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Although the COVID-19 pandemic and global border closures briefly slowed movement, recent years have seen a steady uptick in arrivals, particularly in Greece, with Cyprus also experiencing record numbers of irregular entries compared to previous periods. Both countries face complex, mixed migratory flows, still largely transiting through Türkiye but with a noticeable surge in movements originating from Lebanon and Egypt.

The reports produced under the ‘Mediterranean Migration’ project delve into these evolving migration dynamics and the policy responses in Egypt, Lebanon, Cyprus, and Greece, looking at the period 2021-2024. While these countries occupy different positions in the migratory journey—whether as points of origin, transit, or destination—the research reveals striking similarities in how they navigate and attempt to manage these roles within the broader regional migration landscape.

Country Reports:

Country Report Cyprus

Country Report Egypt

Country Report Lebanon

Country Report Greece

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Policy brief  Cyprus

Policy brief Egypt

Policy brief Greece

Policy brief Lebanon

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Extensive, Synthesis Report

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Triantafyllos Karatrantos, ELIAMEP Senior Research Fellow, explains the crisis in Kashmir and the conflict between India and Pakistan.

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Greece is entering a new phase in European unification. In addition to monetary union, we now have a defence union.

The Greek Defence Technological Industrial Base (GDTIB) is in a position to rise to this challenge. With the help of realistic public policies, it could be included in the top three DTIBs among the eleven frontline EU states, alongside those of Finland and Poland.

The successful integration of the GDTIB into the pan-European DTIB will strengthen the Greek Armed Forces, make the defence sector one of Greece’s economy most capital- and knowledge-intensive ones , and enhance Greece’s strategic alliances.

Specifically, the more that the GDIB exports to the pan-European DTIB as it grows by leaps and bounds, the more it will advance the productive and innovation capacities which Greece’s military deterrence needs in an era which has witnessed the return of ‘Big War’.

 

Read here in pdf the Policy Paper by Antonis Kamaras, ELIAMEP Research Associate.

Introduction

The acceleration of the EU’s emergence as a collective security provider, as well as the rising defence expenditures of all NATO member-countries, presents a unique set of opportunities for Greece’s Defence Technological Industrial Base (GDTIB). Namely, the opportunity to enhance the effectiveness of the Greek Armed Forces; to make a meaningful contribution to the transformation of the Greek economic model; and to strengthen the country’s strategic alliances.

For these opportunities to be grasped, however, concerted policy action is required from the Greek government in such domains as industrial strategy, military procurement reform, and the strengthening of the country’s R&D ecosystem.

This brief note will begin by summarising the main contours of the European Defence Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB), as it is shaped by national and EU policy across Europe and connecting this fast-evolving EDTIB to Greek military, economic and strategic imperatives. Secondly, it will provide a profile of the GDTIB and its actual and latent capabilities. Thirdly, it will situate the GDTIB within its peer group—the DTIBs of the eleven Eastern front-line EU member-states, including Greece—and argue that the GDTIB can and should be one of the three leaders of this group, together with the DTIBs of Finland and Poland. Finally, it will conclude by suggesting the policy set that needs to be adopted to allow the GDTIB to grasp the opportunities that are arising to the benefit of Greece’s national interest.

The opportunity: the rise of the EDTIB

The European Commission’s White Paper on European Defence[1] has catalysed the policy debate on the future of the EDTIB both ahead of and subsequent to its publication.

In it, the Commission was able to recommend two important funding instruments. First, the exemption from the excessive deficit procedure allowing member countries that want to increase their defence spending to do so without breaching the EU’s fiscal rules. The take-up can rise to a cumulative 650 billion euros, should all 27 member states make use of it. And, second, the 150 billion euro SAFE lending facility, offered at concessionary rates similar to Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) loans. Critics have, however, estimated that the two fall short of the amounts that would be required to catalyse defence investment in Europe. It has been calculated that, for France, a 10 billion euro procurement project would, if funded through SAFE, provide an 18 million euro interest rate subsidy per annum[2].  Turning to those EU member countries who could make use of the escape from excessive deficit procedure option, they would still worry that markets could respond negatively, thereby raising their borrowing costs. More importantly, without joint EU borrowing—and thus funding—for defence, the incentives will simply not be there for EDTIB to achieve the economies of scale and interoperabilities that have eluded it thus far.

That being said, the White Paper is arguably more important as a loud and clear statement of intent for a strategically autonomous Europe, rather than for the specific funding instruments it recommends. In our estimation, as a means of funding European defence at a satisfactory level, these funding instruments will soon be overshadowed by joint bond issuance by the European Commission, or another agreed vehicle for joint bond issuance such as the European Stability Mechanism. This is because:

• The new German government has decided to remove the debt brake and generously fund its defence effort; it is untenable politically and operationally, for the effort to rebuild collective European defence to be imbalanced due to Germany’s much greater fiscal space[3].

• The US will accelerate its disengagement from Europe’s defence, with US troop withdrawals from the Continent very much on the cards, in its effort to counter China’s pacing threat[4], and this accelerated withdrawal will further weaken the influence of those EU countries (such as Holland) that are hostile to joint bond issuance. Importantly, replacing the US’s strategic enablers, such as satellite-based ISR and anti-missile defence, is so expensive it will require pan-European industrial collaboration and funding.

• The question mark hanging over the US dollar as a store of value and the world’s dominant reserve currency[5] will make the arguments for creating what the Draghi report called a ‘common safe asset’[6] even more compelling. This asset is jointly raised EU bonds, with a virtuous circle making rising bond issuance cheaper and thus more attractive for    EU member countries to borrow collectively to fund the common good of European defence. Relatedly, the European collective defence that this bond issuance will fund will add further credibility to the euro as a reserve currency. Markets will perceive a strengthened European defence as a pillar of EU cohesion, and hence of the credibility of its collective borrowing.

We underline that trends that are already ongoing argue for an adequately funded EDTIB well into the future. Nearly all NATO member countries, under pressure from the Trump Administration, have committed to raising their defence budget at 2 % as a floor not a ceiling. To grasp the order of magnitude, it has been estimated that had all EU member states spent 2 % of their GDP on their defence in 2006-2025, there would have been an additional 1.1. trillion euros in defence spending over the 15-year period[7]. Relatedly, S&P has calculated that were EU member-states to raise their defence expenditure from 2.67 % of GDP (the current NATO weighted average) to 5 % of GDP (the extreme upper range of the increase President Trump is pressuring  European countries to make), that would have resulted in annual defence expenditure increasing from 242 billion USD to 875 billion USD[8].

In terms of the specific defence domains and imperatives to which this trend in increased funding for the EDTIB is connected, we highlight the following:

1.  The need for stocks of war materiel both to be replenished, due to the assistance provided to Ukraine, but also raised to the level whereby Russia can be credibly deterred. To put this in context, according to credible calculations, in purchasing power parity terms Russia’s defence spending exceeded the totality of Europe’s defence spending in 2024, with an estimated Russian expenditure of 145.9 billion $ equating to 461.6 $ billion in PPP terms and exceeding Europe’s 457 $ billion[9]. The EU therefore needs to translate its decisive collective economic superiority over Russia into a decisive superiority in war materiel by substantially outspending Russia in PPP terms.
2. The need to achieve strategic autonomy from the US, which means that a rising percentage of the procurement meant to establish clear military superiority over Russia will have to be directed at European companies (including non-European companies—be they US, Israeli or Korean—which have taken the trouble to indigenize their operations in Europe). This strategic autonomy encompasses both expensive and cheap innovation, meaning it ranges from R&D in sixth-generation weapon systems such as warships and fighter aircraft to AI-driven drones, as well as strategic enablers historically provided by the US, such as strategic lift, spaced-based ISR and communications, antimissile defence, and last-generation fighter aircraft, which now need to be developed and manufactured by the EDTIB.
3. The imperative to ‘produce and buy European’ to achieve economies of scale through industrial consolidation and joint procurement, as well as the interoperability of the EU’s Armed Forces. Economies of scale will enable the EU to buy more kit cheaper, while interoperability will make for a more effective collective deterrence[10]. Indicatively, Europe provided 7 types of Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) and 9 types of self-propelled howitzers to Ukraine, compared to the US’s 1 and 2 respectively[11]. EU funding will serve these goals by subsidizing the intra-European collaborative production and procurement of defence articles, thus incentivizing both the manufacturing and the buying of EDTIB-developed and -manufactured equipment.
4. The need to raise fiscal commitments in defence to benefit European economies, in order to legitimize the diversion of scarce fiscal resources from social welfare to defence and to maximize direct and indirect wealth generation through an innovative EDTIB. This need also has a strong regional aspect, with national governments keen to ensure that the EDTIB makes a meaningful contribution to the economic wellbeing of their less well-developed regions[12].

In turn, the growth of the EDTIB and the way public policy structures this growth will afford the GDTIB the opportunity to contribute to vital Greek military, economic and strategic goals[13]. In particular:

• GDTIB sales volumes can increase manifold, product and services ranges can be expanded, allowing the GDTIB to invest in upgrading its production facilities, achieve economies of scale, and reinvest in R&D—thus enhancing the security of supply to the Greek Armed Forces and contributing to Armed Forces innovation, with the two altogether meaningfully strengthening the Hellenic Armed Forces’ deterrence.  In other words, a GDTIB that can be an important and effective member of the EDTIB is a GDTIB that can provide both a greater quantity and quality of war material to the Greek Armed Forces. Such a GDTIB accords with Greece’s need to deter against a ‘Big War’, as the disengagement of the US, together with the commensurately increase in Turkish revisionism, means that Greco-Turkish strategic rivalry involves not only two opposing Armed Forces, but also two opposing DTIBs[14].

• As a constituent member of the EDTIB, a dynamically growing GDTIB will most probably be the Greek economy’s most capital- and knowledge-intensive sector, and make a meaningful contribution to the transformation of the Greek economic model and its resulting ability to export high-value-added goods and services.

• Sales to other EU member states of critical war materiel (and its reverse: increasing Hellenic Armed Forces procurement from European firms) as well as participation in European defence supply chains and production consortia, will strengthen and expand Greece’s alliances with other EU member-states, thus enhancing EU solidarity with Greece in relation to the threat posed by Turkey. This alliance-building will not necessarily exclude Israel and the US, as their major defence companies will seek EU corporate partners in order to be eligible for EU funding. Importantly, the growing contribution of the Greek DTIB to the collective defence of the EU would also give Greece a correspondingly greater claim to that common European defence.

Considering all the above, we would claim that an effective GDTIB would, as a bona fide member of the EDTIB, be the industrial equivalent of Greece’s participation in the EU monetary union, as it would sustain Greece’s status as a core, not marginal, member of the EU, this time in the context of the EU’s collective defence endeavour.

The GDTIB: positioning and possibilities

We would argue that the GDTIB has been underestimated for three reasons: the corruption scandals that cast a shadow over the GDTIB in the post-Imia weapons procurement spree (1996-2008), mismanagement in major state-owned defence enterprises that created cost overruns and delays in executing contracts for the Hellenic Armed Forces, and the fiscal crisis that led to Ministry of National Defence (MND) orders to Greek defence firms drying up for over a decade[15].

Notwithstanding these factors, we highlight the following from the pre-fiscal crisis and fiscal crisis periods:

• At a time when other EU member-countries’ DTIBs were retrenching due to the post-1989 peace dividend dynamics, the post-Imia defence procurement spree meant that a number of both private and state-owned firms performed a critical subcontracting role in the manufacturing and servicing of highly advanced weapon systems, ranging from US Patriot batteries to German T214 submarines[16]. The value of the offset agreements involving GDTIB production in this same period, which lasted from the 1990s to the late 2000s, has been estimated at 2.5 billion euros[17] and involved industrial partnerships with four out of the eight top European defence firms: namely Rheinmettal, Leonardo, Dassault and Airbus.
• During the decade-long Greek defence procurement drought, the private firms survived and even grew on the basis of exports. The poster child of this development was Theon International, which manufactures night vision equipment, is entirely export-oriented, and counts some of the world’s most advanced militaries among its clients[18].
• The lack of national funding also meant that private and state defence firms, as well as university and research institute teams under the aegis of the MND, focused on PESCO and EDF funding. This placed Greece among the top 5 countries in terms of number of participants, right after the leading DTIB powerhouses of Germany, France, Italy and Spain. As a result, defence-related expertise has been accumulating, and the GDTIB is thoroughly familiar with the technologies and capabilities which the EDTIB has prioritised for future development[19]. Crucially, these technologies and capabilities address key challenges the EU must resolve to achieve strategic autonomy[20]—a strategic autonomy which, as we mentioned above, is no longer purely aspirational due to the behaviour of the second Trump Administration.
• The fiscal crisis catalysed an effective restructuring of the critical shipyard sector, with the Skaramanga, Elefsina and Syros shipyards being acquired by well-capitalised outside investors, and partial rationalization efforts being undertaken in state-owned firms in aerospace (EAV) and land weapon systems (EAS).
• Last but not least, a maturing start-up ecosystem (now more than 10 years old) has been created in Greece,[21] due to recognition that the Greek economy needs to become increasingly innovative if it is not to relapse into systemic crisis. Greek VCs are increasingly focusing on deep tech, and are more able to enter the defence market due to the European Investment Bank (EIB), which is its anchor investor, relaxing its dual use restrictions. The Hellenic Centre of Defence Innovation (HCDI), the less-than-two-years-old MND vehicle for funding defence innovation, which recently put out its first batch of calls, can now take advantage of this long-term effort in deep-tech start-up development.

In the post–fiscal–crisis environment, a geopolitically-assertive Turkey, the return of ‘Big War’ and territorial conquest in continental Europe, and the US’s accelerating focus on Asia, has kept Greece a top spender in terms of weapon-system acquisitions and upgrades[22]. While the first procurement wave of this period was off-the shelf, mostly from France and secondarily from Israel with little GDTIB input, it has laid the foundations of the Greek government’s current emphasis on 25 % GDTIB participation in all major procurement contracts with non-Greek firms. Importantly, the geopolitical motivation aligned with major procurement choices has catalysed engagement by the French and Israeli DTIBs with the GDTIB. In the former case, Group Naval shared on its own volition some subcontracting work for the Belharra frigates; in the latter, Israel’s IAI acquiring Intracom Defence Electronics, a leading Greek private-sector defence firm. F16 upgrades to the Viper configuration by EAV, and more generally the pick-up of Follow On Support (FOS) in the Hellenic Air Force and Army and Naval Aviation, have also boosted Greece’s aeronautical sector. There has been little activity, however, in FOS work in Greek armour, despite Greece having one of the largest, if not the largest, MBT and self-propelled artillery fleets in Europe.[23] In addition, as another bequest of the post-Imia procurement spree, there are at least two companies which are now part of the supply chain of the main German manufacturers of armoured vehicles—most prominently METKA, a member of METLEN, one of Greece’s leading industrial conglomerates.

Equally important for the GDTIB, over the last five to seven years, several events and processes have accelerated the development of Greek competencies in the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4DI) domain, either in the private sector or through public and private partnerships outside core defence. We highlight:

1. The gathering pace of state digitization during and subsequent to the pandemic, with RRF funding prioritising digitisation. This has meant that both within the state, and in private sector firms contracted to implement a diverse set of digitisation projects, digital competencies have been deepening in Greece[24] with the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector projected to reach 4.6 % of GDP in 2029, which equals 10.4 billion euros in sales. Public and private partnerships have been proposed and are being implemented to expand the pool of ICT personnel[25]. This investment has also included AI which, designated a strategic priority due to its undeniable significance, is receiving a mixture of national and European funds channelled to Greek research institutes.
2. The Greek state has also invested considerably in civil defence competencies[26], including cyber, as well as in border surveillance. In the light of the rising potency of natural disasters, cyber-attacks and population movements, these domains are both inherently synergistic and highly adaptable to the purposes of national defence.
3. The pandemic also catalysed investment by multinational firms, mostly in IT functions serving an international client-base, which has further refined and expanded the Greek IT skill pool.

The importance of such developments for the GDTIB can hardly be exaggerated; indicatively, in the context of Civil Military Fusion (CMF), even companies engaged in IT in Ireland, a country with minuscule Armed Forces, aspire to integrate themselves into the EDTIB[27].

Becoming a leader among the DTIBs of Eastern frontline EU member-states

Greece is one of the eleven EU member-states which have eastern front-line status; the other ten are Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Cyprus. Greece’s DTIB strategy should therefore aim to both present itself as, and aspire to becoming, one of this peer group’s three leaders, along with Finland and Poland.

On a geographic distance from Moscow basis, Greece it is the only comparable high spender in defence within the EU-27 which is not physically proximate to Russia. In context, in 2024 the only EU member-states apart from Greece to spend above 3 % of GDP on defence were Poland, Estonia and Latvia, with Lithuania hovering under 3 % and Finland just under at a still high by EU standards 2.5 %[28] (Cyprus’ defence spending is just below 2 %; it should be borne in mind that the Greek Armed Forces are also organised to defend the island in an event of military conflict with Turkey). Of course, Greek defence spending is so high for the same reason, though the threat is not Russia, but Turkey and its aggressively revisionist agenda.

Establishing the GDTIB in the top three of this peer group will—given the high legitimacy the group enjoys (not for nothing are the EU Commissioners of External Affairs and Defence from the Baltic countries, while the Report which informed the EU’s Preparedness Strategy bears the name of an ex-President of Finland)—allow Greece to promote an agenda that much more effectively within the EU that is facilitative both of its wider national defence effort and of the development of its DTIB.

On the military side, an effective Greek DTIB in the top three of this peer group would translate into being able to provide equipment and solutions to all the front-line states, given the commonality of the threat environment.

On the economic side, Greece can develop a common agenda whereby above-average defence spending in the front-line states does not develop into an inequitable core-periphery relationship with the countries with the stronger DTIBs (such as Germany, France, Italy and Sweden) being the major beneficiaries of the transfer of resources from EU member-states with a weaker industrial base and fewer fiscal resources to develop such an industrial base. Not only would such an arrangement be inequitable, and thus ultimately unsustainable politically, it would also be wasteful of the skills and know-how that front-line states can mobilise in shaping the cause of an innovation-prone EDTIB[29]. And if Ukraine has proven anything, it is that those nation-states which face the greatest existential threat also have the greatest incentive to innovate defence-wise.

In this context, Greece can partner with Poland and other Central Eastern European (CEE) front-line states to demand a partial recycling of their defence expenditures into their own R&D defence efforts. This would allow their DTIBs to mitigate the core-periphery last-link-in-the-chain conundrum—a policy challenge that has been particularly prominent for CEE countries since their accession to the EU[30].

On the strategic side, Greece shares a geopolitical hedging strategy with all the other front-line states[31], whereby they purchase some of their highly advanced weapon systems from non-EU defence firms, primarily from the US and secondarily from such close US allies as the UK, Israel and Korea. We mention, indicatively, the decision taken by Finland and Greece to buy US F35s, Greece’s prioritization of Israeli systems for its air defence, and Poland’s acquisition of US Abrams and Korean K2 MBTs. Greece therefore has an interest in developing a common agenda which: a) enables, under conditions acceptable to other EU member-states and premised on European indigenisation, the participation of the DTIBs  of non-EU member countries in the common EU defence , and b) excludes Turkey from this arrangement, for as long as Ankara  avoids joining the EU’s democratic and geopolitical canon. Indicative of the possibilities of developing a joint agenda of this sort is the annulment in 2014 of the sale of two Mistral amphibious assault ships to the Russian Federation by President Francois Hollande, following a concerted lobbying effort by the Baltic countries and Poland[32].

Is such leadership a realistic prospect, however, and are the benefits that would accrue from it feasible? The answer is a decisive yes.

Unlike Greece, all the CEE countries underinvested in defence in the 1990s and 2000s. This meant they could not benefit from the extensive industrial partnerships and knowhow transfer which, as we pointed out above, forms the foundations of Greece’s current DTIB[33]. The fact that defence was not a priority sector, given the peace dividend dynamics, particularly in Germany, meant that far less effort was expended on trying to incorporate the strong manufacturing sectors of CEE countries into defence-sector supply chains than, say, the civilian automotive sector.  Typically, countries like Bulgaria and Romania underinvested in their Eastern Bloc–vintage defence sectors, which mostly exported military equipment of Soviet origin in Africa and Asia. Accelerating efforts to rearm, particularly after the conquest of Crimea by the Russian Federation, could not make up for this lost time, while the most ambitious rearmament effort of all, by Poland, prioritized speed of delivery and/or cementing the security relationship with the US. Poland, which has undertaken the most ambitious rearmament effort of all EU member-states, has also experienced deep-seated politicization and limited R&D expenditure leading to the under-performance of its DTIB, in a situation not unlike that in Greece[34].

Limited interest in defence, or in the EU as a collective defence provider, as well as the small size of several of the eleven front-line states, also meant a limited uptake of EDF and PESCO facilities. In contrast to Greece, which belongs to the ‘vanguard’ category in terms of its PESCO/EDF uptake, Poland and Romania are in the ‘lukewarm’ category, while Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia and Cyprus are in the ‘loiterer’ category[35].

Furthermore, extensive FDI undertaken by Greek corporations in Bulgaria and Romania post-1989, coupled with a leading Greek presence in the Cypriot economy, means that Greek conglomerates already own subsidiaries in these three peer countries that could be part of a Group approach in terms of defence-related production. No doubt, due to the growth of the EDTIB, there will be additional incentives for M&A acquisitions in defence, with Greek corporates taking the initiative as integrators and mobilisers of needed capital.

Last but not least, Greece is also number two among Eastern front-line states on the European Innovation Scoreboard, after Finland (admittedly, the gap is a large one)[36]. Among the larger front-line countries that can occupy the top three DTIB positions, Finland is number three among the EU-27 on the European Innovation Scoreboard, while Greece is number 20, Hungary number 21, Poland number 23, Slovakia number 24, Bulgaria number 26 and Romania number 27. This means that the Greek research ecosystem can sustain Greek leadership among the front-line peer group. Even more so if, through its own and the European funding facilities this paper recommends, it manages to entice to defence-relevant domains a critical mass of its US-based scientists, given that this scientific pool is the deepest not only within the front-line peer group but among all EU-27 member countries bar Germany, and only then in absolute not relative-to-general-population terms[37].

We would be remiss in this analysis if we failed to highlight Finland’s leading status among the ten front-line countries, Greece included, in terms of the governance, strategic focus and outcomes of its DTIB[38]. Finland’s DTIB has actually benefited from Finland’s strategic isolation, which has translated into efficient use of scarce resources, a focus on an extensive Maintenance Repair and Overhaul (MRO) effort which has resulted in the life cycles of weapon systems procured from abroad being maintained and extended, efficient niche strategies—in, for instance, ship hull design and manufacturing—which have addressed the particular needs of the Finnish Defence Forces, and a distinct lack of corruption and politicization in the DTIB.  This set of features constitute a compelling template for Greece and Poland. As they seek to improve the performance of their DTIBs, and considering that the status of the US as the ultimate guarantor of their territorial integrity is now uncertain, it behoves them to see their respective DTIBs as a genuine, not nominal, pillar of their deterrence —just as Finland has done for decades.

Greek leadership of such a peer group would, of course, require recognition by the other nine members that such a group does exist, and that it is useful for each and all of its constituent members for this group to exist. We would argue that Greece’s status as the only Mediterranean country, together with Cyprus, to be a front-line state in the EU’s east validates both these propositions for three interdependent reasons. First, because it makes the imperatives of territorial defence a cause that is not limited to the centre and north of Europe’s eastern border, but also extends to the south. Second, because it makes this cause agnostic to the origin of the threat, thus universalizing it, increasing its normative strength within the EU along, by extension, with the credibility of the EU’s collective defence—a feature even more important today when even Denmark’s territorial integrity is being questioned from the West (i.e. the US). Third, because it adds numbers to the particular concerns of front-line states—ensuring that defence funding integrates elements that are equitable, for instance,  and enable the full participation of all EU member-states in the innovation that European collective defence needs and from which the economies of EU member states can benefit.

Building on the foundations of Greece’s extant DTIB

Given its present status, the GDTIB can, with the appropriate level of government support, become one of the three leaders of the eleven front-line EU DTIBs. Achieving this would translate into major benefits for the effectiveness of the Greek Armed Forces, the competitiveness of its economy, and the strength of its alliances. We believe that the following set of policies can be decisive in achieving this goal.

1. Fully capitalize the state-owned defence enterprises, namely EAV and EAS, and lift all restrictions on their managerial authority by taking them off Central Government supervision, as in their ability to offer competitive salaries. Doing so will a) improve their performance in critical undertakings for the Greek Armed Forces, as in case of EAV’s F16 upgrades to the Viper configuration and FOS on the Hellenic Army and Hellenic Navy Aviation branches; b) secure the human and capital equipment resources, in the case of EAS, required to allow the GDTIB to partake in the restocking of critical munitions at the pan-European level; c) allow the GDTIB to participate in newly-founded pan-European consortia for next-generation weapon platforms, as much as in the creation of European strategic enablers that will replace those historically provided by the US.

In a nutshell, the Greek government needs to invest amply in order to ensure: (a) that these two firms’ spare capacity is fully utilised   in terms of facilities, production lines – including testing sites – and skilled personnel, as spare capacity is in great demand throughout Europe due to the decades-long running down of the EDIIB, from 1989 to 2022; (b) with additional funding and expertise-injection, their embedded knowledge and skills become a stepping stone to participation in pan-European consortia, not only as subcontractors but also as innovative developers able to capture part of the value added to be created. After an accelerated restructuring effort of this sort, both EAV and EAS will also become attractive acquisition targets to both Greek and non-Greek investors, thus leveraging the government effort via additional inflows of capital and expertise. The private-sector firms, by aggressively expanding the manufacturing capability of their defence subsidiaries through ambitious investment plans (as in the case of METLEN most prominently[39]) are proof positive of what these two state-controlled enterprises can aspire and plan to achieve within the EDTIB, if liberated from their present constraints.

2. If Thessaloniki-based ELVO has retained important production capabilities and licenses—meaning spare capacity that can be resuscitated-ensure that ELVO acquires a credible industrial owner so that it play a role similar to that of EAV and EAS in its domain of expertise, which is military vehicles assembly and their FOS. As per the White Paper recommendations, investors in ELVO and other defence firms in Greece’s regions could make use of EU Cohesion funding, but only if Greek central and regional authorities act fast and make full use of the scheduled revision of this funding source.

3. Double the budget of HCDI, so it can issue more calls and finalise more contracts in order both to accelerate the introduction of innovative technologies in the Hellenic Armed Forces and to give Greek defence high-tech firms a fighting chance to export their goods and services in the pan-European market with the added credibility of already having the Greek Armed Forces as a client. Employ this additional HCDI allocation to defence tech and dual use firms which can submit proposals, on their own or in partnership with research teams from universities and research institutes, to HCDI beyond the remit of the calls issued by the latter. By doing so, HCDI can catalyse the growth of the GDTIB as a growing number of companies and research teams will be able to consider potential defence applications of their technologies and knowledge. We mention here that dual use investments are included in the White Paper and accepted as bona fide investments in defence by the GOFOG classification system. Relatedly, Turkey is dedicating a bit more than 10 % of its public R&D budget to defence compared with a little less than 5 % in Greece[40].

We also note that enhancing the ability of Greek defence tech and dual use firms to produce asymmetric advantages for the Greek Armed Forces, and  enhance Greek deterrence, is synergistic with the defence effort of the other ten frontline EU member-countries; they face similar operational challenges, ranging from Finland’s archipelagic defence in the Baltic Sea to enhanced border surveillance in Poland.

Enhancing the funding of defence startups can have another advantage: drawing to Greece startups with diaspora founders who, apart from gaining access to cost-competitive skilled staff in Greece, may also gain a ‘passport’ into a growing European defence market. Also reserve fiscal space for these deep-tech, Greek-only procurements so that successful prototyping can be converted into production and deployment by the Hellenic Armed Forces without delay.

4. Expand the FOS budget to all functional and upgradable platforms on a value-for-money basis, so that the Hellenic Armed Forces rapidly restore their strength and the GDTIB both gains valuable expertise and is further integrated into pan-European value chains. This imperative is particularly pertinent with regard to land systems, as in the case of MBTs and self-propelled artillery.

5. Strengthen the scientific capacity of the General Secretariat for Defence Investments and Acquisitions by hiring high-quality permanent civilian staff. On the basis of lessons learned from Ukraine about procurement in wartime, revamp the MND’s procurement processes. Also judiciously adopt Israeli practices aimed at enabling civilian firms to design and implement defence solutions, so that CMF can be better implemented in the defence domain in Greece. With additional technical expertise and facilitative processes, the MND would be able to catalyse defence innovation undertaken by the GDTIB, and especially innovation originating from Greece’s dynamically growing ICT sectors, as highlighted above[41].

6. In view of the tumult in the US research ecosystem, create a fund designated to attract top Greek diaspora scientists specialising in defence-relevant domains ranging from aerospace to automotive technology to AI, so as to deepen the scientific capital from which the GDTIB can draw ideas, and to enable its integration into the most cutting edge EDTIB projects. We reiterate that Greece has, relative to its population, by far the most numerous and distinguished scientific diaspora (i.e. Greek nationals who received their undergraduate education in Greece) in the US among the EU-27.matching.

7. Be ready to offer matching funds, as per the recommendation of the PWC study on Greek manufacturing, in order to allow the major firms in the GDTIB to participate in the more ambitious EDTIB consortia. There should be a particular focus here on sea warfare, manned and autonomous, given Greek shipyards’ ability to exploit synergies with their civilian work, which itself benefits significantly from its access to the globally dominant Greek merchant marine. Put in place the foundations for this process now by reviewing and selecting for future support the most promising domains among the EDF and PESCO projects in which Greek defence firms and research teams have participated. Such matching funds should be from national and not EU sources so as to ensure timely decision making in accordance with a national prioritisation strategy.

8. In coordination with the ten other frontline EU member-states, which spend far more than all other EU member-states on defence, undertake the initiative to receive disproportionate R&D funding for defence from collective EU funding sources on the basis of the national weighted average spending on defence as a percentage of GDP over the last five years. Such an initiative needs to be contextualized by the fact that, in the growing European defence market, frontline states would tend to channel a growing percentage of their comparatively larger defence budgets to non-frontline states such as France, Germany, Italy and Spain (and the UK which, while a non-EU member, is asked to financially contribute to common European defence) which have the most highly advanced DTIBs. Include in this support scheme the proposed institution of the EU professor: leading scholars from member-states, either resident or repatriated, who will have their salaries paid directly by the EU, so they may be compensated above the low civil service salaries in their homelands, which would render their repatriation unfeasible.

We underline that, barring such remedies, the growth of the EDTIB will further entrench intra-EU disparities as stronger national DTIBs, and better-funded national research ecosystems, would be able to attract the lion’s share of the collective resources the EU allocates for defence.

9. Aggressively pursue military mobility funding opportunities from the EU, so as to further increase Greece’s significance for the EU’s common defence, and cement relations with the other frontline member-states while improving the transportation infrastructure in Northern Greece.

10. Utilise the recently established General Secretariat of National Defence to coordinate the ministries of National Defence, Finance, Development, Citizen Protection, Education, Merchant Marine, and Digital Governance in pursuit of the policy aims listed above, as well as others aimed at facilitating the growth of the GDTIB.

Concluding Remarks

Considering both existing and highly probable trends in the funding of the EDTIB, as well as the foundations of the extant GDTIB and Greek dual use competencies, it is well within Greece’s grasp to build one of the top three DTIBs among the EU’s eleven front-lines states in the years to come.

Doing so will prove decisive in upgrading the deterrence of the Greek Armed Forces in an era of ‘Big War’, creating the most knowledge- and capital-intensive sector in the Greek economy, and putting Greece at the core of the EU’s collective defence effort.

This task is well within Greece’s fiscal and reform capacity.

Judicious recapitalisations and reforms in the major state-owned defence firms will position them so they can contribute to the restocking of Europe’s war materiel and participate in the next-generation weapon-systems development and manufacturing undertaken by pan-European consortia.

An increase in funding to defence deep tech linked to reforms in weapons procurement can also rapidly boost the Greek Armed Forces’ asymmetric advantages and create export opportunities to the EDTIB.

Larger private-sector core defence and dual use firms can also grow further and deepen their links with the EDTIB on the back of FOS provided to the Greek Armed Forces, as well as their ability to act as subcontractors to Greece’s major foreign suppliers of highly-advanced weapon systems. With matching funds by the Greek state, they will be able to build on their FOS and subcontractor skills to add value, on their own or as members of consortia, through de novo weapon systems developed via common EU funding.

Finally, all three cohorts of the GDTIB stand ready to make use of investments by the Greek state and the EU in Greece’s research ecosystem, as in the case of subsidising dual use consortia including both firms and research teams, repatriating distinguished defence-relevant scientists from the Greek diaspora, and funding basic and applied research applicable to defence purposes.

Almost a quarter of a century ago, and following years of systematic policy effort, Greece reaffirmed its status as a core member of the EU by adopting the euro as its currency. It is now well within the nation’s capabilities, as well as vital to its national interest, to maintain this status by developing an effective DTIB which is instrumental to both national and European defence.

[1] European Commission, White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030, March 12 2025.

[2] Wolff, Guntram, Steinbach, Armin and Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, The governance and funding of European Rearmament, Policy Brief 15/25, Bruegel, April 2025.

[3] For the political implications within the EU of an unbalanced growth of the German Armed Forces, see Kimmage, Michael and David-Wilp, Sudha, The Zeitenwende is real this time – Germany’s defense upgrade is necessary but could upset Europe’s balance of power, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2025.

[4] For an analysis of the ‘Asia first’ policy strain in the US, crystallised in the recent appointment of Elbridge Colby as Under Secretary for Policy at the Department of Defence, see Brands, Hal, Putting “Asia First” could cost American the world”, Bloomberg Opinion, August 5, 2024.

[5] For a comment on these dynamics see, Martin, Felix, Europe can take advantage of King Dollar’s wobble, Breaking Views – Reuters, April 25 2025.

[6] Draghi, Mario. “The Future of European Competitiveness Part A: A competitiveness strategy for Europe.” (2024).

[7] Clapp, Sebastian, Reinforcing Europe’s defence industry, Briefing, European Parliamentary Research Service, November 2024.

[8] Bellesia, Riccardo, Gill, Frank, European Defense Funding: What are the options? Standard and Poors, February 13 2025.

[9] Mackenzie, Lucia, Russian defense spending overtakes Europe, study finds, Politico, February 12, 2025.

[10] Clapp, Sebastian, Delivorias, Angelos, Lazarou, Elena, Pari, Marianna,                Financing the European defence industry, Briefing, European Parliamentary Research Service, September 2024.

[11] See, Wolff, Guntram, Steinbach, Armin and Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, The governance and funding of European Rearmament, Policy Brief 15/25, Bruegel, April 2025.

[12] For a typical example of the political legitimation of rising defence spending see, Partington, Richard, Rachel Reeves vows to use defence spending to support UK’s ‘left behind’ industrial towns, Guardian, March 4 2025.

[13] The author has adopted the perspective of a national DTIB meeting a nation-state’s military, economic and strategic goals from Dorman, Andrew, Matthew Uttley, and Benedict Wilkinson. “A benefit, not a burden. The security, economic and strategic value of Britain’s defence industry.” Policy Institute at King’s Policy Paper (2015).

[14] For the need to prepare for a long war of attrition, and thus also deter such a war, see Freedman, Lawrence, D,. The Age of Forever Wars, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2025.

[15] For an account of the GDTIB see, Kamaras, Antonis, The Greek Defence Sector: Turning the page?, Policy Paper 126, ELIAMEP, February 2023.

[16] The following unpublished study is the most comprehensive treatment of this aspect of the GDTIB: Vlahou, Paraskevi, Defence Industry, Sectoral Study 222,IOVE, March 2009 (in Greek, unpublished).

[17] This figure has been tabulated in the following unpublished study: Mosholios, Panagiotis, Domestic Defence Industry Past-Present-Future, PASOK, March 2025 (in Greek, unpublished).

[18] See Theon International. Theon received new orders in January 2025 totaling 53 million euros, with embedded new options for an additional 95.5 million euros. It also joined the German Future Soldier Program on February 7 2025.

[19] See, Blavoukos, Spyros, Politis-Lamprou, Panos, Dellatolas, Thanos, Mapping EU Defence Collaboration – One Year on from the Versailles Declaration, Policy Paper 133, ELIAMEP, April 20 2023.

[20] For an analysis of the relation between these instruments and the EU’s strategic autonomy see, Fiott, Daniel, Strategic Autonomy: towards ‘European sovereignty’ in defence?, European Union Institute for Security Studies, November 2018.

[21]See, indicatively, Adams, Lucy, Greece’s tech sector grew 15 % in 2024, Tech.eu, January 2 2025.

[22] For a review of current and future procurement decisions by the MND see, Feistead, Peter, Hellenic defence procurement poised to embark on a new modernization plan, EURO-SD, April 28 2025.

[23] See, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). “Building Defence Capacity in Europe: An Assessment.” (2024).

[24] The growth of the ICT sectors has been well-documented in Greece, with the pandemic in particular and the post pandemic RRF funded state digitization acting as a catalyst. See indicatively, Deloitte, Study of the sufficiency of ICT specialists in the Greek labour market, December 2022 and Deloitte, The prospect of the ICT sector in Greece, December 2024.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Investments in civil defence have increased know-how of the use of drones and of sophisticated command and control systems while in Greece’s newly established National Cybersecurity Authority, a distinguished MIT scientist has assumed the reins. See indicatively, European Investment Bank, Greece to bolster civil protection with new EIB loan of 220 million euros, April 12 2024 and Ministry of Digital Governance, Michail Bletsas is the governor of the National Cybersecurity Authority, April 24 2024 (Υπουργείο Ψηφιακής Διακυβέρνησης, Ο Μιχάλης Μπλέτσας Διοικητής Της Εθνικής Αρχής Κυβερνοσφάλειας).

[27] See Webber, Jude, Tech Groups pivot to defence in neutral Ireland as EU rearms, Financial Times, April 28 2025.

[28] See, Wolff, Guntram, Steinbach, Armin and Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, The governance and funding of European Rearmament, Policy Brief 15/25, Bruegel, April 2025.

[29] For a need for such an arrangement see, Witney, Nick, Commissioning defence: how to build a European defence Union, October 30 2024.

[30] For a discussion in particular of Poland’s developmental cul de sac, due to the hierarchical supply chain system which has driven its growth post 1989, see Boguslawski, Jan, Economic dependence curbs Poland’s rise, Politico, June 22 2023.

[31] Based on the ‘European Defence in a New Age’ research project, to which the author has been participating, and which profiles most national DTIBs in Europe, see indicatively,  Molling, Christian, Helmonds, Soren eds, Security, Industry and the lost European vision, DGAP Report, No 10, October 2023.

[32] For a discussion from a Greek perspective of the Mistral Case see, Kamaras, Antonis. “Greece’s call for an embargo on weapons sales to Turkey.” Policy Paper, 44, November 2020.

[33] Molling, Christian, Helmonds, Soren eds, Security, Industry and the lost European vision, DGAP Report, No 10, October 2023.

[34] See, Minder, Raphael, Poland struggles to rearm for era of war on its borders, Financial Times, May, 4 2025.

[35] See, Blavoukos, Spyros, Politis-Lamprou, Panos, Dellatolas, Thanos, Mapping EU Defence Collaboration – One Year on from the Versailles Declaration, Policy Paper 133, ELIAMEP, April 20 2023.

[36] See, European Commission, European Innovation Scoreboard, 2024.

[37] See, Yuret, Tolga. “An analysis of the foreign-educated elite academics in the United States.” Journal of Informetrics 11.2 (2017): 358-370.

[38] For these features of Finland’s DTIB see, Suorsa, Olli Pekka, and Brendon J. Cannon. “Ensuring security of supply: pragmatic defence autarky and Finland’s defence industry.” Defence Studies (2025): 1-21.

[39] Findikakis George, METLEN’S plan for the next day in 12 slides, euro.2day.gr, April 29,2025 [Φιντικάκης Γιώργος, Το σχέδιο της ΜΕΤΛΕΝ για την επόμενη μέρα σε 12 διαφάνειες, euro2day.gr].

[40] Mejino-Lopez, Juan, Wolff, Guntram, A European defence strategy in a hostile world, Policy Brief 29/24, Bruegel, November 2024.

[41] Ukraine and Israel are the templates for institutionalising the integration of technologies originating from the civilian sector into Armed Forces operations through suitable procurement processes and technical support for innovative firms. See respectively Bondar, Kateryna, How Ukraine Rebuilt Its Military Acquisition System Around Commercial Technology, Center for Strategic & International Studies, January 2025 and Evron, Yoram. “4IR technologies in the Israel Defence Forces: blurring traditional boundaries.” Defence Innovation and the 4th Industrial Revolution. Routledge, 2022. 122-143.

• The EU Internal Security Strategy comes to complete the Union’s institutional security architecture until 2030, functioning as the inner circle of the ven diagram composed of the EU Strategy for Preparedness Union for preventing and responding to emerging threats and crises and the European Defence White Paper.
• The main feature of this new strategy is the concept and goal of Protection, which is why it is called ProtectEU.
• Security issues must be integrated into all EU legislation, policies and programmes, including EU external action.
• The Strategy reflects a broad list of threats, which are significantly influenced by the situation in the EU’s neighboring regional subsystems and, at the same time, have many interconnections with hybrid threats.
• It is based on four central pillars that function as umbrellas of actions: anticipate, detect, prevent and respond.
• The Commission will propose an ambitious revision of Europol’s mandate to transform it into a truly operational police service, better supporting Member States.

Read here (in Greek) the Policy paper by Triandafyllos Karatrantos, ELIAMEP Senior Research Fellow.

This Working paper draws on the emerging literature that has established that the employment rates and the earnings of men and women start to diverge once they have children, with women’s labour market performance deteriorating, while that of men’s left unaffected or even improving. This phenomenon has been dubbed the motherhood penalty (or the child penalty). The size of the penalty is affected by the choices parents make as regards employment and childcare, which in turn are affected by gender norms, instilled in women and men early in life, but also by public policies aiming to establish a better work-life balance and help working mothers and fathers combine bringing up a child with pursuing a career. The paper reviews cultural norms and institutional arrangements as potential determinants of mothers’ employment in two polar cases: Greece (where female employment is low, and child penalties large) compared to Norway (where female employment is high, and child penalties are virtually non-existent). The paper concludes with a list of policy recommendations, inspired by our understanding of the gradual emergence of family-friendly work-life policies in Norway, and informed by our awareness of constraints facing policy makers in Greece.

Read here in pdf the Working paper by: Manos Matsaganis, Head, Greek and European Economy Programme, ELIAMEP; A. G. Leventis Foundation Senior Research Fellow; Professor, Polytechnic University, Milan; Tone Fløtten, Senior Researcher, FAFO Institute for Labour and Social Research, Oslo; Chrysa Papalexatou, Research Fellow, Greek and European Economy Programme, ELIAMEP; European Institute, London School of Economics; Daphne Nicolitsas, Research Associate, Greek and European Economy Programme, ELIAMEP;
Assistant Professor, University of Crete and Bjorn Dapi, Researcher, FAFO Institute for Labour and Social Research, Oslo.

 

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for March 2025.

According to Vassilis Nedos (Kathimeri), Greece may receive more than the originally agreed 600 US-made Switchblade drones as increased production has lowered costs, defense officials say. As mentioned in earlier versions of the Transatlantic Periscope brief, the Greek military had secured a deal for Switchblade 300 block 20 and Switchblade 600 loitering munitions worth $75 million, with $50 million funded through the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. However, with manufacturer AeroVironment ramping up production, the US has informed Athens that more drones could be acquired under the existing budget.

On March 18, 2025, a bilateral meeting was held between a delegation of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff (HNDGS) and the U.S. Marine Forces Europe and Africa (MFEA) at “Papagos” camp, in Athens. The HNDGS delegation was headed by 1st Infantry Division (1st ID) Commander, Major General Dimitrios Drosos, representing the Commander of the Hellenic Special Warfare Command (SWC), while on behalf of the US MFEA, the meeting was attended by its Commander, Major General Robert B. Sofge, accompanied by members of his staff and officials from the U.S. Embassy in Greece. The discussions focused on the framework and opportunities for joint training of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) with the Greek marine in Greece, with the aim to further enhance the close cooperation between the Special Operations Forces of both countries in the near future.

National Defense Minister Nikos Dendias met on March 19 with US Embassy Chargé d’Affaires Maria Olson at the Hellenic Ministry of National Defense. Dendias posted on X that they discussed “bilateral defence relations and the ways they could be further strengthened. We also exchanged views on the regional and international security challenges.”

US president Donald Trump celebrated Greek Independence Day, hosting an event at the White House on March 24. “The legacy of the Greeks is all around us. It surrounds us,” he told a group from the Greek-American community gathered at the White House before signing a proclamation recognizing March 25 as Greek Independence Day in the US, “celebrating 204 years of glorious Greek sovereignty and freedom.” “Perhaps the greatest gift we have inherited from this amazing culture is our incredible Greek-American community, now more than 3 million strong,” he added. The US president was accompanied by Archbishop Elpidophoros of America, who congratulated him on his re-election.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

Migration management has become a critical axis of foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, moving beyond its traditional framing as a humanitarian or administrative challenge. Within Greek–Turkish relations, human mobility now functions as a means of exerting pressure, projecting power, and renegotiating geopolitical roles. The 2020 Evros crisis underscored this dynamic, triggering strategies that transcend the bilateral level and involve both European and regional actors. This report analyses the Evros crisis and the broader strategic approaches of Turkey and Greece through the lens of migration diplomacy, drawing on concepts such as issue-linkage and rent-seeking. It examines both coercive and cooperative tactics employed by the two states and the European Union’s often contradictory or defensive role. Finally, the report calls for a more resilient and institutionally coherent strategy that respects humanitarian principles and integrates migration into a broader vision of foreign policy and regional cooperation.

Read here (in Greek) the Policy Paper by Gerasimos Tsourapas, Professor of International Relations at the University of Glasgow; Non-Resident Research Fellow, ELIAMEP.

The White Paper on the Future of European Defence, released in March 2025, represents a landmark initiative by the European Commission to articulate a cohesive vision for strengthening the EU’s defence posture amid mounting geopolitical instability. Acting as a framework for the ReArm Europe plan, the document proposes mobilising hundreds of billions of EUR in defence investments, making use of national and EU resources.

The ReArm Europe Plan and the White Paper clearly succeed in politically signalling the EU’s renewed commitment to defence investment and military readiness. However, despite their rhetorical strength, four major concerns could undermine their transformative potential:

1. Coordination gaps: Without a robust coordination mechanism, national funds may be allocated to less pressing areas and may serve other – national and/or domestic – objectives and interests. In the meantime, the Union will not achieve effectiveness and efficiency unless it focuses on standardisation and interoperability.
2. Financial markets’ sensitivity: While the activation of the national escape clause offers fiscal leeway, it is unclear how the financial markets will react to increased national debts. Alternative instruments, such as the Defence Eurobonds or the European Defence Mechanism, could be examined.
3. Creative ambiguity: The Proposal for a SAFE Regulation includes references presented vaguely enough to allow for multiple interpretations and thus avoid frictions. In view of the negotiations in the Council, the issue of a third country’s participation in a procurement consortium must be further elaborated and clarified.
4. Democratic legitimacy and parliamentary oversight: Article 122 TFEU sidesteps the European Parliament, despite the latter’s willingness to further support the EU defence initiatives. Without adequate parliamentary involvement, defence investments risk alienating public opinion in a policy area which requires broad societal consensus.

All the aforementioned shortcomings reflect a deeper structural issue: the absence of a common threat perception and a truly common foreign and security policy. Without a coherent strategic vision at the EU level, member-states remain inclined to prioritise national over collective objectives and interests.

Read here in pdf the Policy Paper by Spyros Blavoukos, Senior Research Fellow, Head, EU Institutions & Policies Programme, ELIAMEP; Head of the ‘Ariane Condellis’ European Programme; Professor, Athens University of Economics & Business and Panos Politis Lamprou, Junior Research Fellow, EU Policies and Institutions Programme, ELIAMEP.

Introduction

In response to the new geopolitical and geoeconomic realities – including but not limited to the protracted Russian war on Ukraine and the Trump 2.0 administration – and following the earlier announcement of the ReArm Europe Plan, the White Paper on the Future of European Defence was published in March 2025. The White Paper outlines the path to enhanced EU defence capabilities and aims to mobilise hundreds of billions of EUR, detailing measures to finance and strengthen the EU’s military readiness.

The White Paper features well-intentioned objectives and its communication strategy was well orchestrated. It does provide answers to two key questions: first, where the money will come from and second, in what defence capabilities the EU is going to invest. Starting from the former, in the best-case scenario, national resources up to €650 billion will be mobilised through the activation of the national escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which defines the fiscal governance framework for the EU member-states and sets rules for constraining national government deficit and debt. In essence, this clause will allow member-states to accommodate additional defence spending. The €650 billion will be topped by EU resources of up to €150 billion that will be gathered through the common issuance of bonds, as envisaged by the new SAFE instrument. In addition to these €800 billion, the White Paper proposes four additional -but rather vague and not quantified- ways to step up defence spending: a) redirecting existing EU funds towards defence (e.g., cohesion funds), b) contributions from the European Investment Bank (EIB), c) private investments, and d) ensuring financial predictability for the European defence industry in the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), currently under negotiation. Overall, the resources envisaged in the White Paper are shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Envisaged resources for EU defence in the White Paper

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Regarding the capability needs, the White Paper identifies seven priority areas: Air and missile defence, Artillery systems, Ammunition and missiles, Drones and counter-drone systems, Military Mobility, AI, Quantum, Cyber & Electronic Warfare and strategic enablers & critical infrastructure protection. Additionally, the Proposal for a SAFE Regulation (i.e., the €150 billion funding instrument mentioned above that accompanies the White Paper) refers to the following two categories of defence products, the common procurement of which will be funded:

1. Category One: ammunition and missiles, artillery systems, small drones and related anti-drone systems, critical infrastructure protection, cyber and military mobility, and
2. Category Two: air and missile defence, drones (other than small ones) and related anti-drone systems, strategic enablers, space assets protection, AI and electronic warfare.

 ‘Money Makes the World Go Round’: Financing EU Defence

National resources for defence

In 2023, the EU member-states spent €279 billion on defence, marking an almost 10% increase in defence spending compared to 2022 (€254 billion). Approximately one fourth of this expenditure (26%) was directed to research, development and procurement of defence equipment.[1] In 2024, the total defence expenditure made by the EU member-states reached (provisionally) €326 billion, an almost 17% rise compared to 2023, which amounts to 1.9% of the EU’s GDP and is very close to the 2% NATO requirement. These figures are in line with the broader, decade-long trend of increased military spending, especially fuelled by the Russian invasion into Ukraine in 2022.

Still, Europe is lagging in military deterrence and defence, and much more money needs to be poured to close the gap in terms of military capabilities, especially should the US truly reconsider its military presence in Europe. This is the underlying logic behind the proposal to create additional fiscal space for member-states to invest more in defence, bypassing the strict framework of the EU’s macroeconomic governance. The ReArm Europe plan calls for such a fiscal margin for higher defence expenditures (of up to €650 billion) through the coordinated activation of the national escape clause by the member-states. The national escape clause will apply from 2025 to 2028, for expenditure up to 1.5% of GDP.  The reference year is 2021, i.e., the last pre-war year when the EU member-states had spent €214 billion on defence. In other words, if the national escape clause has been activated and a member-state’s increase of military expenditure remains within the 1.5% ceiling, the excessive deficit procedure will not be launched, even if the total budget deficit exceeds the limits set by the revised rules of the fiscal and macroeconomic governance framework. The EU’s executive branch has invited all – interested – member-states to submit a request to activate this escape clause by the end of April 2025. The member-states’ requests will be coordinated by the Council in order to accelerate the process, and the recommendations activating the national escape clause(s) will be adopted by qualified majority voting (QMV).

On- and Off-EU Budget resources for defence

Besides the financial resources under the full control of each member-state’s government at the national level, there are two main channels of financing defence-related activities at the EU level: first, a direct budget line from the EU budget and second, off-EU budget resources that are collectively managed by EU member-states. As regards the former, Article 41 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) forbids, in principle, the use of the Union budget for operations having military or defence implications. Hence, the Commission’s main defence-related initiatives have focused primarily on strengthening the European defence industry and supporting the development of dual use infrastructure, with an allocated budget of approximately €10.55 billion in the current MFF.[2] These initiatives comprise the European Defence Fund (EDF), the Military Mobility, the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA). The European Defence Industry Programme, which falls in this category and is agreed to provide 1.5 billion over the period 2025-2027, has yet to be adopted. The legal basis for financing the European defence industry lays primarily in Article 173(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which touches upon the industry’s competitiveness. Other relevant TFEU articles that could be used to finance European defence-related projects comprise Article 179, on the improvement of the EU’s scientific and technological base, Article 170 on the development and interconnection of trans-European networks, and Title XIX on research, technological development and space policy. As far as the second channel is concerned, the largest defence-related, off-EU budget tool is the European Peace Facility (EPF). As depicted in Figure 2, comparing the two categories, the biggest part of the funds allocated to EU defence remain under full member-states’ control.[3]

Figure 2: EU budget and off-budget major defence-related tools

 

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The Proposal for a SAFE Regulation has the potential to make available up to €150 billion, a huge upgrade compared to the current situation, as shown in Figure 3. The SAFE Instrument operationally looks very similar to the EDIRPA, as it focuses on providing the necessary financial resources to procure eligible defence equipment jointly. However, financially, the two instruments are totally different as SAFE, in its current format at least, will operate through loans (and subsequently debt), whereas EDIRPA provides grants. Consistent with the general approach of EU defence funding mechanisms, the SAFE Instrument promotes a cooperative format. In this context, common procurement under SAFE requires at least the involvement of one member-state in conjunction with either another member-state or an eligible third country.

Figure 3: EU Budget funding for defence(-related) initiatives

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

From Reports to Action: Shaping the Future of EU Defence

A 2024 briefing from the European Parliamentary Research Service brought together the various proposals for the future of EU defence that were put forward in four different documents: a) the Mission Letter to the then Commissioner-designate for Defence and Space, b) Von der Leyen’s Political Guidelines, c) Draghi Report and d) Letta Report. The great majority of the proposals mentioned in the four documents have been integrated into the White Paper and the Proposal for a SAFE Regulation, as clearly shown in Figure 4. The interconnection between defence policy and economic competitiveness and the extent to which these two areas are mutually reinforcing are evident. The defence industrial policy aims to enhance military readiness, while also seeking to bolster economic growth, job creation and innovation. This relationship is highlighted in the Letta and Draghi Reports, both of which focus primarily on the economy, albeit emphasising the importance of a robust EU Defence Technological and Industrial Base. Most of their insights and proposals found their way into the White Paper.

The proposals that did not get through refer to sensitive political issues, such as the issuance of “Defence Eurobonds”, or older initiatives and/or institutional arrangements that are already in place, like, for example, EDIRPA & ASAP and the proposal for a Defence Commissioner. In addition, Letta’s proposal for the creation of a European Stability Mechanism (ESM)-like specialised credit line was not outrightly rejected but rather treated in a non-committing way. The White Paper vaguely notes that if the demand by member-states for funds for defence-related investments outstrips supply, then “the Commission will continue to explore innovative instruments, such as in relation to the European Stability Mechanism”.    

Figure 4: Proposals integrated into the White Paper/Proposal for a SAFE Regulation

 

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Critical Assessment and the Road Ahead

‘ReArm Europe’ and the White Paper have managed to raise awareness about the need to further invest in EU defence. Politically, they have sent a strong message about the Union’s commitment to security and enhancing defence capabilities. They have emphasised the necessity to direct money towards defence, reflecting a proactive approach and have signalled a level of readiness to act, especially in combination with the publication of the Preparedness Union Strategy. However, there are four main concerns that are hard to ignore:

• First, as discussed above, the lion’s share of the ReArm Europe plan will come from the national budgets. While the flexibility to use additional national resources is a positive first step, it remains unclear to what extent member-states will actually decide to invest in defence and, more importantly, whether those investments will be directed towards what is truly needed. In particular, the International Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG), which will be used to measure the member-states’ defence expenditures, includes a very broad set of different sub-categories. For example, COFOG Category 02 – Defence entails expenditure on military personnel, other non-combat defence forces and military aid. There is a genuine concern that, without a robust coordination mechanism, funds may be allocated to less pressing areas and may serve other – national and/or domestic– objectives and interests. To be more specific, there is a possibility that additional defence spending may predominantly be allocated to cover personnel costs rather than addressing critical needs, such as the development of advanced military capabilities or training. Achieving the right balance in order to guarantee long-term strategic readiness is crucial. Furthermore, efficiency and effectiveness in defence cannot be assessed solely in financial terms. Without a clear focus on standardisation and interoperability, progress will likely remain incremental rather than transformative. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has underscored the critical importance of ensuring that national armed forces are capable of operating together effectively and efficiently. As such, the European family has yet to decide how to foster standardisation and interoperability. To achieve this goal, different options exist:

1. Alignment of EU defence initiatives with established NATO standards, and/or
2. Strengthening the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) and the Capability Development Plan (CDP) to improve alignment between member-states’ defence planning and capabilities, and/or
3. Use/strengthening of existing mechanisms (for example, the European Defence Agency) or launch of new – potentially pan-European – initiatives (for example, the European Defence Mechanism, see below).

• Regarding the fiscal space that the national escape clause may provide, an issue not addressed is how the (already destabilised due to the tariff war) financial markets will respond to potential increases in debt levels across the EU member-states. Southern EU member-states have already expressed their doubts on the possibility of further indebting themselves, which will undermine – or further derail – the long-term sustainability of their sovereign debt. Instead, they favour the issuance of “Defence Eurobonds”, which practically entails the EU borrowing money from the capital markets and then distributing it to member-states in the form of grants. Needless to say, in this case, the identification of the distribution criteria will be challenging. Another option would be the establishment of an ESM-like intergovernmental mechanism, called the European Defence Mechanism (EDM), as described in a Bruegel proposal prepared for the Polish Presidency. To be more precise, this extra-EU intergovernmental organisation could act as a “planner, funder and potentially owner of strategic enablers”, allowing the debt incurred to acquire certain defence assets to remain on the EDM’s books instead of national accounts.
• Although “implementation, implementation, implementation” is important, one of the key criticisms lies in the creative ambiguity that characterises parts of the White Paper. Given diverging views among member-states, certain concepts are not fully clarified and allow for multiple interpretations. For example, the Proposal for a SAFE Regulation contains a European preference clause for the procurement source (at least 65% of the costs of the final product must originate from within the Union, Ukraine or EEA/EFTA states). However, the text seems to adopt an extremely wide definition vis-à-vis the potentially eligible third countries that may participate in a procurement consortium. In particular, it states that ‘the Union may conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements with like-minded countries, namely acceding countries, candidate countries other than Ukraine and potential candidates’. In that sense, all current and potential candidate countries constitute like-minded partners for the Union, which is – at least – disputable in the current geopolitical context.
• Finally, issues of implementation are closely linked to (the lack of) legitimacy. It is crucial to encourage public understanding and support for the need to boost defence investments. By having Article 122 TFEU as a legal basis, the Commission bypasses the European Parliament, although the latter has repeatedly positioned itself in favour of enhanced defence cooperation. For example, the European Parliament has recently proposed a higher budget for EDIP, indicating that it is ready to constructively back such defence-related initiatives. It has also called on the European Commission and the member-states “to enable and strengthen parliamentary oversight of EU external action…by involving Parliament in the proper further implementation and scrutiny of the EPF and the Strategic Compass”, thus highlighting its willingness and readiness to oversee key defence tools. The exclusion of the European Parliament from the legislative process could lead to mounting public criticism and a growing negative public disposition to increased defence spending.
• All the aforementioned arguments are deeply interconnected with the absence of a truly common threat perception and, by extension, the member-states’ unwillingness to establish a truly Common Foreign and Security Policy. As such, it becomes nearly impossible to effectively align national defence (industrial) strategies and investments. Obviously, in the absence of such a unified vision and foreign policy framework, governments prioritise national needs over broader pan-European strategic objectives. Can we realistically expect EU defence to emerge in such a political vacuum?

 

 

 

 

[1] Official data from the European Defence Agency (EDA).

[2] Different numbers may also appear due to inflation and changes in currency exchange rates.

[3] Other relevant expenditures comprise the national contributions to CSDP military missions and operations as well as EU Battlegroups. Although these are EU-led initiatives, the associated costs are, in principle, borne by the participating member-states under the ‘costs-lie-where-they-fall’ principle.

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The policy brief “From Migration Fears to Missed Opportunities: The Cost of Politicising EU Enlargement” follows upon the results of the report “The Rise of Radical Right and Eurosceptic Political Forces and the Impact on the EU’s Enlargement Policy.” It is part of the think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration initiative, led by ELIAMEP’s South-East Europe Programme and supported by the Open Society Foundations – Western Balkans.

As debates over EU enlargement intensify, migration has become a focal point for radical right and Eurosceptic parties across Europe. This brief by Ioannis Armakolas (Director, think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration) and Ioannis Alexandris (Research Associate, think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration) explores how these political forces frame enlargement as a migration risk, shaping public discourse and influencing policy decisions. The brief highlights how migration concerns are linked to fears over cultural identity, security, and economic stability, influencing public perception and national policies.

The analysis also examines the broader political landscape, including how national governments respond to these pressures and the role of public referenda in shaping enlargement outcomes. Drawing lessons from past accessions, the brief underscores the economic and strategic benefits of integration while cautioning against the long-term costs of stagnation. Offering concrete policy recommendations, the paper advocates for a proactive communication strategy that counters misinformation, highlights the economic advantages of enlargement, and reengages public opinion with a fact-based narrative.

You can read the policy brief here.

 

 

The South-East Europe Programme of ELIAMEP is a member of the IGNITA network which is led by led by OSF-WB.

 

 

 

 

 

You can learn more about think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration by visiting the website of ELIAMEP and OSF-WB.

 

 

 

Funded by: OSF WB

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for February 2025.

Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Diplomacy and Openness Tassos Hatzivasileiou visited Washington to meet with high-ranking officials of the Federal Office of the United State Trade Representative (USTR). Specifically, on February 10, Hatzivasileiou met with the Deputy Assistant US Trade Representative Bryant Trick with Deputy Assistant US Trade Representative for Europe Michael Rogers and the official responsible for Greece, Dana Fager. The two sides discussed the further deepening of trade relations between Greece and the USA.

On February 23, 2025, the Minister of Culture Lina Mendoni held a working meeting at the State Department with the US Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, Darren Beattie and the Assistant Under Secretary for Education and Culture Scott Weinhold. According to a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, both interlocutors expressed satisfaction  “for the fact that this was the first meeting between the Greek government and the new Trump government”. The meeting focused on the efforts to combat antiquities trafficking, a major global problem linked to organized crime and terrorism.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis on February 28, 2025. In its announcement on the meeting between the two ministers, the State Department said Rubio reaffirmed the strategic importance of the US-Greece partnership, emphasizing that Greece is a “valued NATO ally and critical to regional stability.” Reportedly the two ministers also discussed the importance of “confronting illegal immigration.” In addition, the United States applauded Greece’s strong commitment to meeting NATO defense spending obligations. Finally, the State Department statement noted that Secretary Rubio welcomed Greece’s presence on the UN Security Council for the 2025-2026 term.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

The annual report prepared by Eda Gemi and Bledar Feta for the OECD Network of International Migration Experts, provides an in-depth analysis of migration trends, asylum processes, integration policies, and legislative developments in Greece, covering data from 2023 and the first nine months of 2024.

The analysis explores the composition and socio-demographic characteristics of the immigrant population in Greece, examining its size, distribution, and labour market participation. Special attention is given to the flows and stock of asylum seekers and irregular migrants, particularly those entering through Greek-Turkish sea and land borders. Additionally, the report highlights key policy developments in migration and asylum policy during 2023-2024, addressing the challenges and priorities Greece faces in managing migration and integration policies.

The report is structured into six chapters:

Chapter 1 provides a broad overview of recent migration trends, drawing on the statistical data to analyze the size, composition, and main characteristics of the migrant population, including their participation in the labour market.

Chapter 2 examines the presence of asylum seekers and refugees, assessing their size, demographic profile, and legal status. It also covers asylum applications, Dublin cases, relocation efforts, the decongestion of the Agean Islands, and transfers to the mainland, with a particular focus on unaccompanied minors (UAMs).

Chapter 3 addresses irregular migration flows, returns, and readmissions, providing insights into deportation procedures, detention policies, fast-track asylum processes, and push-back allegations.

Chapter 4 focuses on the reception and integration of Ukrainian refugees in Greece, outlining specific policies and measures implemented to support this group.

Chapter 5 examines the reception system, accommodation schemes, and broader integration policies for asylum seekers and refugees. Special emphasis is placed on the housing and protection of unaccompanied minors.

Chapter 6 discusses policy and legislative developments, including citizenship acquisitions, racism and xenophobia.

Between, 2023 and 2024, Greece’s migration landscape was significantly shaped by increasing migration flows, evolving policy reforms, and ongoing human rights concerns. While Greece’s foreign population grew, partially offsetting some of population loss, the country still faced considerable challenges in managing labour migration and regularization programs, outward migration, irregular migration and asylum pressures. These challenges highlight the complex interplay of political, humanitarian and economic factors that Greece faces in its efforts to manage irregular migration, while balancing the needs of the domestic labour market with its obligations under EU and international law.

You can read the full national report about Greece here.

You can read the 2024 edition of International Migration Outlook produced by OECD here.

 

As part of the CERV project (Re)uniting the East and West: Reflections on the 2004 EU Enlargement (REWEU), the South-East Europe Programme team contributed to the creation of an infographics booklet examining the impact of the 2004 EU enlargement on Greece. This visually engaging, data-driven resource explores how this historic milestone shaped both the newly acceding countries and the European Union as a whole.

Featuring infographics, charts, and graphics, the booklet presents complex information in a clear and accessible format, making it easier to understand the economic, political, and social transformations that followed the enlargement. Designed to reach beyond policymakers and experts, it seeks to engage citizens who are often left out of EU discussions by using visuals and concise narratives to illustrate key trends, challenges, and achievements. Through a blend of data and storytelling, it offers a thought-provoking reflection on the enduring impact of the EU’s largest expansion and its continued significance for Europe today.

You can read the booklet here.

Panagiotis Paschalidis, Research Fellow at ELIAMEP’s South-East Europe Programme, authored an analysis titled “The evolution of the Greek narratives on the ‘big bang enlargement’ from 2004 until today: the views of the political actors and the media” in the framework of the project (Re)uniting the East and West: Reflections on the 2004 EU enlargement (REWEU).

The project marks the 20th anniversary of the 2004 EU enlargement by examining its historical impact, benefits, and challenges through public events, research, exhibitions, and media outreach. Funded by the EU under the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme, it focuses on eight selected countries—four older and four newer EU members—contributing to contemporary EU memory politics.

In his analysis, Panagiotis Paschalidis examines the 2004 EU enlargement as a transformative event that transcended political, social, economic, and cultural boundaries at both national and international levels. Based on interviews he conducted with key politicians involved in decision-making at the time, as well as journalists who extensively covered the topic, he highlights how such events give rise to multiple interpretations and narratives shaped by diverse perspectives and thematic correlations. Focusing on historical narratives, which intertwine objective facts with subjective understandings, he explores how Greece has perceived and interpreted the 2004 enlargement from its inception to the present day. His analysis underscores the evolving nature of these narratives and their role in shaping collective memory and public discourse.

You can read the analysis here.

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for January 2025.

On January 15, 2025, Greece’s Ambassador to the United States Ekaterini Nassika met with the two newly sworn-in Greek-American members of Congress, Congresswoman Maggie Tamposi Goodlander (D-NH) and Congressman Mike Haridopoulos (R-FL). Shortly after they took office, both Representatives welcomed Ambassador Nassika to their offices, where she congratulated both lawmakers on their recent elections, expressing pride in their achievements and underscoring the significance of their roles in strengthening Greek-American relations.

Donald Trump was sworn in as the 47th US President on January 20. Prominent members of the Greek-American community with close ties to Trump were present at the Capitol for the new US President’s inauguration ceremony. Among the attendees was Konstantina Karampatsoli, the only Greek politician at the Trump inauguration. Karampatsoli, a member of the ruling New Democracy party, traveled to Washington DC after receiving an official invitation to the event from Republican Congressman Gus Bilirakis of Florida’s 12th District. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis congratulated President Trump on his return to the White House in a post on X.

On the same day as the US presidential inauguration, US Ambassador George Tsunis’ tenure ended, with Deputy Chief of Mission Maria Olson designated to serve as the top US diplomat in Athens until the new US ambassador to Greece, Kimberly Guilfoyle, arrives and presents credentials to the head of state. Guilfoyle is expected to assume her duties as the US Ambassador to Greece by April 2025, pending confirmation by the Senate.

The Greek Minister of National Defence, Nikos Dendias, visited on 22 January the Fort Sill Fires Center of Excellence in Oklahoma, which houses the Army’s Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-sUAS) University. The Minister had the opportunity to be informed by the Commander of Fort Sill, General Major Winston P. Brooks, about academic training in the field of counteracting Unmanned Aircraft Systems, as well as about the development of state-of-the-art innovations and defence tactics for dealing with new threats. The Minister of National Defence also had the opportunity to meet with Officers of the Hellenic Army, undergoing training in modern Artillery fire directing technologies there.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

• During the current decade, Greece’s development policies are guided and supported by both the Cohesion Policy through the 2021-2027 Partnership Pact for Regional Development (NSRF) and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) through the National Recovery and Resilience Plan “Greece 2.0”.
• The parallel action of these two programming and funding instruments represents an unprecedented development opportunity for Greece and its Regions, but raises important issues of strategy, coordination and management.
• This paper focuses on the institutional architecture and the governance and implementation mechanisms of the NSRF and the RRF and attempts to explore the implications of these institutional arrangements for public policy in Greece.

Read here in pdf the Policy Paper by George Andreou, Research Fellow, ELIAMEP; Assistant Professor at the School of Political Sciences, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (in Greek).

The publication “The rise of radical right and Eurosceptic political forces and the impact on the EU’s enlargement policy” is a result of the initiative think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration, funded by the Open Society Foundations – Western Balkans.

The initiative contributes to reimagining the EU’s engagement with the Western Balkans, as well as the region’s attractiveness for the EU in order to ensure a resilient EU integration strategy and ever-closer integration with a full membership perspective in mind.

The report authored by Ioannis Alexandris, Research Fellow, South-East Europe Programme, ELIAMEP delves into the recent electoral victories of radical right parties and explores how these parties are reshaping the EU’s political landscape, particularly regarding its enlargement agenda. Key themes include public discontent over immigration, economic disparities, and concerns about national sovereignty, all of which fuel opposition to EU expansion.

While the positions of radical right parties vary, their collective influence introduces complexities into EU decision-making. This report provides valuable insights for policymakers, researchers and actors navigating these challenges and shaping the EU’s future trajectory.

Summary:

This think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration report examines the growing influence of radical right and Eurosceptic political forces within the European Union (EU) and their implications for EU enlargement policy. As these parties continue to gain traction across member states, they are altering the political landscape and challenging the long-standing consensus on EU integration.

The analysis takes stock of the recent electoral victories of radical right parties, such as Georgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia (FdI) in Italy and Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party (PVV) in the Netherlands. These electoral results reflect a broader trend of rising right wing Euroscepticism, potentially posing substantial challenges to the EU’s enlargement agenda. Key drivers behind this significant shift of the political pendulum to the right include public discontent with immigration, economic disparities, and a perceived loss of national sovereignty.

The report delves deeper into how these political dynamics could shape the bloc’s decision-making processes, particularly those involving candidate countries pursuing EU membership. The radical right’s scepticism over further enlargement raises doubts over the feasibility of integrating countries such as Ukraine and Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in light of ongoing conflicts and political instability. Through a comprehensive examination of party manifestos, official statements, and expert interviews, this study identifies major patterns and trends among these parties with regard to their views on enlargement. It identifies the major enlargement-related concerns that may resonate with the public, hence influencing the EU’s future trajectory.

Even though several of these parties, including VOX in Spain and the Sweden Democrats, have yet to form cohesive views on enlargement or take clearly anti-enlargement positions, the issue is likely to become more politicised in the coming years. This is largely due to its linkages with other areas of political sensitivity for these parties, including migration, fiscal policy, agricultural policy, and national sovereignty, all of which are fundamental to their agendas. Building on its findings, the report concludes that radical right parties share core thematic concerns shaping their views towards EU enlargement. These can be categorised into five main driving forces:

1. Financial concerns: Opposing the financial costs associated with the accession of economically less developed states is a recurring theme among these parties. For example, the PVV in the Netherlands supports a “frugal” economic position, arguing that admitting less developed countries would place undue financial strain on net-contributing member states. Similar concerns are echoed by the Rassemblement National (RN) in France RN, AfD in Germany, SD in Sweden, and FPÖ in Austria, all of which represent net contributor countries concerned over further budgetary burdens.
2. Migration and security: Enlargement is also closely tied to migration and freedom of movement, which are key issues for radical right parties. The RN in its discourse often associates enlargement with increased illegal immigration and organised crime, a stance aligned with its broader domestic agenda. Both the AfD and FPÖ focus on anti-migration narratives targeting Muslim populations, while the PVV places more emphasis on cultural and social risks.
3. Foreign policy: Relations with Russia as well as concerns about geopolitical ramifications can also be a factor influencing the positions of these parties. The AfD’s longstanding tolerant –if not favourable- stance toward Russia drives its opposition to Ukraine and Moldova’s accession. Conversely, Italy’s FdI under Giorgia Meloni has so far adopted a pro-enlargement position, reflecting its broader pro-Western and NATO-aligned foreign policy strategy.
4. Popular support and electoral strategy: Public opinion and domestic political dynamics can also influence these parties’ positions. In Austria and Germany, where public scepticism towards enlargement is significant, the FPÖ and AfD have aimed to capitalise on these sentiments to gain electoral support. Additionally, these two parties have sought to appeal to specific demographics, formulating narratives that resonate with their target voter bases.
5. Concerns over EU functionality and sovereignty: Finally, radical right parties often link enlargement to broader discussions about EU governance. They claim that incorporating new members would necessitate institutional reforms, such as a shift to Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in areas such as foreign policy and tax policy, which they perceive as undermining national sovereignty. This could signal a departure from traditional anti-federalist methods that favoured enlargement as a counterbalance to deeper EU integration. Even though a shift to QMV could streamline decision-making, it might also exacerbate tensions among member states, providing fertile ground for radical right parties to amplify their Eurosceptic discourse.

The EU needs to navigate these complexities carefully, balancing the challenges posed by radical right parties with its broader goals of unity and expansion. The growing influence of these parties introduces complexities into the EU’s decision-making processes. On the one hand, their scepticism can slow down or derail enlargement policy, particularly concerning Ukraine and the Western Balkans. On the other hand, their focus on sovereignty and national identity raises questions about the EU’s integration model, potentially leading to alternative frameworks such as “multi-speed Europe” or associate memberships.

It is important, however, to mention that the dividing lines between support and opposition to enlargement among radical right parties are far from uniform. For example, Italy’s FdI has adopted a pragmatic, pro-enlargement stance emphasising economic and strategic benefits, while parties such as the Netherlands’ PVV and Austria’s FPÖ maintain staunch opposition. Hence, a much more nuanced picture emerges from the findings, where radical right parties can be categorised as ‘’supportive’’, like the FdI, ‘’ambiguous’’, like VOX, and ‘’against’’, like the AfD, when it comes to their EU enlargement position.

Overall, this report intends to serve as a resource for understanding the intersection of radical right-wing political forces and the EU’s enlargement policy, offering valuable insights for policymakers involved in shaping the future of the EU in the coming years.

You can read the report here.

The South-East Europe Programme of ELIAMEP is a member of the IGNITA network which is led by led by OSF-WB.

 

 

 

 

You can learn more about think nea by visiting the website of ELIAMEP and OSF-WB.

 

Funded: OSF WB

 

 

 

This policy brief discusses the role of Greece in the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), focusing mainly on those aspects related to infrastructure and ports and the global supply chain. It suggests a series of different actions and highlights different angles that Greece should take into account if it wants to be a major player in the establishment of the Corridor and its gateway to Europe/European Union.

– IMEC will be a game changer in international trade relationships, regional tensions, and political challenges.

– The main obstacles to IMEC’s establishment are the conflicts in the Middle East and other major national interests of key actors (such as the Chinese monopoly in the region).

– Focus is given to port infrastructure, as ports are pivotal to the global supply chain. India pays significant attention to its ports, while the Port of Piraeus is the largest port in Eastern Europe.

– The critical role and position of Greece are highlighted, underlying its role as a hub that connects India and the Middle East to Europe.

– Greece needs to invest in infrastructure development, build a skilled workforce, and attract foreign investments.

– Suggestions for establishing a successful commercial corridor between India and Greece are given, focusing on mutual interests and growth opportunities.

Read here in pdf the Policy brief by Dimitris Gavalas, Associate Professor, Department of Ports Management and Shipping, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens and George Dikaios, Senior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP; Lecturer & postdoc researcher, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens.

Introduction

Greece’s involvement in IMEC is a significant element of their strategic partnership, asserting that Greece serves as India’s gateway to Europe. 

During state visits to India in February 2024, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi engaged in discussions with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis. The leaders, among other topics, deliberated on enhancing cooperation under the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which “is a geoeconomic project that propels infrastructure connectivity higher than ever on the geopolitical agenda of global powers” (Sauvignon and Benaglia, 2024). Prime Minister Mitsotakis expressed that Greece’s involvement in IMEC is a significant element of their strategic partnership, asserting that Greece serves as India’s gateway to Europe. He further emphasized the necessity of achieving peace in the Middle East, stating that stability is essential for any initiative aimed at fostering greater prosperity in the broader region, that would benefit all participating nations. Greece’s role is essential to discuss, as it was not in the seven countries (India, France, Germany, Italy, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, United States) and the EU, which signed the initial IMEC Memorandum of Understanding in September 2023, during the G-20 Summit in India (Gonultas, 2023). Still, the IMEC is highly possible to go through Greece’s territory.

This policy brief unveils a series of opportunities and challenges that arise from the establishment of IMEC, focusing on Greece’s role and position. It first gives the bigger picture of how the global supply chain works, what role IMEC will play in it, and what infrastructure will be needed. The next section focuses on Greece’s role and opportunities, which might enhance Greece’s position within this particular cooperation, as well as the country’s potential gains. A section on what needs to be done to better prepare for the establishment of the collaboration between India and Greece follows. The final part presents the way forward.

Global supply chains, infrastructure and IMEC’s challenges

A supply chain can be defined as a systematic approach focused on the conversion of materials into finished products or services. It may also be perceived as a comprehensive network encompassing all entities engaged in the production and delivery of goods or services to consumers, including suppliers, manufacturers, transporters, distributors, warehouses, wholesalers, retailers, and customers. The modern supply chain is characterized by complexity, dynamism, competitiveness, and flexibility. Standard metrics utilized to evaluate supply chain performance encompass customer satisfaction, service quality, time efficiency, responsiveness, cost-effectiveness, and overall quality of output (Gavalas, 2024).

Supply chain management fundamentally pertains to the oversight and administration of such a network. In the era of globalization, numerous multinational corporations have established partnerships with entities located across the globe. The global supply chain is primarily driven by economic globalization, as companies endeavor to extend their supply chains into international markets. Such global operations typically increase business complexity due to the involvement of a broader array of stakeholders compared to domestic operations, necessitating the navigation of various political, economic, and cultural influences. Global supply chains function as fully integrated operations, thereby leveraging the distinct advantages offered by diverse geographical locations worldwide (Ma, 2020).

The global value chain can be defined as a complex network of international trade and commerce that involves multiple countries, regions, and industries. It relies on various trade routes, including maritime and road transport networks, to facilitate the movement of goods and services (Vasiliadis et al., 2024). Strategic hub ports like Haifa (Israel), Piraeus (Greece), and Red Sea Gateway Terminal (Saudi Arabia) play a crucial role in connecting different regions and facilitating trade. The global value chain is influenced by global trade relationships between countries, including trade agreements, tariffs, and non-tariff barriers, as well as financial ties between countries, such as investment and trade agreements.

The multimodal transport system of IMEC would enable the efficient and cost-effective transportation of goods. The system would also allow for the flexibility to switch between different modes of transport depending on the specific requirements of each shipment. For example, if there is a high demand for speed, rail transport may be preferred, while if there is a high demand for flexibility, road transport may be preferred.

IMEC aims to connect India, the Middle East and Europe, through a railway network, enhancing regional integration and trade. […] IMEC’s success will depend on navigating the complex web of international trade relationships, regional tensions, and political challenges.

The establishment of IMEC would respond to the global value chain by creating a new ship-to-rail transit network that will supplement existing maritime and road transport routes. IMEC aims to connect India, the Middle East and Europe, through a railway network, enhancing regional integration and trade. By reducing costs and increasing speed, IMEC seeks to challenge Beijing’s influence in the region and offer an alternative to China’s Belt Road Initiative (BRI). However, IMEC’s success will depend on navigating the complex web of international trade relationships, regional tensions, and political challenges. China’s existing influence in the region, through its financial ties with Arab Gulf states, may limit IMEC’s ability to challenge Beijing’s dominance, while regional tensions, such as the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, may hinder the progress of IMEC and other regional integration projects (Monroe, 2023).

A major potential obstacle to the IMEC that is to be taken into account is that it does not offer a clear plan to address the Chinese monopoly in the region. The Greek port of Piraeus, a crucial link in the IMEC corridor, is already owned by Cosco, a Chinese shipping company. It is unclear whether India and the United States will attempt to buy stakes in Piraeus and shift the balance of power away from Cosco. Additionally, the deep financial ties between China and the Arab Gulf likely limit the ability of IMEC or any similar development project to challenge Beijing’s influence in the region (Khan et al., 2024).

Additionally, another challenge that needs to be considered is the conflict in the Middle East, as shown in the map below, as the area is an integral part of the Corridor. As it is to be expected, the conflict poses significant barriers to the advancement of IMEC. For example, countries that have not normalized their diplomatic relations, like Israel and Saudi Arabia, would have to work together in order to develop railways, as connectivity between the countries of IMEC has to be undisturbed. The same applies to the relations between Jordan and Israel, as the former would be the corridor-country between Israel and Saudi Arabia (Das, 2024).

(IMEC map, source: Vienna International Institute for Middle East Studies)

 

In terms of infrastructure, the physical aspect of IMEC would include railway lines connecting the United Arab Emirates to Israel via Saudi Arabia and Jordan, as well as electric cables to enhance digital connectivity, and pipes for clean hydrogen export. The multimodal transport system would likely involve a combination of maritime and rail transport. The Greek port of Piraeus would play a crucial role in this system, serving as a hub for cargo transportation from the port of Haifa in Israel to destinations in Europe and beyond. The port’s locality on the Mediterranean and its existing connections to European markets make it an ideal location for transshipment and distribution of goods (Datta and Misra, 2024).

For Greece, the port of Piraeus is well-positioned to play a key role in the IMEC project, and Greece should focus on leveraging its strategic location to benefit from the project (Pandya and Leal-Arcas, 2024).

India’s Strategic Steps Towards an Enhanced Port Infrastructure

In pursuit of the implementation of the IMEC corridor, India has taken steps from as early as January 2023 to acquire the port of Haifa (Israel). The acquisition was executed by Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone Limited (APSEZ Ltd.), India’s largest private port operator and a comprehensive provider of logistics services. This development came as part of a long-term strategy for India’s blue maritime economy, as introduced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi during the inauguration of the Global Shipping Summit and International Expo held on October 17, 2023, in Mumbai (Maritime India Summit, 2023). The envisioned horizon of the project is set with a vision towards 2047 (Reuters, 2023).

The plan encompasses several strategic initiatives aimed at enhancing port facilities, promoting sustainable practices, facilitating international collaboration, and executing major projects for the creation of Next Generation Mega Ports, which include the development of international container ports, islands, inland waterways, and multi-modal hubs. The total projected investment for these initiatives is estimated at approximately €900 billion, which is anticipated to generate a substantial number of job opportunities and reduce business operating costs, while mitigating environmental degradation.

Through the plan, India aspires to enhance its cargo handling capacities to 10,000 million metric tons per year by 2047, by addressing the increasing traffic demands and positioning itself among the top five shipbuilding nations of the world, through the establishment of shipbuilding and repair facilities in multiple locations. Over the past decade, the capacity of India’s major ports has doubled, the turnaround time for large vessels has been reduced to under 24 hours from the previous 42 hours, and coastal cargo traffic has similarly doubled, reflecting the ongoing modernization of logistics (Gavalas et al., 2022).

What should Greece’s role be within IMEC? 

As the focus of this brief is to understand the strategic role of Greece in the IMEC’s success, this part focuses on highlighting potential advantages of the process. Given the country’s geographical location between Asia and Europe, Greece could provide a critical and strategic link between India, the Middle East, and mainland Europe. By playing a key role in facilitating trade, infrastructure development, and regional integration, Greece can benefit economically and political, the latter by strengthening its ties with these regions. Below, some potential roles that Greece could seek to play are listed, as a guide:

• Logistics Hub: Greece, particularly the port of Piraeus, can serve as a logistics hub for the IMEC corridor, connecting India and the Middle East to Europe. This could involve the development of new infrastructure, such as warehouses, storage facilities, and transportation networks.

• Gateway to EU: As the largest port in Eastern Europe, Piraeus can serve as a gateway to the EU for goods and services coming from India and the Middle East. This would facilitate trade and investment between these regions and the EU.

• FTA Facilitator: Greece could play a key role in facilitating an FTA (Foreign Trade Agreement) between India and the EU. As a member of the EU, Greece could help negotiate and implement the FTA, which would benefit Greek businesses and industries.

• Infrastructure Development: Greece could invest in developing its infrastructure, such as ports, roads, and railways, to support the growth of trade and commerce between India and the EU. This would also create new economic opportunities for Greek businesses and citizens.

• Trade Facilitation: Greece could work with Indian and EU authorities to simplify customs procedures, reduce bureaucratic hurdles, and increase trade facilitation measures to make it easier for goods and services to move across borders.

• Investment Attraction: Greece could attract investment from Indian companies by offering competitive incentives, such as tax breaks, subsidies, or other forms of support. This would help create new economic opportunities and jobs in Greece.

At the same time, strengthening bilateral relationships and improving connectivity between ports can facilitate trade and commerce between Greece and India. This could be a potential step towards advancing the IMEC project, especially if India and Greece can work together to improve the efficiency and reliability of their port operations. Additionally, improving Greek-Indian port relations could also have broader benefits for the region. For example, it could help reduce transportation costs and increase trade volumes between Europe and Asia, which could be beneficial for the economies involved.

Balancing Political Priorities

Since 2016, Greece has cultivated a significant partnership with China, notably through Cosco’s investment in the Port of Piraeus. This relationship has significantly helped in the improvement of  Greece’s economic standing. As such, the country – in theory – would not stand to benefit from severing these ties. This parameter is one that the country oughts to consider, as it seeks to assume a central role in IMEC. Balancing these two priorities will require diplomatic finesse and significant, holistic strategic planning. This may involve renegotiating terms with Cosco to maintain control without straining relations with China.

On the other hand, and provided that the former has been dealt with in a productive manner, Greece stands to benefit significantly if it can leverage the IMEC project to foster regional economic cooperation with neighbors like Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania.

Navigating these dynamics, however, demands skillful diplomacy to manage the interests of the two major global actors.

Through careful balancing, Greece could position itself as a pivotal player in both IMEC and the broader regional framework, advancing its strategic and economic goals,

Focus on infrastructure and a skilled workforce

Greece’s port of Piraeus, being the largest port in Eastern Europe, if IMEC proceeds, is to play a crucial role. […] it’s indeed reasonable to suggest that Greece should enhance its domestic skilled workforce in areas such as logistics, transportation, and infrastructure management. 

Greece’s port of Piraeus, being the largest port in Eastern Europe, if IMEC proceeds, is to play a crucial role. Therefore, it’s likely that Greece will be a major actor in the implementation of the project, particularly in terms of logistics and transportation. In light of this, it’s indeed reasonable to suggest that Greece should enhance its domestic skilled workforce in areas such as logistics, transportation, and infrastructure management. This would enable Greece to capitalize on its strategic location, and potentially attract more investment and business opportunities. Moreover, having a skilled workforce would also help Greece to maintain its competitiveness in the region and ensure that it can adapt to any changes or challenges that may arise during the implementation of the IMEC project.

Essential steps to establish a successful commercial corridor between India and Greece

To establish a successful commercial corridor between India and Greece, several essential steps should be undertaken. Firstly, fostering strategic partnerships is crucial; collaboration between Indian and Greek governments, companies, and industries will help identify mutual interests and growth opportunities. Infrastructure development plays a significant role as well, and investment in modernizing and expanding transportation facilities—such as ports, airports, and highways—will facilitate the efficient movement of goods and people.

Negotiating and implementing bilateral trade agreements, particularly FTAs, can serve to reduce tariffs, increase trade volumes, and strengthen economic cooperation. Simplifying customs clearance procedures is also necessary to minimize delays and alleviate bureaucratic obstacles for importers and exporters. Furthermore, efficient logistics and supply chain management systems should be developed to ensure timely and cost-effective delivery of goods.

Encouraging foreign investment in both countries is another critical component, which can be achieved by promoting investment opportunities, providing incentives, and offering support services. As per the data provided by India’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the value of goods imported from India to Greece during the fiscal year 2023-24 amounted to $1,055.17 million. This sum includes significant products such as aluminum, organic chemicals, transformers, and various other electrical equipment (Embassy of Greece in India, 2024).

Additionally, capacity-building programs that offer training for businesses, entrepreneurs, and policymakers in areas like international trade, logistics, and entrepreneurship are vital for enhancing skills and knowledge. Marketing campaigns that highlight the benefits, attractions, and opportunities of the Corridor can attract potential investors, exporters, and importers.

Risk management strategies must be developed to identify and mitigate potential trade-related risks, such as regulatory differences, currency fluctuations, and security concerns. Establishing a robust digital connectivity infrastructure, including high-speed internet and data transmission networks, would facilitate seamless communication and data exchange between the two countries.

Identifying competitive advantages in areas like production costs, quality standards, or innovation will further attract businesses and investors. It is essential that both governments provide necessary support and incentives to businesses operating within the corridor, including tax breaks, subsidies, or other forms of assistance. Effective communication channels between Indian and Greek businesses, governments, and regulatory bodies should be established to facilitate dialogue and collaboration. Finally, regular monitoring and evaluation of the Corridor’s progress will be necessary to assess performance and identify areas for improvement, ensuring its continued success.

The way forward

The discussions between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis during their state visits highlight the profound potential for collaboration under the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor. The proposed commercial Corridor serves as a critical link that can enhance trade, connectivity, and regional integration among diverse economies, positioning Greece as a pivotal gateway for India into Europe.

Key actions such as developing strategic partnerships, investing in infrastructure, and negotiating favorable trade agreements are paramount for establishing a robust commercial corridor.

To realize the ambitious goals of IMEC, a multifaceted approach is essential. Key actions such as developing strategic partnerships, investing in infrastructure, and negotiating favorable trade agreements are paramount for establishing a robust commercial corridor. By simplifying customs procedures and improving logistics and supply chain systems, both countries can foster a conducive environment for trade, thereby driving economic growth.

Successful IMEC implementation hinges on achieving regional cooperation, brokering peace initiatives, and creating a balance of power that favors equitable economic engagement among participating nations.

Moreover, the challenges posed by existing geopolitical dynamics, notably China’s significant influence in the region and the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, must be addressed strategically. Successful IMEC implementation hinges on achieving regional cooperation, brokering peace initiatives, and creating a balance of power that favors equitable economic engagement among participating nations.

Greece’s role as a logistical hub and trade facilitator is indispensable. The port of Piraeus not only complements the IMEC’s shipping routes but also positions Greece favorably to attract investments, foster regional integration, and promote sustainable development practices. Navigating the complexities of international trade relationships while maintaining a focus on green initiatives can enhance IMEC’s viability and public acceptance.

The IMEC presents a unique opportunity for India and Greece to strengthen their bilateral ties while playing a significant role in reshaping regional trade dynamics. 

The IMEC presents a unique opportunity for India and Greece to strengthen their bilateral ties while playing a significant role in reshaping regional trade dynamics. With concerted efforts in infrastructure development, strategic collaboration, and diplomatic negotiations, the IMEC could become a transformative framework benefiting not just the participating nations but also the broader global economy.

As a final comment, it is likely that the project would require significant investment from governments and private companies in terms of who will pay for the implementation of IMEC. The endorsement of IMEC by several countries, including India, Saudi Arabia and the UAE (and France, Germany, Italy, and the United States), suggests that they may be willing to contribute financially or otherwise to its development. The project’s potential economic benefits, such as cutting costs and increasing speed of cargo shipment, could attract private investment and funding from companies and institutions interested in the region’s growth and development.

References

Das, D. (2024). Revisiting the contours of the evolving Middle Eastern order through the India-Middle East-EU Corridor: mapping India’s scopes and limitations. Asian Journal of Political Science, 32(1), 35-56.

Datta, B., & Misra, S. (2024). Port Efficiency and Infrastructure Development: Catalysts for the India-Middle East-European Union Economic Corridor. In Global Cargo Industry: Resilience of Asia-Pacific Shipping Industries (pp. 1-34). IGI Global.

Embassy of Greece in India. (2024). Greek Exports to India in fiscal year 2023-2024, Office of Economic & Commercial Affairs, Available online at https://agora.mfa.gr/infofiles-menu/infofile/88418, last accessed November 14th 2024.

Gavalas, D. (2024). Does sustainability reporting affect firm performance? Evidence from the port sector. Maritime Technology and Research, 6(2), 266092-266092.

Gavalas, D., Syriopoulos, T., & Tsatsaronis, M. (2022). Assessing key performance indicators in the shipbuilding industry; an MCDM approach. Maritime Policy & Management, 49(4), 463-491.

Gonultas, B. (2023). 7 countries, EU sign memorandum of understanding for trade corridor linking Europe, Middle East and India, Available online at https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/7-countries-eu-sign-memorandum-of-understanding-for-trade-corridor-linking-europe-middle-east-and-india/2988027, last accessed January 20th 2025.

Khan, K. H., Bastanifar, I., Omidi, A., & Khan, Z. (2024). Integrating gravity models and network analysis in logistical strategic planning: a case of the India Middle-East Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). Maritime Economics & Logistics, 1-36.

Ma, S. (2020). Economics of maritime business. Routledge.

Maritime India Summit. (2023). Available online at https://maritimeindiasummit.com/, last accessed November 1st 2024.

Monroe, S. (2023). The India‒Middle East‒Europe economic corridor: an early assessment. In Economic Research Forum.

Pandya, D., & Leal-Arcas, R. (2024). India-EU Relations: geopolitics, energy and trade. In Research Handbook on EU Energy Law and Policy (pp. 299-321). Edward Elgar Publishing.

Reuters. (2023). Adani-led group completes purchase of Israel’s Haifa Port, Available online at https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/adani-led-group-completes-purchase-israels-haifa-port-2023-01-10/, last accessed November 13th 2024.

Sauvignon, F. & Benaglia, S. (2024). Why IMEC needs to change course in the EuroMed: To invest in the true drivers of peace and economic security. European Institute of the Mediterranean, EUROMESCO Paper no. 71.

The Maritime Standard. (2024). Large scale Gujarat investments planned by DP World, Available online at https://www.themaritimestandard.com/large-scale-gujarat-investments-planned-by-dp-world/, last accessed November 7th 2024.

Vasiliadis, L., Gavalas, D., & Tsitsakis, C. (2024). Competitive strategies and integration expanses in the large shipping container industry during an era of consecutive global crises. Maritime Technology and Research, 6(1), 266413-266413.

Analyzing data from the European Social Survey (ESS), we explore macro-level effects of the 2015 refugee crisis on public attitudes toward immigration in Greece. Contrary to the belief that the crisis hardened Greeks’ attitudes toward immigration, we find no evidence of a significant negative effect that persists over time. Indeed, we observe a slight improvement in immigration attitudes since a low point that occurred during Greece’s foreign debt crisis. More broadly, the commonly held belief that European publics are becoming more hostile toward immigrants over time is a misperception of reality. We instead observe a slight improvement in attitudes since the refugee crisis of 2015.

Read here in pdf the Working Paper by Nicholas Sambanis, Kalsi Family Professor of Political Science, and Director, Identity and Conflict Lab, Yale University, ELIAMEP Non-Resident Senior Research Fellow and Carlos di Bonifacio, Research Affiliate, Identity & Conflict Lab, Yale University.

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for December 2024.

On 4 December, 2024, a fifteen-member delegation from the Office of Global Partnerships of the US Department of State met with representatives of Greek business groups at the Ministry of Macedonia and Thrace. Discussions focused on the formation of intergovernmental business and academic collaborations in the field of the green transition and renewable energy sources. Representatives of Greek business groups outlined their plans in the RES sector, including investment plans.

With regard to the upcoming transition in the United States, President-elect Donald Trump nominated Michael Kratsios, a Greek-American with roots from the island of Chios and the northern city of Kastoria, as Assistant to the President for Science & Technology and as the new Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). Kratsios’ nomination as OSTP Director will need to be confirmed by the Senate. Furthermore, Greek-American Michael J. Rigas has been nominated by President Trump as Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources.

On December 10, 2024, Trump tapped Kimberly Guilfoyle, former Fox News host and former prosecutor in San Francisco and Los Angeles, to become US ambassador to Greece. Guilfoyle’s nomination requires Senate confirmation. In an exclusive statement to ERTNews, Guilfoyle said she is excited to collaborate with the Greek government and would work to ensure that the strong relations between the two countries continue to deepen, under the leadership of President Trump.

On defence matters, according to Reuters, Athens has drafted a multi-billion, 10-year purchasing plan that includes, among others, acquiring up to 40 new F-35 fighter jets from the US. One of the officials noted that on December 13, 2024,the Government Council for National Security (KYSEA), the country’s top decision-making body on foreign affairs and defence matters, approved the procurement of US-made Switchblade drones, made by AeroVironment.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

In the annual Special Edition “ELIAMEP Outlook – Predictions for 2025”, sixteen of ELIAMEP’s leading analysts and associates present their predictions for the New Year. They assess the main challenges, the trends, the risks, the potential opportunities and inflection points of 2025 for Greece, Europe, the Mediterranean and the world.

Table of contents:

A year of transition, Maria Gavouneli

Trump, NATO, Europe and Greece,George N. Tzogopoulos

Trump 2.0 and the world in 2025, Elena Lazarou

China-US Trade War and the Opium Crisis, Stefanos Gandolfo

Middle East: Walking the tightrope over the turmoil, Triandafyllos Karatrantos

Geopolitical Maneuvering and EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans: Challenges and Prospects for 2025, Bledar Feta

Ukraine-Russia and uncertainty over the end of the war, Panagiota Manoli

Critical issues for Turkey in 2025, Ιoannis N. Grigoriadis

Holding on to what has been achieved with no solution in sight, Panagiotis Tsakonas

In 2025 migration will continue but with constraints, Angeliki Dimitriadi

Europe’s Uneasy Stasis, Alekos Kritikos

National Defence in 2025, Antonis Kamaras

Developments in European Defence, Spyros Blavoukos

Climate change or climate crisis?, Emmanuella Doussis

How much of a problem is hereditary democracy?, Asteris Huliaras

Europe in difficult times, Loukas Tsoukalis

You can read the paper here in pdf.

A year of transition

Maria Gavouneli

As our world shifts from an architecture of principles and rules to a horizontal distribution of more or less opportunistic partnerships in multiple fields of activity, the lack of a clearly defined direction […] becomes ever more evident, but also more decisive in its impact on developments.

In the course of 2024, about half of the world’s population voted in elections, from India, the most populous democracy on the planet, to Indonesia, the country with the largest Muslim population, and from Japan and Britain to the European Union, France and of course the United States. Not one of these elections delivered the expected outcome in full—either because the far-right tsunami anticipated in the European Parliament turned out to be little more than a swell, or because the seemingly certain re-election of Prime Minister Modi ended up strengthening rather than weakening the institutional guarantees of the Indian Republic. The most important thing all these elections have in common, however, is that they have left people feeling insecure round the world, from the Seine to the transatlantic relationship; democracy truly is a difficult tool to manage. As our world shifts from an architecture of principles and rules to a horizontal distribution of more or less opportunistic partnerships in multiple fields of activity, the lack of a clearly defined direction, which finds its ultimate expression in the transactional approach of the newly-elected and re-elected President Trump, becomes ever more evident, but also more decisive in its impact on developments. In the pages that follow, we record our thoughts on the most critical fields of confrontation between our deeply shaken old world and versions of the future in the perpetual quest for security that breeds prosperity.

The French election has put Europe’s most significant political force into a prolonged tailspin, revealing its complete inability to reform an obsolete social model that is no longer viable, but also just how hugely difficult it is to manage the pressure exerted by the populism that could win Mme Le Pen and her team the presidency—and all this while Germany, Europe’s traditional economic powerhouse, can only stand by as an ineffective coalition government dissolves and watch fearfully as its own populists grow in strength ahead of the early elections called for February. One might consider this the ideal opportunity to strengthen both the EU’s internal cohesion and its external presence, given that the groundwork has now been done both at the level of policy: with the reports by Letta on the common market, Draghi on competitiveness, and Niinistö on Europe’s political and military preparedness; as well as of politicians, with the new European Commission now in place. In the meantime, the European Union has started talking about attaining energy autonomy, acquiring a Defence Commissioner, and coordinating its response to a possible tariff policy—all in its own ‘European’ mode of decision-making.

…the West has experienced Russia’s invasion as an attack on the international legal order it built in the wake of World War II, ensuring peace, security and prosperity for three generations.

The first indication of whether the European Union is going to succeed will be if it manages (or fails) to maintain economic and military support for Ukraine, in view of the United States’ expected withdrawal from the front line. The global South and—now—the United States consider the war an internal European affair, a family quarrel. But the West has experienced Russia’s invasion as an attack on the international legal order it built in the wake of World War II, ensuring peace, security and prosperity for three generations. As our world changes, the revisionist powers are forming an alliance of authoritarianism with Russia in the lead and talking openly of a paradigm shift. Of course, it is the Middle East that is spoiling the best laid plans. While, prior to 7 October 2023, Israel was surrounded by the long arm of Iran, the unconscionable humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza has been accompanied by a significant weakening of other Iranian non-state actors, one direct result of which has been the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria. The new architecture in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Arab world, including the neo-Ottoman role Turkey so clearly covets, means we will get to witness the formation of new political and economic reconnections in the region and beyond, as far afield as India and the Far East.

As the American political scene is set to be plunged into turmoil by another Trumpian presidency, it behoves us to remember that China’s leadership has a long-term perspective.

And all this in the light of the United States’ declared desire to withdraw from the international stage and of its burgeoning confrontation with China. As the American political scene is set to be plunged into turmoil by another Trumpian presidency, it behoves us to remember that China’s leadership has a long-term perspective and will continue to follow the existing rules, with added flexibility and a clear sense of its not inconsiderable economic power. We will not be bored in 2025, either, as our world continues to change—imperceptibly, we hope…

Trump, NATO, Europe and Greece

George N. Tzogopoulos

…the American president will be called upon to decide on the shape of transatlantic relations to come, counting much more on certain European states than on the European Union as a bloc.

The second term of US President Donald Trump is expected to start with different challenges from the first. The world is now in disarray, while the Ukrainian issue remains a major hurdle. After that, the American president will be called upon to decide on the shape of transatlantic relations to come, counting much more on certain European states than on the European Union as a bloc. Naturally, attention is turning to NATO’s future role in the international system.

As was the case in 2017-2021, Donald Trump is expected to focus on the obligation of the Alliance’s member countries to pay more towards their own defence. His approach is purely economic and, to some extent, reasonable. In other words, Trump considers it unfair that the United States should provide security to Europe while many European countries are happy to take advantage of the situation rather than investing more themselves and taking on additional obligations. In a recent interview given after his victory in the November 5 elections, Trump said he would not withdraw US support for NATO, as long as the European member states pay their fair share. Should they fail to do so, he hinted, the United States could even leave the Alliance.

From a European perspective, the Trump administration should be looked upon as an opportunity. 

From a European perspective, the Trump administration should be looked upon as an opportunity. Although his motives were financial, the American president had sought to hold the states of Europe to account long before the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. That war was instrumental in changing the European approach, and the next four years could be an opportunity to build on that momentum. The European states will seek to show President Trump that his demanding they contribute more to the Alliance is of geopolitical and not merely economic significance, and aligns with the US foreign policy of the new era.

The countries of Europe are being called upon to prepare to play an active role in Ukraine should the war come to an end. In practice, this means that the military forces of NATO’s European member countries will have to send forces to Ukraine to create a security zone and maintain a possible ceasefire. Of course, ending the war while Russia is still winning militarily will be no simple matter. As for Ukraine joining NATO at some point in the future, a possibility that has been publicly discussed in the West in recent weeks, it would be very difficult for Russia to agree to such a development. It is essential that the history of the Ukrainian crisis is taken into account before jumping to convenient assumptions.

The US president takes a positive view of Turkey’s regional role, which may lead to that role being upgraded. Greece will need to anticipate a possible downgrading of Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus Issue in US strategic calculations.

From a Greek perspective, the Trump administration and its policy on NATO will pose a challenge. The US president takes a positive view of Turkey’s regional role, which may lead to that role being upgraded. In Syria, for instance, the Alliance is largely represented by Turkey, even though Ankara is seeking to serve its own interests rather than expanding and bolstering the Alliance’s Mediterranean goals. Given that the Mediterranean has been slowly returning to the fore since the NATO Summit held in Washington DC last summer to mark the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Alliance, Greece will need to anticipate a possible downgrading of Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus Issue in US strategic calculations.

Finally, for obvious reasons, it is unlikely any progress will be made towards deepening the Republic of Cyprus’s relations with NATO. It would therefore be useful if Athens and Nicosia were to combine Cyprus’ continued pro-Western orientation with the formulation of a request for military guarantees from the United States. Obviously, despite NATO’s enormous importance, this objective could be achieved via different channels, including the activation of the 3+1 mechanism with the participation of Israel. President Trump will probably look positively upon moves made in that direction.

Trump 2.0 and the world in 2025

Elena Lazarou 

With the Republican party having won in both the House and the Senate in the November 5th elections, and with Trump’s influence now well-established within the Republican party, but also over the Supreme Court, an important part of the media and much of what is called Big Tech, the new US President will likely face relatively favourable conditions for the implementation of his vision for the U.S.A vision.

On 20 January 2025, Donald Trump will make his triumphant return to the White House, officially becoming the 47th President of the United States, and only the second president in the entire history of the United States to serve non-consecutive terms after Grover Cleveland, who was elected in 1884 and again in 1892. But Trump is, by all accounts, an outlier in other ways, too. Despite having served as President between 2017-2020, most analysts still consider him as an “outsider” in traditional US bipartisan politics. He and his entourage, including Elon Musk, repeatedly state their aim to shake up the Washington political establishment and inaugurate new ways of governing. With the Republican party having won in both the House and the Senate in the November 5th elections, and with Trump’s influence now well-established within the Republican party, but also over the Supreme Court, an important part of the media and much of what is called Big Tech, the new US President will likely face relatively favourable conditions for the implementation of his vision for the U.S.A vision which, according to Trump, received support by both the majority of US states (the ‘red map’) and by the popular vote in the November elections.

Trump’s domestic agenda is relatively clear. On the economic front, it emphasises growth through the re-industrialisation of the US, and energy independence through fossil fuel production. It also includes significant tax cuts. In terms of immigration policy, a key part of his pre-election platform, he has promised tighter control over the nation’s borders and an increase in deportations. Institutionally, his agenda is focused on unprecedented and radical government reform, possibly under the leadership of a new Department of “Government Effectiveness” (DOGE) led by Elon Musk and by fellow entrepreneur and former candidate for the Republican nomination, Vivek Ramaswamy. Among other things, the new DOGE would be making major cuts to the federal budget.

But while elements of the new President’s domestic agenda are becoming discernible, numerous questions remain about his foreign policy. Capitals around the world are keeping a watchful eye on Washington as Trump announces his nominees for key foreign policy and national security posts, his advisors and ambassadorial appointments, and as his administration takes shape, hoping to decipher the policies he intends to implement in the field of global affairs and international relations.

In an era of geopolitical instability which is unprecedented by post-Cold War standards, this raises the question: what do we really know about the priorities and plans of the new leader of what is still the world’s greatest economic and military superpower? For now, there seem to be more questions than answers.

…in the Trumpian world-view, strength breeds respect and respect forms part of deterrence. 

Some of the baseline assumptions that will likely underpin the new administration’s approach to international relations are beginning to become clear. A bilateral approach to individual states, with an emphasis on trade and on deals linking seemingly unrelated issues (such as trade and defence) is, by most accounts, one of those elements. In trade policy, the assumption is that Trump will use tariffs, which he refers to as the “most beautiful word in the world”, as a key tool (and as a weapon). Regarding military conflicts and defence, Trump has stated that he intends to end the “endless wars” in Ukraine and the Middle East, though how exactly he intends to achieve this remains unclear. The doctrine of “peace through strength”, first cited by Trump in 2017 as part of an ‘America First’ foreign policy, seems to be re-emerging, but what this will translate to in practice in an environment of substantially deteriorated peace compared to his first presidency, is another unknown. What is (probably) certain is that parts of the strength would be drawn from Trump’s own ability to ‘cut deals’ and from the use of the threat of tariffs and economic sanctions as a geopolitical tool. Moreover, in the Trumpian world-view, strength breeds respect and respect forms part of deterrence. Notably, when asked whether he would use military force against China if Beijing threatened Taiwan, Trump said he wouldn’t have to, because Chinese President Xi Jinping “respects me”.

At the same time, numerous question marks remain regarding the policy content and practices the new administration will adopt. Will Trump end economic and military support for Ukraine? Will he really impose 60% tariffs on China, escalating the trade and technology war with Beijing—with collateral consequences for Europe and others? What will be his approach to multilateral organisations (such as the UN and NATO) and to international treaties—especially in the sphere of climate change, given that he withdrew the US from the Paris climate agreement in his first term? Finally, how much influence will his cabinet and advisors wield? Will Trump 2.0 be a one man show with rotating guest appearances, or can third countries assume that the initial makeup of his team will endure this time around? Interestingly, the team ‘in the making’ is increasingly resembling a motley crew made up of Silicon Valley giants (e.g. Elon Musk), advocates of the “end of endless wars” (e.g. Keith Kellogg, Steve Witkoff), “China hawks” and tariff enthusiasts (e.g. Marco Rubio, Mike Waltz, Peter Navarro), and Trump’s own loyalists (e.g. Pete Hegseth, Tulsi Gabbard).

…in the case of Donald Trump, the most predictably unpredictable President of the United States, nothing can be taken for granted.

December is always a month of predictions. But in the case of Donald Trump, the most predictably unpredictable President of the United States, nothing can be taken for granted. In today’s increasingly unstable and challenging international environment, this raises the urgency for capitals—in Europe and across the world—to adopt clear strategic priorities, to raise preparedness and to enhance diplomatic engagement in order to ensure enduring and mutually beneficial relations with the world’s superpower.

China-US Trade War and the Opium Crisis

Stefanos Gandolfo

For President-elect Donald Trump, the word “tariff” is the “most beautiful word in the dictionary”.

It is hardly surprising then that he intends to impose 25% tariff on imports from Canada, Mexico and China—three of the US’s largest trading partners.

More striking is the link between the tariffs and Trump’s accusations that these three countries [Canada, Mexico and China] are responsible for the unprecedented opioid crisis that has been wreaking havoc in America for at least the last decade.

More striking is the link between the tariffs and Trump’s accusations that these three countries are responsible for the unprecedented opioid crisis that has been wreaking havoc in America for at least the last decade. Last year alone, more than 100,000 Americans died primarily as a result of their use of the extremely dangerous synthetic opiate fentanyl. Although experts have described this epidemic as the most damaging in US history in terms of loss of human life, it has not been adequately covered by either the US or international media. Similarly, Trump’s multiple posts on his own social network Truth Social towards the end of November, in which he linked the increase in tariffs to drug trafficking, attracted limited attention.

In his posts, Trump accused China of failing to take the necessary measures to combat the trafficking of the substances in question, and of not implementing the death penalty as required by Chinese law. In light of this, he is threatening to add an additional 10% tariff to all Chinese exports. For several years now, the US authorities have been accusing China of being responsible for producing the bulk of fentanyl’s key ingredients, but Trump is the first to link the drug crisis so explicitly to the US trade balance. It is worth noting that most of the trafficking is done through the Mexican cartels, and that China, in response to a request from the US, classified all fentanyl-type substances as narcotics in 2019. This makes China the only major nation in the world to have done this—the US itself has yet to do so.

This role assigned to opiates in the US-China trade dispute is extremely interesting from a historical perspective. In the first half of the 19th century, China experienced its own profound drug crisis, with a third of the male population becoming addicted to opium. The opium crisis then, as now, was due to a number of discrete factors. It is surprising, however, that the issue of international trade should have been so closely intertwined back then, too—two centuries ago—with a health crisis featuring opiates at its core. In the late 18th century, the British Empire, then the world’s dominant power, began trading with China. As it proceeded to import huge quantities of tea, porcelain, silk and other valuable goods, its trade balance was quickly deep in deficit. To balance the flow, rather than imposing tariffs, the East India Company decided to increase its exports (having first increased production in North India) of opium, the one product China seemingly couldn’t get enough of. And the policy would prove highly effective, reversing the trade balance on the one hand and creating millions of addicts on the other. The Chinese political class began to take increasingly strict measures against traffickers, seizing and destroying huge quantities of opium. When British commercial interests in China began to be threatened in a substantial way, they intervened by despatching military forces. The clashes between Chinese and British forces have gone down in history as “The Opium Wars” (1840-1860) and mark the start of a period of “unequal treaties” and “national humiliation” for China which form the basis on which President Xi Jinping’s narrative of “national rejuvenation” is built. This is the historical background to the statement made by the Chinese Embassy in the US in 2023 to the effect that drugs are a scourge and a “burning pain” for China, and that unprecedented measures are being taken to combat fentanyl.

With inflation a major thorn in the side of the US economy, the key problem the new administration will have to solve is how to reduce dependence on China without raising prices for consumers.

Returning to the present, the reality is that the new Trump administration will face numerous difficulties when it comes to implementing its announced course of action. The tariffs imposed by the first Trump administration—and maintained by President Biden—brought about a temporary reduction in bilateral trade, with China’s exports and the trade deficit hitting all-time highs in 2022 (although both have fallen significantly over the last two years due to the policy of “decoupling”). With inflation a major thorn in the side of the US economy, the key problem the new administration will have to solve is how to reduce dependence on China without raising prices for consumers. Typically, the bulk of Chinese exports to the US are electronic goods, on which no tariffs were imposed during Trump’s first term.

…it is expected that China will continue to present itself as a guarantor of global trade and related institutions such as the World Trade Organization, which the US has been obstructing  systematically since 2019.

How China chooses to respond will complicate Washington’s decision-making. It is considered almost certain that Beijing will retaliate with a new round of tariffs of its own. Of greater interest, however, is the intention of Chinese companies to expand their production in South-East Asian countries, which have benefited significantly from the trade war since 2018, strengthening China’s presence in the region. Finally, it is expected that China will continue to present itself as a guarantor of global trade and related institutions such as the World Trade Organization, which the US has been obstructing  systematically since 2019. How China will manage to convince President Trump that it is doing everything it can to fight fentanyl—if that is possible—remains to be seen.

Viewed in this historical context, the current US-China trade war takes on a different hue. On the one hand, it underlines the failure of the American political establishment to solve one of the biggest social and health problems the US has ever faced which may partly explain Trump’s appeal to portions of the American population who feel invisible to the eyes of the “elite.” On the other, it creates a more complex context for China, as Trump’s evolving rhetoric connects separate and complex issues that penetrate to the core of China’s contemporary political identity.

Middle East: Walking the tightrope over the turmoil

Triandafyllos Karatrantos

The Middle East was the catalyst for geopolitical developments in 2024, with the situation in Syria following the toppling of the Assad regime representing the final (?) act in a chain of changes that have caused upheavals and instability.

The terrorist attack of 7 October 2023 and the military confrontations that came about as a direct consequence of it showed that the Middle East remains the epicentre of strategic developments and continues to have a catalytic effect on both the balance of power and international (in)security. It is no coincidence that the turmoil in the Middle East defined the policy debate in the field of international relations in the run-up to the US elections.

The combination of instability and turmoil in the Middle East with a new Trump administration in the US make it extremely hard to predict what may happen in 2025.

The new President’s approach could be summed up as increasing support for Israel and increasing pressure on Iran, which will obviously have a knock-on effect on US policy with regard to the entire regional subsystem.

What is certain is that developments in the region, as well as US policy, will centre on an Iran-Israel axis. The new President’s approach could be summed up as increasing support for Israel and increasing pressure on Iran, which will obviously have a knock-on effect on US policy with regard to the entire regional subsystem.

The collapse of the Assad regime radically changes the framework of the Iran-Israel confrontation, as one of the key elements in the so-called Axis of Resistance no longer exists. But the argument that Israel has gained from this development is based on a fragmentary reading of the situation. Because, while the removal of the Assad regime may have a positive impact in the short term, how things work out in the long term will depend on where Syria goes from here—which, in turn, is a factor that will significantly impact the overall direction the Middle East takes in 2025.

There are three negative scenarios for the future of Syria: The first is a process reminiscent of the events that followed the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq and the extensive de-Baathification that served to further strengthen the divisions in an already deeply-divided country, causing massive population movements while also strengthening terrorism, with many of the Baath regime’s battle-hardened former military and police officers joining ISIS.

The second is that of a Middle Eastern Afghanistan. In this scenario, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham could evolve into a variation on the Taliban, a jihadist organisation that wants to present itself as a route to normalization in order to form a government and control Syria without provoking reactions from the international community.

The third possibility is that Syria mirrors Libya, meaning further fragmentation and instability that could lead to multiple centres of power and a new conflict. In this case, Syria could become a new black hole spewing insecurity throughout the whole regional subsystem.

There is one crucial parameter in each of these scenarios, and in discussions on the future of Syria in general: the Kurds, particularly in relation to Turkey’s priorities and actions.

…the future of Syria will clearly have a catalytic effect on developments in the Middle East.

So, the future of Syria will clearly have a catalytic effect on developments in the Middle East.

However, there are other crucial issues and open fronts, first and foremost being Gaza and, more generally, the war between Israel and Hamas. Apart from the ceasefire that has yet to be achieved, there is the big question of what the future will hold for the enclave, including its critical rebuilding. But it isn’t only Gaza: there is also Israel’s broader confrontation with the Axis of Resistance, and particularly with the Houthis, who are currently the strongest member of Iran’s alliance militarily.

Iran itself will not remain unaffected. Israel’s defeat of Hezbollah and the collapse of the Assad regime have detracted significantly from its ability to intervene in regional developments. The new pressure expected from the US will only make the situation more difficult for the Iranian regime, which, despite its brutal repression of any signs of discontent, has on several occasions faced mobilisations by citizens with accumulated grievances.

The last parameter for the region is the role of external actors: the US and the EU, and especially France, Great Britain, Russia and Turkey. Competition between international and regional powers and interests creates a geopolitical spiral that is not generally conducive to stabilisation, and this has been the case in Syria. In addition, it is obvious that developments in the Middle East are directly linked to and influenced by the situation in Ukraine and the war being fought there.

In 2025, the Middle East will remain a living laboratory for instability and insecurity.

In 2025, the Middle East will remain a living laboratory for instability and insecurity. Over and above states, both regional and international actors, the main catalysts for developments will be the various non-state actors, and in particular the extremist and terrorist organisations. There is, in any case, a continuous feedback loop between state and non-state actors in various spheres, which impacts on European and international security while also hampering stabilisation initiatives.

Geopolitical Maneuvering and EU Enlargement in the Western Balkans: Challenges and Prospects for 2025

 Bledar Feta

In 2024, the Western Balkans became a focal point for geopolitical maneuvering, with Brussels prioritizing regional stability and emphasizing EU integration. Significant progress was achieved in Albania and Montenegro’s EU accession processes, while Serbia’s accession remains stalled due to its pro-Russian stance, and North Macedonia’s progress is impeded by issues with Bulgaria.

Diplomatic tensions with Greece are also likely in 2025, depending on Skopje’s adherence to the Prespa Agreement.

In 2025, North Macedonia’s journey towards EU membership will be decisive. The government, led by Hristijan Mickoski, must break the deadlock by initiating constitutional reform to recognize a Bulgarian community, as requested by Sofia. Brussels has emphasized this step is essential for Skopje to progress towards the second intergovernmental conference (IGC) and open its first negotiating cluster. However, the government has hesitated to implement further EU-requested reforms without substantial incentives from Brussels. Mickoski may seek strategic partnerships with leaders like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and U.S. President-elect Donald Trump to leverage support from Brussels. Diplomatic tensions with Greece are also likely in 2025, depending on Skopje’s adherence to the Prespa Agreement. Additionally, the disputed constitutionality of a controversial minority languages law will challenge the government and could trigger political instability and social unrest.

Rama’s goal to open all accession chapters by the end of 2025 and conclude negotiations by 2027 seems unrealistic.

Albania is gearing up for an electoral year likely to keep the Socialist Party of Edi Rama in power. In October 2024, Albania marked a significant milestone by opening the first “cluster” of negotiation topics. The year ended on a high note with the opening of two EU accession chapters related to foreign policy. However, Rama’s goal to open all chapters by the end of 2025 and conclude negotiations by 2027 seems unrealistic, considering the experiences of other Balkan countries like Croatia and Montenegro. The Albanian government must provide tangible evidence of judicial reform implementation to convince others of its independence, a crucial precondition for progress in chapters 23 and 24, which have proven to be the most challenging.

The stance of the new American government towards Sali Berisha will be a catalyst for Albania’s internal political situation.

As Albania approaches the May 2025 parliamentary elections, restoring political dialogue with opposition is crucial for its EU membership aspirations. Without it, necessary reforms, particularly in the judiciary, will be hindered, delaying the opening of additional negotiation chapters. Opposition leader Sali Berisha has been a vocal critic of the government, and his continued street protests are likely to intensify as the elections approach. The stance of the new American government towards Sali Berisha will be a catalyst for Albania’s internal political situation. Any decision to lift Berisha’s non-grata status could dramatically change the political landscape, potentially affecting the electoral results, as Berisha’s supporters may feel emboldened, leading to increased political activity and possibly altering voter sentiment. This development could either stabilize or further polarize the political environment, depending on how it is managed by both the government and the opposition.

In 2024, the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue faced significant challenges, with numerous incidents, including violent clashes and political standoffs, impeding progress. The dialogue is currently at a standstill with both parties entrenched in their positions. In the first months of 2025, no significant changes are expected. Kosovo’s leadership will focus on the February 9, 2025, parliamentary elections, diverting attention from the dialogue with Serbia. Meanwhile, Serbian President Vučić will prioritize managing protests against his administration, further hindering progress in the dialogue.

The return of President Trump could notably impact the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue.

The return of President Trump could notably impact the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. During Trump’s first term, his Balkan envoy Richard Grenell championed the controversial idea of territorial partition as a solution to the Kosovo issue, which met significant resistance from the EU and other Western allies. The possibility of revisiting such contentious proposals under the new Trump administration remains a worrying prospect.

Similarly, Bosnia and Herzegovina faced significant political and security challenges in 2024, primarily driven by the actions of Milorad Dodik, the leader of Bosnian Serbs. Dodik’s threats to undermine the state and his close ties with Russia have exacerbated tensions within the country. Bosnia and Herzegovina is expected to continue grappling with internal divisions and external influences. The EU’s role in mediating and supporting reforms will be crucial, but the risk of political instability and security threats persists. The country’s path towards EU integration will depend on its ability to navigate these challenges and maintain a stable political environment.

In 2025, Serbia’s political landscape is expected to be shaped by several key developments. President Aleksandar Vučić faces significant political challenges, including protests against his administration. Vučić’s handling of the situation will be crucial in determining his political future and maintaining stability in the country.

It would not be a surprise if Brussels, despite reservations, gives the green light to Serbia as a counterbalance to the increased influence of Russia and China in the country.

Recently, there was a significant push, led by Hungary, major EU member states like France and Italy, and the European Commission, to hold a third intergovernmental conference and open several negotiation chapters with Serbia. Despite this, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania blocked the process due to Serbia’s nonalignment with the EU’s sanctions policy on Russia. The issue of Serbia’s EU progress is expected to resurface in early 2025. It would not be a surprise if Brussels, despite reservations, gives the green light to Serbia as a counterbalance to the increased influence of Russia and China in the country.

The EU faces criticism for prioritizing stability in its enlargement process, often overlooking the autocratic tendencies of several regional leaders.

The EU faces criticism for prioritizing stability in its enlargement process, often overlooking the autocratic tendencies of several regional leaders, which undermines the region’s democratic consolidation. Critics argue that the EU’s geopolitical push for enlargement has shifted the process away from a strictly merit-based approach, favoring political considerations instead. If this approach has diminished the EU’s transformative power, the return of Trump, who focuses on a business-oriented approach in the Balkans rather than the consolidation of democracy, could further complicate matters in 2025, leaving the region’s structural issues, such as state capture, unaddressed.

Ukraine-Russia and uncertainty over the end of the war

Panagiota Manoli

(How) Will the war in Ukraine end? This question is gaining in pertinence as it becomes increasingly likely that a ceasefire at least, if not a comprehensive solution, is being sought as we head towards the end of the third year of the conflict. US President-elect Donald Trump declared during his election campaign that he would end the war in “24 hours” (a statement he has avoided repeating since his election), while more recently, on 24 November 2024, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that the Russian incursion could end in the year ahead—though he clarified that this could only happen if “Russia wants the war to end”.

An end to the war in Ukraine in 2025 seems anything but certain. It seems even less certain that a final settlement to the conflict will be reached and peace achieved.

An end to the war in Ukraine in 2025 seems anything but certain. It seems even less certain that a final settlement to the conflict will be reached and peace achieved. What are the factors feeding into this uncertainty? First, there is the lack of a clear picture of the new US administration’s plans vis-a-vis Ukraine and the policy it will pursue towards Russia. What is, however, considered a near certainty is that US military aid to Kyiv in its current form will be reduced (or even stopped) and that extreme pressure will be put on Kyiv to reach a ceasefire agreement. Of course, neither of the above implies Kyiv’s immediate “surrender”, particularly if the existential threat Russia poses to the country is not satisfactorily addressed via the provision of reliable security guarantees. Second, there is no indication that Moscow would be willing to withdraw its forces from Ukrainian territory if it has not achieved all of its objectives, which include not only recognition for the territories it has illegally occupied and annexed since 2014, but also regime change in Kyiv and full control over a demilitarised, neutral Ukraine. A third important parameter is Ukraine’s ability to access necessary resources, mobilise additional forces, and maintain popular support for the ongoing war. A fourth uncertainty relates to how resilient the Russian economy will prove in the face of the sanctions which have now been in force for over three years. Economists believe the Russian economy faces the spectre of stagnation and will have to cut social benefits (which would impact on the domestic economy) amidst falling revenues—due mainly to the reduction of its energy exports. However, despite these estimates, Russia’s 2025 budget includes a 25% year-on-year increase in military spending.

What can we expect?

2025 will bring about a renewed focus on diplomatic initiatives aimed at achieving an agreement or establishing a ceasefire.

Initially, 2025 will bring about a renewed focus on diplomatic initiatives aimed at achieving an agreement or establishing a ceasefire. These efforts will be initiated by the new administration in the US and, hopefully, coordinated with the European capitals to define the negotiating strategy and the goals of actions taken. However, political uncertainty in key European states (elections in Germany and political problems facing the French presidency) will restrict Europe’s active involvement in the negotiations. It should be noted here that the EU leadership have recently reiterated their determination to continue to support Kyiv by any means and have not ruled out an increase in military support. However, Europe’ ability—unaided—to provide Kyiv with the military support required to tip the balance on the ground in Kyiv’s favour and not just to keep it in the war, is questionable, especially given the “Ukraine fatigue” noted among the peoples of Europe.

Kyiv now seems to acknowledge that it will not be able to recover (all) the territories Russia has occupied.

Second, on the military front, only limited developments are expected, with Ukrainian forces maintaining a strategic defence, given that military aid to Ukraine will not increase, and Russian forces possibly making minor gains in some eastern regions. Kyiv now seems to acknowledge that it will not be able to recover (all) the territories Russia has occupied.

Thirdly, even if there is a cessation of hostilities, it will be in the form of a truce. The two sides will present the truce as a temporary victory at home, winning themselves time to regroup their forces and strengthen their military capabilities. No certain, absolute “victory” for either party is expected in the coming months. In one possible scenario, a truce could lead to a “protracted conflict” and a stabilization along the front line. In another scenario, both parties would regroup their forces, ultimately leading to a “long war” of attrition with the aim of exhausting the economic, military and human resources of the other. Such a situation would put Ukraine at a disadvantage, as it would have to tackle the extra challenge of reconstructing the nation while continuing to engage in combat. Under these circumstances, Ukraine’s negotiations with the European Union on its future accession will continue, gaining increased political weight, especially in the absence of any prospect of NATO membership for Kyiv.

The EU-Russian agenda is becoming increasingly burdened with problems that extend beyond the war in Ukraine.

The war in Ukraine reflects, of course, on Russia’s relations with the West. The indications in recent months are that the EU is hardening rather than softening its stance towards Russia, as demonstrated by the renewal and expansion of sanctions until early 2025, and by the rhetoric of the new EU leadership. The EU-Russian agenda is becoming increasingly burdened with problems that extend beyond the war in Ukraine to include hybrid threats including disinformation and cyber-attacks aimed at destabilizing the EU, as well as Russian aggression along the bloc’s eastern border, and in the Baltic in particular.

Whatever Trump may intend, it is the Kremlin that holds the key to resetting relations with the West. And at the time of writing, far from sending signs of some sort of collaboration.

But will Trump’s return to the White House introduce a new dynamic into relations with Moscow? Will the President-elect’s transactional approach and expressed intention of normalizing US-Russian relations serve as an opportunity for Moscow? Whatever Trump may intend, it is the Kremlin that holds the key to resetting relations with the West. And at the time of writing, far from sending signs of some sort of collaboration, the Kremlin seems to be signalling a head-on confrontation with the West on every front aimed at wresting control of Ukraine, redrawing the European security map, and weakening the Western world.

Critical issues for Turkey in 2025

 Ιoannis N. Grigoriadis

2024: an assessment 

The opposition’s wide-ranging victory in the municipal elections of 31 March 2024 was the most important political event in Turkey in 2024. It wasn’t just the comfortable or overwhelming re-election of the mayors of Istanbul and Ankara, Ekrem İmamoğlu and Mansur Yavaş, that made an impression. There was also the unexpected victory of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), which finished in first place for the first time since 1977. This success proved that the party’s new president, Özgür Özel, had opted for the right policy, as well as confirming the leading role played by the two mayors as pillars of the opposition front. It also partially restored morale among the ranks of the opposition, which had been dealt a severe blow by its painful dual defeat in the presidential and parliamentary elections of May 2023. However, there was still a good chance the government would use the judiciary to block the candidacy of İmamoğlu and Yavaş, and a serious political crisis remained a distinct possibility.

The move taken to resolve the Kurdish question came as a surprise, not only due to the circumstances but also in the light of whose initiative it was.

The move taken to resolve the Kurdish question came as a surprise, not only due to the circumstances but also in the light of whose initiative it was. For it was the president of the Nationalist Movement Party, Devlet Bahçeli, a politician not known for his sensitivity with regard to minority rights, who led the public debate on the issue. Indeed, in his speech on the matter in the Turkish Parliament, he went so far as to suggest that the convict and historic leader of the PKK Abdullah Öcalan should be invited to address the body. However, the ongoing suspensions and arrests of mayors of Kurdish origin elected with the pro-Kurdish DEM party, and one mayor of Kurdish origin elected with CHP support in a suburb of Istanbul, have to call into question the sincerity of the government officials’ intentions and/or indicate that the ‘deep state’ intends to undermine the new initiative.

The fall of the Assad regime in Syria […] marks the start of a new era in the Middle East in which Israel imposes its hegemony in collaboration with the Gulf States, with the other Arab states left on the sidelines.

The Hamas terrorist attack of 7 October 2023, and Israel’s retaliation to it, have had a profound impact on Turkey’s foreign policy. The weakening of Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran have ushered in a new era for the strategic balance of power in the Middle East. The fall of the Assad regime in Syria surprised everyone, especially given how it came about, and marks the start of a new era in the Middle East in which Israel imposes its hegemony in collaboration with the Gulf States, with the other Arab states left on the sidelines.

The release of Abdullah Öcalan 

Although he has been imprisoned on the island of İmralı in the Sea of Marmara for a quarter of a century, Öcalan remains a symbol for a large part of Turkey’s Kurdish minority.

The release of Abdullah Öcalan, who has been imprisoned since February 1999, could form part of a new government initiative to resolve the Kurdish issue. He could either be pardoned or released on parole, since he has served a full 25 years in prison. There are also European Court of Human Rights judgements that could be instrumentalized with this goal in mind. Although he has been imprisoned on the island of İmralı in the Sea of Marmara for a quarter of a century, Öcalan remains a symbol for a large part of Turkey’s Kurdish minority. The goal would be for Öcalan’s release to split the opposition by stopping Turkey’s Kurdish minority voting as a bloc for its candidate (especially if it is Ekrem İmamoğlu) in the next presidential elections. The omission of the other big name in the Kurdish political movement who remains in prison, Selahattin Demirtaş, is indicative of these aims: since it is not thought Mr Demirtaş will be agreeing to play any role in the political plans of the ruling coalition, he has been left out of the negotiations and his release is not under discussion. 

Crisis in Turkey’s Relations with Russia 

…any readjustments made to Russian-Turkish relations in view of the new conditions will lead to a crisis.

Turkey’s relations with Russia have gone through multiple phases in recent years, as the interests of the two states have sometimes coincided and sometimes clashed. The two states have often preferred to side-step international crises in which both their interests were at stake in order to seek convergence. The apparent weakening of Russia as a result of its involvement in military operations its state infrastructure and resources cannot support has become clear in both Ukraine and Syria. In Ukraine, Russia was forced to request the assistance of North Korean troops. In Syria, the collapse of the Assad regime was made possible by Russia’s failure to provide the support that had propped the regime up in the past. It is highly likely that any readjustments made to Russian-Turkish relations in view of the new conditions will lead to a crisis. Possible Trump administration support for a ceasefire plan in Ukraine that serves Russian interests would shift the regional balance of power away from Turkey. Moreover, the future of Russia’s military presence in post-Assad Syria will be a crucial point of reference. Both the Tartus naval base and the Khmeimim air base are crucial to Russia’s strategic security architecture in the Eastern Mediterranean and to its relations with Turkey, and Russia’s presence a few hundred kilometres to the north-west, at the nuclear power plant it is building in Akkuyu, Turkey, south of Mersin on the Mediterranean coast, can also be understood in this context. Any attempt to remove these Russian bases from Syria could lead to a crisis in Russian-Turkish relations.

Holding on to what has been achieved with no solution in sight

Panagiotis Tsakonas

In last year’s special feature on Greek-Turkish relations, we successfully predicted both that the waters would remain calm for most of 2024 and that the Turkish President would limit his focus, for a range of reasons, to keeping relations with Greece in a state of relative normality and stability, without seeking to resolve the differences between the two countries. Moreover, given Turkey’s stance on the ongoing war in Ukraine and on the Gaza front, we correctly predicted that Turkey would continue to be a useful, albeit “problematic” partner for the West, with its active support for Hamas having certain legitimacy cost for Ankara. Nonetheless, we overestimated the determination of the Biden administration and the EU to set the terms of, and preconditions for, the West’s current and future relationship with Turkey in order to increase the pressure on the Turkish President and limit his options, especially with regard to the pursuit of ambitious goals that would clash with those of the US and/or the EU.

… far from abandoning these grandiose ambitions, Turkey seems to be pursuing them with ever greater confidence. […] Turkey’s influential role in the fall of the Assad regime has been recognised both by President Trump and by a weak EU which is reluctant to intervene in the developments currently underway in the Middle East.

As the New Year begins, far from abandoning these grandiose ambitions, Turkey seems to be pursuing them with ever greater confidence. Indeed, regardless of how the war in Ukraine is finally settled, it seems that Turkey will be coming out ahead—albeit less so than it would like, especially in terms of its high level of dependence on Russia. Still, there can be no doubt that Turkey has emerged as the biggest winner on the Syria front where, following the collapse of the Assad regime, it expects not only have a seat at the table around which the final settlement will be reached, but also to play a leading role in the proceedings of the negotiations. It should be noted that Turkey’s influential role in the fall of the Assad regime has been recognised both by President Trump and by a weak EU which is reluctant to intervene in the developments currently underway in the Middle East.

Apparently, President Erdoğan will cash in on Turkey’s enhanced usefulness for the West (chiefly the US and NATO) by seeking a trade-off in terms of the “existential threat” the continuation of US support for both Kurdish fighters in Syria (the Kurdish YPG-PYD) and for Israel poses for Turkey. Fortunately, the “linking” of Israel with the Syrian Kurds, which President Trump seems intent on pursuing after his installation in the White House, is expected to offer the new US administration serious leverage with which to counter both Turkey’s aspirations in the Middle East and its attempt to decouple its foreign policy from that of the US. Indeed, given both its upgraded say and role in events in the Middle East and its stated goal of achieving “strategic autonomy”, Turkey may also seek to expand its role further by claiming a leading place among the world’s “emerging powers”.

…the conditions that would force Greece and Turkey to engage in meaningful negotiations with a view to resolving their problems will once again be absent in the year ahead.

What could the above imply for the future of Greek-Turkish relations in 2025? Unsurprisingly, both countries are interested in keeping the rapprochement process ongoing, albeit for different reasons. For an upgraded Turkey with grand ambitions, maintaining an—at least relatively—stable front in its relationship with Greece will allow it to pursue a broader range of goals. For Greece, a continuation of its current, relatively smooth relations with Turkey is the best-case scenario, especially if the achievements the rapprochement process has delivered in terms of the bilateral “positive agenda”, confidence-building measures and cooperation between the two neighbours on migration can be retained.

However, the conditions that would force the two countries (Turkey in particular) to engage in meaningful negotiations with a view to resolving their problems will once again be absent in the year ahead. Indeed, the “Political Dialogue” which both countries have gone out of their way to downplay ensures that any “exploratory discussions” will not address the two neighbours’ differences on ‘high politics’ issues, but aim instead at achieving some kind of “lasting peace”. For the above reasons, 2025 is highly unlikely to bring with it developments that are either extremely positive—the resolution of the Greek-Turkish conflict—or extremely negative—the discontinuation of the rapprochement process and a return to the perilous and unpredictable relations of the past.

President Trump’s picks to date for US ambassadors to Athens and Ankara reveal a limited appreciation of Greece’s importance as a pillar of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Of course, these predictions about the future of Greek-Turkish relations assume that the Greek-Turkish rapprochement remains independent of the planning and priorities of specific third parties. As regards the US in particular, which remains the dark horse, President Trump’s picks to date for US ambassadors to Athens and Ankara reveal a limited appreciation of Greece’s importance as a pillar of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean (although the choice of a young female ambassador is anything but hackneyed) and a greater interest in Turkey’s potential role as a facilitator of the US strategic goals in various Turkish ‘zones of control’. The same applies should Turkey succeed in reaching an agreement with the new Syrian government on the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)—which, though unlikely, is not out of the question. The most likely consequence in that case would be an abrupt end to the Greek-Turkish rapprochement and the subsequent negation of any progress made thus far.

In 2025 migration will continue but with constraints

Angeliki Dimitriadi

In 2024, the UN Refugee Agency reported that at least 117,3 million people remained forcibly displaced due to conflicts, violence, persecution, and human rights violations, with the number rising to 120 million by mid-2024. Seventy percent of these displaced individuals are in countries of the “Global South,” yet most restrictive measures are taken in the “Global North,” including the United States and the EU.

Migration was a central issue in various national elections in 2024 and is expected to play a significant role in the upcoming German elections.

While migration has increased, returning to pre-pandemic levels, so too have reactions within EU member states. Migration was a central issue in various national elections in 2024 and is expected to play a significant role in the upcoming German elections. Electoral gains by far-right parties have pushed centrist and right-wing parties to adopt restrictive measures and even xenophobic rhetoric in an effort to appease growing voter discontent. This trend is set to continue into 2025, already influencing policies such as the Migration and Asylum Pact, which reflects a highly conservative approach.

After years of negotiations and failed attempts, Europeans reached an agreement in May 2024 on the Migration and Asylum Pact. The Pact includes 10 major reforms aimed at strengthening border controls, enhancing the processing of asylum claims, increasing deportations, and cooperating with non-EU countries of origin and transit to curb irregular migration.

A key milestone was the introduction of a new solidarity system, requiring member states to take responsibility either through relocation or other forms of assistance (financial, technical, etc.). Nevertheless, the Pact retains the logic of the Dublin Regulation.

The new reforms incorporate practices tried since 2016 at Greece’s external borders, which have proven problematic, especially during periods of large influxes. A key milestone was the introduction of a new solidarity system, requiring member states to take responsibility either through relocation or other forms of assistance (financial, technical, etc.). Nevertheless, the Pact retains the logic of the Dublin Regulation—the first country of arrival remains responsible for processing and hosting asylum seekers.

As a political compromise, the legislation is already considered insufficient for reducing arrivals and asylum requests. Although set to come into effect in mid-2026, full implementation is unlikely, with member states already seeking new ways to fortify their borders and shift responsibilities to frontline states for migration management.

In this context, deportations will become a priority in 2025. Within the EU, most of the 100,000 return orders issued quarterly do not result in deportations. As a result, more radical ideas than those of 2024—such as return hubs in third countries—are expected to be discussed to achieve higher deportation rates.

Following the end of Assad’s rule in Syria in December 2024, attention in many member states, including Germany, has turned to how quickly Syrians can be repatriated. Several countries have suspended the processing of Syrian asylum claims, awaiting developments. However, large-scale returns to Syria in 2025 are unlikely unless conditions stabilize and meet the legal framework criteria for enabling voluntary return.

Several states will maintain or expand internal border controls within Schengen while seeking ways of reducing secondary movement from frontline states.

In the coming year, the Schengen area will continue to face challenges, along with the capacity of member states to demonstrate solidarity and responsibility. Several states will maintain or expand internal border controls within Schengen while seeking ways of reducing secondary movement from frontline states. This will disproportionately affect countries like Greece, which is expected to face additional challenges in 2025.

Greece will continue to act as the “gatekeeper,” with the new Pact explicitly linking a country’s adherence to its asylum and migration obligations with its ability to receive solidarity support. At the same time, Greece must develop robust migration diplomacy, not only to secure returns beyond Turkey but, more importantly, to establish successful legal migration pathways. These pathways are critical for meeting labor market demands and should remain a national priority.

Legal migration, in all its forms, will be the EU’s primary challenge in the coming year. The absence of regularization programs, restrictive entry and employment policies, and the inability to align labour markets with individuals eligible for refugee status (who often possess valuable skills) are issues that have already emerged in several countries and are set to intensify. Meanwhile, the return of Trump to the U.S. presidency will mark a shift back toward isolationism and a significant reduction in resettlement programs and legal migration pathways, undoing progress made under the Biden administration. This development will heighten the EU’s responsibility to find a delicate balance between maintaining secure borders and providing legal pathways for refugees and migrants, all with the ultimate goal of integrating them into European societies.

Europe’s Uneasy Stasis

Alekos Kritikos

A mass of storm clouds are gathered, dark and threatening, in the international sky. But they didn’t appear suddenly out of nowhere, and as Europe we should really have noticed them and started worrying long before Trump’s re-election. We should have heard the bells tolling long ago for the major geopolitical changes that are taking place, for the emergence of new powers demanding their place on the international scene, for the ongoing decline of Europe’s international competitiveness, the crisis of democracy in the West, climate change, immigration, the war in Ukraine, and the crisis that was simmering for years in the Middle East whose current size and volatility shouldn’t have taken us by surprise.

Trump re-election was just the icing on the cake of these dangerous developments. That this latter development has served as a wake-up call for us as Europeans—it remains to be seen whether it will actually wake us up—is due to the US being the world’s most powerful nation both economically and in terms of defence, and hence the main factor in the global balance that is currently being upset, but also to the US being both a competitor and a partner of Europe, with everything that contradiction entails.

The Letta and Draghi reports, two crucial texts, emerged not as an initiative conceived of by certain inspired circles or individuals, but as a logical consequence of rapid geopolitical developments. They both begin with the same realisation, though they formulate it differently: that the international geopolitical environment has changed dramatically and that the EU must therefore take immediate action to address its investment deficit, estimated at €800 billion per year, along with what Draghi calls the “existential challenge” it is facing. Both reports make concrete and detailed proposals for the comprehensive and multi-faceted actions the EU needs to take, the most important of which is to unify its member states’ fragmented national efforts so as to close the EU’s competitiveness and innovation gaps.

That the European Council accepting the bulk of these proposals in Budapest, and did so in short order (by EU standards), indicates how important they are for the future of Europe.

But Budapest also made it clear how unwilling Europe’s leaders were to even broach the hot potato of EU competition policy (distortions caused by the state aid the larger EU member states give to their companies, the discouraging of mergers and thus of the creation of European international business “champions”) and the even hotter issue of generating significant additional resources through new joint borrowing, which led some to argue that November’s European Council did little more than draw up a somewhat painless wish-list.

Recent developments also include the discussion of the proposal that certain member states fund the joint defence policy through a hybrid type of borrowing, in the light of the refusal of Germany and other “frugal” Member States to accept new joint EU borrowing.

Recent developments also include the discussion—brought to light by the Financial Times—of the proposal that certain member states fund the joint defence policy through a hybrid type of borrowing, in the light of the refusal of Germany and other “frugal” Member States to accept new joint EU borrowing. Specifically, the borrowing in question would not be undertaken by the EU itself, as was the case with the Recovery Fund, but by a kind of SPV in which as many member states as want to can participate, along with some non-EU countries (such as Great Britain and Norway), with the loan then guaranteed by all these countries.

However, it should be noted that this debate, though it undoubtedly has positive aspects, serves to reduce, if not actually eliminate, the pressure to implement the proposals both Letta and Draghi make for the repeated issuance of bonds by the EU itself, which would contribute substantially to the promotion of European integration.

It is possible that the gathering storm clouds of burgeoning threats will bolster and accelerate the EU’s ‘awakening’ but there is always a risk that losses suffered in the interim could pre-empt the wake-up call, stalling recovery efforts and pushing Europe into a regression that could prove irreversible.

It is possible that the gathering storm clouds of burgeoning threats will bolster and accelerate the EU’s ‘awakening’—confirming Jean Monet’s prophetic comments yet again on the contribution crises have made to European integration—but there is always a risk that losses suffered in the interim (from the imposition of punishing tariffs on European products, other protectionist measures, the withdrawal of the US defence umbrella, etc.) could pre-empt the wake-up call, stalling recovery efforts and pushing Europe into a regression that could prove irreversible. Which is why how Europe reacts is important, but also when it reacts.

And while the Budapest declaration may not have gone as far as the situation demands, it still makes it clear that the European Union has taken the need to regain the initiative fully on board. Given certain preconditions, the discussion about a policy on joint defence funding, even outside the EU framework, also points in the same direction. On the other hand, the political uncertainty in Germany, together with the signs of Berlin distancing itself from European options, plus—and above all—the political deadlock in France and the prospect of worse to come, make the possibility of the active awakening of a united Europe at best remote. Does realism require the scenario of EU regression to be tabled, albeit in the context of attempts to prevent it? Whatever the case, Europe must leave its uneasy stasis behind as soon as possible.

National Defence in 2025

Antonis Kamaras

In previous years, the US and France were the two countries most crucial for Greek national defence in terms of a combination of geopolitical alliances and weapon systems procurement. In 2025, Germany will emerge as the country with the greatest impact in this policy area, in view of its European dimension.

The government that will emerge from the snap German elections of 23 February 2025 will remove the debt break and thus lift fiscal limits on spending. The need for greater investment in defence in the wake of the return of ‘Big War’ to Europe will make this development politically feasible.   

The government that will emerge from the snap German elections of 23 February 2025 will remove the debt break and thus lift fiscal limits on spending. The need for greater investment in defence in the wake of the return of ‘Big War’ to Europe will make this development politically feasible. The new Trump Administration will, in any case, be applying pressure in the same direction. In turn, the lifting of the German debt brake will facilitate the exclusion of national defence spending from EU fiscal rules and/or an increase in the resources set aside by the European Commission for collective defence. After all, bolstering German military power with no commensurate investment in the Armed Forces of the other EU member states lacks operational logic and would also be politically problematic.

Greece will be able to increase its defence spending and close with greater rapidity the 20-billion-euro investment gap in Greek national defence which opened up during the fiscal crisis.

Consequently, Greece will be able to increase its defence spending and close with greater rapidity the 20-billion-euro investment gap in Greek national defence which opened up during the fiscal crisis, according to Nikos Dendias. At the same time, the EU will further step up its role as a collective security provider for Greece. The start of the Russian-Ukrainian war in February 2022 has led de facto to Greece—for decades, the only NATO member country that has not enjoyed Article 5 protection, due to Turkey also being a member of the Atlantic Alliance—joining an increasingly powerful, and this time purely European, collective security mechanism. We can expect to see Greece’s membership to this new collective security mechanism being further crystallised in 2025 both institutionally, with the new EU Commissioner for Defence taking office, and financially.

At the level of the Greek Armed Forces, the relatively neglected Land Army will be the beneficiary of this development. Therein, the armour, mechanised infantry and artillery in particular will seek to exploit the increased funding made possible for national defence to upgrade their existing systems and/or acquire new ones. One of the key lessons learned from the war in Ukraine is that all main elements of a Land Army need to modernise if they are to prevail on the modern battlefield, and if the personnel manning them can enhance their survivability. This reinforcement of the Greek Land Army will also restore Germany’s status as one of the three or four main suppliers of weapon systems to Greece, both because the Greek Army’s armour is German-manufactured and in light of the aforementioned influence Germany can be expected to exert over collective European defence.

The Hellenic Centre for Defence Innovation (HCDI) will prove its worth in 2025. In addition to the highly technocratic leadership of both the Greek Armed Forces and the HCDI, the Greek start-up ecosystem has now matured to the point at which it can meet the challenge, and pursue the opportunities, presented to it by HCDI. The accelerated lifting of restrictions on European Investment Bank (EIB) financing to European defence companies will allow domestic venture capital funds, almost all of which manage EIB funds, to invest in Greek defence companies. As well as generating financial returns, the intangible incentive for our most innovative entrepreneurs and researchers, including those of the Greek diaspora, to help the Greek Armed Forces gain a qualitative advantage over Turkey’s armed forces will also prove to be a powerful driver of innovation in the defence sector.

2025 will see the Greek Armed Forces employing their deterrent power once again in grey-zone operations at sea and/or in the air.

Syria is clearly going to be of particular concern to the Turkish military establishment in 2025. However, the at least transient perception developments in Syria will instil in Turkey’s political and military leadership that the regional environment can be shaped through the use of military force will reinforce a sense of Turkish superiority over Greece. Consequently, 2025 will see the Greek Armed Forces employing their deterrent power once again in grey-zone operations at sea and/or in the air.

Given its focus on Syria, the possibility of Turkey springing a strategic surprise at Greece’s expense is rather remote. But certainly not out of the question. President Erdoğan’s efforts to perpetuate his rule either directly, or indirectly through his successors, against a backdrop of declining economic expectations and a resurgent opposition mean his regime must regain the political initiative at all cost. And this can be achieved through the domestic prestige which Turkey imposing itself militarily abroad confers on the Erdogan regime. The successive military victories won by Turkey’s proxies with direct or indirect assistance from the Turkish Armed Forces has reinforced Ankara’s ‘war optimism’, even in view of a possible military conflict with Greece, despite Greece’s deterrent power being incomparably stronger than any of Turkey’s military opponents to date. If Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Hamas’ attack on kibbutzim in Israel have taught us anything, it is to avoid ‘mirror imaging’. In our case, this means that we must not project our own circumspection and prudence, as a mature democracy and EU member state, onto an undemocratic regime which Erdoğan has rendered profoundly personalistic; a regime that is powerful but simultaneously weak and which has become path-dependent by the very arbitrary use of power that it has exercised in order to perpetuate its rule.

Developments in European Defence

Spyros Blavoukos

The (West’s) Problem: the global geopolitical system has been subject to repeated and intense shocks since February 2022. The invasion of Ukraine crowned Russia’s attempts to re-establish its sphere of influence around its perimeters and beyond, while putting the West’s will to support the Ukrainian struggle to the test, as a result of the growing ‘war fatigue’ in European societies. Ukraine is reaching its limits, but every appeal to the need for pragmatism comes accompanied by the realisation that any solution that fails to provide Ukraine with sufficient security guarantees will inevitably lead in time to a new round of clashes and destabilisation.

…while several NATO member countries are still struggling to meet the long agreed 2% GDP threshold for defence spending, discussions have already started on raising the threshold to 3%.

The (American) Elephant in the Room: Trump announcing during his campaign that he would resolve the conflict immediately on being elected raises concerns for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and how its borders could end up being redrawn. This puts pressure on Kiev, but also fuels a perilous escalation in military operations aimed at securing territorial gains in view of an expected border “freeze”. At the same time, Trump’s repeated references to the need for the West’s security burden to be shared more equitably portend serious tensions in transatlantic relations. Threats of the US withdrawing from NATO, should this fail to come about, seem—for the time being, at least—to be more a means of exerting negotiating pressure than a realistic possibility, judging from President Trump’s transactional modus operandi and world view. The new element in the equation is that, while several NATO member countries are still struggling to meet the long agreed 2% GDP threshold for defence spending, discussions have already started on raising the threshold to 3%.

The (European) Solution: the ‘Ukrainian problem’ has been a ‘European problem’ from the start, due to its geographical proximity but also—and mainly—because it calls into question the fundamental givens of the global geopolitical system as Europe perceives it, including respect for international law and the inviolability of borders. So, it is imperative Europe contributes to its resolution. Now, it is clear this cannot be achieved through financial support alone, however generous it may be. Setting aside the provision of European combat units to directly support the Ukrainian struggle, which would signal an unthinkable escalation of the conflict, a Western security umbrella for Ukraine remains a key component of any viable settlement of the war. Europe has an essential role to play in this umbrella, though—realistically speaking—it can only provide it with US support. Moreover, in the event of peace or a ceasefire, a European military presence on the ground will be needed in any buffer zone that is created.

Europe is under pressure twice over: from the US to increase its defence spending in a period of ‘lean cows’, which will exacerbate the political and socio-economic strains within EU member states, but also from the geopolitical reality that is challenging the EU to rise to the occasion and increase its military strength.

This means Europe is under pressure twice over: from the US to increase its defence spending in a period of ‘lean cows’, which will exacerbate the political and socio-economic strains within EU member states, but also from the geopolitical reality that is challenging the EU to rise to the occasion and increase its military strength.

The Two Basic Conundrums (for the European Union): 2025 will be a pivotal year for EU defence, on two levels: firstly, on the financial side, the bloc will need to find resources to finance the process of strengthening defence cooperation between Member States. In the period now ended, discussions centred on exploiting existing untapped resources—from the Cohesion Fund or the European Stability Mechanism, for instance, to European Investment Bank funding, all of which have a very different raison d’être but remain largely underutilized. Alongside these existing resources, the debate on new financial mechanisms in which only a ‘coalition of the willing’ will participate has now gained considerable momentum; at this stage in the discussions, it appears to be the most realistic prospect. This new intergovernmental scheme would involve the setting up of a special Fund which would finance investments in the European defence industry by borrowing on the international financial markets with the expert guidance of the European Investment Bank. This scheme differs from the ‘defence Eurobonds’ that have been tabled but met with opposition from several EU member states opposed to joint borrowing; it will permit flexibility and sidestep obstacles and delays caused by Member States that are not interested in the EU’s defence prospect and certainly do not want to be saddled with new financial burdens stemming from it.

…the processes required for defence cooperation to come about cannot take place in a political vacuum. However, with France and Germany both racked by internal political strife, it would be unrealistic to hope for meaningful policy initiatives in 2025—unless Commission President Ursula von der Leyen surprises us and demonstrates exceptional leadership skills in her second term.

Second, closer defence cooperation transcends the purely technocratic to touch directly on the political deepening of the EU. Apart from military operational organisation and the handling of interoperability issues, both of which are major factors in any discussions centred on a credible European deterrent, the processes required for defence cooperation to come about cannot take place in a political vacuum. However, with France and Germany both racked by internal political strife, it would be unrealistic to hope for meaningful policy initiatives in 2025—unless Commission President Ursula von der Leyen surprises us and demonstrates exceptional leadership skills in her second term.

So, what can we expect from the year ahead? Certainly, important developments in the field of European defence financing, where a medium- and long-term dynamic could come into being on the basis of the neo-functionalist approach to European integration. With no meaningful political progress on the horizon, however, these schemes cannot help the EU cross the Rubicon of political integration—at least not in the near future. So, once again, as Europe, we will be called upon to pay for the tardiness of our response to major crises and challenges, and risk being overtaken by historical and geopolitical developments. Unless, that is, catalysts from outside the bloc—the Trump 2.0 administration, for instance, developments in Ukraine, or some new crisis—provide us with the impetus to overcome our inherent weaknesses.

Climate change or climate crisis?

Emmanuella Doussis

Over the last year, the term “climate crisis” has been increasingly used to emphatically describe the severe deterioration of certain phenomena affecting the climate, and to awaken society. Sudden and extreme weather events, which are now occurring more frequently and with greater intensity and duration, alongside with droughts, heat waves, floods, and wildfires, cause massive destruction and impact water resources, agriculture, infrastructure, health, and security, accelerating population displacement and testing the resilience of governments and national economies.

However, a crisis is typically a temporary phenomenon that peaks and then subsides or transitions into something else. Thus, the term “climate crisis” is misleading because it does not include the parameter of duration. Moreover, it gives the impression that a return to normality is possible. But this is now unattainable. The Earth’s average temperature has already risen significantly, and harmful greenhouse gas emissions are still increasing rapidly. We are therefore facing a phenomenon that is causing an emergency, a situation that requires urgent action in two directions: to drastically reduce the causes and to manage the consequences. This is a phenomenon that we will be constantly confronted with and which we must learn how to manage. There are practices that can help in this direction, but the pace of our mobilization is exceedingly slow.

…global climate cooperation under the auspices of the United Nations, while important for maintaining a channel of communication, is neither a panacea nor a provider of substantial solutions for managing climate change.

The annual global climate conference (COP 29), which concluded its work a few weeks ago in Baku, Azerbaijan (a country that produces and exports fossil fuels, as well as being the host country of the 2023 conference), had the main objective of reaching an economic agreement on the transition to clean energy and addressing the climate-related disasters in poorer countries that are most affected and least equipped to respond. An agreement was reached, but it falls short of expectations. Annual funding of $300 billion a year will be provided until 2035, but trillions are needed. This outcome confirms the observation we made last year that global climate cooperation under the auspices of the United Nations, while important for maintaining a channel of communication, is neither a panacea nor a provider of substantial solutions for managing climate change. The persistent search for global consensus serves only to lower the bar to the lowest common denominator.

Meanwhile, the upcoming assumption of the U.S. presidency by the most well-known climate change denier is not good news. Certainly, the circumstances are not the same as in 2016, when the same president withdrew U.S.A, the world’s second-largest emitter, from the Paris Agreement. At that time, the biggest challenge was to convince the largest polluter, China, to make commitments to reduce harmful emissions. Today, while China still relies on coal as its primary energy source, it has invested heavily in expanding renewable energy, aspiring to become climate neutral by 2060 while maintaining high exports of materials essential for clean energy. Therefore, it also has an economic reason to support the green transition. India, which has risen to third place on the list of global polluters, is also heavily investing in renewables, has set ambitious targets for 2030 and leads global initiatives, such as the International Solar Alliance, to accelerate the deployment of solar energy technologies that will improve energy access and ensure energy security in participating countries.

Having adopted most of the necessary legislation, attention now turns to implementation, which requires Member States’ cooperation to achieve the collective European goal.

Despite the heightened politicization of the green transition ahead of the European elections, the European Union, which ranks fourth on the list of global polluters, remained committed to achieving the European Green Deal goal of achieving climate neutrality by 2050. Having adopted most of the necessary legislation, attention now turns to implementation, which requires Member States’ cooperation to achieve the collective European goal. Implementation is far from easy given the great turmoil affecting Europe. It will only succeed if the net-zero carbon emissions target is combined with Europe’s economic transformation.

Greece is slowly but progressively moving towards a green transition. […] It is obvious that another way for central government to engage with local authorities is needed, rather than simply shifting responsibility to municipalities.

Greece is slowly but progressively moving towards a green transition. The revision of the National Energy and Climate Plan gives great priority to the use of domestic energy sources, such as solar and wind power, i.e. abundant, proven and not speculative resources, establishing a system that better leverages the natural assets available. However, it is not yet clear how the ongoing hydrocarbon (i.e. fossil fuel) extraction programme is consistent with European climate change objectives. In addition, the implementation of important provisions of the National Climate Law is delayed, such as the obligation for municipal authorities to draw up five-year emission reduction plans. It is obvious that another way for central government to engage with local authorities is needed, rather than simply shifting responsibility to municipalities.

But beyond addressing the causes, which is one aspect of climate action, particular attention must also be given to adaptation to climate change and preparing to manage the inevitable. This involves more than flood prevention projects or purchasing more firefighting vehicles and coordinating emergency services. Emphasis on prevention—such as monitoring vulnerable areas, planting trees to cover open spaces, better water management, etc.—along with citizen education, are also critical factors.

Identifying and understanding the challenges is a priority, and this requires a common language of communication between science, policymakers, and society. In a region warming faster than others on the planet, communicating both risks and best practices is becoming a major issue. Today many communication efforts try to convince the sceptics that climate change is happening and is an undeniable fact. Yet most citizens already know this. What they do not know is how it specifically impacts the area they live in and what they can do to protect their homes, land, businesses, and infrastructure to make them more resilient to climate change. Time is already running out.

How much of a problem is hereditary democracy?

Asteris Huliaras

22 years ago, in October 2002, The Economist published an article entitled “Enduring virtues: Greece’s political dynasties go on and on”, which noted that “there is one aspect of Greek politics that is remarkably enduring: the loyalty that voters feel for familiar old surnames—even if the policies, and political styles, are entirely new”. The article was accompanied by six photos with the subtitle: “One Karamanlis, Mitsotakis and Papandreou after another”. Kyriakos Mitsotakis wasn’t included among the photos (Dora Bakoyannis was there to represent the Mitsotakis clan), but the author of the article would surely feel vindicated two decades on.

…”hereditary democracy” is a feature of a good many countries both developed. […] excluding monarchs, there are now more democratically elected heads of government whose fathers were heads of government before them than there are autocratic heads of government for whom the same is true!

But The Economist article was misleading in one important respect: it seemed to imply that political dynasties are an exclusively Greek phenomenon. In fact, as Professor James Loxton noted in a recent article in The Journal of Democracy, what he calls “hereditary democracy” is a feature of a good many countries both developed (the Kennedy, Clinton and Bush families in the US, for instance, or the Trudeaus in Canada) and less developed (e.g. the Gandhis in India and Marcos père and fils in the Philippines). And not only in the past. In fact, excluding monarchs, there are now more democratically elected heads of government whose fathers were heads of government before them than there are autocratic heads of government for whom the same is true! And on every continent: from Mexico to Estonia and from Guatemala to Pakistan. Loxton is highly critical of the phenomenon. He argues that hereditary democracy shrinks the pool of political talent and can frustrate the expectations of voters who mistakenly believe that the son, daughter, widow or relative of an important statesman will share their abilities. However, the professor does notes that these negatives are partly offset by one noteworthy plus: that more women reach high office in countries where this would be unlikely under other circumstances (the first woman ever elected prime minister in the world was Sirimavo Bandaranaike in Sri Lanka—still Ceylon at the time, in 1960—six decades before Sweden elected its first female head of government). But the paper ends on a bitter note, concluding that this isn’t how democracy is supposed to work.

However, there is a counter argument. In his provocative 2003 book In Praise of Nepotism, Adam Bellow—son of the Nobel Prize-winning author Saul Bellow—argues that nepotism has always been and will always be part of life, and that it is practised in a far less damaging way today than it was in the past.

He calls the modern version ‘meritocratic nepotism’, in so far as family connections help a person to come to the fore and knock on the door of advancement, but no further: after that, they have to prove their worth. Bellow concludes his argument by saying they are likely to do so, given that they will have been apprenticed to the role since childhood. This obviously applies to politicians, but also to actors, academics, trade unionists and others. In the final chapter of the book, he argues that nepotism is a natural development, since it stems from the ties that bind children and parents, the transmission of family heritage, and the cycle of generosity and gratitude that binds society as a whole. And because nepotism is not going away any time soon, Bellow argues we should take an “open-minded” approach to the phenomenon.

…perhaps it is time we looked on nepotism with a slightly more open mind—especially in relation to our leaders.

Nepotism offends our sense of meritocracy and fair play, which tell us that what we receive in life should be the result of our efforts and not of inherited advantage. For centuries, people have been fighting nepotism in court, in parliament and the workplace in the name of justice and equality. In part, it is an ongoing battle whose outcome remains undecided. In politics, though, the practice has made such a comeback in recent years, we can legitimately speak of a “new nepotism”. But perhaps it is time we looked on nepotism with a slightly more open mind—especially in relation to our leaders.

From a different perspective, the debate on nepotism obscures more wide-ranging problems. The fundamental problem in countries like Greece is favouritism, meaning the favouring of one person over another, whether they are relatives or not. In many ways, the debate on nepotism helps to conceal the high levels of cronyism and party-political selection criteria in Greece, both of which are more germane and critical to the functioning of democracy than political dynasties. Focus on those instead, and nepotism might also become less prevalent.

Europe in difficult times

Loukas Tsoukalis

I wrote this time last year that Europe was not at its best and that 2024 looked set to be a difficult year. And so it has proved. But it’s looking like next year is going to be even harder. And it is certainly far from a foregone conclusion that Europe can summon a response that even begins to measure up to the immense challenges confronting it.

Trump’s re-election in the United States will have a direct impact on transatlantic relations and Europe’s relations with the rest of the world, also on how its own member states interact. We know that the once and future President of the US does not believe in international institutions and rules, or much in alliances. Like a true businessman, he takes a transactional approach to international relations and also believes in the law of the strongest.

…the question is how long the Europeans can withstand US pressure before they split and retreat? And at what cost to the European economy?

He views the European Union as something strange and perhaps rather decadent: such terms as consensus and shared sovereignty are alien to him. The US trade deficit with Europe annoys him, and his threat of tariffs has the German automobile manufacturers and others shaking in their boots. He sees China as the biggest threat to American hegemony and we can expect the trade war between the US and China to heat up. The pressure on Europe to toe Washington’s line will also increase. But European and American interests don’t necessarily coincide. So, the question is how long the Europeans can withstand US pressure before they split and retreat? And at what cost to the European economy?

The newly elected US president wants the war in Ukraine to end sooner rather than later. But the responsibility for maintaining a precarious peace and the expense of rebuilding a badly savaged Ukraine will fall mainly on the Europeans, who will also have to take more responsibility of their own external security. On this last point at least, Donald Trump is certainly not wrong. Can the Europeans take all that on? And what place do they envisage for Russia in Europe’s security architecture in the future? For the leaders of Poland, the Baltic countries and a few others, the answer is clear: prepare for war. Can there be a unified and autonomous European response to these key questions? If not, Europe will continue to be dragged behind decisions taken by others on its behalf.

The EU is entering the new year with a clear leadership deficit.

The EU is entering the new year with a clear leadership deficit. Germany will be heading to the polls and the Christian Democrats are readying themselves for a return to power leading a new coalition government that will probably take a few months to smooth over its differences between the constituent parties. As for France, a stable government that excludes the extremes is going to be very hard to achieve and extremely precarious if and when in place. The President of the French Republic, for years the only leader who thought and acted European, is now paying the price for political mistakes at home and, dare we say it, of arrogance.

There are no other strong candidates to fill the gap at the European level, although some have begun to look to Meloni who, like Orban, may enjoy privileged access to President Trump. God help us! As far as the European Commission is concerned, power will be even more concentrated in Ursula von der Leyen’s hands in her second presidency, while the responsibilities of rather weal politically Commissioners will overlap. I doubt the Commission has the political weight to fill the leadership vacuum left by others.

A crisis of governance and a crisis of democracy across Europe. The disappointment the political system engenders in large sections of European societies (and an even bigger one in the United States of America) continues to lead voters to cast their votes increasingly for anti-systemic parties, most of them populist and in the far right. The old mainstream parties are still trying to work out why, as is European social democracy that most of the poorer strata abandoned years ago, thus leaving a vacuum that the far right has filled with appeals to patriotism and social welfare. We had seen an earlier version of this same scenario play out in the interwar period, and let’s not forget how badly that had turned out.

How can the problem be addressed? Certainly not by labelling as populism every radical proposal that departs from traditional norms. And certainly not by cancelling elections when we don’t like the verdict they deliver, as happened very recently in the Romanian presidential election. If elections had to be cancelled every time someone attempts to manipulate the popular vote via social media, how should the US have dealt with Elon Musk and other plutocrats for their interventions in the US elections? They surely spent much more money than the Russians may have done in Romania. While maintaining an embarrassed silence on such major issues, European institutions will lose in credibility.

The Draghi report highlighted Europe’s economic woos. It proposed bold and concrete solutions. But will it be possible to translate the positive reception by the leaders of member states into action? […] In Europe, we still do too much talk.

The Draghi report highlighted Europe’s economic woos. It proposed bold and concrete solutions. But will it be possible to translate the positive reception by the leaders of member states into action? Because with words we can’t build an army or run an industrial or a social policy, let alone pull off the green transition. In Europe, we still do too much talk.

This year, I have not followed the advice proffered by Savvopoulos one of his well-known songs: “Since he had no good news to share, he’d best have said nothing at all”. Because I believe complacency is dangerous in the difficult times we are going through.