European Union

Length of video : 90'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Length of video : 60'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

On Thursday, the Consumer Protection Committee adopted updated rules on package travel to clarify the rights of travellers when their journey is affected by unforeseen circumstances.
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

On Thursday, the Consumer Protection Committee adopted updated rules on package travel to clarify the rights of travellers when their journey is affected by unforeseen circumstances.
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

In this press kit, you will find a selection of the European Parliament’s press releases reflecting MEPs’ priorities for the topics on the summit agenda.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

In this press kit, you will find a selection of the European Parliament’s press releases reflecting MEPs’ priorities for the topics on the summit agenda.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

On 25 June 2025, from 14:30 to 16:15, the FISC Subcommittee will host a joint public hearing with the SEDE Committee on "The European Defence Union: Tax Matters". The hearing will focus on the legislative framework governing VAT exemptions for defence-related activities carried out under the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

It will examine the 2015 Council Decision granting VAT exemptions to NATO and EU agencies for defence efforts supporting the implementation of Union activities, and assess how effectively Member States are applying these provisions.

In particular, the discussion will explore the cooperation mechanisms between the European Commission, national Ministries of Finance, and Ministries of Defence in ensuring consistent and compliant implementation of the VAT exemptions. The panel will also address the operational and administrative challenges encountered in the field. The insights gathered will contribute to the broader debate on strengthening the fiscal framework underpinning European defence initiatives, including the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) and upcoming measures under the ReArm Europe Plan and Readiness 2030 strategy.
Location : European Parliament - SPAAK (5B001) - Brussels
Programme of the hearing
Webstreaming
Mr Ludwig de Winter, Acting Head of Unit, VAT Policy (TAXUD.C.1), Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union, European Commission
     Statement
Ms Kaija Schilde, Associate Dean of Studies, Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University
     PowerPoint Presentation
     Statement
Background document provided by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS)
     Tax challenges facing the European defence union
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Length of video : 50'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The Regional Development Committee adopted its position on proposals to introduce new priorities and flexibilities to the current EU cohesion funding cycle.
Committee on Regional Development

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The Regional Development Committee adopted its position on proposals to introduce new priorities and flexibilities to the current EU cohesion funding cycle.
Committee on Regional Development

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Length of video : 75'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The draft legislation aims to address speculation on the gas market and bring down prices, by introducing greater flexibility in rules on gas storage refilling.
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The draft legislation aims to address speculation on the gas market and bring down prices, by introducing greater flexibility in rules on gas storage refilling.
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Sesame project https://www.sesame.org.jo/

Marina Cino Pagliarello

Diplomacy is under pressure – from climate change and trade inequalities to military conflicts on multiple fronts. Russia’s war in Ukraine continues to test the continent’s democratic resolve. The crisis in the Middle East underscores the limits of formal diplomacy. Across regions, authoritarianism is on the rise, and even established democracies are witnessing growing constraints on academic freedom.

In this context, universities are stepping up not only as knowledge producers, but as institutional actors with growing diplomatic relevance. Yet as this role expands, so does the vocabulary surrounding it. Terms like science diplomacy, knowledge diplomacy, and informal diplomacy are gaining traction, but are often used interchangeably or without clear distinctions. This piece aims to offer a more precise grammar for academic diplomacy by distinguishing between these overlapping but distinct paradigms. Greater clarity is not a semantic exercise: it is essential for enabling more effective policy, alliance-building, and strategic positioning across the higher education sector.

 

Science diplomacy: strategic reach, structural limits

Science diplomacy has long been a tool of statecraft, initially aimed at bolstering national prestige and influence through scientific collaboration to promote international understanding, prosperity, and evidence-based policymaking (Flink & Schreiterer, 2010). It has since evolved to address global challenges and support sustainable development, while reinforcing domestic research and innovation systems (The Royal Society, 2010; Ruffini & Krasnyak, 2023).

The European Union has developed a particularly ambitious model of science diplomacy. Through Horizon Europe, it aligns scientific cooperation with sustainability, equity, and foreign policy goals, while maintaining global competitiveness (Lopez de San Roman & Schunz, 2018). EU bodies such as the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Joint Research Centre (JRC), and the EU Satellite Centre play a key role in integrating science and foreign policy. Reflecting this, the European Commission has recently called for science diplomacy to become a core instrument in the EU’s diplomatic toolbox, identifying it as a key element in leveraging Europe’s power and partnerships for a global role. The EU also employs two central frameworks: ‘diplomacy for science,’ promoting global research collaboration, and ‘science for diplomacy,’ using science to advance EU foreign policy objectives. As a normative power, it emphasizes reciprocal access, ethical standards, and equitable partnerships (Lavenex, 2015).

Yet the traditional model of science diplomacy presents structural limitations. Its top-down, state-centric approach often fails to capture the relational and adaptive dynamics that define effective transnational collaboration. Universities, by contrast, operate through decentralised, network-based infrastructures that prioritise education, academic freedom, and long-term societal engagement. This divergence creates friction: while science diplomacy often responds to geopolitical goals, universities pursue missions that resist transactional alignment.

The SESAME project in the Middle East exemplifies these tensions. While celebrated as a scientific facility and peacebuilding initiative, some viewed its political framing as intrusive and misaligned with local realities (Rungius et al., 2022). Despite its technical success, SESAME revealed how science diplomacy can undermine trust and autonomy when co-opted by diplomatic agendas. Recognising these limits is essential if universities are to be fully recognised as autonomous diplomatic actors.

 

Knowledge diplomacy: strategic engagement through higher education

Knowledge diplomacy has emerged as a framework for understanding how higher education, research, and innovation contribute to international cooperation and the resolution of global challenges. Defined by Jane Knight as “the role of international higher education and research in building and strengthening relations between and among countries” (Knight, 2018, p. 8), it reflects a shift toward multilateralism and the growing role of non-state actors in diplomacy. Unlike science diplomacy, which often remains state-centred, knowledge diplomacy integrates academic institutions as core participants in global engagement, fostering networks of trust, cultural exchange, and shared problem-solving. This broader vision includes not only research but also teaching, training, and the formation of epistemic communities. Universities function as hubs of innovation and platforms for intercultural dialogue, extending their influence beyond knowledge production to norm-shaping. They increasingly serve as drivers of cognitive soft power, advancing values, worldviews, and institutional models across borders.

However, the promise of knowledge diplomacy is undercut by persistent limitations, with many initiatives relying on unidirectional flows of knowledge. This dynamic perpetuates intellectual hierarchies, may impose external agendas that overlook local expertise — especially in the Global South and conflict-affected areas like Ukraine — and contradicts the very principles of inclusivity and co-creation that knowledge diplomacy seeks to promote. As Anna Wojciuk’s (2018) concept of empires of knowledge highlights, powerful institutions in wealthy nations dominate the global knowledge system, marginalizing under-resourced universities and reinforcing systemic inequalities.

An additional ambiguity lies in the fine line between diplomacy and branding. In practice, efforts branded as knowledge diplomacy may serve reputational or competitive objectives rather than reciprocal engagement. This instrumentalisation risks emptying the concept of its collaborative ethos.

To be effective, knowledge diplomacy requires more than content delivery. It demands strategic vision, one that recognises the need for equitable partnerships, adaptive frameworks, and long-term capacity-building. Without this, the term risks remaining aspirational – conceptually rich, but operationally limited.

 

Informal diplomacy: relational mechanisms and the power of trust

Informal diplomacy refers to trust-based dialogue and cooperation led by non-state actors, a tradition rooted in Track II or multi-track diplomacy theory (Montville, 2006). Unlike state-driven approaches, it relies on adaptive, relational processes outside formal diplomatic frameworks. This mode of engagement is particularly well suited to addressing global challenges where flexibility, co-creation, and mutual learning are essential. Building on this tradition, universities are increasingly operating as infrastructures of informal diplomacy. Rather than serving as passive instruments of national policy, they act as autonomous actors: convening stakeholders, mediating cross-border cooperation, and fostering soft-power relationships.

Findings from HEIDI (Higher Education Informal Diplomacy) project illustrate this role. Based on a survey of 201 universities across 52 European alliances and complemented by around 30 interviews to senior university leaders, the data show that 96.49% integrate internationalisation into their institutional strategy, and 91.87% prioritise partnerships with non-EU actors. These partnerships are not confined to academia. Alliances reported active collaborations with 134 embassies, 116 NGOs, 75 UN agencies, and 66 humanitarian organisations (Cino Pagliarello, 2025). These are not coordinated by governments: rather, they reflect universities’ own diplomatic agency.

What sustains these collaborations is not regulation, but trust. Across interviews, trust consistently emerged as the key mechanism enabling continuity and speed, particularly when formal structures were absent or uncertain. This approach was especially visible in the immediate response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Within days, university alliances mobilised to support displaced students and staff. Some created dedicated platforms, others offered relocation assistance or language programmes. These actions were not symbolic. As one alliance representative observed: “These were soft power in action.”

But informality should not be mistaken for institutional weakness. On the contrary, it demands strategic clarity, long-term coordination, and autonomy from state control. Its strength lies in its adaptability — the ability to operate across governance gaps, respond to crisis, and build diplomatic ties grounded in shared purpose. For universities acting on the global stage, informal diplomacy is no longer peripheral: it is a core infrastructure of international engagement.

To clarify the conceptual distinctions outlined in this piece, the table below compares science diplomacy, knowledge diplomacy, and informal diplomacy across key features: actors, objectives, modes of engagement, and limitations. While overlapping in purpose, each model reflects a different logic of international cooperation — from state-driven influence to relational trust-building — and highlights the need for a more precise grammar of academic diplomacy.

Table 1: Comparing the three diplomacy models

Feature Science diplomacy Knowledge diplomacy Informal diplomacy Main actor States, institutions Universities, research networks Universities, alliances, NGOs, etc. Objective National influence, research collaboration Knowledge exchange, academic partnerships Trust-building, adaptability, collaboration Approach Top-down, policy-driven Institutional, capacity-building Relational, flexible, transnational Limitations Lacks grassroots engagement Reinforces power imbalances Harder to institutionalise

Source: Author’s synthesis.

 

Conclusion: toward a clearer grammar of academic diplomacy

As universities step into roles once reserved for governments and multilateral bodies, the vocabulary surrounding their international engagement must evolve with precision. The proliferation of terms – science diplomacy, knowledge diplomacy, informal diplomacy – reflects real transformations, but without conceptual clarity, the risk of semantic inflation is high.

A sharper grammar is not a matter of academic neatness, but of institutional effectiveness. When universities understand the affordances of each mode of diplomacy, they can calibrate strategies accordingly. But greater clarity also raises harder questions. Who legitimises academic diplomacy? What qualifies a university to act not just as a knowledge provider, but as a diplomatic actor in its own right?

Universities cannot be treated as mere facilitators of diplomacy. They are already acting as agents. The task now is to name that agency and equip it with a vocabulary that is both precise and politically consequential.

Marina Cino Pagliarello is Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow at the Florence School of Transnational Governance, European University Institute (Italy), Visiting Fellow at the LSE European Institute, and honorary lecturer at the Department of Political Science, University College London (UK).

 

Literature

Chou, MH & Demiryol, T. (2024) Knowledge power or diplomacy? University alliances and the Belt and Road Initiative. High Educ, 87, 1693–1708.

Cino Pagliarello, M. (2025). Higher Education Informal Diplomacy (HEIDI) Survey, European University Institute. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/77751

Flink, T., & Schreiterer, U. (2010). Science diplomacy at the intersection of S&T policies and foreign affairs: Toward a typology of national approaches. Science and Public Policy, 37(9), 665–677.

Knight, J. (2022). Knowledge diplomacy in international relations and higher education. Springer.

Lavenex, S. (2014). The power of functionalist extension: How EU rules travel. Journal of European Public Policy, 21(6), 885–903.

López de San Román, A., & Schunz, S. (2018). Understanding European Union science diplomacy. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 56, 247–266.

Montville, J. V. (2006). Track two diplomacy: The work of healing history. Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy & International Relations, 7, 15.

Rungius, C., Flink, T., & Riedel, S. (2022). SESAME – A synchrotron light source in the Middle East: An international research infrastructure in the making. Open Research Europe, 1, 51.

Ruffini, P. B., & Krasnyak, O. (2023). Science diplomacy from a nation-state’s perspective: A general framing and its application to Global South countries. Science and Public Policy, 50(4), 771–781.

Wojciuk, A. (2018). Empires of knowledge in international relations: Education and science as sources of power for the state. Abingdon: Routledge.

The post Beyond the buzzwords: rethinking diplomacy through the lens of higher education appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

MEPs push for a common reimbursement form, no charge for selecting a child seat, free on-board personal item and small hand luggage and better protection for multimodal journeys.
Committee on Transport and Tourism

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

MEPs push for a common reimbursement form, no charge for selecting a child seat, free on-board personal item and small hand luggage and better protection for multimodal journeys.
Committee on Transport and Tourism

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

by Nicolás Pose-Ferraro (Assistant Professor of International Studies at the Universidad de la República, Uruguay)

Since 2023, there have been renewed efforts to conclude the long-awaited European Union (EU)–Mercosur preferential trade agreement (PTA), including a 2024 successful renegotiation of the 2019 ‘agreement in principle’ between both parties. However, the agreement’s completion remains uncertain. What is driving these efforts? What threatens its conclusion?

In a recently published JCMS article, I explore the reasons for the latest push to conclude the agreement, as well as the reasons for the challenges it faces.

A geopolitical boost, but enough?

I show that a marked reduction in opposition from Mercosur’s expected distributional losers—namely, the manufacturing industry—combined with increased geopolitical incentives in the EU to conclude a deal, created conditions conducive to renegotiation. This, in turn, allowed the European Commission (EC) to address and reduce opposition from EU-based environmental civil society organizations (CSOs), ultimately paving the way for an understanding between the EC and Mercosur. However, the EU continues to face domestic political economy constraints, particularly due to the influence of distributional losers from the PTA—namely, agricultural producers—who retain the capacity to sway key actors within the EU’s decision-making process. This ongoing resistance continues to pose challenges to the agreement’s ratification. In this way, I highlight the current tension between a geopolitically-driven trade initiative of the EU and the EU’s domestic political economy constraints derived from the distributional effects of a PTA.

The article contributes to the literature on the EU–Mercosur negotiations in two main ways. First, it highlights the substantial reduction in Mercosur’s domestic political economy constraints to reaching an agreement. Second—and centrally—it highlights that the 2024 updated agreement ratification is still uncertain, despite the EU’s recent geopolitical push and the inclusion of stronger environmental commitments in the revised text.

At the theoretical level, the case study seeks to contribute to current debates on the increasing role of geopolitics in shaping trade agreements and flows as it adds the nuance that domestic political economy constraints may counteract geopolitically-driven initiatives.

The negotiation in three stages

My analysis is organized around three pre-specified stages: (1) the negotiation process that led to the ‘agreement in principle’ (2016 to mid-2019); (2) the paralysis within the EU (mid-2019 to 2022); and (3) the renegotiation that led to an updated agreement with an uncertain prospect (2023–2024).

During Stage 1, I found a marked reduction in the opposition of Mercosur’s distributional losers. This, coupled with the European Commission’s relative insulation from agricultural influence, low levels of politicization (in contrast to initiatives like CETA and TTIP), and high geopolitical incentives arising from the protectionist turn in U.S. trade policy under the Trump administration and the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU, culminated in the 2019 agreement.

In contrast, during Stage 2, much of this changed. The agreement now had to be approved by the EU Council and ratified by the European Parliament (EP), thus opening new veto points through which opposing EU agricultural producers could exert influence. In addition, the Brazilian government’s management of the Amazon wildfires, which involved denying climate change and blaming ‘global elites’ in a narrative inspired by Trump’s position, led to greater environmental CSO opposition to the deal. The result was the formation of an opposing agrarian–environmental coalition, which secured the approval of symbolic motions against the deal in the EP and several national parliaments of EU members.

So, what changed during Stage 3? ‘Increasing geopolitical challenges,’ in the words of the EC and the High Representative of the Union, such as the consolidation of the US/EU–China systemic rivalry, rising concern about the strategic implications of economic interdependence that followed COVID-19 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the longstanding crisis of the multilateral trading system, and the threat to transatlantic ties represented by an eventual return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency (confirmed in November 2024), combined to increase the geopolitical attractiveness of a deal with Mercosur.

However, as opposition within the EU remained high, the EC undertook a renegotiation with Mercosur. Its aim was to reinforce the deal’s environmental commitments, thereby appeasing opposing environmental CSOs. In exchange, the EC accepted several key demands from Mercosur. Specifically, it agreed to Brazil’s demand to exclude its health sector from the Public Procurement chapter—a point it had insisted on including in the 2019 agreement. The EC also accepted to extend the transition period for the removal of Mercosur’s tariffs on industrial goods like electric vehicles, agreeing to periods exceeding 15 years, a duration it had explicitly rejected in the past. Furthermore, it accepted the inclusion of a ‘rebalancing mechanism’ designed to compensate Mercosur countries should forthcoming European Green Deal legislation undermine their market-access gains from the PTA.

The described trade-off led to an updated agreement, which was announced in December 2024. However, ratification in the EU is far from guaranteed. While the inclusion of newer binding commitments linked to the Paris Agreement as a result of the renegotiation did appease environmental CSO opposition, agricultural producers continue to be mobilized against the deal and find in countries like France and Poland a voice to express their opposition at the EU Council. Whether these countries may be able to form a ‘blocking minority’ at the Council to prevent its approval is still an open question.

In any case, the analysis illustrates that the Mercosur agreement is in the middle of a clash between geopolitical incentives and domestic political economy constraints.

Dr. Nicolás Pose-Ferraro is Assistant Professor of International Studies at the Universidad de la República (Uruguay) and member of Uruguay’s National Researchers System. His research focuses on the political economy of trade negotiations and the processes of trade policy preference formation within business associations in Mercosur countries.

 

The post Between Geopolitics and Political Economy: The European Union–Mercosur Negotiation appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Following the Commission’s announcement on Friday that it intends to withdraw the legislative proposal, the Council has decided to cancel the trilogue scheduled for Monday.
Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Following the Commission’s announcement on Friday that it intends to withdraw the legislative proposal, the Council has decided to cancel the trilogue scheduled for Monday.
Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

In 1997, a little-known Russian political thinker, Aleksandr Dugin, published The Foundations of Geopolitics. Inside, he laid out a blunt and chilling plan.

Russia, he argued, would not rise again through tanks and bombs alone. It would use propaganda, political subversion, disinformation and destabilisation, especially across the West. One of Dugin’s most striking claims was that Russia should work to cut the United Kingdom off from the European Union.

He described Britain as “an extraterritorial floating base of the U.S.” – a piece of Europe that, in his view, needed to be severed from the EU’s institutional core. Many analysts now argue that after Vladimir Putin came to power, the Kremlin began acting on elements of Dugin’s vision.

Putin has never formally endorsed Dugin, and the two are not personally close. Even so, the pattern is difficult to ignore. Some observers caution against overstating Dugin’s influence. But the parallels between his 1997 blueprint and the Kremlin’s later actions are striking.

From the annexation of Crimea to hybrid operations across Europe, Russia’s moves have often echoed the geopolitical logic laid out in Dugin’s book: expanding Moscow’s influence, disrupting Western alliances, and weakening the EU from within.

Nearly two decades later, Britain’s decision to leave the European Union appeared, to many, to be a domestic rebellion: against elites, globalisation, or Brussels bureaucracy, depending on whom you asked. Yet beneath the headlines, growing evidence points to something more deliberate and far-reaching: signs of a Russian effort to divide and destabilise Europe by exploiting internal political fractures.

This article does not seek to blame Leave voters, who took part in the 2016 referendum in good faith. Instead, it asks deeper questions about the context that shaped the Brexit landscape: the long-running Russian strategy, the Kremlin’s evolving hybrid tactics, and the hidden networks of influence, and money that reached into British political life.

We will explore how Dugin’s ideas appear to have influenced Putin’s worldview, how Russia’s hybrid operations targeted both Britain and the wider European project, and why Brexit should be seen not just as a national rupture, but as part of a broader international strategy.

This is a story few have heard – about how a major turning point in British history may have been shaped by a geopolitical doctrine conceived in Russia in 1997.

Russia’s covert war on Europe

Aleksandr Dugin’s The Foundations of Geopolitics (1997) was not just an academic exercise. It became one of the most influential works shaping Russian geopolitical thinking in the post-Soviet era.

In it, Dugin argued that Russia’s revival as a great power would not come through military conquest alone. Instead, it would require systematically weakening the cohesion of its Western rivals, particularly the European Union and NATO. He called for Russia to disrupt Western alliances, encourage separatist movements, spread anti-Americanism and form tactical partnerships with countries hostile to the US-led international order.

One striking recommendation was to separate Britain from the European Union. Dugin saw the UK as a key bridge between the United States and the European continent, a link that, if broken, could seriously weaken both.

His prescriptions were not limited to diplomacy or trade. They included the use of psychological operations, disinformation, political influence and subversive campaigns to sow division and encourage fragmentation.

While Dugin remained a theorist, Vladimir Putin became the figure who later brought many of these ideas into practice. Rising through the ranks of the post-Soviet security services, Putin came to power in 2000, determined to restore Russia’s national pride and global standing. While Dugin himself remained outside official structures, his ideas found an audience among military strategists, foreign policy thinkers, and nationalist advisers close to Putin.

For Putin, the collapse of the Soviet Union was, as he famously put it:

“the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.”

Under his leadership, the Kremlin invested heavily in state-controlled media outlets like RT (formerly Russia Today), online troll farms such as the Internet Research Agency, covert financing of populist movements and cyber capabilities designed to hack, leak and disrupt Western democracies.

While global attention often focused on Russia’s military interventions in Chechnya, Georgia and later Ukraine, much of its most damaging influence work occurred in the shadows. These efforts encouraged political division, amplified extremist voices and systematically undermined Western institutions from within.

Experts argue that this approach closely mirrors the blueprint laid out in Dugin’s Foundations of Geopolitics.

Chace A. Nelson, writing for The Strategy Bridge, stated:

“A single book, written in 1997, signalled every significant foreign policy move of the Russian Federation over the following two decades.

“From the annexation of Crimea to Britain’s exit from the European Union, the grand strategy laid out in Aleksandr Dugin’s Foundations of Geopolitics has unfolded beautifully in a disastrous manner for the western rules-based international order.”

Stanford University’s Europe Center has described the book as “one of the most influential works in post-Soviet Russia,” noting its significant impact on Russian military, police and foreign policy elites. The Atlantic Council warned in a 2017 report that Russia was conducting “an intensifying campaign of hybrid attacks across our allied territories, interfering directly in our democracies, sabotaging industry and committing violence.”

Bengt Jangfeldt, summarising Dugin’s strategy, noted that it includes:

“Sowing geopolitical chaos in the United States’ internal politics… and encouraging separatism, conflict, extremism, and racial division.”

Andrei Kolesnikov of the Carnegie Endowment observed that:

“the nationalist-imperialist worldview that the Putin regime is imposing on Russians is intended to feed on the past and exploit historical memories and concepts to reshape and manage the mass consciousness of the Russian people.”

Observers such as former Labour Minister for Europe Dr Denis MacShane warned in 2017 that Putin resented dealing with the EU as a bloc, and saw Brexit as a strategic opportunity to fracture Europe, not just diplomatically, but geopolitically.

As MacShane wrote at the time:

“The Russian president told Bloomberg in September 2016 that Brexit would lead to a smaller EU. Putin has always resented having to deal with the EU and insisted that only bilateral relations mattered for Russia.”

Crucially, Putin’s strategy has never been only about projecting power abroad. It is also about reshaping the geopolitical environment so that Russia can advance its interests without direct confrontation. At the centre of this effort lies a calculated push to unravel the transatlantic alliance, weaken the European Union and, critically, drive deeper wedges between Britain and its European neighbours.

And nowhere was this destabilising strategy more consequential than in the United Kingdom.

Russia’s fingerprints on Brexit

The 2016 Brexit referendum was one of the most consequential political moments in modern British history. It also became a high-profile target for Russian interference.

By mid-2016, Moscow had already tested its hybrid tactics across Europe and the United States. The US intelligence community’s January 2017 assessment concluded that Russia had interfered in the 2016 US presidential election, using cyber operations, propaganda and influence campaigns to undermine confidence in Western democratic processes.

In May 2015, the NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, publicly warned that Russia was employing a wide range of “hybrid tactics” to undermine Western democracies. These tactics, often referred to as hybrid warfare, include the coordinated use of military, political, economic, and information strategies to destabilise target countries.

The Brexit referendum became a prime opportunity for Moscow to apply its hybrid strategy by encouraging the UK’s separation from the European Union — a move that would weaken the Western alliance and disrupt European cohesion. One of the most visible forms of interference came online.

A 2017 investigation by the University of Edinburgh identified over 400 Twitter accounts operated by the St Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency (IRA), Russia’s so-called “troll farm,” which had actively posted about Brexit in the months leading up to the June 2016 referendum.

According to the BBC’s October 2018 report, more than 10 million tweets posted by suspected state-backed Russian and Iranian “troll farms” were shared online by Twitter in an attempt to influence public opinion. Early analysis by the BBC’s data journalism team indicated that the word “Brexit” was mentioned in 3,789 tweets linked to the Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA), nearly all of which were published on the day of the vote or afterwards.

In 2017, Facebook admitted for the first time that some Russia-linked accounts may have used its platform to try to interfere in the EU referendum vote in June 2016.

But Russian activity extended beyond social media.

In 2019 the UK Parliament’s Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) Committee concluded that Russian state media outlets such as RT and Sputnik had “spread disinformation and promoted discord” during the referendum. The committee found that this coverage disproportionately supported Leave campaigns and undermined trust in EU institutions.

Questions were also raised by the UK Parliament, the Electoral Commission, journalists and intelligence experts about possible links between prominent Brexit campaign figures and Russian interests.

Arron Banks, the co-founder of Leave.EU, was reported by The Guardian in November 2018 to have held multiple meetings with Russian diplomats before the referendum. These meetings prompted concerns about potential financial offers or influence. No evidence of crimes was found and no charges were brought.

Banks has consistently denied any improper dealings or Russian backing. In 2022 he partly won a libel case against journalist Carole Cadwalladr, with the High Court finding that her claims caused serious harm. However, the court also upheld the public interest defence for much of her reporting.

Further concerns emerged around Boris Johnson’s connections to Russian-born media mogul Evgeny Lebedev, son of former KGB officer Alexander Lebedev. In 2023 Channel 4’s Dispatches documentary Boris, the Lord & the Russian Spy reported that British intelligence had warned Johnson against elevating Lebedev to the House of Lords. Johnson proceeded regardless, overruling those concerns.

The documentary also noted that Italian intelligence had monitored Johnson’s unguarded visit to the Lebedev villa in Umbria in April 2018.

At a private diplomatic gathering after the referendum, then Russian ambassador Alexander Yakovenko is reported to have said:

“We have crushed the British to the ground. They are on their knees, and they will not rise for a very long time.”

This quote was cited by journalist Luke Harding in his book Shadow State and independently reported by others.

Senior Conservative figures also raised concerns. Dominic Grieve, former Attorney General and Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, repeatedly warned of the government’s reluctance to investigate Russian influence. Patience Wheatcroft, a Conservative peer, argued that transparency over foreign interference was essential to protect democracy.

Perhaps most troubling is the UK government’s response, or lack of one. In its 2020 Russia Report, the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament stated that “the government had not seen or sought evidence of successful interference in UK democratic processes,” effectively acknowledging that no meaningful investigation had been carried out.

By contrast, the United States launched multiple high-profile inquiries into Russian interference, including the Mueller Report of March 2019.

The UK’s Russia Report concluded that the UK had “actively avoided looking for evidence.” As the committee warned:

“Protecting the UK’s democratic discourse and processes from hostile foreign interference is a central responsibility of Government, and one which it is failing to fulfil.”

At the press conference launching the Russia Report in July 2020, ISC Chair Julian Lewis emphasised the need for stronger inter-agency coordination and urged Government-wide action to safeguard UK democratic systems from foreign interference.

In 2025, new Parliamentary debates revived these concerns. MPs cited evidence that the group known as Conservative Friends of Russia had played a role in cultivating Kremlin access and influence within British politics. Despite multiple warnings, ministers continued to resist calls for a full inquiry.

As former Europe Minister Dr Denis MacShane wrote back in 2017:

“If more evidence surfaces that the narrow Brexit result was influenced by an unfriendly foreign power, it will be harder to argue that a stolen poll should be the final word on Britain’s relationship with its friendly neighbours.”

The implications are serious. If foreign actors exploited vulnerabilities in Britain’s political and media systems to influence the outcome of a constitutional referendum, it raises urgent questions about the integrity of British democracy. That concern applies not only to the events of 2016, but to all future elections and referendums.

Without proper investigation or accountability, the UK remains at risk from similar campaigns in the years to come.

 The Russia Report cover-up

In July 2020, after months of political delay, the UK Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) finally released its much-anticipated Russia Report. The document raised serious concerns about Moscow’s interference in British political life, and, perhaps more significantly, the British government’s failure to respond.

The report concluded that no government department or agency had taken responsibility for investigating Russian interference in the Brexit referendum, or in UK democratic processes more broadly.

The ISC said it was “astonished” that ministers had not even asked the intelligence agencies whether Russia had interfered in the 2016 vote. According to the committee, this amounted to a deliberate political decision. As the report put it:

“The government had not seen or sought evidence of successful interference in UK democratic processes. We were told they had not seen any evidence, but it was not clear whether they had actively looked for it.”

Public anger intensified when the government delayed publication of the report until after the December 2019 general election. This delay fuelled widespread suspicion that damaging political information was being suppressed.

Green Party MP Caroline Lucas condemned the delay as “utterly reprehensible,” adding that the public deserves clarity on what the government knew and when, and called for full transparency to safeguard democratic integrity.

The decision to release a heavily redacted version of the report drew further criticism. Key sections were withheld from public view, prompting concern that damaging political connections were being concealed.

Despite intelligence warnings following the 2018 Salisbury poisoning, there is no public evidence that Theresa May’s government launched any serious investigation into Russian interference in Brexit.

Subsequent Conservative governments under Boris Johnson and Rishi Sunak, and the Labour government under Keir Starmer, have also declined to initiate a formal inquiry into the 2016 referendum’s vulnerability to foreign influence.

Adding to public concern is the network of political links between Russian-connected individuals and senior figures in British politics. The Russia Report raised questions about the Conservative Party’s ties to wealthy Russian donors. Many of those donors had gained UK citizenship or residency through the now-abandoned “golden visa” scheme.

One notable example was the Conservative Friends of Russia, a lobbying group later rebranded as the Westminster Russia Forum. It was established in 2012 to promote UK–Russia ties. Although the group was presented as a networking platform, critics argued that it served as a convenient backchannel for Kremlin influence, especially after the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

In 2025, Parliamentary debates revived these concerns. MPs cited evidence that the Conservative Friends of Russia had provided access and influence to Russian officials, including former ambassador Alexander Yakovenko.

The Russia Report warned that the UK had become a “top Western intelligence target” for Moscow, not only because of Britain’s global diplomatic influence but also due to its “very favourable business environment”, a diplomatic way of describing London’s reputation as a hub for dirty money, influence-buying and financial secrecy.

Despite the known risks, the ISC found no evidence that the government had taken systematic steps to defend British democracy. The refusal to investigate Russian interference in the Brexit vote is not just a matter of historical record. It raises serious questions about the present and future integrity of UK elections.

Without proper accountability, the country remains exposed to further attempts at influence and disruption, a threat that has grown since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and amid rising geopolitical tensions in 2025.

Chatham House analysts echoed the concern in a 2021 report, warning that:

“Failing to investigate foreign interference leaves the UK dangerously exposed to continuing hybrid attacks, including disinformation, cyber operations, and political influence.”

 The legal battle to expose Russian interference in Brexit

With the UK government’s refusal to investigate Russian interference in the Brexit referendum, despite warnings from the Intelligence and Security Committee, a critical legal question has emerged:

Does a government have a duty to safeguard the democratic process when credible foreign interference is alleged?

This question now sits at the heart of a landmark case before the European Court of Human Rights.

A cross-party group of British MPs, peers and campaigners, including Caroline Lucas (Green Party), Ben Bradshaw (Labour), Alyn Smith (SNP) and Molly Scott Cato (Green Party), brought the legal challenge in 2021. They argued that the government’s failure to investigate potential Russian interference in the Brexit vote violates citizens’ rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, specifically the right to free and fair elections and democratic participation.

Explaining their decision, Caroline Lucas told The Guardian in March 2022:

“As President Putin wages a war of terror on the Ukrainian people, he’s been waging another war on the very principles of democracy.”

“The Russia report is clear that there is credible evidence of Russian interference in UK electoral process – and yet our government has consistently refused to investigate these serious conclusions.”

Ben Bradshaw echoed this concern, stating:

“When a hostile foreign power interferes in our democratic processes and the government does nothing to investigate, that is a betrayal of the public trust and a breach of its legal obligations.”

Lord Ricketts, who was national security adviser from 2010 to 2012 and is supporting the legal action, commented:

“Given the importance of knowing the extent of past Russian interference in assessing the risk for future elections, I do not understand why the government would choose not to investigate.”

The seriousness of the issue was underlined in December 2023, when a junior Conservative minister, Leo Docherty, Minister for Europe, acknowledged in the House of Commons:

“The Russian Federal Security Services, the FSB, is behind a sustained effort to interfere in our democratic processes.”

Caroline Lucas, speaking again in Parliament in April 2024, added:

“There has still been no serious investigation into Russian interference in the Brexit vote. What is the Government afraid of?”

Despite these warnings and the legal action, successive UK governments — under Boris Johnson, Rishi Sunak and now Keir Starmer — have declined to launch a full investigation into the 2016 referendum or broader concerns about foreign interference in British democracy.

This legal battle has implications not only for Britain, but for Europe as a whole. Governments across the continent are wrestling with how to defend against hybrid threats and preserve the integrity of democratic elections.

From Russian interference in French and German elections to Kremlin-linked disinformation in Central and Eastern Europe, the challenge is escalating. In Romania, TikTok was reportedly used to spread pro-Russian narratives during electoral campaigns. Investigations are ongoing, and Romanian authorities have raised concerns with EU partners.

Critics argue that without effective mechanisms for accountability or redress, democratic systems remain wide open to future interference — whether from Russia, China, or other actors intent on exploiting political vulnerabilities.

At the same time, the ECHR case faces political resistance.

Brexit itself was partly driven by opposition to European institutions. In recent years, UK governments have signalled their intention to reduce reliance on rulings from the European Court of Human Rights — or even to leave the ECHR altogether. Nonetheless, the legal challenge highlights that this is not merely a political debate. It is a question of fundamental rights.

As the case progresses, it will test the limits of democratic safeguards in the age of hybrid warfare.

 Beyond Brexit: Why all Europe is now worried

While Brexit was a significant milestone in Russia’s strategy to destabilise the West, it is increasingly clear that Moscow’s ambitions extend well beyond cyberattacks and disinformation.

Across the continent, European nations are preparing for the possibility of direct military conflict with Russia.

In the United Kingdom, Defence Secretary John Healey warned in June 2025 that Russia is “attacking the UK daily” through cyber operations. He stressed the need for Britain to be “battle-ready” and announced plans to invest £6 billion over five years in munitions production and to procure up to 7,000 long-range weapons.

The UK government also released a new strategic defence review. It described the most significant overhaul since the Cold War. The review included plans to acquire up to 12 nuclear-powered submarines and to establish a new cyber command focused on Russian-linked threats.

Prime Minister Keir Starmer reinforced the urgency of the situation. Speaking in June 2025, he said:

“The threat from Russia is real, and it is growing. We must stand united with our European allies to ensure the defence of democracy and peace across the continent.”

Germany has also accelerated military preparedness. In May 2025, General Carsten Breuer, the country’s top military official, warned that NATO must be ready for conflict with Russia by 2029. He cited intelligence that Moscow is stockpiling weapons far beyond those used in Ukraine.

Poland, acutely aware of its location and its history, has responded by transforming itself into what many now call a military powerhouse. This response has been driven by growing fears about Putin’s long-term intentions. Under successive governments, and particularly under centrist and pro-European Prime Minister Donald Tusk, Poland has rapidly expanded military training, defence procurement and civil readiness.

By late 2024, analysts described Poland as having the strongest military in Europe. Its capabilities were said to surpass those of Germany, France and the United Kingdom. This transformation has been credited to record defence budgets, modernised weapon systems and a society-wide focus on deterrence.

Following national elections in June 2025, the new Polish President Karol Nawrocki, a right-wing Eurosceptic, declared:

“Russia remains the biggest threat to Poland and to peace in Europe.”

The Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, have all increased defence budgets and expanded civil preparedness measures, fearful of an attack by Russia. Each country remains acutely aware of its border proximity to Russia and its own history under Soviet occupation.

Finland and Sweden, also fearful of Russian aggression, have both joined NATO, abandoning long-standing neutrality in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its broader threats.

French President Emmanuel Macron issued a similar warning in April 2024. He said:

“Europe must be prepared to defend itself. No one can pretend Russia’s ambitions will stop at Ukraine.”

Despite Moscow’s repeated denials of aggressive intent, European governments remain deeply sceptical. They recall how President Putin repeatedly claimed there were no plans to invade Ukraine, right up until Russian forces crossed the border in February 2022.

Analysts continue to debate Putin’s ultimate goal. Some argue he seeks to expand Russia’s borders and restore an imperial sphere of influence. Others believe his aim is to destabilise Europe enough to preserve his own regime and maintain geopolitical leverage.

As The Conversation noted in March 2024:

“Putin has no successor, no living rivals, and no retirement plan, and his eventual death will likely set off a vicious power struggle inside Russia.”

Whatever his long-term intentions, European leaders are no longer treating the threat as hypothetical. The UK’s experience with Brexit is now viewed as part of a broader Kremlin strategy to divide and weaken Europe. Defending democracy, national sovereignty and territorial security across the continent will require a united, coordinated and long-term approach. The stakes are no longer only political. They are existential.

This isn’t just about Brexit. It’s about Europe’s survival. This investigation does not aim to blame Leave voters. Many made their decision in good faith, motivated by sincere beliefs about sovereignty, identity and the future of Britain. But it does seek to uncover a more difficult truth.

The Brexit vote was not simply a domestic decision. It was influenced by a broader international strategy, shaped by decades of Russian planning, manipulation and interference.

Aleksandr Dugin’s The Foundations of Geopolitics, published in 1997, laid out a long-term vision. It called for the separation of Britain from Europe, the fracturing of the transatlantic alliance, and the weakening of institutions that held Western democracies together.

In the years that followed, Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin adopted and adapted many of these strategic ideas. It deployed a sophisticated arsenal of hybrid tactics: cyberattacks, disinformation, covert funding and political influence. Brexit was a significant success in that campaign. Not because it aligned ideologically with Russian goals, but because it disrupted European unity and destabilised one of NATO’s key members.

The implications go well beyond 2016. If the UK can hold a constitutional referendum without properly investigating potential foreign interference, what does that say about the resilience of its democratic systems? If external actors can amplify political divisions, spread falsehoods and build quiet relationships with influential figures, what defences are truly in place?

This challenge is not unique to Britain. Across Europe, the Kremlin has worked to destabilise democracies, embolden extremist movements and undermine international alliances. From the annexation of Crimea to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, from targeted assassinations to acts of sabotage, Russia’s ambitions have only grown more aggressive.

In 2006, former FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko was murdered in London using radioactive polonium-210. The UK High Court later ruled that this was an act of state-sponsored nuclear terrorism.

In 2018, former double agent Sergei Skripal and his daughter were poisoned in Salisbury, and British citizen Dawn Sturgess died, after exposure to a military-grade nerve agent that was capable of killing thousands. This prompted the coordinated expulsion of Russian diplomats by Western allies.

In 2019, Georgian exile Zelimkhan Khangoshvili was shot dead in a Berlin park by an assassin linked to Russian security services.

In 2020, prominent Russian opposition leader, Alexei Navalny, was poisoned by the Novichok nerve agent while on a domestic flight over Siberia. He survived after being treated by doctors in Germany, but then went on to die, allegedly killed, in a Russian prison in 2024.

In 2021, Germany accused the Russian security services of mounting a “wholly unacceptable” cyberattack on members of the Bundestag.

In 2022, Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, despite President Putin claiming just hours before the attack that Russia had no intention of occupying Ukraine or using force.

In 2023, the UK government disclosed a Russian campaign to hack MPs, journalists and think tanks. Ministers confirmed the FSB was behind a “sustained effort to interfere in our democratic processes.”

In 2024, EU authorities warned that Kremlin-backed disinformation campaigns were targeting the European Parliament elections, promoting far-right parties and undermining public trust in EU democracy.

In 2025, Russia-linked hackers posing as journalists targeted staff at Britain’s Ministry of Defence.

These were not isolated incidents. They were part of a systematic strategy: to intimidate, to destabilise and to project Russian power across Europe.

As Russia expert Mark Galeotti wrote in We Need to Talk About Putin (2019),

“For Putin, violence is not a last resort but a tool of statecraft, a signal to the world that Russia cannot be ignored, and a warning to any who would challenge his rule.”

Human Rights Watch, in its 2021 global report, noted that:

“Russia’s government systematically uses violence, coercion and fear not only to silence domestic critics, but to project its authoritarian reach across borders.”

In May 2025, the UK government announced the construction of six new weapons factories. This marked an acknowledgement that the Russian threat is no longer merely informational or political. It is military, material and potentially existential.

By June 2025, the warnings had escalated. Fiona Hill, a former White House adviser and one of the world’s foremost experts on Russia, told The Guardian that “Russia is at war with the UK”, adding:

“We are already in a war situation, a hot war.”

Dr Hill also warned that the United States “is no longer a reliable ally”, and urged Europe to act with unity and urgency.

In June 2025, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte warned in London that Russia was arming faster than the entire NATO alliance and could be ready to launch an attack within five years.

“Russia produces in three months what the whole of NATO does in a year … Russia could be ready to use military force against NATO within five years. We are all on the eastern flank now.”

The NATO Secretary General added that without a major increase in defence spending, British people “better learn to speak Russian”.

That warning was echoed just days later in the UK government’s own security strategy. In June 2025, Prime Minister Keir Starmer confirmed that Britain must now prepare for the possibility of an attack on UK soil, citing Russia’s military build-up and Iran’s use of overseas operatives as direct threats to national security.

The report, as covered by The Guardian, described the UK as facing a future in which domestic war could no longer be ruled out. It comes amid growing evidence of Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics – from cyberattacks to political interference – already undermining democracies from within.

This is not a distant or hypothetical threat. The Kremlin’s interference in British democracy was part of a broader pattern. It was a warning that too many ignored.

Military readiness is important, but it is not enough. Defending democracy also requires political will, legal accountability and a firm commitment to protecting the information space. That includes public inquiries, strong electoral safeguards, stricter regulation of political finance, and a more informed and resilient public.

Above all, it requires recognition of what is truly at stake. Brexit was not just a domestic decision. It was a product of an international hybrid campaign designed to weaken the West from within. Until that is understood and confronted, the UK and Europe will remain exposed.

Brexit may have been decided in Russia in 1997 – but the defence of democracy must be decided now.

• Watch: Putin and Brexit – The interference they tried to bury

• Join the discussion about this post on Facebook, LinkedIn, YouTube, Instagram, BlueSky

• My other articles about Russian interference:
• March 2025 – Europe united against Putin and Trump
• February 2025 – How Brexit played into Putin’s hands
• February 2024 – The Russian Connection – update
• February 2023 – A vote for Brexit was a vote for Putin
• March 2022 – Putin’s fingerprints are all over Brexit
• February 2022 -Back to the USSR?
• November 2017 – European Union or a new Soviet Union?
• December 2013: Latvia From Soviet Union to European Union

Some further reading

This section lists some of the sources referenced or relevant to the investigation of Russian interference in British democracy and the Brexit referendum. 

1. Geopolitical Doctrine and Dugin’s Influence

• Aleksandr Dugin – The Foundations of Geopolitics (1997)

This 1997 book lays out a strategic vision for Russia to reassert itself by destabilising the West, not through military force but via ideological, economic, and informational subversion. Dugin called for the severance of the UK from Europe, described Britain as a U.S. outpost, and advocated for disrupting NATO and the EU. Though never officially endorsed by Putin, the book has reportedly been used in Russian military academies and closely reflects many elements of Kremlin hybrid warfare.

No official English translation exists, but two credible English-language sources provide detailed summaries:

Putin’s Playbook by Chace A Nelson

Stanford Europe Center – Dugin’s Foundations

2. Russian Hybrid Warfare Strategy

• Atlantic Council – Strategy of ‘Constrainment’

This 2017 report sets out how the West should respond to Russian hybrid threats. It outlines how Russia uses economic coercion, disinformation, political influence, and cyber operations to destabilise adversaries. It argues for a coordinated Western strategy to contain and deter Kremlin aggression without triggering di

3. Political and Financial Influence in the UK

• Catherine Belton – Putin’s People

Belton’s book investigates how Putin and former KGB operatives used state power and illicit finance to consolidate control in Russia and extend influence abroad. It documents Kremlin efforts to build financial networks in the UK and co-opt elites. The book strengthens the case that Russia’s use of money and kompromat is strategic and imperialist in aim.

Publisher’s page (HarperCollins)
The Guardian review

• The Guardian – The Westminster Whistleblower (2025)

This article recounts how a whistleblower named Sergei sought to expose a Kremlin-linked effort to influence British political decisions. It highlights both personal testimony and the wider context of UK-Russia connections. The piece underscores the risks taken by insiders trying to reveal covert foreign influence.

5. Parliamentary and Government Reports

• ISC Russia Report (2020)

The UK Intelligence and Security Committee’s report found that the British government had not properly investigated Russian interference in the Brexit referendum. It accused ministers of failing to ask intelligence a gencies to assess Kremlin influence, and concluded that the UK was a ‘top target’ for Russian political disruption. The report’s delayed release and heavy redactions prompted allegations of political suppression.

UK Parliament PDF download
Gov.uk summary page

6. Legal and Electoral Challenges

• European Court of Human Rights Case – Interference in Brexit Referendum

Filed in 2021 by British parliamentarians and campaigners, this ECHR case argues that the UK government violated citizens’ rights by failing to investigate credible evidence of foreign interference in the 2016 referendum. Applicants claim this undermined democratic integrity, breaching Articles 3 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

7. Investigative Documentaries and Original Material

• PBS Amanpour – Interview with Carole Cadwalladr

In this televised interview, journalist Carole Cadwalladr describes Russian disinformation as a form of ‘military assault’ on the West. She discusses the vulnerabilities of democratic institutions to manipulation and the lack of accountability in the UK after Brexit. Her statements support the framing of hybrid warfare as an ongoing, systemic threat.

 

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