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On 18 May 2016, two delegations representing respectively the insurgent faction of Hezb-e Islami-ye Afghanistan and the Afghan High Peace Council (HPC) initialled a draft peace agreement that should end Hezb’s armed struggle. The status of the document – and whether it may still be subject to changes – is not fully clear, but there is optimism in official circles, particularly within the HPC, that the actual agreement may be signed soon. The government and some of its allies see the draft agreement as a possible blueprint for a peace accord with the Taleban—who so far have shown little interest. As AAN co-directors Thomas Ruttig and Martine van Bijlert write, there are however still some stumbling blocks and open questions.

On 18 May 2016, after several earlier meetings that were widely reported on in the national and international press, the High Peace Council and a delegation of the armed wing of Hezb-e Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar finalised a draft peace agreement. The document was initialled (not signed) in the house of HPC chairman Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani who was appointed in February 2016 (his house currently serves as a temporary HPC office). A photo of the two groups after the meeting was immediately circulated on social media and the draft agreement was presented as an important achievement for the now-reformed HPC that is still struggling to prove its usefulness. (1)

The HIG and HPC delegations after initialling the agreement. Photo c/o Mutmaeen/ Twitter.

Background

Hezb-e Islami has been led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar ever since it was founded in the second half of the 1970s (2). During the Soviet occupation in the 1980s, it received the lion’s share of funding handed out to the Afghan mujahedin by western and Arab governments, through Pakistan’s ISI, who believed Hezb to be the most effective anti-Soviet force. The group lost western support when Hekmatyar spoke out in favour of Saddam Hussain during the first Gulf War, and most of Pakistan’s support when Islamabad started favouring the Taleban movement in the mid-1990s. After the collapse of the Taleban regime, Hezb split, or divided itself, into the insurgent faction that is now often called Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) and a wing that was registered as a legal political party inside Afghanistan. This relegated HIG to a far distant second place in the Afghan insurgency. HIG currently controls fighters in many provinces across the country, with strongholds in Wardak, Baghlan, Kapisa, Farah and Kunar, but it has not consolidated any significant territorial control or parallel administration-like structures, like the Taleban. Its military impact is also significantly smaller.

Politically, Hezb’s legal wing was more successful. In order to get registered, it distanced itself from the insurgency and Hekmatyar, as demanded by the US government but it did not burn all bridges. Its continuing relationship with the HIG wing became more and more open over the years. As we wrote in 2013, representatives of both the insurgent HIG and of the registered Hezb faction in Kabul

… have implied in interviews with AAN that there is only one Hezb-e Islami and [that there are] no splinter groups. This, of course, conflicts with the pre-condition of the registration of Hezb’s Kabul wing and also contradicts earlier statements of the Kabul-based faction that Hekmatyar could not return to work under the party’s name.

With positions in the government, both on the central and the subnational levels, the largest number of seats in parliament and several provincial governor positions, both under the Karzai and the Ghani/Abdullah government, Hezb may well politically be the best represented mujahedin party inside Afghanistan (more detail in this AAN analysis) – approximately on par with its old foe Jamiat-e Islami, from which it split in the 1970s. In 2014, a Hekmatyar deputy, Qutbuddin Helal, ran for president as an ‘independent,’ gathering 2.75 per cent of the vote in the first round. It never became fully clear whether he did this on his own or with Hekmatyar’s backing, nor was he required to distance himself from the insurgency before being accepted as a candidate. What added to the confusion was the fact that HIG’s official position on the elections kept changing, from participating to ‘boycotting’ while tacitly accepting Helal’s candidacy (more in previous AAN analyses, here and here).

The current draft agreement between HIG and the government follows years of negotiations through different channels. Talks started under president Karzai, around 2008 (or even earlier), but had no tangible results. They were then restarted under Ghani. HIG negotiator Karim told AP that Ghani in July 2014, while he was still campaigning to become president, had already approached Hekmatyar with a letter, suggesting to re-initiate talks.

What is in the agreement?

According to a soft copy of the agreement, dated 26 Saur 1395 (15 May 2016), that has widely circulated in Kabul and that AAN has obtained, Hezb will agree to cease all military anti-government activity and recognise the current Afghan constitution, in exchange for an exemption from prosecution for “the leader and the members of Hezb-e Islami with regard to past political and military measures [eqdamat]”, integration into the political system and a strong, if still undefined, role in political decision-making.

Many stipulations are left rather vague and remain subject to clarification by a “joint executive commission” (kamisyun-e mushtarak-e ejrayawi) that is to be established with a parity of representatives from both sides. This commission will also be responsible for the oversight of the agreement’s implementation and to settle disputes stemming from it.

The agreement starts with a preamble and general commitments (ta’ahudat) from both sides. These include the commitment to the current Afghan constitution and the values enshrined in it, including a specific reference to articles 2 and 3 stipulating that no Afghan law can be against “the tenets and provisions of Islam” and extending this further by stating that “the religious principles and guidance will be the original foundation of all laws and government action [italics by the author].” Furthermore there are joint commitments to elections, equality of women and men before the law, and Afghanistan as a unitary state that belongs to “all tribes [ethnic groups] and people” on its territory. Both sides also support the withdrawal of the foreign military forces “based on agreements that are in the national interest of the country.”

Chapter Two is divided into two parts and spells out the commitments made by each side: 14 for the government and four for HIG.

Based on the draft HIG commits that, after the agreement is signed, it will, “in order to permanently stop the war and violence (…) become active in the country as an important political party,” announce a “permanent ceasefire”, stop all military activity and dissolve its military structures. It will also release all prisoners and hand them over to the government, while the government arranges for the security of HIG members. HIG undertakes to maintaining no relationship with terrorist groups and illegal armed organisations and to giving no support to them. It will move its party offices to the provincial capitals and support the government’s peace efforts.

The list of government commitments starts with legal commitments. The government promises to work with the UN Security Council and all concerned states and international organisations to lift all sanctions against Hezb, its leader and members “in the shortest possible time” (Art. 5). It says it will provide legal immunity for the party’s leader and members and free all HIG-related prisoners who have not been sentenced for certain crimes and both sides agree on. To accomplish this, a “special judicial commission” will be established within three months. HIG will guarantee that released prisoners do not return to the battlefield (Art. 11).

On the political side, the government commits to provide freedom of travel and accommodation for “the honorable leader of Hezb-e Islami and other eminent personalities of that party” (Art. 6) and to give Hekmatyar the choice “of two or three appropriate residences,” including security arrangements, for which it will take on the costs (Art. 10). It will, according to the text of the agreement, further honour Hekmatyar in a special presidential decree “for his efforts for the liberation of the country,” (Art. 9) and will officially announce the right of Hezb to be active both in the political and the social realm and to participate in all elections, (Art. 7). It will also arrange for the presence of Hezb in the “consultation process for important government policies” (Art. 12).

The articles that most explicitly seek to provide Hezb with a guaranteed role in the government are 13 to 15.  Art. 13 provides for participation of Hezb in “government institutions,” the modalities of which will be agreed on in the joint commission and proposed to the presidential office. The same goes for the integration of “interested HIG individuals [fighters] and commanders” into the government forces (Art. 14). Art. 15 provides for the re-instating of officials and officers linked to HIG, who had been in government positions earlier, “based on the law.” This article leaves open to which positions and which period of time it refers.

It is in particular these articles, that contradict the claims of Hezb representatives, like deputy to the CEO Khan Muhammad and HIG chief negotiator Karim, that the agreement does not represent a ‘power sharing’ arrangement and that Hezb has neither demanded, nor been promised concrete government posts.

The agreement also provides for the voluntary return of refugees from HIG-related camps in Pakistan and other HIG members in exile, and the equal treatment of HIG-related disabled persons and family members of martyrs. Returnees will receive land “in Kabul and other provinces,” and about 20,000 families will be given help from “the international community.”

Art. 8 insists that the government is to “provide the circumstances for more reform of the electoral process” and to ensure HIG’s presence in the “reform process of the electoral system.” Hezb concedes that there might be not sufficient time to carry out electoral reform before the coming elections, but seems to have received assurance that there will be an “adjustment of the electoral system towards a party-based, proportional system” (nezam-e entekhabati-ye mutanaseb-e hezbi). The insistence on electoral reform and a role for Hezb in the reform process, shows political savvy and pragmatism, as it seeks influence in the electoral (reform) process and the electoral bodies, with an eye to future elections. Here, it partly overlaps with its old rival, Jamiat-e Islami, that favours strengthening parliamentary elements and the role of parties in the political system and, by that, decreasing the power of the president. Given that it is already extensively present in most spheres of the Afghan political system, Hezb probably assumes it would do well in party-based system.

HIG chief negotiator Eng. Muhammad Amin Karim,. Photo: Pajhwok.

Likely impact of the agreement

Although any cessation or decrease of violence will be welcomed by the population and it is clear that the government is keen to show success after the difficulties in its talks with the Taleban, the text of the agreement does suggest that the ‘peace’ may be bought rather expensively. Hezb’s comparatively low military impact on the current battlefield means that the agreement is unlikely to result in a major shift in the strategic balance between the insurgency and the government forces.

The agreement, if indeed signed and implemented as drafted, will result in a display of prestige for Hezb leader Hekmatyar, providing him a red-carpet return to the country, as well as honours, support and special treatment for him and his followers. The renewed access to resources is likely to translate into political power, as seen when Hekmatyar’s co-mujahedin leader returned to Afghanistan after having been pushed out by the Taleban in the mid-1990s.

It is debatable whether an agreement that so explicitly seeks to give positions and privileges as part of the peace negotiations, is the way to go. Or whether it will indeed be a good blueprint for a possible future peace accord with the Taleban. The experience of the NUG should serve as a warning that the division of government between different camps that need to negotiate every major decision and appointment along formulas reflecting power arithmetics, greatly complicates the business of governing. It hampers the prospects for reform and development, and threatens to bring the government to the point of paralysis.

How and when will the agreement become valid?

Technically, the ‘signing ceremony’ that was announced on social media and in the press, merely signalled the fact that the draft agreement was finalised and initialled by both sides (this was confirmed by a member of the HPC). But there seems to be some disagreement on how ‘final’ the current draft might be. A source close to the HPC told AAN on 19 May 2016 that the document “cannot be subject to any further changes [as it] has the agreement of all sides,” including that of “the internationals,” and because the HPC acted on behalf of the Afghan government.

On the other hand, Hezb chief negotiator Eng. Muhammad Amin Karim told Pajhwok on 14 May 2016 that the draft agreement – which according to him had already been finalised on 11 May – would continue to be shared with key members and officials of Hezb across the country and that this process could take “a few weeks or two months. (…) If they have no concern, the agreement will become ready for signature,” he said.

The draft that has circulated mentions three signatories to the agreement: the head of the High Peace Council, the leader (“Amir”) of Hezb-e Islami-ye Afghanistan and the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (see this picture). However, the sequence of the signing does not seem to be clear yet, or even between whom the agreement will be: whether it is a tripartite agreement signed by HIG, HPC and the president, or whether it is between HIG and the HPC, with a presidential endorsement. This would seem to make a difference in its enforceability.

HPC sources have told Afghan media that they envisage Hekmatyar coming to the country for a joint signing ceremony with the Afghan government. This was confirmed to AAN, with the addition that the time and venue are not clear yet. (3) Hezb chief negotiator Eng. Muhammad Amin Karim, on the other hand, told Pajhwok on 14 May 2016 that the return of Hekmatyar to Kabul was not a condition for signing the deal, but that it would facilitate the signing of the agreement immediately after it was signed by the president and the high peace council chairman.

Possible stumbling blocks

Although the High Peace Council and some officials appear optimistic about the scope of the current draft agreement, there are a few potential stumbling blocks and complexities. There is first of all a sequencing problem in the draft’s provision on taking HIG, Hekmatyar and other party leaders from the sanctions lists.

Hekmatyar was designated a “global terrorist” by the United States in 2003 and, on the request of the US, blacklisted by the United Nations in the same year. In both cases, HIG as an organisation is not listed. (Since 2005, it is on the British government’s list of “proscribed terrorist organisations”, though.) The Afghan government commits in the draft agreement to start the process to lift all sanctions against Hezb-e Islami, but such proceedings tend to take months, if not years, and apparently the Afghan government has not yet started. There are indications that Hekmatyar does not intend to sign the agreement until after the de-listing. Hezb chief negotiator Karim told Pajhwok (English version, not accurately translated, here) – partly cited in indirect quotes – that it was impossible for the HIA leadership to come to Kabul to sign the agreement when the HIA youth were imprisoned – a reference to Hezb fighters still in Afghan government custody – and that removing sanctions on HIG and removing names of the party leaders from blacklists were a prerequisite to sign the peace deal. In a direct quote from the interview, he said: “You cannot make peace with a party which [simultaneously] has its leadership on a list that makes it your target and on which a bounty is placed; such action is against the peace process.”

The de-listing, in turn, is complicated by the fact that the US apparently wants a clear commitment from Hezb that it will and has severed all links with terrorist groups and particularly, and explicitly, with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (Daesh). The draft, though, only speaks of “terrorist groups and illegal armed groups” in general. According to a source in the international community, the relevant Article 19 might, for that reason, still not be the final version.

In general, however, the US government expressed its “support” for “an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned process for a negotiated … resolution of the conflict in Afghanistan.” The State Department’s spokesman on 17 May 2016 went on to say:

All relevant groups, including Hezb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, should be a part of such a political dialogue so that Afghans can talk directly to other Afghans about the future of their country. So in this regard, we would welcome political negotiations that have been taking place. (…) we’re going to continue to seek reconciliation conditions, including that any reconciled group must end the violence – these are end conditions, not preconditions – that any reconciled group must end violence, break associations with international terrorism, and accept Afghanistan’s constitution, as we’ve said many times, which includes the protections for women and for minorities.

Another stumbling block could be the long-standing and often violent rivalry between Hezb and the former ‘Northern Alliance,’ and particularly its core party, Jamiat-e Islami. This rivalry dates back to the early years of both parties; it continued throughout the Soviet occupation (1979-89), and did not end when the Soviets departed. (4)

The animosity resounds in statements like that of former intelligence chief (and erstwhile assistant to Ahmad Shah Massud) Amrullah Saleh, who lambasted Hekmatyar in a Facebook post for his Pakistani connections and his “40 years in a place of anti-Afghanistan conspiracies” and tweeted that “[t]hree pages of vague & rosy redemption doesn’t make a terrorist a good person overnight“ – although in both cases without mentioning his name.

CEO Abdullah, in contrast, who belonged to Jamiat’s inner leadership during the most vicious conflicts with Hezb, stated some days ago that the situation had changed. He said he had already enjoyed the support of Hezb’s registered wing during the 2014 elections and was now ready to sit down with Hekmatyar for a meal in a sign of reconciliation.

Other consequences of the agreement

One of the major consequences of a possible return of Hekmatyar to Afghanistan will be the possible merging of the different, currently quarrelling factions of Hezb that are politically active in the country and of HIG under a united leadership. There are three groups: the registered mainstream party, led by Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal, who was economy minister under Karzai, that supported Abdullah in the 2014 election; the so-called Alliance of Hezb-e Islami Councils, a loose group of party heavyweights that did not follow Arghandiwal in the elections and supported Ghani instead; and a smaller sub-faction led by Muhammad Khaled Faruqi, who belongs to the same tribe as Hekmatyar. Faruqi was the first leader of Hezb’s wing inside Afghanistan before it was registered in 2004 and – not fully voluntarily – replaced after a party congress in 2007 by Arghandiwal. Several attempts, including by Hekmatyar deputy Helal, have been made in the past to bring these groups together again, but so far they have failed.

Renewed unification attempts – that of course also serve to improve one’s position in case Hekmatyar’s does indeed return to the country and the top of the party – have already gained a new dynamic. Juma Khan Hamdard, a former governor of Balkh and Paktia and member of the Hezb Councils, recently brought together Hezb members of different strands to prepare for the return of Hekmatyar (see this picture). According to Afghan media, former presidential candidate and Hekmatyar deputy Helal meanwhile has been made the “joint head of Hezb-e Islami’s branches.”

If the agreement, in its current form, is indeed endorsed and implemented, it could also result in the return of thousands of refugees from camps in Pakistan, particularly from Shamshatu, a refugee settlement near Peshawar, that has traditionally been controlled and used as both a recruitment reservoir and the seat of the party’s leadership council by Hezb. A mass return of such a politically allied population, particularly if they are housed in specific areas, would provide Hezb with a continued recruitment and mobilisation base. Moreover, a preferential treatment for returnees from Shamshatu may well alienate other returnees who already have to struggle with a myriad of problems, particularly access to land (AAN analysis on this here). And it might draw ‘new’ Afghan refugees to Shamshatu, who have been living elsewhere in Pakistan so far.

The draft agreement mentions international support for the voluntary return of 20,000 families (although AAN was told by UNHCR that it had not yet been contacted by the government on the issue). According to a joint document of UNHCR and the administration of the Pakistani Khyber Agency, where Shamshatu is situated, the HIG section of Shamshatu had 37,995 inhabitants in October 2015. But given the long existence of Shamshatu (it is some times called a “refugee village” rather than a “camp”), a significant number of families might want to stay put.

Does the peace agreement signal impunity?

The draft peace agreement raises questions as what to do with the accusations and evidence of gross human rights violations during the decades of war (for detail see for example the report “Casting Shadows: War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: 1978-2001“ by The Afghanistan Justice Project. Patricia Gossman, senior Afghanistan researcher for Human Rights Watch, has summarised this recently in the Los Angeles Times:

Many Afghans revile Hekmatyar because his forces relentlessly and indiscriminately rocketed and shelled Kabul in the early 1990s. His forces weren’t the only ones to do it, but they carried out some of the worst attacks, killing and wounding thousands.”

But it seems Hezb will be protected twice against being held to account, first by the particular clause in the peace agreement and second by the so-called amnesty bill (AAN analysis here) that came into force in 2010 and provides a blanket amnesty to all sides for the pre-2001 Afghan wars. This, of course, does not preclude accountability based on international law.

Although the International Criminal Court (ICC) has mentioned HIG in its preliminary reports, there are no indications that intends to investigate allegations against the party, given the ICC’s worldwide workload and HIG’s relative insignificance, particularly after 2003 when Afghanistan became party to the ICC. It would be in the capacity of the ICC, however, to look into the last large terrorist attack claimed by Hezb, a suicide bombing in Kabul in May 2013, as a result of which 16 people, including three US citizens, were killed.

In contrast to when he chose General Dostum as his running mate in 2014 (see AAN analysis here), President Ghani does not seem to have insisted on a public apology from HIG for its involvement in past violence. The specific honours promised to Hekmatyar will be difficult to swallow for the relatives of victims of Hezb, both among the civilian population and the former rival mujahedin.

A blueprint for peace with the Taleban?

The government and some of its international allies also seem to hope that the agreement could serve as a possible blueprint for a desired peace accord with the Taleban (see for example here). But this seems overly optimistic. First, the Taleban have repeatedly rebuffed overtures of the Kabul government for direct talks. Attempts to arm-twist them into accepting such talks by the Quadrilateral Coordination Group have so far gone nowhere (the QCG just held its fifth meeting amid a low of optimism, after Afghanistan hardened its position vis-à-vis both Pakistan and the Taleban; see AAN analysis here). In contrast to the Taleban’s rejectionist position, Hezb had not just initiated, but had keenly pursued talks with the government in Kabul under Karzai. This can be largely explained by the fact that a peace deal was always likely to increase, possibly even inflate, Hezb’s political and military relevance – both in the run-up to and after any eventual agreement.

A Taleban spokesman explicitly poured cold water over the idea that they may be inspired to follow suit, when he stated that the deal with Hezb-e Islami would have “no impact” on the movement’s position and that “a majority of Hezb-i-Islami members are already part of the government.”

It is also questionable that the Taleban would be inspired by an organisation with which they had enjoyed increasingly strained relations, particularly in the last years, although they were theoretically fighting the same enemies. The two groups started as rivals when the Taleban emerged in the mid-1990s. The Taleban then defeated Hezb on its way from Kandahar to Kabul and absorbed a number of its fighters; Hekmatyar had to give up his headquarters in Chahrasyab, south of Kabul, under their first their onslaught in early 1995 and fled to Iran a year later, when they took Kabul. After the US-led military intervention, Hekmatyar entered into a tacit alliance with the Taleban. At least, that is what he said in a 2006 interview with the Arabic newspaper al-Hayat (quoted here):

We issued clear instructions to the Mojaheddin in Hezb-e Eslami to help anyone acting against the occupation in their areas. We respect and appreciate the efforts everyone is exerting in this direction. I admit to you, as head of the Hezb-e Eslami organization here, that there is not, very unfortunately, comprehensive and full coordination in all the fields and fronts with “Al-Qa’idah” and Taleban at the leaders’ level, though this is present at the individuals’ level in the various areas and we back it and wish it to spread and broaden. […] We negotiated with the Taleban on the various issues. But, very unfortunately, we have not reached an official agreement so far. The brothers in Taleban are acting alone and independently and we are acting alone and independently too.’

In March 2007, Hekmatyar announced an end to this cooperation because “certain elements among the Taliban rejected the idea of a joint struggle against the aggressor” and proclaimed his readiness for talks with the Karzai government. Since then, repeated fighting has been reported between the two groups, including in the Hezb strongholds in Baghlan and Wardak.

What will happen now?

There are rumours that Hekmatyar may be in bad health. Afghanistan’s first lady, Rula Ghani, told the audience at an event held by the US Institute of Peace (quoted here) that Hekmatyar and other former mujahedin leaders were “old people” who should be allowed to come back. “If they want to come to Afghanistan and finish their lives where they were born, I think it is only the human way to say, ‘OK, you come, but we put some conditions.’” Others are more sceptical: “I think he is very ambitious. He would not come to Kabul and accept an isolated life,” said Haroun Mir, a Kabul-based political analyst. “He would certainly engage in politics, and we know what kind of politics he favors…”

Hekmatyar’s senior co-mujahedin leader, the late Maulawi Yunos Khales, was quoted in a 2006 portrait of the Hezb leader published by the Jamestown Foundation:

I pray to god to let Hekmatyar live among us in Pakistan, but I don’t want him with us in Afghanistan because he would not let anyone, other than himself, become the country’s leader.

 

(1) The Washington Post reported that the HPC was kept “technically operational” after the “US rushed in $5 million to pay [HPC] administrators” while the money for the Afghanistan Peace and Reconciliation Programme managed by the Joint Secretariat under the HPC was “drying up… amid broader scrutiny here [in Afghanistan] and in Washington of de-radicalization efforts.”

(2) The exact founding year is contested. Hezbis often mention 1968, but the actual split of the originally unified, but loosely organised urban Islamist movement into Jamiat and Hezb happen in the mid-1970s, most likely as a result of the failed uprising in July 1975.

(3) It is not fully clear where Hekmatyar is now. First deputy to the CEO, Khan Muhammad, who is from Hezb’s legal wing in Afghanistan recently said he did not know Hekmatyar’s whereabouts. HIG usually claims he is based inside Afghanistan, but he is mainly believed to shuttle between Afghanistan (particularly Kunar) and Chitral, Bajaur and Mohmand agencies on the Pakistani side of the border. Many of his followers and part of the party’s leadership live in Shamshatu camp in Pakistan and his sons live in Peshawar. Hekmatyar has stopped holding speeches in the camp since the emergence of the Taleban in mid-1990s. His last Eid message was read in his name.

(4) The rivalry between Hezb and Jamiat started in 1975 when Hekmatyar and Massud, then members of the Muslim Youth (Jawanan-e Musalman), accused each other of betrayal after their armed Islamist uprising against then President Muhammad Daud failed. After the emergence of their separate organisations, fighters of both sides clashed in Parachinar (Pakistan) as early as in December 1978, according to Edward Girardet (Edward Girardet, Killing the Cranes: A Reporter’s Journey Through Three Decades of War in Afghanistan, 2001, p 174-5 and Edward Girardet, Afghanistan: The Soviet War, 1985, p 170). A climax was reached, when on 9 July 1989 a group of commanders associated with Massud’s Shura-ye Nazar – Jamiat’s main military wing – ran into a Hezb ambush on their way back from a planning meeting with Massud in Farkhar district, Takhar province. 30 men were killed, including seven commanders. The ambushers were hunted down, captured by Massud’s men, sentenced to death and executed in December 1989 in a public park in Taloqan (read here and here).

In late April 1992, when the Najib government collapsed, both sides clashed heavily over control of Kabul, with Massud’s forces gaining the upper hand and pushing Hekmatyar’s forces out of Kabul (Hekmatyar was officially the Prime Minister, but had not yet been instated as he was kept out of the city by the fighting). On the morning of New Year’s Day 1994, an alliance of Hezb with Khalili’s Wahdat and Dostum’s Jombesh tried to topple the Jamiat government, triggering years of fighting that ultimately resulted in the emergence of Taleban, who pushed both Jamiat and Hezb out of Kabul. In a last ditch effort to fend off the Taleban in June 1996, Jamiat made peace with Hezb and Hekmatyar was allowed to return to Kabul for the first time since his student days, where he was sworn into the position of Prime Minister he had been denied so far. The Bonn conference after the fall of the Taleban brought Jamiat to power, while Hezb was not invited.

Les opérations de forcenés sont tout aussi dangereuse que celles contre des terroristes : un gendarme
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Dans une lettre ouverte adressée au premier ministre Viktor Orbán, le groupe des « 1001 médecins sans pots de vin », qui s’est constitué pour lutter contre la pratique généralisée des dessous de table dans le domaine de la santé, s’alarme de l’effondrement du système de soins psychiatriques en Hongrie. L’hebdomadaire Vasárnapi Hírek a interviewé le Docteur Péter Álmos, l’un des auteurs de cette lettre*. Ce qui suit est la traduction de cette interview réalisée par Anna Kertész et publiée le 30 avril. Crédit photo : Vasárnapi Hírek

Cette lettre a suscité beaucoup moins d’attention que les précédentes. Pourtant, d’une part elle formule des affirmations stupéfiantes à propos des soins psychiatriques, d’autre part elle décrit l’effondrement du système de santé. Ce faible intérêt est-il révélateur du rôle social du secteur psychiatrique ?

Oui, c’est probablement dû à cela et non pas au fait que l’état du secteur de la santé intéresse moins les gens. Notre groupe s’élargit de plus en plus, il compte près de 2000 médecins et quelques centaines d’autres membres. C’est un fait que ses manifestations précédentes ont suscité plus d’attention. Ainsi en est-il de notre geste d’attirer l’attention des députés sur le fait que, si le président de la banque centrale, selon son propre jugement, travaille aussi bien que son collègue tchèque, et pour cela mérite un salaire semblable, alors que cela soit vrai également pour les travailleurs de la santé.

C’était une lettre de quelques lignes alors que nous avons travaillé pendant un mois et demi sur notre écrit analysant l’effondrement des soins psychiatriques. Mais nous ne le destinions pas au grand public, mais plutôt à être un matériau fait pour amorcer un débat. La situation que nous avons exposée a stupéfié également les membres du groupe travaillant sur d’autres domaines.

La lettre commence par cette affirmation percutante selon laquelle le secteur des soins psychiatriques s’est effondré.

Ce avec quoi les travailleurs de la santé nous « effraient », à savoir que le système s’effondre, cela est quelque part déjà arrivé. Cela ne peut pas être comparé à la faillite d’une banque, c’est une sorte d’état végétatif, plus exactement un état où les soins sont insuffisants et parfois mettent en danger les gens. Récemment j’ai lu dans un article qu’en Indonésie les malades mentaux sont gardés enchaînés dans des cages… Cela aussi peut être considéré comme des soins… Nous, ici au centre de l’Europe, nous avançons à reculons au regard des conditions des soins psychiatriques.

Le monde occidental progresse vers l’intégration, il met en avant les soins communautaires ; chez nous, dans les années passées, les cliniques de province ont été soit évincées des campus universitaires, soit sursaturées au moment des fusions avec les hôpitaux. Malgré les protestations, à Debrecen et à Szeged, les cliniques psychiatriques ont échouées dans l’ancien hôpital de la ville ; à Pécs, ils ont entassé les lits hospitaliers dans le bâtiment de la clinique… Des lits se sont retrouvés dans les réfectoires, dans les salles d’activités ou d’enseignement. Dans ce domaine, le développement signifie que le département psychiatrique reçoit un nouveau lit si, ailleurs, ils en éliminent un. Ce secteur n’exige pas de moyens médicaux chers, les conditions minimales sont d’un niveau beaucoup plus bas que dans d’autres secteurs, mais avec un tel niveau de financement il ne peut assurer ses tâches, il ne peut accéder aux moyens nécessaires.

En psychiatrie, je pense quand même que la présence du médecin serait le plus important.

Oui, c’est un domaine particulier dans lequel le médecin ne peut être remplacé par des appareils. Durant les 20 dernières années, le nombre de psychiatres travaillant dans le secteur public a diminué de 40%. Ce sont eux qui ont amorcé le mouvement d’émigration au début des années 2000 car, déjà à cette époque, ils travaillaient ici dans des conditions impossibles, et on ne peut attendre de leur part qu’ils reviennent car celui qui entreprend d’apprendre parfaitement une langue étrangère, ce qui est incontournable dans notre domaine, ne fera pas la navette. La génération du milieu a disparue entièrement et dans une discipline où la transmission de l’expérience est très importante, cela peut avoir des conséquences tragiques car il n’y a plus personne de qui apprendre. Ainsi peut se présenter cette situation dans laquelle un médecin doit examiner 40 malades lors d’une consultation. Dans un tel laps de temps il est impossible de bien s’occuper d’un malade et il faut le faire admettre dans le service même si le séjour en hôpital n’est pas bon pour son état.

Dans son rapport sur la situation de la psychiatrie hongroise, l’Organisation mondiale de la santé a nommé « incitations perverses » les particularités de son financement. Par exemple dans le service « chirurgie », on maintient inutilement des malades à l’hôpital pour que le service perçoive plus de fonds. Il arrive que cela se produise aussi en psychiatrie. Dans les réunions de service hebdomadaires, les médecins ne discutent pas de l’état du malade ou des nouvelles thérapies qu’il serait possible d’appliquer, mais discutent de l’évolution des indicateurs financiers et sur la base de ces derniers, qui peut rester et qui doit être renvoyé chez lui.

Les rapports de l’Ombudsman ont mis à jour des désordres importants dans certains services psychiatriques, des cas de brutalités et de décès inexplicables. Le malade est-il en danger dans les services psychiatriques ?

Disons plutôt qu’il manque cet ensemble de conditions qui le mettrait en sécurité. Les rapports que vous avez mentionné ont révélé des violations du droit très grossières dans lesquelles les travailleurs et les dirigeants du service ont une responsabilité. Mais la véritable responsabilité est celle des financeurs et de ceux qui élaborent les lois. Les protocoles professionnels ont expiré depuis des années, il n’y a pas de loi qui régulerait de façon appropriée les soins donnés aux malades et il n’y a pas les moyens financiers qui assureraient des soins suffisants. Non seulement ils ne peuvent assurer le monitoring d’une femme enceinte (ndlr : allusion au cas d’un bébé mort quelques heures après sa naissance), mais en général ils ne peuvent pas non plus procéder à l’examen du fonctionnement cardiaque, car dans plusieurs départements il n’y a qu’un seul appareil pour faire un électrocardiogramme.

Par ailleurs, il n’y a pas de solution pour isoler un malade dangereux pour les autres, de celui qui, disons, arrive dans le service avec des troubles du comportement. Dans ce genre de situations, effectivement, le service psychiatrique peut devenir un endroit dangereux. La profession demande depuis plusieurs années la création de 5 ou 6 services à haute sécurité. L’État consacre 5 % du total des dépenses de santé à la psychiatrie, mais le nombre de malades et les conséquences de ces maladies justifieraient un financement plus important. Ainsi, la dépression non-soignée figure à la deuxième place dans la liste des maladies entravant l’aptitude au travail et, selon les prévisions, elle pourrait rapidement passer au premier rang.

Selon leur analyse, c’est grâce aux bonnes grâces des firmes de l’industrie pharmaceutique que les services psychiatriques continuent de fonctionner malgré tout. Ceci soulève des questions d’ordre éthique…

Il est important de clarifier la question des relations avec les fabricants de médicaments, qu’elles soient sous surveillance étroite et qu’elles soient absolument légales. Ce n’est pas la cause de la prescription plus fréquente de médicaments, mais plutôt le fait qu’il n’y a pas d’autres moyens de soigner, faute de personnel qualifié. Il y a des symptômes pour lesquels il serait possible d’appliquer une psychothérapie, mais il n’y a ni temps ni ressources pour cela. Les médicaments psychiatriques modernes sont extraordinairement coûteux, une seule injection peut coûter 100 000 forints. Nous, c’est seulement avec les médicaments bon marché que nous pourrions nous en sortir financièrement et donc c’est avec des moyens tombés en désuétude que nous assurerions les soins si les entreprises ne nous faisaient pas cadeau des préparations plus onéreuses. C’est une sorte d’action caritative de leur part,  de la même façon que ce sont elles qui financent une part significative de la formation médicale continue obligatoire. Évidemment il y a dans cela un intérêt économique, car si les services ne fonctionnaient plus, il ne se trouverait plus personne pour prescrire des médicaments au malade.

Si les malades relevant de la psychiatrie ne reçoivent pas les soins appropriés, quelles seraient les conséquences ?

De plus en plus de patients restent seuls et leur mal est non-traité. Ceci fait le lit des problèmes de dépendance et de déshérence sociale. Ce n’est pas un hasard si 30-40% des sans-abri sont concernés. […] En 2014, Viktor Orbán a sollicité l’un des dirigeants de l’OMS pour qu’il procède à l’examen de la situation et élabore un ensemble de propositions. Tout ceci a été fait et le document de travail a été accepté sans changement par la Société Hongroise de Psychiatrie. Depuis lors, aucun écho à propos de la réalisation de ces promesses. La situation de la psychiatrie en Hongrie est devenue une source d’inquiétude dans les milieux professionnels européens.

Avez-vous reçu une réponse de Viktor Orbán ?

Jusqu’à maintenant, non. Mais sa page internet stipule qu’il répond à toutes les lettres. Si de toute façon il ne le fait pas, nous irons plus loin…

* Le Dr Péter Álmos est psychiatre, il a 36 ans et vit à Szeged. Sa spécialité est la façon de soigner les maladies psychotiques.Son domaine de recherches est l’examen de l’arrière plan biologique des maladies mentales. Avec son collègue anesthésiste, le Dr András Lovas, ils ont fondé le groupe « 1001 médecins sans pot de vin » il y a 1 an

Traduction réalisée par Paul Maddens.

Observateur à bord du Falcon 50 sur le crash aérien de l’EgyptAir (crédit : Marine nationale)

(BRUXELLES2) Dans un accident aérien, traditionnellement, ce sont les moyens les plus proches de la zone du crash qui se dirigent sur la zone en secours. Participent également les moyens dont l’avion est originaire (nationalité de la compagnie aérienne, des passagers, lieu de fabrication de l’avion ou du moteur).

Les secours sont coordonnés par le pays où se situe ce crash. Sur terre, c’est évident. En mer, c’est la délimitation des zones de secours (JRCC) qui fixe la responsabilité d’un pays précis.

En l’occurrence, c’est l’Egypte qui est principalement concernée (zone JRCC du lieu supposé du crash, nationalité de la compagnie, 1er pays concerné selon la nationalité des passagers). Mais la Grèce (de par sa proximité géographique) et la France (lieu de décollage de l’avion, de fabrication de l’avion, 2e pays concerné par la nationalité des passagers) le sont également.

A cela s’ajoutent des questions de haute politique. Entre Paris et Le Caire, il y a une alliance de facto politico-militaire que ce soit au plan des achats d’équipement militaire (BPC type Mistral, Frégates, avions) ou sur le plan politico-opérationnel (Libye, lutte contre le terrorisme, processus de paix au Moyen-Orient, etc.).

(NGV)

Cadre juridique international

La règle sur les secours sur accident aérien est posée par la Convention de Chicago (art. 25)

Chaque Etat contractant s’engage à prendre les mesures qu’il jugera réalisable afin de porter assistance aux aéronefs en détresse sur son territoire et, sous réserve du contrôle par ses propres autorités, à permettre aux propriétaires de l’aéronef ou aux autorités de l’Etat dans lequel l’aéronef est immatriculé de prendre les mesures d’assistance nécessitées par les circonstances. Elle se recoupe d’une certaine avec la règle posée par la même convention en matière d’enquête sur l’accident (art. 26) En cas d’accident survenu à un aéronef d’un Etat contractant sur le territoire d’un autre Etat contractant (…), l’Etat dans lequel l’accident s’est produit ouvrira une enquête sur les circonstances de l’accident, en se conformant, dans la mesure où ses lois le permettent, à la procédure qui pourra être recommandée par l’Organisation de l’Aviation civile internationale (= OACI). Selon l’OACI, les données de l’enquête sont alors envoyés à l’État d’immatriculation (de l’avion), l’État de l’exploitant, l’État de conception et l’État de construction

This month, several initiatives concerning the Schengen Area of free movement have been taken at European level, either as consequence of the political pressure some (core) member States put on the European institutions either as developments of previous interventions by the European Commission in the field. This last has for umpteenth time found a small window of opportunity to push its own agenda, i.e. ensuring a proper European response to the mining effects of the migration crisis has provoked on normal functioning within the Schengen Area. After two years of repeated unilateral national decisions, this institution is regaining control of the situation, gradually appeasing the differences among EU States and the reciprocal mistrust that is nowadays shaping intra-EU relations.

On Monday 2 May 2016, five Schengen member States, already under a temporary regime of exceptional reinforced check at borders, sent a letter to Commissioner Dimitri Avramopoulos (DG Internal Affairs) to obtain an extension of the above mentioned temporary regime, in accordance with article 26 of the Schengen Borders Code (SBC). On Wednesday 4th May, Commissioner Avramopoulos agreed officially to the proposal, submitting a recommendation to the Council to let Norway and four EU members (Austria, Denmark, Germany and Sweden) extend the temporary border check system up to a maximum of six months. The possibility of such a delay of the temporary regime has been anticipated by the Commission itself in the Communication “Back to Schengen – A roadmap”, sent on 4th March 2016 to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council. The Recommendation has been further adopted Thursday 12 May by the Council reunited in its Development formation, starting a new period during which the Commission will monitor and evaluate the concerned members States within 4 months, while these last will report to the Commission every 2 months.

The position of the Commission has been clearly defined in its abovementioned Communication released almost three months ago. One of the primary goals defined is to move “from patchwork to a coherent approach”, as “at this moment in time, there are serious deficiencies in external border control caused by a lack of border surveillance and insufficient registration and identification of irregular migrants. As a consequence of the secondary movements triggered by these deficiencies, member States have [unilaterally] reintroduced internal border controls. (…) If the migratory pressure and the serious deficiencies in external border control were to persist beyond 12 May, the Commission would need to present a proposal under Article 26(2) of the Schengen Borders Code to the Council recommending a coherent Union approach to internal border controls until the structural deficiencies in external border control are mitigated or remedied”. The Communication came after months of declarations by Commission representatives against the dangerous path undertaken by several member States in the last couple of years, following the intensifying arrival of refugees and asylum seekers at the Schengen external border.

Notably, since 2013 Commissioners Avramopoulos (Internal Affairs) and Bieńkowska (DG Internal Market) have constantly reminded that the reinstating of borders controls within Schengen was not only mining symbolically the EU, damaging one of the main pillars of European integration, but also economically damaging EU via the obstacles to a fluid circulation of tourists, students, professionals and goods.

Nowadays, queuing for border controls within the Schengen area appears unusual to the generation of European 20-somethings that experienced their first travels and the professionals whose routine of free-movement has consolidated over the last twenty years. If queuing at borders for ID/vehicle check gives a reinforced feeling of security, this last is nevertheless accompanied by a sense of wasting time and money. Moreover, this step back implicitly puts into question the capability of the ensemble of Schengen members of having achieved solid policy results. In this time of lack of confidence towards EU, the Schengen crisis add just more wood to the existing fire.

The cost of renouncing to Schengen

Born as an agreement to regulate and facilitate free movement within Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, the Schengen Treaty has gradually extended its membership to 26 countries. It conveys and reinforces one of the main pillars of the European Union, freedom of movement, despite the fact that four member States are still not part of it (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, Romania and United Kingdom). The connecting power of Schengen goes beyond the EU, with Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway and Switzerland being part of the area: an area where Europeans travel every year, covering as much as 1.25 billion of annual displacements.

Being without Schengen, or reinstating completely controls at national borders, would seriously damage European economy. Several research institutes have studied the so-called “no-Schengen costs”, for example the increase of trade costs would raise between 470 and 1400 billion euro, as estimated by the German Prognos Institute last February. Prognos’ study specified that additional costs related to time wasted could not be computed, but that in general rising costs would negatively impact international trade, augmenting prices of European export to other countries. If this increase would attain a mere 1%, the subsequent scenario would be that of 470 billion euro lost between 2016 and 2025. If the increase would reach 2%, the billion lost by EU would be 1400, of which 235 billion by Germany and 244 billion by France.

How did we end up speculating on no-Schengen?

In 2013, the increased movements of non-Europeans fleeing war zones and misery concentrated on the external borders of Europe, often with the objective of a precise second displacement, that is to say to pursue the road after entering the Schengen space trough one country to another as final destination. In absence of a coordinated reaction at European level capable of dealing with the new dimension of the migratory phenomenon, Schengen member States decided to reform the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) to establish a new, EU-based, “Schengen evaluation mechanism”. This last consists in the possibility to send inspection teams to make unannounced visits to internal borders in order to halt any “critical situations”, notwithstanding that the arrival of the inspection team (composed by experts from the member states, the Commission, EU agencies and bodies) would be notified to the member States concerned at least 24 hours in advance. Furthermore, the amended SBC contains common rules for the temporary re-instalment of checks at internal borders under exceptional circumstances, tolerable only as last resort measures. The feasibility of such measures must be based on specific objective criteria and on an assessment of its necessity, monitored at Union level, only for a limited amount of time.

It is within this legal framework that from 2015 onwards a series of unilateral decisions has been taken by several states, either because directly concerned by the arrival of migrants and asylum seekers, either because indirectly feeling exposed to secondary displacement of irregular migrants by the lack of capacity to keep the phenomenon under control at the external border (i.e. the maritime one). The first temporary control motivated by an “unprecedented influx of persons seeking international protection” has been disposed in 2015 by Germany between 13 and 22 September and soon reinstated. Other countries followed the example, with three of them having already suspended the temporary regime: in Belgium, controls between West-Vlaanderen and France ended last month (23/02/2016- 22/04/2016), while Slovenia and Hungary did not prolong controls, in force for 30 and 10 days respectively. Except France, all this States introduced measures within the meaning of article 25 of the SBC, which allows border controls for maximum two months for “cases requiring immediate action”. As the situation did not improve significantly, a prolongation up to six months was demanded, based on articles 23 and 24 of SBC, after the various delays would expire between May and June. Controls established at the French borders in November 2015 were not related to migration but to security issues, firstly in the context of the COP21 Conference, after extended as a consequence of the emergency state following the Paris terrorist attacks.

Before the extension granted on 12 May, temporary border controls were still in force in the following countries:

1. Denmark (4/3 – 2/6/2016), all borders with particular focus on the sea and land borders with Germany;
2. Norway (15/1 – 12/5/2016), all borders, with focus on ports with ferry connections to Norway via internal borders;
3. Sweden (10/1 – 7/6/2016), all borders, with special focus on Southern and Western harbours and Öresund Bridge between Denmark and Sweden;
4. Austria (16/11/2015 – 16/5/2016), all borders, the border can be crossed only at the authorised border crossing points;
5. Germany (14/11/2015 – 13/5/2016), all borders, with special focus on the German-Austrian land border;
6. France (13/11/2015 – 26/5/2016), internal land borders and air borders.

Within this background, the Recommendation submitted by the Commission on 4th of May concerned five of the six abovementioned countries (France excluded). As the combined legal base of articles 23, 24 and 25 does not allow to maintain controls beyond a total period of eight months, the coherent approach pursued by the Commission has been that of turning to article 26 of SBC, providing that if “the overall functioning of the Schengen area is put at risk” by exceptional circumstances constituting a serious threat to public policy or internal security”, the Commission “can submit a proposal to the Council for a Recommendation”, a possibility that concretised on 4th of May.

Temporary border controls are just a fraction of the more complex issue of a full comeback of the proper functioning Schengen system. Indeed, two thirds of the Roadmap proposal focused on restoring security at the Greek border, with a strong coordinated support by EU countries, EU agencies and with collective resources. In particular, the Commission renewed with the Roadmap the December 2015 proposal for a European Border and Coast Guard to address structural deficiencies in the Southern European maritime external border. On 12 February 2016, the Council adopted a Recommendation, followed by the European Council of 18-19 February, when three areas of intervention have been identified:

• Normalising the state of migration management in Greece;
• Restore the normal approach of asylum procedures, according with EU law;
• Replace the existing mix of unilateral decisions with a unique coordinated approach to temporary border controls, within December 2016.

The European Commission Roadmap mirrors this three-branched approach, and full attention to the Greek question will be not addressed here, but in a forthcoming article.

A European Coastal Guard

As part of a unique coherent approach, the renewed proposal of a European Coastal Guard has presented as the main measure to deal with the urgency of the migratory phenomenon, the Commission defined insisting on the delay for the adoption of the proposed regulation should not exceed June 2016. If that will be the case, in August at the latest the European Coastal Guard could be operational, delivering the first vulnerability tests by September and allowing necessary preventive measures to be taken before autumn. The urgency being motivated now by the potential change of migration routes (so that every section of EU external borders should be secured and its defence rapidly activated) the Commission referred other measures to single countries and EU agencies to intervene while the juridical iter of the European Coastal Guard is completed. In the Communication, the Commission has prayed member States to promptly activate to pool resources, to support joint operations and border interventions carried out by Frontex agency. The suggestion of the Commission to Frontex has been that of collaborate, within the limits of its mandate, with the European Fisheries Control Agency and the European Maritime Safety Agency to prepare the steps further needed to let the European Border and Coast Guard. The ultimate goal is to lift all internal borders controls within the Schengen area within six months from their introduction, namely by mid-November 2016, adding the full operational European Coastal Guard, we will than have the European coherent response that has been lacking since the migration crisis started.

The absence of a true Schengen coalition or another shadow of euroscepticism

The real obstacle to a coherent European approach to solve the temporary malfunctioning of Schengen lies in the same nationalistic approach that led to the status quo these last years. Of course, it is recognizable that elected governments need to rapidly implement measures to appease phenomena perceived as threats to security by the electorate. And within the current post-economic-crisis phase intra-EU relations are now in, immediate agreement in policy responses to longstanding problems is just not part of current routine. On that note, we can open a parenthesis on the issue of the Brenner border, a case that can easily constitute an example of the actual (lack of) cooperation within the EU consortium. Again, the (shy) answer of the Commission could be considered as part of the attempt to surmount the initiatives taken by several countries to grab little by little control of border again (or the proclaimed “regained sovereignty”).

The dispute over Brenner boarder concerns Austria on one hand and Italy on the other, this last being a country that, as Greece, has carried the burden of patrolling the maritime external border of the EU and the Schengen area these last years. Already at the beginning of 2016, Prime Minister Matteo Renzi complained about the absence of a truly coherent approach to migration, pointing his finger to the absence of coordination and conciliation, as declared during an interview to newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: “If we are looking for a European solution to the refugee problem, then it is not right that Angela [Merkel] first speaks to Hollande and then calls European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, and I only find out about it in the press later”.

Intensified controls over internal borders were then displayed by Austrian authorities, an attempt to calm citizens’ disappointment with the public managing of the incoming migrant. The current coalition government, formerly guided by socialist Werner Faymann, has hardened the national migration policy until passing a law that denies the principle of limitless acceptance. In April, tension mounted in Italy with respect to the campaign for presidential elections and the results of the first round held on 24 April. Norbert Hofer, the candidate for xenophobic Freedom Party (FPÖE) obtained 35% of the preferences, while the second best, Alexander van der Bellen (Greens), obtained only 21% of the preferences. Despite the victory of the Freedom Party, the most significant result has been the defeat of the socialists (SPÖ) and the populars (ÖVP), or the traditional order since the Independence of the Second Republic of Austria in 1955. The socialist Rudolf Hundstorfer and the popular candidate Andreas Khol didn’t reach 11%, while the Freedom Party has accomplished its best performance until now. The Freedom Party already made the headlines in the European press under the leadership of the controversial Jorg Haider, and the current leader Heinz-Christian Strache declared after the polls: « We have written history, today starts a new political era ». The aspiring President Hofer has declared to be willing to endorse a motion of distrust if the government will not adopt stricter measures towards incoming migrants. Needless to say, the extreme right in all its national facets has welcomed the result as the umpteenth confirmation of the European citizenship shift to eurosceptisism and xenophobia. Austria has then announced that it will be building a 370 metre long by 4 metre high barrier at the border with Italy, to stem the flow of migrants, unless Italy would allow Austrian police to patrol trains on Italian territory. It specified that 250 police officers would be mobilised from the end of May and 1500 Austrian soldiers would be available to intervene at the border. Only after a meeting with Italian Minister of Internal Affairs, his Austrian correspondent confirmed solemnly that, in exchange of a strengthened cooperation offered by Italy no walls will be built. But the international commitment of its government was suddenly compromised by the evolution of national politics, as on 8 May former Prime Minister Faynmann resigned after a seven years mandate, while tensions between black blocs and authorities exploded at the borders.

Finally the recommendation proposed by the Commission has been adopted by the Council on 12 May without granting the extension of temporary control based on article 26 of SBC to the Brenner segment. A decision that one could see as a reinforcement of the Commission to convey the nationalistic approach of Austria to more European senses. Indeed, as specified in the Roadmap, “any proposal by the Commission under article 26 of the SBC would only propose border controls at those internal border sections where controls would be necessary and proportionate to respond to the serious threat to public policy and internal security identified”.

Part of the general negative fate the EU is experiencing nowadays, the malfunctioning of Schengen can be an opportunity to finally embank egoistic pursuits of national solutions in order to satisfy eurosceptical electorates. One of the main pillar of the EU, the freedom of circulation and its consequent benefits must be preserved, and, in our opinion, better exemplified to reach the widest public possible. And 2016 could be remembered as “the year the Commission Roadmap put brakes to the collapse of Schengen”.

In an interview published on Project Syndicate, a reflection by Javier Solana, former « Monsieur PESC », former Secretary General of the Council of the European Union and former Secretary General to the Western European Union, defined the dark age in which Europe is now, and the lack of an European leadership that brought us to fragmented national closures: “The European Union has a dangerous case of nostalgia. Not only is a yearning for the ‘good old days’ – before the EU supposedly impinged on national sovereignty – fueling the rise of nationalist political parties; European leaders continue to try to apply yesterday’s solutions to today’s problems. (…) Everyone was supposed to benefit from European integration. Whenever a new country joined, it received financial aid, while existing members gained access to a new market. The advantages, it was expected, would be apparent not just from aggregate data, but also from individual citizens’ own experience. This represents a disappointing reversal. In my former professional roles, I witnessed, as few others did, the entry of Poland and Hungary into the Euro-Atlantic institutions. I saw first hand the eagerness and hope of their peoples at that momentous time. That is why it is so hard for me to understand their position today ».

Waiting for the second round of presidential elections in Austria on 22nd May, the Brexit referendum on 23rd of June and the juridical development around the European Coastal Guard proposal, we can only hope in a true commitment of the European Parliament and the Council to respect the deadlines stated in the Roadmap to offer a stronger policy against future political wind of change.

 

Francesca Sanna

For further information:

•  “Regulation on Schengen Borders Code: use of the Entry/Exit System”, Procedure file (EN) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2016/0105(COD)&l=en
• EU-Logos Athena (FR), « L’Agence européenne de contrôle des pêches au service de la crise des réfugiés », https://europe-liberte-securite-justice.org/2016/04/05/lagence-europeenne-de-controle-des-peches-au-service-de-la-crise-des-refugies/
• EU-Logos Athena (FR), « Un corps européen de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes : une atteinte aux souverainetés nationales ? », https://europe-liberte-securite-justice.org/2016/03/05/un-corps-europeen-de-garde-frontieres-et-de-garde-cotes-une-atteinte-aux-souverainetes-nationales/
• Internazionale (IT), « Al Brennero si firma la pace sulla pelle dei migranti », http://www.internazionale.it/opinione/gerhard-mumelter/2016/05/16/brennero-italia-migranti
• Internazionale (IT), « Cosa succede in Austria dopo l’affermazione della destra xenofoba », http://www.internazionale.it/opinione/gerhard-mumelter/2016/04/27/austria-elezioni-destra
• Project Syndicate (EN), “Europe’s Dangerous Nostalgia”, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nationalism-leaves-europeans-at-risk-by-javier-solana-2016-04

Classé dans:Citoyenneté européenne, Droit à la liberté et à la sûreté, DROITS FONDAMENTAUX, Liberté de circulation des personnes, Lutte contre l'immigration illégale, MIGRATIONS ET ASILE

A gyermekvédelmi bentlakásos intézmények férőhelyeinek kiváltása, a településbe integrált lakásotthonok, gyermekotthonok korszerűsítése és a speciális gyermekotthoni ellátás biztosítása érdekében.

II. Magyar Speciális Független Filmszemle. Nevezési lehetőség értelmi fogyatékossággal élő speciális filmesek, pszichiátriai- és szenvedélybeteg alkotók, valamint civil függetlenfilmesek és diákok számára.

A kiíró pályázatot hirdet európai és arab kulturális szervezeteknek a programban való részvételre.

Pályázat gyermekeket sújtó nélkülözés újratermelődésének megakadályozására és a gyermekek esélyeinek növelésére irányuló helyi projektek megvalósítására.

A kiíró 170 éves a magyar vasút! címmel pályázatot hirdet mozdonygrafika elkészítésére 2016. április 25. és május 25. között. A művek témájának egyetlen megkötése, hogy a magyar vasút 170 éves történetéből, mindennapjaiból ragadjanak ki egy jelenetet, részletet, témát tetszés szerint.

A kiíró pályázata a családi kohézió erősítését elősegítő programok megvalósítására.

Németország az Egyesült Államokban is érdeklődik a lassan kivonásra kerülő Sikorsky CH-53G nehézhelikopterek pótlására képes forgószárnyas felől. A legutóbbi megkeresés tárgya éppenséggel a CH-53K King Stallion változat volt. Ebből a tengerészgyalogság első körben 200 darab megvásárlását tervezi, míg Berlinben 40-50 helikopter beszerzési lehetőségével kacérkodnak. Egy ilyen megrendelés jelenősen csökkenthetné a Washingtonra nehezedő költségvetési terheket, valamint a gyártósor életét is meghosszabbíthatja. Amennyiben a németek a King Stallion mellett teszik le voksukat, úgy a szerződés aláírására 2018-ig sort keríthetnek és az első gépek 2022-től kerülhetnek átadásra.

Következő héten települ át egy három hetes próbaidőszakra Hollandiába az első két holland megrendelésre legyártott Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II-es vadászbombázó. A gépek az Edwards támaszpontról indulnak útnak és az Atlanti-óceán átrepülése előtt még leszállnak egy tankolás és egy alapos ellenőrzésre a haditengerészet Patuxent River-i támaszpontján. Innen indulnak el a nagyjából hét órás Európába vezető repülésre, ahová társként két holland KDC-10 légi utántöltő repülőgép, valamint a tartalék alkatrészeket szállítását végző NATO egyik C-17 Globemaster III-ának kíséretében érkeznek meg. Hollandiában, most még csak átmeneti jelleggel, a Leeuwarden repülőtér lesz a gépek otthona, ahova legközelebb 2019-ben érkeznek majd meg.

Megérkezett Izraelbe az első olasz megrendelésre módosított Gulfstream G550 üzleti repülőgép. A civil gépek légtérfelderítővé történő átépítés két lépésben valósul meg. Az elsőt a gyártó végzi el, ez nagyrészt a szerkezeti átalakításokat foglalja magában, a levegőben tartózkodó repülőgépek észlelésére szolgáló elektronikát az Israel Aerospace Industries építi be. A két olasz légtérfelderítő közül az első várhatólag 2020-ban került majd Róma számára átadásra.

Talán hét hónapig is eltarthat az a munkafolyamat, amely során a repedésre hajlamos, alumíniumból készített szerkezeti elemeket cserélik le az Airbus Military A400M Atlas teherszállítókon, egyes források szerint. Az egyik francia repülőgépen jelentkező probléma orvoslása jelentős időkiesését jelenthet majd az üzemeltetőknél. Németországban a katonai vezetés aggodalommal figyeli a gép körül kialakult helyzet alakulását, mivel számukra leginkább a még nem létező képességek (ejtőernyősök ugratása és az orvosi evakuációs) sokat jelentenének.

Oroszországban szeretnék 2020-ra lecserélni a Kalasnyikov PKM (6P6M) 7,62 milliméteres géppuskákat. A már a rendszeresítés elején lévő PKP (6P45) igaz, már évek óta jelen van a Specnaz fegyvertárában, de most a nem különleges rendeltetésű alakulatoknál is megjelenhet. Az éjjellátó és nappali optikával is ellátható PKP tűzgyorsasága 650lövés/perc, hatásos lőtávja 1500 méter. A PKP 658 milliméter hosszú csöve vastagabb, mint a PKM-é és nem cserélhető, a gyártó véleménye szerint azért, mert 30000 lövés az élettartama, harci súlya 11,1 kilogramm, hossza 1155 milliméter. Az géppuskából állítólag már vásárolt Kazahsztán, Kirgizisztán és Jemen is.

Egyiptom számára az amerikai külügyminisztérium jóváhagyta UGM-84L Harpoon Block II hajók elleni robotrepülőgép eladását 143 millió dollár értékben. Ebben az összegben 20 éles, valamint két oktatásra szolgáló Harpoon mellett tároló és szállító konténerek, pót- és cserealkatrészek, logisztikai támogatás és vizsgálati eszközök, oktató és műszaki dokumentáció és a személyzet képzése is benne foglaltatik. Ezek a tengeralattjárókról indítható változatok a Type 209/1400-as osztályú tengeralattjárók fegyverzetébe kerülnek. Kairó még 2012 augusztusában jelentette be négy felszín alatti egység megrendelését a ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems-től, ahol eddig nem közöltek semmit sem a gyártásba vett tengeralattjáró jövőbeli tulajdonosának kilétéről. A majdan 30 fős legénységgel hajózó, lemerülve 1594 tonna vízkiszorítású, 62 méter hosszú, 6,2 méteres átmérőjű törzzsel rendelkező, jelenleg S41-es jelzést viselő egységről nem tudni mikor kerül átadásra.

Végrehajtotta első repülését újabb két, Irak számára gyártott F-16-os. Az F-16D (1619/13-0032) és az F-16C (1621/13-0016) a 2012 októberében megrendelt második 18 darabos Block 52-es széria elsőnek elkészült példányai. Ezeket a 2,3 milliárdért megrendelt gépeket, melyek a második F-16-os század gépállományát alkotják, 2017 és 2018 folyamán tervezte átadni Bagdad számára a Lockheed Martin.

Ha Új-Delhiből nem érkezik további megrendelés a Szuhoj Szu-30MKI vadászbombázóra, akkor négy év múlva befejeződhet a típus gyártása a HAL üzemében. Eddig 174 példányt készítettek el és a megrendelés 222 darabra szól. A fennmaradó 48 példányt az indiai gyár az előrejelzések szerint 2020-ra elkészíti.

Tajvanon a Lockheed Martin F-16A/B Block 20-ok korszerűsítése a következő évben kezdődhet el. A mind a 144 példányt érintő munka folyamán csak az első néhány gép repül át az USA-ba, a túlnyomó többség helyben az AIDC üzemében kerül modernizálásra 2022-ig. A Northrop Grumman APG-83 AESA antennával ellátott rádiólokátor és a műszerfal középső-alsó részébe beszerelésre kerülő 15x20 centiméteres kijelző mellett további elektronikai átalakítást is magába foglaló korszerűsítést szeretnék a szigetország védelmi képességének jelentős csökkenése nélkül végrehajtani. Éppen ezért az időszakos felülvizsgálatokat is figyelembe veszik a program végrehajtásánál, így a gépállomány 75%-a mindig készen fog állni Tajvan védelmére.

Hat évvel a Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning II-es első függőleges leszállása után sor került a 1000.-re is. Az amerikai haditengerészet Patuxent River-i támaszpontján végrehajtott landolás során a brit Peter 'Wizzer' Wilson tesztpilóta irányította a gépet.

Elsőként az AeroVironment Blackwing pilóta nélküli repülőgép kerülhet alkalmazásra az amerikai tengeralattjárókon. A vízfelszín alól indítható gépeket 2013-ban kezdték el kifejleszteni és pár éven belül több száz darabos mennyiségben kerülhet a US. Navy felszín alatti egységeire. A most „csak” 150 darabos mennyiségben, a 2017-es költségvetés terhére megvásárolt, nagyjából 51 centiméter hosszú, 2 kilogrammos, villanymotor által hajtott, 60 perces repülési idővel rendelkező Blackwing pilóta nélküli repülőgép a vadász és a rakétahordozókon egyaránt a torpedók elleni csalik 7,62 centiméter átmérőjű indítócsövébe, egy tartályban kerül majd elhelyezésre, amik merőlegesek a tengeralattjáró hossztengelyére.

Költségvetési okokra vezethető vissza az, hogy Brazíliában időlegesen felfüggesztik az AMX vadászbombázók modernizációs programját. A 45 millió dolláros költségelvonás miatt 33 együléses A-1A és 10 kétüléses A-1B A-1M szabvány szerinti átépítését meg nem határozott időre lelassítják, vagy talán fel is függesztik. Pedig a pár évvel ezelőtti elképzelés szerint 1,12 milliárd dollárt áldoztak volna az Embraer repülőgépgyárban elvégzendő munkára, amit az izraeli Elbit is segít. A brazil AMX-ek orrába a Mectron által kifejlesztett SCP-01 többfeladatú radar kerül beépítésre a korszerű avionika mellett. Az így már A-1M jelzést viselő gépek 3,8 tonnás fegyverterhelése egyaránt állhat majd levegő-levegő, levegő-föld, levegő-felszín osztályú precíziós fegyverekből is. 

Két éve még arról volt szó, hogy a 43 gépes darabszám még módosulhat, hiszen a légierő parancsnoksága a jelenleg szolgálatban álló összes, azaz 53 AMX korszerűsítését tervezte, amint meglesz rá az anyagi fedezet. Az A-1M-ek így 2032-ig maradhatnának szolgálatban. Továbbá nem elképzelhetetlen, hogy a típus újabb átalakításon is át fog esni a jövőben, ugyanis 2012 októbere óta folynak a szélcsatornában végzett vizsgálatok az A-1-es makettjével. Ennek a szívócsatornájának az oldalára helyezték el a merev „kacsa-vezérsíkokat”. Ezektől azt várták, hogy javítani fogják a gép nagy állásszögű repülési tulajdonságait, valamint növelik a gép manőverező-képességét és csökkentik a fel- és leszálláshoz szükséges távot. A vizsgálatok minden téren pozitív eredményt hoztak, az aerodinamikai módosítás kis anyagi ráfordítással megvalósítható lenne.

Viszont a déli szomszédból, Argentínából érkező sajtóhírek szerint a légierő használt repülőgépek beszerzését szeretné véghezvinni. Egy küldöttség már az Egyesült Államokba is érkezett, a még használatba vehető repülőgépek ügyében. A jó pár hónapja megszellőztetett F-16-os beszerzés helyett most 12-14 Northrop F-5E/F Tiger II megvásárlási lehetőségéről cikkeznek a helyi médiában, T-34C Turbo Mentor oktatógépekkel együtt. A sugárhajtású típus nem ismeretlen a légierő számára, hiszen két argentin pilóta két évvel ezelőtt egy csereképzés keretén belül repült a spanyol légierő F-5M gépével.

Az argentin haditengerészet ellenben Franciaországgal tárgyal az A69-es osztályba tartozó korvettek (D’ESTIENNE D’ORVES-osztály) megvásárlásáról. Az országban három egységgel, mint DRUMMOND-osztály jelen lévő, 1320 tonnás vízkiszorítású, 80 méter hosszú, 10,3 méter széles, 3,55 méteres merüléssel rendelkező korvettek igen kedveltek a flotta vezetése körében, mivel igen megbízhatóan üzemelnek, alacsony költségek mellett. 2012-ben viszont ezek a hajók is igen gyakran a kikötőben rostokoltak az anyagi források szűkössége miatt. Az argentin hajók leginkább elektronikai eszközeikben különböznek francia társaiktól, mivel német és a holland rendszerek kerültek beépítésre.

 

NETARZENÁL GALÉRIA

 

Lockheed Martin F-16I Sufa.

Dassault F-103E Mirage IIIEBR.

McDonnell Douglas Phantom FGR.2.

Aerospatiale SA-316B Alouette III.

Lockheed Martin F-22A Raptor.

MiG-29A.

General Dynamics F-16AM Fighting Falcon.

Panavia Tornado F.3.

Cessna OA-37B Dragonfly.

Dassault Rafale B.

Boeing F/A-18F Super Hornet.

Mil Mi-35M.

Fairchild A-10C Thunderbolt II.

British Aerospace Hawk T.1A.

Grumman S-2N Tracker.

Szuhoj Szu-22UM-3K.

Boeing AV-8B Harrier II+.

Eurocopter EC-225LP Super Puma Mk2+.

McDonnell Douglas TA-4G Skyhawk.

Eurofighter EF-2000 Typhoon T.3.

 

Wenn die Bahn ab Ende 2016 das Gotthardmassiv auf ihrer neuen, flachen Trasse unterquert, wird nach und nach ein Stück Schweiz in der Wahrnehmung verblassen.

Russian AEK-971 Assault Rifle

"...Az idei Honvédelem Napja az állománygyűlést követően meglepetéssel is szolgált, ugyanis Dani Zoltán, a szerb hadsereg magyar származású, nyugállományú ezredese tett látogatást a győri alakulatnál, aki a délszláv háború idején véghez vitt, szakmai körökben mára legendássá vált tettéről osztotta meg élményeit a hallgatósággal. 1999. március 27-én, a NATO Jugoszláv Szövetségi Köztársaság ellen indított légitámadásakor ugyanis Dani Zoltán, a Belgrádot védő 3. Légvédelmi Rakétaosztály parancsnokaként megsemmisített egy bombázó harci repülőgépet az Észak-atlanti Szerződés szervezetének erőiből.

Noha hazánk ekkor már NATO tagállam volt, de Dani ezredes olyan szakmai felkészültségről, hivatástudatról és leleményességről tett tanúbizonyságot, ami minden légvédelmi rakétás számára tiszteletet parancsol, s egyszersmind hitet is táplál, hogy elavultnak vélt technikával is lehet meglepetést okozni a korszerűbb fegyverrendszerrel rendelkező ellenségnek. Dani Zoltán ugyanis Sz-125M Nyeva légvédelmi rakétarendszerrel, valamint egy átalakított P-18-as radarral semmisítette meg a korábban sebezhetetlennek tartott F-117-es lopakodót, köszönhetően professzionális taktikájának, valamint annak, hogy a támadó fél nem fordított kellő figyelmet a korszerűtlen fegyverrendszerek elleni védelemnek.

Túlzás nélkül állítható, hogy a lebilincselő – egyszerre humoros, és rendkívül tartalmas – előadás bearanyozta az idei Honvédelem Napját a 12. Arrabona Légvédelmi Rakétaezrednél."

Forrás: MH12/raketaezred.hu/Sályi Gergő törm.

 

Moïse Katumbi, l'opposant congolais candidat à la présidentielle, a quitté vendredi soir la RD Congo (RDC) pour l'Afrique du Sud. Il est depuis la veille sous le coup d'un mandat d'arrêt pour atteinte à la sûreté de l'État.

A törvény által előírt május 20-i határidőre mindössze 11 uniós tagállam ültette át teljesen a dohánytermékekről szóló uniós irányelvet, ami újabb mérföldkő lehet a dohányzás visszaszorítására irányuló erőfeszítésekben. Magyarország az utolsó simításoknál tart a jogszabály átvételében.

The Nigerian military has announced that 97 women and children held by the Islamist group Boko Haram have been rescued.

Un officier et trois sous-officiers s'entraînaient à bord de Choucas 65, le H145 déployé au DAG de
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