European Union

European Parliament’s spokespersons will hold a last-minute briefing on the 20 - 23 January plenary session today at 16.30.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Prime Minister of Poland, Donald Tusk, had a message for our Prime Minister, Sir Keir Starmer on his visit to Warsaw on Friday 17 January.

He said:

“I am aware this is a dream of mine, that instead of a Brexit we will have a Breturn.”

Mr Tusk, who was previously a President of the EU Council, added:

“Perhaps I’m labouring under an illusion. I’d rather be an optimist and harbour these dreams in my heart – sometimes they come true in politics.”

Sir Keir has consistently ruled out the UK rejoining the EU or its Single Market or customs union.

And yet, it’s not only Mr Tusk who has a dream of Britain’s Breturn. Millions of Britons also share this dream, and every UK poll now shows a majority want to rejoin the EU.

But what exactly is the case AGAINST continuing with Brexit and INSTEAD doing a Breturn?

DEBUNKING BREXIT MYTHS

Sovereignty? Far from gaining sovereignty, Brexit means Britain now has no say in EU decisions, despite being affected by them.

Migration? Britain faces a labour shortage, with almost a million chronic job vacancies. Migrants have always been essential, contributing positively to the economy and public services.

Housing, Schools, and Hospitals? Reduced EU migration has worsened shortages of skilled workers, from builders to healthcare professionals.

“Taking Back Control”? EU membership never meant losing national identity; other EU nations maintain sovereignty and strong support for the union.

Laws and Bureaucracy? EU laws are collaboratively agreed upon, bringing collective benefits like fair mobile charges, flight compensation, and accountability for tech giants. The EU operates democratically, with decisions shaped by elected representatives.

THE CASE FOR BRETURN

Economic Gains: EU membership boosted Britain’s economy, yielding a tenfold return on membership fees. The Confederation of British Industry estimated it added £3,000 per year to each family’s income. [Source: CBI Report: Our Global Future, page 11]

Peace and Freedom: The EU has been instrumental in maintaining peace and democracy, winning the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize. Membership also granted Britons freedom to live, work, and trade seamlessly across Europe.

Global Strength: The EU’s economic might enables its members to secure favourable trade deals and exert influence on the global stage. Outside the EU, Britain struggles to achieve comparable agreements.

Rights and Protections: EU laws safeguard workers, consumers, and travellers, offering paid holidays, anti-discrimination measures, and fair work conditions. Such protections are difficult to replicate nationally.

Trade: The EU remains Britain’s largest trading partner, with nearly half of exports and over half of imports linked to the bloc. Erecting trade barriers with this critical market has been economically damaging.

LOOKING AHEAD

Brexit means we are poorer, and with less sovereignty, fewer rights and protections, restricted trade, and diminished power.

The case for Breturn – Britain returning to the EU as a full member – is overwhelming. It may take years to achieve a democratic reversal of Brexit, but it’s a worthwhile fight.

In a democracy, losing doesn’t mean having to give up. Ask Brexiters, they know. (See graphic below)

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The post What’s the case for Breturn? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

When Theresa May became Prime Minister in July 2016, she famously declared, “Brexit means Brexit”.

It was pure gobbledygook.

Brexit at that time didn’t mean anything – there was no consensus on what Brexit should entail, not among the electorate, politicians, or even Brexit campaigners themselves.

But on 17 January 2017, Mrs May unilaterally defined her version of Brexit in her speech at Lancaster House, London.

Paradoxically, she claimed that the referendum was, “not the moment Britain chose to step back from the world” but “the moment we chose to build a truly global Britain”.

The Prime Minister outlined her unequivocal red lines – closing doors on most possibilities before any negotiations with the EU had even taken place.

• No partial membership of the European Union, associate membership, or anything that “leaves us half-in, half-out”.
  

No model already enjoyed by other countries.

No holding on to “bits of membership as we leave”.

No membership of the EU Single Market.

No free movement of people.

No to being part of the EU Common Commercial Policy (CCP) or the EU Common External Tariff (CET).

Michel Barnier, the EU’s Chief Brexit Negotiator, was ‘astounded by the sheer numbers of doors she is closing here, one after the other.’

In his diary entry for 17 January 2017, published in his book, ‘My Secret Brexit Diary’, he asked:

Have the consequences of each of these decisions been fully thought through, assessed and discussed?

Does she realise that, in doing this, she is excluding almost all models of cooperation we have managed to construct up to now with our partners, even the closest among them?

Can we be sure that the referendum vote gave the British government carte blanche for such a total break?

He concluded:

‘In fact, for her to say all this, amounts to writing off not only membership of the European Economic Area – of which Norway, Iceland and Switzerland are members – but also the kind of partnership we have with Turkey, which has a customs union agreement with the EU.’

MY VIEW TODAY

No version of Brexit – be it Theresa May’s, Boris Johnson’s, Liz Truss’s, Rishi Sunak’s, or the as-yet-defined Brexit of Keir Starmer – has ever enjoyed the consensus support of the electorate.

Even Kemi Badenoch, new Tory leader and a staunch Brexiter, has admitted that the “no plan” Brexit approach was “a mistake.”

We’ve been had.

Successive Prime Ministers hijacked the simple word “Leave” and shaped it into THEIR visions of Brexit, none of which align with the public’s expectations or interests.

• A Brexit nobody voted for – watch 4-minute video



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by Sarah Wolff (Leiden University), Helena Carrapico (Northumbria University), and Agathe Piquet (UC Louvain)

To kick off 2025, the JCMS blog is highlighting some of the great work published in JCMS during autumn 2024. Here we feature the findings of ‘Out of Sight, Out of Mind? UK-EU Member States Bilateralism as an Enabler of Europeanisation’, which was published as part of the Symposium on ‘Selective Reconstruction: Re-engagement in the Post-Brexit UK-EU Security Relationship’.

Extensive scholarship has examined the UK’s role in multilateral (e.g. United Nations, World Trade Organisation) and mini-lateral venues (e.g. E3 with France and Germany on Iran; G7 and G20 on economic issues) since Brexit, but less attention has been given to the 24 bilateral declarations signed between the UK and EU Member States from 2021 to 2023. Bilateralism has been one of the UK’s preferred strategies for achieving foreign policy coordination with EU Member States post-Brexit. This article finds that, despite clear efforts to de-EUise UK foreign policy, there is no evidence of purposeful de-Europeanisation.

Purposeful de-Europeanisation would imply a repudiation of shared European values, a divergence from common priorities, and an end to social encounters between UK and EU member state officials. Instead, through a frame analysis of these declarations and interviews, the article highlights that bilateralism has enabled continued Europeanisation, albeit to a lesser extent compared to the pre-Brexit situation. Closer relations with European capitals have thus allowed Europeanisation of UK foreign policy to persist. In other words, while the UK has distanced itself from the EU as a political entity, it has not rejected the common European values and priorities that remain shared with EU Member States.

De-EUisation and Europeanisation in foreign policy: conceptual and methodological reflections

Renewed bilateralism, initiated by the UK through the 24 joint statements it agreed upon with EU Member States, raises questions about the UK government’s intentions regarding EUisation and Europeanisation of its foreign policy. The recent strengthening of these bilateral ties (e.g. with the war in Ukraine), during a time of troubled relations with the EU, could suggest the UK’s intention to pursue ideational transfers.

To understand the UK’s intentions in its post-Brexit bilateralism, it is crucial to distinguish between EUisation and Europeanisation. EUisation refers to the more top-down transfer of institutional and organisational practices and policies between the EU and its Member States. In contrast, Europeanisation is a broader process of social learning and diffusion of ideas and values through multiple interactions, including those outside formal EU structures.

In the context of foreign policy, we argue that de-EUisation is characterised by three dynamics that reflect the institutional, political and organisational aspects of policy change:

1. the disengagement from EU structures, ranging from a reduced rhetoric or substantive support and commitment to a complete withdrawal;
2. the rescaling of foreign policy discourse namely, where non-EU geographical spaces are given preference; and
3. the reorganisation of foreign policy bureaucracy through a reinforced control over the national officials seconded to Brussels, including a redeployment of staff away from EU institutions.

De-Europeanisation, on the other hand, is made of three cognitive and social processes:

1. the rejection of shared European values;
2. the divergence from ‘previously established common European […] priorities that have emerged through Europeanisation’, resulting from ideational transfers and discussions; and
3. the end of social encounters with European national officials, including outside formal EU venues.

Using this framework, this article examines the 24 bilateral declarations signed between the UK and EU member states to assess whether they reflect intentions of de-EUisation, de-Europeanisation, or a continuation of Europeanisation in the UK’s foreign policy.

De-EUising but still Europeanising: away from Brussels but closer to European capitals

The analysis of bilateral declarations underscores the de-EUisation of UK foreign policy, marked by disengagement from EU structures, a re-scaling of foreign policy discourse to the global level discourse, and counter-Brusselisation via bureaucratic reorganisation.

The UK’s foreign policy has increasingly shifted away from the EU, especially under the leadership of Boris Johnson. The Global Britain strategy emphasised the UK’s autonomy and global ambitions, with less emphasis on EU cooperation. This shift was evident in the UK’s decision to have a reduced involvement in EU foreign policy structures and its focus on bilateral relations with individual EU member states. The signing of bilateral declarations with EU countries was part of this broader strategy.

These declarations reveal limited references to the EU, with most emphasising the desire to go beyond current UK-EU cooperation frameworks. Comparatively, there are more references to cooperation through NATO, highlighting the UK’s preference for alternative multilateral venues over EU structures. This re-scaling of foreign policy discourse to a global level and the bureaucratic reorganisation of UK institutions, including the transformation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office into the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), further illustrate the UK’s de-EUisation efforts. The reduction of UK staff in Brussels and the redeployment of personnel to bilateral embassies in Europe also signalled a shift away from an EU-centric foreign policy.

Secondly, the article finds that despite the clear trends of de-EUisation, the bilateral declarations also suggest a desire for continued Europeanisation of UK foreign policy. This is evidenced by three dynamics:

1. Persistent Shared Values: The bilateral declarations consistently align with EU foreign policy values, including human rights, democracy, international law, and multilateralism. These shared values and the many references to a specific European like-minded community reflect a continued Europeanisation of UK foreign policy, even as the UK seeks to redefine its global role.
2. Convergence Towards Shared Security Priorities: The UK’s bilateral declarations with EU member states also demonstrate a strong alignment with EU security priorities, ranging from international conflicts, cybersecurity and disinformation, to migration, organised crime and terrorism. This common understanding of priorities suggests that the UK remains committed to addressing shared security challenges with its European partners, even outside formal EU structures.
3. Continuation of Social Encounters: The bilateral agreements emphasise the importance of regular consultations and meetings between UK and EU officials, ensuring the exchange of ideas and practices, including through new fora (e.g. joint trainings, joint defence capabilities). While the level of institutionalisation achieved through these bilateral agreements may not match that of the EU framework, they still provide a mechanism for social learning and ideational transfers, contributing therefore to continued Europeanisation.

Conclusion

Could the recent intensification in UK foreign policy bilateralism be seen as an instance of de-EUisation and/or de-Europeanisation of its foreign policy? Despite the UK’s exit from EU structures, shift towards global ambitions, and reorganisation of its administration to reduce EU focus, Europeanisation persists through extensive bilateral diplomatic ties. The UK continues to promote values and priorities fundamental to European countries and maintains social interactions with European capitals. This ongoing Europeanisation is not solely a product of the UK’s former EU membership but is also rooted in broader historical ties and shared values across Europe.

The article contributes to understanding the evolution of bilateralism in times of crisis, with UK and EU partners seeking closer cooperation in response to challenges such as the war in the Ukraine. We call for further research on how polycrisis, including the Eurozone debt crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, has intensified bilateralism both within the EU and between the EU and third countries, questioning whether this trend strengthens or undermines European integration.

Sarah Wolff is Professor in International Studies and Global Politics at the University of Leiden. She is an expert on EU-UK relations, EU migration policy as well as the gender and religious dimension of EU foreign policy. She can be followed on Linkedin.

 

 

Helena Farrand Carrapico is Professor in International Relations and European Politics at Northumbria University, UK. Her research focuses on European internal security governance, in particular on the UK-EU relationship post-Brexit. She can be followed on LinkedIn.

 

 

Agathe Piquet is Marie Skłodowska-Curie Postdoctoral Fellow at UCLouvain Saint-Louis Bruxelles. Her primary research interest lies in EU internal security policies, with a particular focus on the processes of Europeanisation. She can be followed on Linkedin.

The post Out of Sight, Out of Mind? UK-EU Member States Bilateralism as an Enabler of Europeanisation appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Plenary session, Strasbourg

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

27/28 January 2025:

The constitutive meeting of the Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) is scheduled to take place on Monday, 27 January 2025 from 15:00-18:30 followed by the first meeting of the full-fledged SEDE Committee on Tuesday, 28 January 2025 from 9:00-12:30 and 14:30-18:30 in Brussels (SPINELLI 1G3).

Further information about the meeting can be found here.

_______________________

SEDE missions 2024:

• Ukraine - 25-26 October 2024
• United Kingdom - 28-30 October 2024
  

SEDE meetings' calendar 2025
SEDE meetings' calendar 2nd half of 2024 - 10th legislature
EP calendar 2024
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The Leaders of the G7 fully endorse and will stand behind the ceasefire agreement reached between Israel and Hamas.

Press briefing ahead of the Eurogroup meeting will take place on 16 January 2025 at 10.00. 

Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2024/3175 of 16 December 2024 implementing Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/3174 of 16 December 2024 amending Decision 2014/2643 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities.

The Council adopted a decision authorising the coordinator of the PESCO project ‘Military Mobility’ to invite Switzerland to participate in this military project.

European Council President António Costa invited the EU leaders to an informal meeting on defence. The retreat will take place in the Château de Limont, in Belgium.

Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad: Council extends restrictive measures by one year.

Overview of the main subjects to be discussed at meetings of the Council of the EU over the next two weeks and upcoming media events.

Weekly schedule of President António Costa, 13–19 January 2025

The EU issued a statement on the events of 10 January 2025, reiterating its solidarity with the people of Venezuela, and stressing its support for a negotiated and democratic solution to the crisis in the country.

The Council decided to renew restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela until 10 January 2026, and to list 15 more individuals. 

Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/3198 of 16 December 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/254 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Guatemala.

Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/3154 of 16 December 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2023/2135 concerning restrictive measures in view of activities undermining the stability and political transition of Sudan.