policy recommendations for fostering climate- and resource-efficient digitalisation, enabling G20 members to align data-driven growth with global sustainability and net-zero objectives.

Le principal aéroport de Belgique a été contraint de fermer pendant environ une heure jeudi 6 novembre dans la soirée après une nouvelle observation de drone. Il s'agit de la troisième fermeture en une semaine, alors que le pays est confronté à une recrudescence d'activités suspectes dans son espace aérien.

The post Drones : l’aéroport de Bruxelles fermé pour la troisième fois en une semaine appeared first on Euractiv FR.