Afrique

Le défenseur sénégalais Mamadou Sarr, âgé de 20 ans, aspire à une première titularisation en Premier League lors du match entre Chelsea et Arsenal, après une progression fulgurante sous la direction de Liam Rosenior.

L’acoziborole, un antiparasitaire administré en une seule prise, présente des résultats remarquables contre la trypanosomiase africaine, presque toujours mortelle sans traitement.

Chaque année, dans le monde, deux millions de personnes sont envenimées par des morsures de serpents. 130 000 d’entre elles en meurent. Pourtant ces décès sont évitables : mesures de prévention, premiers soins, politiques publiques de mise à disposition d'anti-venins... Pour l'Organisation mondiale de la santé, cette maladie tropicale est négligée et il faudrait y accorder plus d'attention. Reportage de notre correspondant au Kenya, où la guerre contre les morsures de serpent est déclarée.

La politique de retrait prônée par le président des États-Unis et ses changements d'opinion constants poussent les autres puissances à adopter de nouvelles approches.

Wie vertragen sich die EU-Verträge mit der Bundesverfassung? Und wie sieht es aus mit dem Ständemehr? Die Juristen Martin Dumermuth und Paul Richli sehen (fast) alles unterschiedlich.

En Libye, le mois de ramadan est rythmé par l'inflation à Tripoli, à l'Ouest, tout comme à l'Est, gouvernée par le maréchal Haftar, dans une Libye divisée en deux gouvernements. A Benghazi, la clientèle tente de faire face à la fluctuation des prix, tandis que la solidarité avec les plus démunis est aussi très présente pendant ce mois saint. Nos correspondants, Lilia Blaise et Hamdi Tlili, ont pu se rendre sur place.

In addition to disrupting the official trade flow, the war in Myanmar has led to a spike in smuggling, black markets, and other economic crimes.

The region may be far away, but the emptying of camps housing foreign Islamic State fighters and their families could have local repercussions. 

Serge Bavaud hat nach den ersten Monaten im Amt seine erste Bilanz präsentiert. Er will den Nachrichtendienst wieder schlagkräftig machen und den Totalumbau des Nachrichtendienstes endlich abschliessen.

Deux semaines après un premier round de négociations à Madrid, le Maroc, l'Algérie, la Mauritanie et le Front Polisario se sont retrouvés à Washington les 23 et 24 février pour de nouveaux pourparlers confidentiels. Depuis plusieurs mois, l'administration Trump accélère la cadence diplomatique pour clore le dossier du Sahara occidental au profit de son allié marocain.

Un mystérieux groupe Whatasapp propose aux migrants subsahariens en Tunisie d'organiser leur rapatriement express dans leur pays d'origine, alors que des opérations de démantèlement des autorités tunisiennes se multiplient dans les campements d'El Amra et de Jebeniana, depuis début 2026.

Trump’s careful approach to China stems from an internal Republican battle over tariffs with the midterm elections looming in November.

Out of 300 seats up for grabs in Bangladesh's general election, just seven women won election.

"We are not asking Kyrgyzstan not to have trading relations with Russia. We only ask that that trading relationship does not involve the deliberate circumvention of our sanctions…” 

While most Japanese lawmakers support revising the constitution, they are more divided on what, exactly, needs to change.

During the seven-day WPK conclave, Kim Jong Un introduced the “Haekpangasoe” system while reaffirming his will to beef up nuclear capabilities in a new five-year military development plan.

Record patent filings in recent years suggest an expanding research ecosystem. Yet with only a fraction granted and even fewer commercially worked, scale may be outpacing substance.

He could have used his trip to Israel to call explicitly for de-escalation of tensions with Iran and a negotiated settlement; instead, he chose silence on that front.

Dans le viseur de la police "pour son implication dans la traite d'êtres humains", Festus Omwamba a été arrêté, a annoncé la police kényane dans la nuit de mercredi à jeudi. Une enquête a décrit cet homme de 33 ans comme "le cerveau" de l'opération qui aurait envoyé plus de 1 000 Kényans rejoindre les rangs de l'armée russe.

Ino Afentouli, Senior Policy Advisor; Head of the Geopolitics and Diplomacy Observatory, ELIAMEP 

The return of fear 

If anything changed in Europe after 24 February 2022, it was the conviction that our continent had seen a definitive end to war. In the eight decades since the end of World War II, European leaders had done everything they could to consolidate the peace which they won in 1945, with American help. “Never again” was the driving force behind the founding of the European Economic Community, NATO, and other organizations created to eliminate conflict and establish a framework for peaceful coexistence motivated by a supranational interest that would be the sum of all national interests.

The columns of Russian tanks wresting territory away from Ukrainian metre by metre brought that historical era to an end, reanimating the old demons that had wreaked destruction across the continent for centuries. Objectively speaking, the institutions have held firm. Neither NATO nor the European Union has collapsed. Fortunately, because without them, Russia would not have stopped at Ukraine and broadened the European front; many countries would now be occupied, as they were between 1914 and 1944.

Still, Europe does not feel—and is not—secure. Worse still, in many countries, an alarming proportion of Europeans have begun to doubt whether these supranational institutions can protect them better than a return to national supremacy. This shift is the result of a fear which, if it becomes generalized, will erode the European unity that is already being tested by the war in Ukraine. Unity will be further undermined by the desire of certain EU member states to return to business as usual with Russia if peace is achieved. But Russia does not want peace. It wants Europe to remain in a state of perpetual insecurity, forever awaiting the next blow. It envisions a European Union divided into Moscow’s friends and enemies, rendered incapable of addressing its threats effectively. Russia wants a Europe unable to select its future members and forced to rearm at the expense of other policies, whose downgrading will drive segments of its population towards pro-Russian choices. This is the existential dilemma facing the EU. If it fails to address it, the bloc will indeed face the risk disintegration.

Jens Bastian, Senior Policy Advisor, ELIAMEP

As Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine enters its fifth year, two new strategic parameters of the war have come into focus. The first is that the dictator in the Kremlin is deliberately targeting energy infrastructure in order to force Ukrainian citizens to surrender. With the help of Iranian-manufactured Shahed drones and incessant missile attacks, power grids and energy pipelines are being destroyed in the middle of a brutal Ukrainian winter.

The other development relates to Donald Trump’s request for a so-called “peace deal”. To the extent that we know what this entails (and its elements are fluid at best), Trump’s “acrobatic” negotiating tactics appear set to reward the aggressor in Moscow. The envoys Trump has despatched to Geneva, Qatar and Istanbul for trilateral “negotiations” are not acting as neutral mediators between Kiev and Moscow. The US administration has made its hostility to the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, absolutely clear, while welcoming Putin with full honours in Alaska.

So, on the one hand, Russia’s winter bombing campaign is seeking to create a rift between Ukraine’s resilient civil society and its courageous army. And, on the other, the stance adopted by the US administration is pushing for the imposition of a “peace agreement” that will eviscerate Ukraine’s sovereignty and gravely jeopardize European security.

Both developments are perilous. The Trump administration and some EU governments want to re-establish trade agreements with Russia, particularly in the energy sector. The political groundwork for the policy of appeasing Putin is being laid in Washington, Budapest, Bratislava and Prague.

For more than four years, Putin has made it quite clear he does not speak the language of diplomacy. This sombre anniversary of Russia’s aggression obliges Europe to do ‘whatever it takes’ to help Ukraine survive. Kiev’s leverage at the negotiating table needs to be bolstered through increased military aid, sustained funding, and the restoration of civilian infrastructure. Ukraine’s citizens and soldiers will one day remind us who stood within the alliance of solidarity to defeat the Russian invaders—and who did not.

Spyros Blavoukos, Professor at the Athens University of Economics and Business, Head of the “Ariane Contellis” European Programme at ELIAMEP

Four years on, is there a realistic exit from the war in Ukraine?

As we enter the fifth year of the war in Ukraine, international fatigue has become palpable. One has only to glance at the scarce media coverage of developments on the battlefield or of the ongoing (?) negotiations. After all, the change of leadership in the White House has provided ample fodder for discussion and reflection, from the unilateral dismantling of the post-war regulatory framework governing the international economic system to the blatant challenging of the concept of state sovereignty in instances ranging from Greenland to Venezuela, with Iran potentially next in line. Amidst this onslaught of (violent) changes, who still focuses on the drama playing out in Ukraine? This explains why calls for Ukraine to embrace pragmatism have intensified, urging Kiev to search for a realistic exit strategy from the war.

There is no doubt that our insights into the battle-readiness of the Ukrainian army and the fighting spirit of Ukraine’s civilian population come to us filtered and second hand. But, at the end of the day, only the Ukrainian people has the right to decide on when and if to end hostilities, bearing the consequences of their choices. However, there is a fundamental prerequisite linked to the feasibility and, above all, the viability of any agreement. A settlement born of pressure or exhaustion that fails to establish a stable equilibrium and condemns Ukraine to a state of (semi)permanent vulnerability, is no more than a temporary fix with no realistic prospect of long-term implementation. Consequently, any discussion on ending the war must encompass elements to consolidate Ukrainian security and provide a robust deterrent against a new round of hostilities. Otherwise, the “realism” of today may well become synonymous with disastrous “appeasement” in the future.

Triantafyllos Karatrantos, Research Associate, ELIAMEP

Can peace be made sustainable?

February 24, 2022 was one of those days that changed our world. Its impact on security, international relations, and national and supranational policies can only be compared to that of the September 11 attacks. For four years now, interstate war and invasions by revisionist powers and totalitarian regimes has no longer been a hazy memory of World War II, but the difficult everyday reality for a European country and its citizens as they bravely defend themselves in the face, too, of a significant asymmetry of power.

Since taking office in January 2025, the US President has been working to craft a peace plan that could serve as a foundation for an agreement. Over the intervening 13 months, we can discern two primary strategic manoeuvres: overtures to Russia and the exertion of pressure on Ukraine. The latter, and its President, have shown themselves willing to make difficult decisions and bear the cost of peace. Russia, the invader, has yet to show the same willingness. This disparity is crucial when addressing the question of how realistic a prospect peace truly is. Even the most difficult peace can be realistic; however, it is not necessarily just and—most crucially—it is exceedingly difficult to sustain. That is the big question and the issue here. Will the peace be sustainable? The experience of 2014 has shown us how extremely hard this can be to achieve. We should not forget, either, that the pressure being put on Ukraine to agree to terms may become a highly problematic factor in the future.

Finally, there are two more parameters to take into account: The first is how Russia is punished for its invasion. That cost, across multiple levels, is what could render the use of hard power a non-option in the future. Yet, there is little room for optimism here, given our ongoing drift towards a world governed by force, rather than international law and rules. The second parameter is the threat Russia poses to European security, a point I feel needs no further elaboration here.

Panagiota Manoli, Associate Professor at the University of the Peloponnese; Senior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP

Fluctuating Deadlines

Russia’s “special military operation” against Ukraine, which was initially only supposed to last a few days, has stretched into its fifth year of full-scale war. The two sides began negotiating a ceasefire accord during the “Istanbul Talks” less than a month after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. These talks failed, but left a foundation for a potential ceasefire. Under Trump’s term in office, diplomacy has restarted with fluctuating peace objectives, timelines, and places of negotiations. Trump has set June 2026 as the latest date for an agreement. Despite the growing cost of the conflict on both sides, negotiations appear to be moving slowly.  The same slow pace is observed on the battlefield. Russia’s daily gains on the ground are measured in meters. It appears that Kyiv is also unable to mark a decisive advancement. Is it possible that a cease-fire agreement will be concluded any time soon? The territorial issue appears to be the most challenging one on the table. Russia wants Kyiv to surrender all territories that have officially (and illegally) annexed, but Moscow does not control. Kyiv calls this an unacceptable capitulation.  In an effort to alter the situation on the ground, military activities are anticipated to step up alongside diplomatic efforts. However, there is another, equally significant political issue on the table, and that is nothing less than Ukraine’s sovereignty as an independent state.  Moscow’s objectives for Ukraine’s political subjugation remain unchanged, and on multiple occasions, Kremlin spokespersons have said that the “special military operation” will continue until “its goals are achieved”. Concerningly, US mediation focuses too much on the need for Ukraine to make concessions. Trump stated on 28 May 2025, that he would find out in two weeks if Putin was “tapping us along” or genuinely interested in ending the war. Since then, nine months have gone by, but Kyiv is instead held responsible for the lack of peace. “Ukraine better come to the table fast,” Trump repeated once again ahead of the latest round of talks in Geneva. Unless a major development happens, mainly on the battlefield, the prospects for a ceasefire, let alone a peace agreement, are grim.

Cover photo: publicdomainpictures.net