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ProSieben: Unterföhring (ots) - Wien gegen Berlin gegen Bad Segeberg. Wien gegen Pulheim gegen Ostfildern. Im #GNTM-Finale 2025 stehen gleich zwei Models aus Österreichs Hauptstadt Wien. Aber können Pierre (22) und Magdalena (21) auch "Germany's Next ...

Telex.hu: Szokatlan jelenetek zajlottak le csütörtökön az FBI Los Angeles-i központjában. Kirsti Noem republikánus belbiztonsági miniszter sajtótájékoztatót tartott a városban kitört zavargásokról, amikor Alex Padilla demokrata szenátor megpróbált belebeszélni, közbevágni. Padillát, amikor az újságírók mellett megpróbált előremenni, az eseményt biztosító személyzet először feltartóztatta, majd elkezdte kitolni a teremből, és a biztonsági őrnek kinéző férfiak az ajtón kívül FBI-feliratú ruhát viselő embereknek adták át a szenátort, akik először letérdeltették, lenyomták a földre és a háta mögött megbilincselték a kezeit, majd később elengedték...

Wort & Bild Verlagsgruppe - Gesundheitsmeldungen: Baierbrunn (ots) - In Online-Foren wird das Thema Sex in der Schwangerschaft heiß diskutiert. Kein Wunder: Mit der Freude ziehen auch jede Menge Fragen ins Schlafzimmer ein. Wie verändert sich unser Sexleben, und was ist überhaupt noch erlaubt? ...

SAT.1: Unterföhring (ots) - Hervorragende Quote für den ersten souveränen Sieg der U21-Nationalmannschaft bei der Europameisterschaft: Das 3:0 der Deutschen gegen Slowenien sehen 5,4 Millionen (Nettoreichweite ab 3 Jahren) in SAT.1. Damit liegt der Wert ...

Volodimir Zelenszkij ukrán elnök csütörtökön Kijevben kijelentette, hogy részt tervez venni a hét legfejlettebb ipari ország (G7) jövő heti csúcstalálkozóján Kanadában, és reméli, hogy a tanácskozás szünetében módja nyílik majd Donald Trump amerikai elnökkel is találkozni.

Zelenszkij az ukrán fővárosba látogató Boris Pistorius német védelmi miniszterrel tartott közös sajtótájékoztatón hangsúlyozta, hogy az Alberta tartománybeli Kananaskisban június 15-én kezdődő G7-csúcstalálkozón az Ukrajnának szánt támogatás folytatásáról, az Oroszország elleni szankciókról és a jövőbeli kijevi újjáépítési tervek finanszírozásáról kíván tárgyalni.

„A végső döntés mindenképpen a Fehér Házé, az Egyesült Államok elnökétől függ” – mondta Zelenszkij az Oroszország elleni további szankciók esetleges bevezetésére utalva.

Zelenszkij kijelentette, hogy Kijev valószínűleg nem fogja tudni mással pótolni az amerikai fegyverrendszereket, ha leállnának a szállítások.

Hozzátette, hogy Ukrajna bővíteni kívánja a fegyvergyártási együttműködést Németországgal. „Finanszírozásra van szükségünk (…) Németország egyike azon országoknak, ahol ezt megértik, ahol ismerik a szabályokat, és mindig azt teszik, amit mondanak” – jelentette ki az ukrán elnök.

Pistorius, aki csütörtök reggel érkezett váratlan látogatásra az ukrán fővárosba, közölte, hogy az Ukrajnának nyújtott német katonai támogatás összege idén elérte a 7 milliárd eurót és további 1,9 milliárd euró vár parlamenti jóváhagyásra.

Az ukrán elnök és a német védelmi miniszter a tárgyalások után azt is bejelentette, hogy Kijev és Berlin hosszú hatótávolságú manőverező robotrepülőgépek, drónok és rakéták közös gyártását tervezi.

Németország pénzzel, Ukrajna pedig az Oroszországgal vívott háborúban szerzett technikai szakértelemmel járul hozzá a tervhez – közölték. Zelenszkij elmondta, hogy a terv végrehajtásával egy speciális németországi vállalatot bíznak meg, a gyártás várhatóan mind Ukrajnában, mind Németországban történik majd. Az ukrán kormány becslései szerint a hazai fegyvergyártás kihasználatlan kapacitása évi mintegy 30 milliárd euró.

Pistorius a sajtótájékoztatón kérdésre válaszolva leszögezte, hogy Kijev ismételt kérése ellenére Németország továbbra sem tervezi a 480 km hatótávolságú Taurus manőverező robotrepülőgépek szállítását Ukrajnának.

Nyitókép: president.gov.ua

hirado.hu

The post Zelenszkij részt venne a G7-csúcson appeared first on Kárpátalja.ma.

Kamil Šaško (Hlas) egészségügyi miniszter ígéretéhez híven kész megnyitni a tranzakciós adó módosításáról szóló parlamenti vitában azt a kérdést, milyen hatással van ez az adó a rendelőintézetekre és a páciensekre – tájékoztatta a TASR-t a minisztérium kommunikációs osztálya.

Alors que la quatrième édition de l'exposition économique et commerciale Chine-Afrique s'est ouverte ce 12 juin 2025 à Changsha (centre du pays), Pékin a annoncé son intention de supprimer les droites de douane sur les produits de 53 pays africains. Objectifs affichés par les autorités chinoises : stimuler les exportations africaines et réduire la balance commerciale largement en défaveur du continent. Explications.

Le tribunal militaire garnison de Kinshasa-Matete a rendu son verdict, jeudi 12 juin à Kinshasa, dans le procès des braqueurs de Lemba Foire. Sur les deux prévenus poursuivis, seul Prospère Ndjeka écope de la peine capitale.

Son coaccusé, Yannick, a été simplement acquitté et libéré immédiatement sous les acclamations du public.

ZDF: Mainz (ots) - ZDF-Programmhinweis Bitte aktuelle Programmtexte beachten: Montag, 16. Juni 2025, 15.05 Uhr Bares für Rares Horst Lichter und sein Team präsentieren eine Hèrmes Kelly-Bag, ein Spielzeugauto, ein Schmuckset, eine glasierte Vase, ...

Apothekerkammer Nordrhein: Düsseldorf (ots) - Jeder kennt es - jeder hasst es: Unerwünschte Werbung per E-Mail, Spam ist ein riesiges Problem für die Wirtschaft und Privatleute. Im Gesundheitssystem gibt es ein eigenes E-Mail-System namens "KIM". Der Kommunikationsdienst, ...

Erfurter Garten- und Ausstellungs gemeinnützige GmbH: Erfurt (ots) - Die schönste Zeit des Jahres hat begonnen, die Blütezeit der Rosen, ein besonderer Blühhöhepunkt und ein wunderbares Gartenerlebnis von Mai bis Juli. Die eleganten Blumen mit dem besonderen Duft sind bei Gartenfreunden und ...

EXCLUSIF. Le gouvernement vise les 400 000 bornes de recharge accessibles au public en 2030. Mais ce marché n’est pas encore mature. Dans l’Hérault, l’entreprise IES Synergy a dû repenser son modèle industriel et se restructurer.

Tel-Aviv a mené, dans la nuit du jeudi 12 au vendredi 13 juin, une série de bombardements dans plusieurs régions de l’Iran. « Nos pilotes continuent d’attaquer des cibles militaires et des cibles liées au programme nucléaire dans diverses régions d’Iran », a annoncé, vendredi matin, le porte-parole de l’armée israélienne, Effie Defrin.

Over the last decade, the European Union has taken major steps to improve its defence industrial base, reflecting a growing strategic ambition and assertiveness. The European Defence Fund (EDF), launched in 2021, and managed by the European Commission, marks a pivotal step in the EU’s efforts to build a more integrated and competitive defence industrial base.

As of June 2025, the EDF has been implemented through annual work programmes from 2021 to 2024, supporting 224 collaborative defence projects involving entities from different EU member states. The aim of the policy paper is to initially evaluate the extent and nature of cross-border industrial cooperation among EU member-states (excluding Malta) and Norway under the European Defence Fund, and to identify emerging patterns, strategic partnerships, and sector-specific dynamics that reflect progress toward the Single Market for Defence.

Our main findings include:

• Success of the EDF: The EDF has successfully built a dense, interconnected network of cooperation among entities from participating countries, promoting shared expertise, EU-wide interdependence, and a more competitive European defence sector.
• Clusters: Intense cooperation is concentrated among countries like France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Greece, the Netherlands and Belgium.
• Specialisation: Entity participation across defence (R&D) categories varies by country, often reflecting national strengths or geostrategic priorities.
• Coordinators: The role of the coordinators becomes more and more important as the dense network of collaboration is expanded.

Our recommendations touch upon three main areas:

• Funding: The EDF’s success justifies increased funding to strengthen the EU’s defence capabilities and support industrial cooperation.
• Inclusivity: To avoid dominance by a small number of large/prime players, the EU should strengthen support for underrepresented countries to ensure broader participation.
• Regarding Greece: Greek entities should be further encouraged to join EDF projects, linking national talent and research initiatives with EU networks to boost innovation and counter brain drain.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Spyros Blavoukos, Head, EU Institutions & Policies Programme, ELIAMEP; Head of the ‘Ariane Condellis’ European Programme; Professor, Athens University of Economics & Business; Panos Politis-Lamprou, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP and Georgios Matsoukas, Research Assistant, ELIAMEP.

Introduction

Nearly a decade has passed since the European Commission, under Jean-Claude Juncker, implemented the first EU-wide defence industrial initiatives. During this decade, the European Union’s defence industry has seen significant developments, more recently with the announcement of the ReArm Europe Plan and the SAFE Regulation that prioritises defence industrial readiness. At the same time, the European Defence Fund (EDF) has been a crucial and active instrument since 2021, signaling the EU’s intention and efforts made to close capability gaps, foster innovation and strengthen pan-European defence industrial collaboration.

To what extent have the EU member-states (excluding Malta) and Norway succeeded in building and reinforcing linkages between their defence industries? Which member-states tend to cooperate more intensively with which partners, and do such patterns vary depending on the sector or category of defence capability in which they operate?

These questions become ever more relevant as transnational industrial collaboration constitutes a driver for the development of a real Single Market for Defence, as envisioned by the Draghi Report. Furthermore, understanding the dynamics and structure of defence industrial cooperation among member-states in EU funding programmes is essential for making informed policy advice and decisions aimed at strengthening Europe’s defence capabilities and industrial competitiveness, especially in the context of the negotiations for the next MFF 2028-2034.

Setting the Background: what has changed in the realm of defence

The EU is undergoing a profound transformation regarding security and defence. Long reliant on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the American security umbrella, the EU has increasingly begun to adopt -at least rhetorically- a more assertive and autonomous role in these fields. The broad concept of strategic autonomy, which was once perceived with scepticism, has gradually evolved into a necessity, with the EU realising that the “ability to make its [the EU’s] own choices and shape the world around it through leadership and engagement” is fundamental. After decades of underinvestment, fragmentation and external dependency, the EU is now treating defence industrial policy as a core pillar of its geopolitical awakening. 

In this vein, over the past decade, the European family has taken concrete action to support both the demand and the supply sides of defence, giving more emphasis, though, until very recently, on the latter. In particular, the European Commission, under President Juncker, presented the European Defence Action Plan in 2016, paving the way for the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) (2017-2019) and the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) (2019-2020). Together, these two initiatives accumulatively channeled approximately 590 million EUR from the EU budget towards defence research and development (R&D). The EDF, which constitutes the successor of the two aforementioned tools, has been the flagship funding instrument for R&D in defence, earmarking almost 7.3 billion EUR for collaborative defence research and capability development for the current Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). A smaller-scale supply-oriented instrument is the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) with a budget of approximately 500 million EUR (2023-2025).

On the demand side, the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) aims to incentivize the common procurement of ammunition, air and missile defence and platforms with a total budget of 310 million EUR until 2025. Furthermore, the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), whose negotiations have not yet been concluded, is expected to unlock 1.5 billion EUR from the EU budget for the period 2025-2027 to support both the production and common procurement of defence equipment, building on the experience from both ASAP and EDIRPA. On May 27, 2025, the Council established the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument, incentivising the common procurement of specific categories of defence equipment, which will be supported by up to 150 billion EUR in funding borrowed from capital markets or financial institutions by the European Commission until 2030. However, it must be noted that in contrast to the aforementioned instruments, SAFE offers loans, not grants, which will have to be repaid by the member states.

A combination of external factors and the new geopolitical understanding drives the EU’s defence industrial efforts. Starting with the former, the most obvious and pressing reason has definitely been Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The invasion has exposed Europe’s inability to adequately ramp up its defence production levels. At the same time, the return of conventional and high-intensity warfare to the Old Continent has sparked concern among the European demos, as revealed by the most recent Eurobarometer. Beyond Ukraine, a deeper strategic reorientation is underway. The post-Cold War assumption that Europe could rely indefinitely on the United States (US) for the protection of its territorial integrity no longer applies. Quoting US Secretary of Defence, Pete Hegseth, “It’s deterrence and peace through strength, but it cannot be reliance”.  In addition, President Trump has repeatedly shaken the transatlantic trust. In the meantime, the US pivot to the Indo-Pacific constitutes a long-term strategic recalibration which has been promoted since the Obama administration. As Washington’s (strategic) interests shift towards the People’s Republic of China (PRC), European security can no longer assume that American help is a given.

The new geopolitical understanding is closely linked to the return of Realpolitik in the international scene. Great power competition and broader security threats have raised the importance of the Union’s broader industrial policy. The development and the resilience of the EU’s defence and technological industrial base are now considered part of its efforts to achieve strategic autonomy. In this environment, the EU’s traditional soft power must be complemented by credible military capabilities, defence innovation capacity and competitiveness.

Data collection and methodology

Why studying the EDF matters

To this end of developing credible military capabilities, the EDF plays a crucial role, being the core tool of defence industrial cooperation within the EU framework. It constitutes the first fully-fledged EU-funding mechanism, marking a shift in the Union’s approach to defence. Studying the patterns of cooperation under the EDF provides valuable insights into both the functional and political evolution of the EU’s defence industrial policy.

Furthermore, the EDF offers temporal depth and continuity. In contrast to shorter-term or ad-hoc funding instruments such as EDIRPA or ASAP, the EDF covers a multi-annual time period, namely the current MFF (2021-2027). This provides a longer and more stable timeline for assessing emerging patterns of collaboration among defence industry actors. As of 6 June 2025, four rounds of EDF project selections have been publicly announced, allowing for a more representative and credible dataset. At the same time, data is not available from either EDIP (still under negotiations) or from SAFE (not yet implemented).

Finally, with a planned envelope of 7.3 billion EUR over seven years, the EDF surpasses other comparable instruments both in scale and ambition. Although the amount may still be considered insufficient relative to Europe’s growing strategic needs (or ambitions), the funding volume makes the EDF one of the most important financial tools for defence capability development at the EU level. This financial magnitude also tends to attract many stakeholders (e.g., companies from the defence sector, research institutes, universities), which allows for a more comprehensive and representative picture of the emerging European defence ecosystem. In particular, approximately 4 billion EUR has been invested between 2021 and 2024, with almost 3,000 entity participations from all EU member states, except Malta, and Norway.

Figure 1: EDF entity participations (2021-2024)

Source: Fiott (2025)

Data mining process

For the needs of our research, the following data gathering process was followed, combining manual research with automated tools to ensure accuracy. First, we reviewed in a systematic way all individual project factsheets released under the EDF for the years 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024. As of 6 June 2025, a total of 224 projects have been publicly selected for EU (co-)funding. These factsheets, available on the European Commission’s (DG DEFIS) official website, list all participating entities, their role in the consortium and their country of origin.

Next, for each project, we identified and recorded every entity listed as a participant (including the coordinator), along with the country from which it originates. This step is critical for making the mapping of defence industrial cooperation possible.

Using the data above, we constructed a 27×27 matrix to capture the frequency of cooperation between entities from different participating countries. Each row and column of the matrix represents one of the 26 EU member-states (excluding Malta) plus Norway. The matrix entries reflect the number of projects in which at least two entities from two given countries jointly participate in an EDF selected project, thereby indicating the intensity of bilateral cooperation.

Beyond the aggregate matrix, we also built additional matrices to reflect cooperation in specific categories of defence capability (e.g., air combat, cyber). For 2021, 2022 and 2024, the project categorisations were available on the Commission’s official website. However, for the 2023 selected projects, no such categorisation was publicly available at the time of writing. To resolve this, we manually reviewed each 2023 project and assigned it to the most relevant/appropriate category, based on the thematic guidelines outlined in the official EDF Work Programme for that year.

In order to minimise the probability of human error, we developed a Visual Basic for Application (VBA)-driven programme, with the support of artificial intelligence (AI), to automate the generation of matrices. Each EDF project was uploaded as a PDF file to Power BI. While the initial stages of project identification and classification required human judgment, especially in 2023, automation ensured consistency in matrix construction and allowed for an efficient verification process.

Building the Matrix of Cross-border Industrial Defence Cooperation

In this section, we present the results of our research on cross-border industrial cooperation within the framework of the EDF from 2021 to 2024. The findings are visualised through a series of graphs and tables, reflecting the cooperation between entities from the participating countries. In addition to the general matrix, which covers all categories, we also provide 18 separate matrices corresponding to specific capability categories. The National Focal Points (NFPs) category is taken into account only in the general matrix. These thematic categories enable a better understanding of how industrial partnerships vary across different domains, providing deeper insight into the patterns of specialisation and collaboration within the EU’s defence landscape. To ensure clarity and maintain the readability of the main text, the full tables containing all data is provided in the Annex.

General matrix

The general matrix reveals a high level of interconnectedness among the entities of participating countries. Nearly all participating countries have established at least one cooperative link with each other. The thickness of each line connecting two countries represents the frequency of cooperation between entities from those respective countries. Thicker lines indicate a great number of joint participations. As such, it is evident that France, Germany, Italy, Spain, followed by Belgium, Greece and the Netherlands, are involved in a significantly large number of cooperative projects and emerge as central nodes within the broader network. Based on our data, only four country pairs show no collaborative links, namely Croatia-Cyprus, Croatia-Estonia, Slovakia-Hungary and Hungary-Luxembourg. These exceptions highlight rare gaps in the otherwise dense network of partnerships.

Figure 2: General matrix of cross-border industrial cooperation in the framework of EDF (2021-2024)

Created with Flourish.studio. 

Specific categories

While the general matrix offers a comprehensive overview, a closer examination at the category level provides more insights. When the data is disaggregated by capability domain, it becomes evident that fewer countries tend to cooperate within individual categories, particularly in specialised or technically demanding areas (e.g., air and missile defence, underwater warfare). Even in these categories, entities from approximately twenty participating countries have been identified. In broader or more horizontal domains, such as SME calls, digital transformation or cyber, we observe a more diverse range of participating countries.  

Figure 3: EDF industrial cooperation in Air and Missile Defence (2021-2024)

Figure 4: EDF industrial cooperation in Air Combat (2021-2024)

Figure 5: EDF industrial cooperation in Cyber (2021-2024)

Figure 6: EDF industrial cooperation in Digital Transformation (2021-2024)

 

Figure 7: EDF industrial cooperation in Disruptive Technologies (2021-2024)

Figure 8: EDF industrial cooperation in Energy and Environment (2021-2024)

 

Figure 9: EDF industrial cooperation in Ground Combat (2021-2024)

 

Figure 10: EDF industrial cooperation in Information Superiority (2021-2024)

Figure 11: EDF industrial cooperation in Materials & Components (2021-2024)

Figure 12: EDF industrial cooperation in Medical Response and CBRN (2021-2024)

Figure 13: EDF industrial cooperation in Naval Combat (2021-2024)

Figure 14: EDF industrial cooperation in Protection & Mobility (2021-2024)

Figure 15: EDF industrial cooperation in Sensors (2021-2024)

Figure 16: EDF industrial cooperation in Simulation & Training (2021-2024)

Figure 17: EDF industrial cooperation in SMEs calls (2021-2024)

Figure 18: EDF industrial cooperation in Space (2021-2024)

Figure 19: EDF industrial cooperation in Technological Challenges (2021-2024)

Figure 20: EDF industrial cooperation in Underwater Warfare (2021-2024)

All figures were created with Flourish.studio.

Is an EU Industrial Defence Ecosystem Emerging?

The Key Insights

The analysis of data from the EDF for the results of 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024 reveals several insights into the evolving landscape of the defence industrial cooperation in the EU. These findings may provide valuable insights for shaping future policy directions at both the national and European levels.

The first and most notable finding is the emergence of a dense and increasingly interconnected network of industrial collaboration across entities from the participating countries. This web of partnerships demonstrates that the EDF has succeeded in one of its central objectives: “to promote cooperation between companies, including SMEs and research actors throughout the Union”. By enabling entities from different member-states and Norway to jointly research, design, develop and/or test defence technologies, the Union provides a platform for building shared expertise, transferring know-how and promoting the involvement of all interested (and eligible) countries in developing a truly European defence technological and industrial base. This, in turn, allows each participant to capitalise on its own comparative advantages, reinforcing strategic EU-wide interdependence rather than duplication or dependency on third countries (to the extent this is possible). Moreover, as cooperation intensifies across borders, the European defence sector may become more efficient and competitive at the international level.

The second major finding highlights the existence of concentrated clusters (or “isles”) of more intense cooperation, particularly among certain countries. These include France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Greece and the Netherlands. Their enhanced presence is not surprising, as these states have expressed their interest in leveraging the EDF funding since its early stages. Another factor may be that large and promising projects naturally gravitate toward countries with high R&D capacity, experience or enhanced dual-use capabilities. At the same time, entities from smaller states seek to “plug into” projects led by bigger players to gain access to European consortia so that they receive EU funding, build their reputational capital and integrate more fully into the European defence value chains.

The third key insight relates to participation in specific categories. The data (Figures 3-20) clearly shows that not all countries are equally represented across all categories of defence R&D. Participation levels often correspond to national comparative advantages, specialisations or geostrategic profiles. For example, in the naval domain, all entities come from participating countries with direct maritime borders. Moreover, the participation of (entities from) Finland, Norway, Sweden and the Baltic states in underwater warfare is noteworthy, given the hybrid attacks and sabotage incidents targeting undersea infrastructure in the Nordic-Baltic region. This finding reinforces the idea that the EDF constitutes a mirror of national industrial strengths and strategic preferences.

Finally, a fourth finding concerns the increasingly pivotal role of project coordinators. As noted before by Fiott (2024), coordinating an EDF project entails more than administrative responsibility. Project coordinators act as network builders and managers. Taking into account this dense network of cooperation, their role becomes extremely important.

Limitations and future research

While the findings presented above offer a valuable overview of defence industrial cooperation through the EDF, five main limitations should be acknowledged, each of which may function as a fruitful ground for future research.

1. The analysis is primarily quantitative. While it captures the presence of cooperation between entities from different countries, it does not measure the quality, depth or strategic significance of those partnerships. To assess these dimensions, qualitative case studies are needed, while interviews with project coordinators and national contact points could shed further light on substantial (internal) issues of collaboration within each consortium.
2. Directly correlated to the first limitation, qualitative research may reveal interesting facts about the ownership of companies (i.e., the country of origin of the parent companies) that benefit from EDF (co)-funding. For instance, Greece’s INTRACOM Defense, which has been awarded at least 15 million EUR through the EDF, was acquired by Israel Aerospace Industries – Israel’s biggest state-owned defence company – in March 2023. Another example would be MILREM AS, whose majority stake was acquired by the Emirate EDGE GROUP in February 2023. Furthermore, the US has also been indirectly involved in EDF projects (e.g., EPIIC 2021), for example, through Germany’s Rockwell Collins Deutschland GmbH, a subsidiary of Rockwell Collins, Inc. More importantly, for Greece, Miilux Oy, a Finnish manufacturing company participating in the EDF 2021 project ECOBALLIFE, had its majority shares acquired by Türkiye’s OYAK Group in 2019. The discussion about the ownership shares and the (indirect) participation of entities from third countries has become more relevant after the SAFE Regulation and the broader discussion it has triggered regarding the role and participation of third countries in EU-funded schemes and initiatives.
3. The current methodology maps cooperation at the country level, but not specific patterns of partner selection within each consortium. It would be interesting to examine whether the big players tend to cooperate with specific entities of equal size from certain countries, indicating a process of cartelisation in the defence sector.
4. The study does not assess the level of EU financial contribution allocated to each project, nor does it analyse the specific distribution of the funding among participating entities. Thus, it does not entirely capture the financial weight or the strategic importance of each entity’s involvement.
5. The political context of cooperation is also not reflected in the dataset. It would be valuable to cross-reference industrial partnerships with indicators of political alignment or joint strategic interests. This could help policymakers understand to what extent defence industrial cooperation reflects broader geopolitical considerations.

Policy Recommendations

Different theoretical approaches offer alternative accounts for the dynamics driving the evolution of the EDF, stressing either its neofunctionalist features or its intergovernmentalist operational logic. To our understanding, it is clear that the EDF evolves into a mechanism for deeper structural integration in the defence sector by creating transnational consortia, fostering interoperability, and promoting European technological development and innovation. The increasing reliance on cross-border defence industrial partnerships and the creation of a dense network of cooperation may be the drivers for deeper political cooperation.

Building on all the above, three key policy recommendations emerge. Firstly, the EDF’s success would justify a significant increase in its funding under the upcoming MFF. This will not only consolidate existing cooperation but also pave the way for more ambitious and strategically relevant projects. The commercialisation of successful EDF projects must also be supported through financial means, as proposed in the White Paper, while the implementation of European defence projects of common interest should take into consideration the lessons learnt, the good practices from the EDF as well as the Union’s strategic needs.

Secondly, to prevent the emergence of cartel dynamics, where a limited number of large players dominate most projects, the EU should further strengthen measures to promote inclusivity and broader participation. Additional tailored incentives for SMEs must be promoted, while incentives for entities from less-represented countries shall also be considered. These actors may often offer significant added value, but they lack the institutional access and means compared to large defence contractors. The European Defence Innovation Scheme’s (EUDIS) matchmaking process could be further expanded.

Last but not least, in the case of Greece, its entities have already demonstrated a capacity to contribute meaningfully to various categories. Greek authorities should encourage greater participation not only from defence firms but also from research institutes and universities. Indeed, involvement in EDF projects would not only provide additional funding streams for their activities, but also facilitate access to cutting-edge European networks, strengthen their visibility and create high-skilled employment opportunities in Greece. This mobilisation of scientific talent and research infrastructure can be closely linked to “Rebrain Greece”, which aims to reverse the brain drain. EU-level funding could serve as a strong incentive for these highly skilled professionals to return and contribute to the development of a competitive Greek defence innovation ecosystem.

Annex I: General matrix

 

 

 

75 victimes de maltraitance dans un établissement clandestin proche de Stara Zagora et six personnes en état d'arrestation. Les scandales dans les maisons de retraite bulgares s'enchaînent, alors qu'explose la demande de soins et d'hébergement.

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Les rebelles de l’AFC/M23 ont interpellé, jeudi 12 juin, plus de 150 jeunes lors d’une opération dite de bouclage dans la cité de Saké, au Nord-Kivu.

Certaines sources proches de la rébellion justifient cette opération, qui n’est pas la première dans la zone, par le souci de stabiliser Saké, en proie à plusieurs cas d’insécurité.

Après une vérification des identités, certains de ces jeunes devraient être relâchés, indiquent les mêmes sources.

Nommé à la tête du Secrétariat à la planification écologique, Augustin Augier prend les rênes d’une instance stratégique en plein marasme écologique en France. Une situation dont il a bien conscience, et pour laquelle il entend trouver des « solutions concrètes », a-t-il confié à La Tribune.

The United States said it had no part in the operation, which raises the risk of a fresh escalation in tensions in the Middle East.

Statistisches Bundesamt: WIESBADEN (ots) - Großhandelsverkaufspreise, Mai 2025 +0,4 % zum Vorjahresmonat -0,3 % zum Vormonat Die Verkaufspreise im Großhandel waren im Mai 2025 um 0,4 % höher als im Mai 2024. Im April 2025 hatte die Veränderungsrate gegenüber dem ...

Statistisches Bundesamt: WIESBADEN (ots) - Die Zahl der beantragten Regelinsolvenzen in Deutschland ist nach vorläufigen Angaben des Statistischen Bundesamtes (Destatis) im Mai 2025 um 0,7 % gegenüber dem Vorjahresmonat gesunken. Das war der erste Rückgang dieses ...