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Les entreprises européennes ne sont plus de simples acteurs économiques : elles sont devenues des cibles stratégiques. Cyberattaques, espionnage industriel, pressions réglementaires, désinformation, sabotages logistiques ou prises de contrôle hostiles composent désormais un continuum de menaces dites « hybrides », où les frontières entre guerre, économie et influence s’effacent. Dans un nouveau Briefing, l’Institut Choiseul […]

C'est de la coopération militaire à bas bruit, en mode contraint : petit pas, petit calibre, petit feu. Mais la France, sollicitée le dimanche 7 décembre par le gouvernement du Bénin, sur la côte ouest africaine, aux prises avec une tentative de putsch, a admis avoir accordé au régime de Cotonou un appui présenté comme ponctuel et « strictement technique ». Voire un peu plus. Le signe d'un retour vers l'Afrique par la petite porte, après en avoir été chassée ces dernières années ?

- Défense en ligne

By Sebastian Heidebrecht (Centre for European Integration Research, Department of Political Science, University of Vienna)

On 30 October 2025, the European Central Bank (ECB) announced the next preparatory phase and its readiness to introduce a digital euro in 2029. Unlike private forms of electronic money created by private banks, the digital euro will be a retail central bank digital currency (CBDC). As such, it will be directly available to citizens for everyday use. Unlike electronic money held in bank accounts, which is money created by the private banking system, the digital euro will be a direct liability of the central bank, like cash. Shortly before, on 23 October 2025, the European Council also signalledcontinuing support, highlighting the importance of the digital euro project for “a competitive and resilient European payment system” and “Europe’s strategic sovereignty and economic security”.

Down The Rabbit Hole? A Puzzling Policy Initiative

It seems the common currency is getting fit for the digital age, or are key European Union (EU) policymakers marching towards a digital Euroland? (Perceptive readers will note that I am referring to an earlier debate around the introduction of the analogue euro in the JCMS issues of June and September 1999.) A fictive wonderland, in which polarised politics, citizen concerns, and stakeholder interests do not play much role? It is essential to note that the issuance of the digital euro will depend on the success of an accompanying legislative package, which will, among other things, introduce the digital euro as a form of legal tender. Yet, CBDCs have long been met with considerable scepticism; inter alia, they are deemed “a solution in search of a problem”. Furthermore, the digital euro will require costly public infrastructure, marking a departure from the previous reliance on private actors and the general principle that state intervention should only occur in clear cases of market failure.

Perhaps most importantly, the digital euro project, and particularly the retail version, also poses several potential challenges, including public opinion. Banks and traditional payment providers may resist it to defend their business models. Populist parties may also oppose it and defend analogue cash against what they may perceive as an elite-driven project originating from Brussels and Frankfurt. In times of tight public budgets and rising Euroscepticism, the drive by the ECB and the Commission to introduce the digital euro seems particularly surprising. Why are the EU institutions advancing this project?

Through the Looking Glass: Why EU Actors Promote the Project

In a recent JCMS article, I examine the move forward of the digital euro project. I demonstrate the importance of how digitalisation, intertwined with geopoliticisation, impacts the euro area. Of course, innovation in the world of finance has long been closely tied to technological advancements. ‘Fintech,’ or the use of digital technology to provide financial solutions, may thus be only the most recent innovation in a long list of financial innovations. Yet, big platform companies have entered the sector, offering payment services such as Apple Pay, Google Pay, and Amazon Pay. These may, due to lock-in and network effects, consolidate markets and create potential oligopolies or even a monopoly in certain sectors. Furthermore, states are using digital financial technology to weaponize interdependence, as demonstrated by Russia’s exclusion from the SWIFT international payment system in March 2022.

Against this backdrop, important developments in the late 2010s and early 2020s encouraged EU policymakers to advance the project.

First, in 2019, Meta (formerly Facebook) announced its intention to introduce its own cryptocurrency, sparking significant debate among public officials about potential threats from private and/or foreign financial innovations, and demonstrating the need to keep pace with financial innovation.

Secondly, policymakers reconsidered the problematic fragmentation of the EU payment sector along national lines, which results in a reliance on a few international card companies, such as Visa and Mastercard. This issue has long been recognised, with repeated but unsuccessful attempts to integrate the euro retail payment market. The latest attempt of a private-run and publicly promoted initiative failed in 2022, revealing the challenges of a market-based European solution.

Third, EU policymakers increasingly aim to ensure monetary sovereignty and the public role of money, thereby safeguarding EU strategic autonomy. One argument presents the European payment sector’s dependence on foreign infrastructure and a few foreign private companies as problematic, particularly in a period of growing international tension. Ever since the prospect of a second Trump presidency in January 2025 emerged, EU officials in the Commission and the ECB have increasingly framed the digital euro in geopolitical terms.

Waking Up: Political Challenges and EU Politics

Yet, concerns remain. Far-right politicians mobilise against the project, inter alia claiming to defend an imaginary “fortress cash”, demanding a “no to CDBC”, and advocating the usage of crypto alternatives instead. The private banking sector is also sceptical about the project. In terms of EU bureaucratic politics, one of the most controversial issues for policymakers and the institutions involved is whether, in line with the Commission’s proposal on the digital euro, holding limits and the prohibition of remuneration should be addressed in secondary legislation. The ECB opposes these measures, arguing that such restrictions in secondary legislation are contrary to its monetary policy competences and may be necessary in exceptional scenarios, such as a negative interest rate environment. Yet, legislators defend them based on their structural impact on the financial system, which, as an economic rather than monetary policy, would be an issue of political concern.

Against this backdrop, it will be interesting to see if the digital euro project can overcome political challenges in the legislative process. Perhaps most importantly, many of the project’s controversial design features will affect whether and how the digital euro will be accepted and used by citizens. Ultimately, this will be the main benchmark for assessing whether we will find ourselves in a digital wonderland, in which the digital euro exists only in central bank drawing boards, or worse, is implemented but not used by anyone, or if we wake up in a world where the familiar euro has found an actual digital reflection.

Sebastian is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Centre for European Integration Research, housed in the University of Vienna’s Department of Political Science. His research looks at how actors, processes, and institutions shape the digital transformation of European economies and societies, with a particular focus on European Union policies. Website: https://eif.univie.ac.at/heidebrecht/index.php LinkedIn: www.linkedin.com/in/sebsebastian-heidebrecht-22194066

The post Ready to Introduce a CBDC – or ECB in Digital Euro Land? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

La Présidente Metsola a remis le Prix Sakharov 2025 aux représentantes des deux journalistes emprisonnés au Bélarus et en Géorgie, lors d’une cérémonie qui s’est tenue mardi à Strasbourg.
Commission des affaires étrangères
Commission du développement
Sous-commission "Droits de l'homme"

Source : © Union européenne, 2025 - PE

2026. január 15.-től akár 60 millió forintra is pályázhatnak az 5000 főnél kisebb lakosságszámmal rendelkező települések a Magyar Falu Program keretében az önkormányzati tulajdonú ingatlanok fejlesztésére, és önkormányzati feladatellátáshoz kapcsolódó beszerzésekre. 

A pályázat keretében akár 60 millió Ft 100% támogatás igényelhető út, híd építése/felújítására vagy nyílt- és zárt vízelvezető rendszer felújítására már 2026. január 15.-től.

Im Streit um die Zuwanderung sind alle Vorentscheide gefallen. Das Volk kann im Juni 2026 ohne Gegenvorschlag über den jüngsten Angriff der SVP auf die Personenfreizügigkeit abstimmen.

Durée de la vidéo : 90'

Clause de non-responsabilité : L'interprétation des débats facilite la communication mais ne constitue en aucun cas un enregistrement authentifié des débats. Seuls le discours original ou la traduction écrite révisée du discours original peuvent être considérés authentiques.
Source : © Union européenne, 2025 - PE

French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz at the joint press conference of the European Digital Sovereignty Summit, Berlin, November 18, 2025. (picture alliance / Andreas Gora)

In November 2025, the European Union crossed a decisive threshold in its effort to safeguard its digital backbone from strategic vulnerabilities linked to Chinese technology. On November 10, Vice-President Henna Virkkunen introduced a legally binding proposal requiring all EU member states to phase out Huawei and ZTE equipment from their 5G and future telecommunications networks. This marked a sharp departure from the EU’s 2020 ‘5G Toolbox,’ which relied on non-binding recommendations and lacked enforcement mechanisms. The new plan—complete with financial penalties for non-compliance—makes clear that Beijing’s expanding technological influence, and Huawei’s entrenched position in particular, has become the central threat to the Union’s digital sovereignty.

Only a week after the phase-out announcement, EU leaders convened in Berlin for the Summit on European Digital Sovereignty on November 18. There, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron jointly emphasized that Europe must rapidly strengthen its strategic autonomy if it hopes to remain competitive in artificial intelligence, cloud computing, and semiconductors. Although the summit’s official agenda avoided explicitly naming China, Europe’s accelerating policy shift—including the renewed push to remove Huawei from its networks—made the underlying target difficult to miss. The subtext became even clearer when placed alongside Merz’s remarks at a business conference days earlier, where he outlined Germany’s new course: “We have decided within the government that wherever possible, we will replace components, for example, in the 5G network, with components that we produce ourselves,” he said, before adding, “and we will not allow any components from China in the 6G network.”

Europe’s consolidating consensus on a Huawei phase-out now sits alongside the EU AI Act of 2024 and the Cyber Resilience Act of the same year—two frameworks that impose strict cybersecurity and data-protection requirements designed to privilege trusted vendors over high-risk Chinese suppliers.

Unified Export Controls and Sanctions Might Accelerate Transatlantic AI Governance Convergence

The United States’ AI full-stack strategy, outlined in the July 2025 AI Action Plan, seeks to secure American advantage across the full technological chain—from semiconductor chips and high-performance computing to foundational models, data governance, and downstream applications. It blends restrictive measures and incentives: export controls, licensing rules, and standards-setting diplomacy operate as “sticks” to slow China’s access to frontier systems, while subsidies, joint research initiatives, and preferential integration into U.S.-led supply chains serve as “carrots” to draw allies into a shared technological ecosystem. Yet despite the strategy’s breadth, transatlantic coordination remains thin, lacking the institutional depth needed to support a truly integrated approach.

Europe’s recent moves, when viewed through the logic of the U.S. strategy’s sticks and carrots, provide new momentum for narrowing this gap. If Washington can translate this moment into practical institutional mechanisms, the full-stack strategy could serve as a strategic scaffold—offering political reassurance, regulatory leverage, and innovation resources that help Europe consolidate its trusted telecommunications infrastructure while advancing its broader digital sovereignty. In such a coordinated transatlantic framework, the United States and Europe together reinforce the foundations of a shared ‘free world’ technological space, reducing the free world’s dependence on Chinese digital and hardware ecosystems.

This convergence, however, remains fragile. Major EU regulatory projects, including the 2024 AI Act, must still reconcile competing demands from domestic constituencies and both European and American technology firms. The bloc’s struggle over the Huawei question illustrates these tensions vividly. Years of friction between security hawks and economic pragmatists meant that, after the 2020 ‘5G Toolbox,’ only 10–13 member states implemented meaningful restrictions. Germany hesitated largely because Huawei offered a 20–30 percent cost advantage over Nokia and Ericsson, compounded by significant sunk investments in its already‑deployed infrastructure—factors that made a rapid, full ban economically burdensome. Spain faced similar incentives: Telefónica had renewed a Huawei 5G core contract through 2030 and relied heavily on Huawei’s lower‑cost equipment and existing deployments, making an abrupt shift technically and financially challenging. Even so, by July 2025 Madrid committed to phasing out Huawei equipment in Spain and Germany to comply with tightening EU‑level security requirements, while maintaining Huawei systems in Brazil, where no such restrictions applied. Ultimately, Germany and France converged on a stabilizing middle path. Berlin sought to reconcile economic pragmatism with mounting security imperatives by offering subsidies to Deutsche Telekom, Vodafone, and Telefónica to complete equipment swaps by 2027. Paris—more hawkish from the outset—reinforced this trajectory by consistently framing Chinese vendors as fundamental sovereignty risks, helping steer the broader EU toward a more unified and security‑driven position.

These internal pressures help explain the endogenous nature of broader transatlantic divergences—differences that analysts at the Atlantic Council characterize as structural, rooted in the EU’s more precautionary regulatory philosophy, its deeper emphasis on market fairness, and its persistent drive for ‘strategic autonomy,’ especially in digital governance.Yet despite unresolved frictions, convergence is strong where both sides perceive systemic risk—data security, supply-chain resilience, and preventing the militarization of AI and quantum technologies by authoritarian states. The real task is, thus, to translate these shared anxieties into structured cooperation before divergences harden.

Coordinated export controls and sanctions offer a particularly strong pathway for accelerating transatlantic AI governance convergence. These instruments cut to the core of what makes uncoordinated national responses inadequate in an era defined by overproduction, supply-chain dominance, and state-supported technological scaling by Chinese-linked firms. For individual states, unilateral measures against China’s rapid advances are insufficient. But the United States and Europe possess complementary strengths—American technological leadership, European regulatory capacity, and the combined market power of the transatlantic economy—that can turn coordination into the linchpin of a coherent strategy. When synchronized, such controls help bridge differences in high-risk AI safety practices, fortify supply chains, and close loopholes that currently undermine enforcement.

Building this coordination requires elevating emerging-technology policy into a top-tier transatlantic channel—most naturally through a strengthened Trade and Technology Council (TTC). Within such an upgraded framework, Washington and Brussels could operationalize a common approach to high-risk technologies by jointly defining safety expectations for advanced AI systems, aligning listings and sanctions on sensitive Chinese-linked firms, tightening oversight of technology and data flows, coordinating early on outbound investment, and cooperating to disrupt diversion networks operating through Russia and other intermediaries. As analysts at the Atlantic Council note, these mechanisms offer more than technical alignment: they create the institutional fabric that allows the United States and Europe to manage systemic technological risks together rather than in parallel.

A fully developed TTC of this kind would also serve as the platform for narrowing existing regulatory gaps. The United States, for instance, could work with the European Commission (EC) to build an ‘AI-governance bridge’ that provides companies with predictable operational expectations across jurisdictions even when the laws are not identical. Synchronizing sanctions and export restrictions with the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) would tighten enforcement and limit opportunities for evasion. Simultaneously, deeper collaboration with the Directorate-General for Trade (DG TRADE) would help Europe construct a more coherent export-control regime that complements the protective goals embedded in Washington’s AI Action Plan. Reciprocal notification requirements and shared-risk taxonomies for outbound investment would round out this architecture, laying the foundation for a future transatlantic screening system capable of managing strategic leakage at its source. Such alignment would extend the reach of transatlantic AI export controls and sanctions beyond bilateral borders, establishing global standards that shape technology flows worldwide through tiered licensing and extraterritorial enforcement mechanisms.

Rising International Multi-Layer Governance Threats from China to Transatlantic AI Governance

LGU+’s Huawei-linked IoT lab exposes how corporate dependencies can strengthen China’s leverage over allied digital systems.

Recent developments in Northeast Asia illustrate why transatlantic coordination on AI governance and high-risk technology controls must extend far beyond national capitals. In 2020, the U.S. State Department publicly warned LGU+ that continued reliance on Huawei equipment could expose the operator to serious reputational, legal, and security risks—part of Washington’s broader push to discourage high-risk vendors within allied 5G ecosystems. Five years later, during a 2025 parliamentary oversight hearing, LGU+ was again criticized for still operating Huawei-supplied 5G equipment, underscoring how entrenched procurement decisions can harden into long-term structural dependencies even after security concerns become explicit.

In September 2025, Mayor Kang Ki-jung’s Gwangju delegation visited Huawei’s 1.6 km² Shanghai Research Campus, revealing how municipal engagement can strengthen China’s strategic leverage.

Municipal dynamics reveal a similar vulnerability. Last September, Gwangju conducted an official visit to Huawei’s 1.6 km² Shanghai research campus as part of its effort to benchmark smart-city and AI-hub strategies. Though framed as a technical mission, the visit created an opening for Beijing to cultivate influence over subnational officials whose infrastructure preferences increasingly shape the region’s technological trajectory. Such episodes highlight how Chinese firms strategically leverage local development incentives to embed themselves in urban infrastructure planning—well beyond the oversight reach of national authorities.

These cases illuminate a broader strategic tension: while the free world benefits from maintaining limited, cooperative grey zones that allow behavioral observation of Chinese technological conduct, these same spaces create opportunities for Beijing to conduct its own counter-conditioning. The challenge is therefore not simply to preserve channels for observation, but to define the permissible boundaries of these grey zones and discipline the risks associated with them. Without clearer parameters, cooperation intended to generate insight can gradually drift toward structural dependence.

Taken together, these developments are not merely warning signs; they constitute a new frontier of strategic challenge for the transatlantic community. They underscore an underappreciated reality: high-risk technology penetration increasingly occurs through governance layers that traditional export-control systems were never designed to monitor. Ensuring technological security now requires policy mechanisms that span the full chain of decision-making—from national ministries to regional telecom operators to municipal administrations—each capable of introducing vulnerabilities that adversarial firms can exploit. Strengthening vendor‑risk standards, aligning licensing rules, and coordinating penalties across jurisdictions have thus become essential to prevent subnational gaps from crystallizing into strategic footholds for authoritarian influence.

Conclusion: Cultivating Carrots to Advance Transatlantic AI Coordination

Yet institutional alignment alone cannot build a durable front. Sustained cooperation depends on credible economic incentives that make participation strategically and commercially viable for allies. The next phase of transatlantic technological strategy must therefore pair regulatory ambition with material commitments that reduce the political and economic friction of compliance. If Washington couples its institutional efforts with meaningful economic commitments—co‑funded infrastructure, joint R&D programs, and clear assurances that export controls will not become instruments of unilateral commercial gain—its AI full‑stack strategy could evolve from a national blueprint into the backbone of a transatlantic technological alliance.

Such an alliance would not only strengthen the free world’s ability to resist Chinese technological influence but would also offer a coherent model for global technology governance—one grounded in transparency, high‑standard safety, shared economic opportunity, and a rules‑based order capable of shaping the next generation of advanced technologies. In this sense, transatlantic coordination is no longer a desirable accessory to national strategies; it is the essential foundation for securing the free world technological frontier in the decade ahead.

 

Russia’s state debt increased by 2.8 percent between January and October 2025, reaching 32.9 trillion rubles, according to data released by the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation. While the absolute number appears substantial, the pace of growth remains moderate and notably lower than earlier preliminary estimates. An operational report from the Accounts Chamber had previously indicated a ten percent rise in public debt between January and September, bringing the total to 31.98 trillion rubles. The discrepancy between the two estimates is largely explained by statistical adjustments and the clarification of debt parameters as of early November. Updated accounting methods and revised data on obligations resulted in a more restrained assessment of the annual increase.

Colombian Air Force Kfir fighter jets fly in formation during the military parade to commemorate Colombia’s Independence Day in Bogota on July 20, 2024. (Alejandro Martinez/AFP)

There has been a lot of discussions on US plans in addressing security issues with Venezuela, as US forces take to targeting boats related to cartels attempting to bring narcotics into the United States. While the likelihood of a full assault on Venezuela would mirror the recent strikes on Iran as opposed to a strategy of regime change like in Iraq and Afghanistan, the success in assaulting the most well equipped nation in Latin America comes with significant risks to US forces.

Venezuela has been the benefactor of past procurements of weapons systems from the United States. In the pre-Chavez era, Venezuela was tasked with protecting not only itself, but American and foreign owned oil production assets. This close relationship between the US and Venezuela enabled the former ally to purchase early F-16 jets and rely on the overall protection of US assets in the region. With the start of the Chavez regime, Venezuela moved to a policy of expropriation, the cutting of ties with the West, and massive purchases of Russian military equipment, specifically the SU-30 fighter platform. With Venezuela’s border nations flying older Kfir jets and Mirage IIIE/5s, the SU-30s gave Venezuela a massive advantage in air superiority, now having the most capable fighter jets in the Americas after the United States.

While air defence over Venezuela would start with their SU-30 radars and longer range missiles intercepting incoming threats, Venezuela also obtained a layered air defence network from Russia and radars from China. Venezuela has not just one of the most capable air defence networks in Latin America, but worldwide. Chinese radars are some of the more modern variants available for territorial defence, systems which are now operational in Venezuela. To target longer range threats from the air and evasive missile threats, the export version of the S-300VM is operational in Venezuela. The S-300VM is the export tracked version of Russia’s S-300 missile system, and is one of the most capable systems in the world. To support the S-300VMs, Venezuela also uses the modern BUK-M2 for medium to long range air defence, a system that matches anything operational in the War in Ukraine in 2025. An assault on Venezuela may require more advanced techniques than even the recent strikes on Iran, as their systems are more modern than some of those that were operating in Iran before the strikes.

Being well known for many decades, and becoming more popularized in the movie Top Gun: Maverick, Venezuela operates the SA-3 air defense missile system. While not used as they would operate in real life in the movie, the SA-3 when used en masse would cause a lot of chaos in the air for any non-stealth aircraft conducting an assault on Venezuela. While the F-35s and F-22s would be a solution to avoiding the SA-3’s modernised radars in Venezuela, it would have made for a less exciting movie. A a mark of excellence, of good training by the SA-3 radar operators, and mistakes by the pilot and his support structures, an SA-3 was able to shoot down a F-117 stealth bomber over Serbia in the 1999. Even in chess, the Pawn sometimes is lucky enough to kill a King.

While the common theme when speaking about a US assault on Venezuela does not consider the mission to have great risks overall, mistakes could lead to US pilots being shot down. With multiple scenarios of defeating both S-300 systems and BUK-M2s having taken place in Ukraine, US forces likely have a good base of knowledge on how to defeat these systems in real world combat scenarios. Venezuela is quite a large country, and the very limited number of S-300VMs is not adequate to defend the entire territory. Lacking a sufficient number of BUK-M2s is also a problem and the SA-3 systems can be carefully avoided or defeated via cruise missile strikes on their radar hubs and launchers themselves. In reality, those missiles would have been taken out by overwhelming waves of Tomahawk cruise missile strikes in order to save Tom Cruise an Miles Teller a lot of grief, and in real life, all of the S-300VMs, BUK-M2s and SA-3s would be hit early with the Chinese made radars seeing the strikes coming in and being subject to them directly. If US bravado on Venezuela turns to conflict, waves of missiles would be what strikes Venezuela first and perhaps last, with no pilots being put at risk in the initial assault. The loss of US lives in combat with Venezuela would sour the public on any coercive actions, but the bluff might be worth the reward in the view of the current US Administration.

A több mint ötven éve repülő Boeing 747-es típus másodvirágzása az elmúlt évtizedben fellendült e-kereskedelemnek köszönhető. A légi áruszállításban az utasforgalomból fokozatosan kiszorult és kargógéppé átalakított Jumbók éppúgy megtalálhatók, mint az eredetileg is teherszállítónak készült példányok. Néhány ilyen gép kormánya mögött magyar pilóta ül. Egyikük Szüle Zsolt kapitány, aki immár tíz éve repüli a legendás típust. 

Volt idő, amikor a Boeing 747-esre csak a közforgalmi repülésben eltöltött évtizedek, a szakmai lépcsőfokok megmászása – 10-15 ezer óra repült idő, szélestörzsű tapasztalat, stb. - után, pályafutásuk megkoronázásaként kerülhettek a pilóták. Az ezredfordulót követően ez megváltozott, és már a fiatalabb repülőgép-vezetők is lehetőséget kaptak a típuson. Így bukkantak fel a világban szerencsét próbáló, szakmai kihívást kereső magyar pilóták is a B 747-esek fedélzetén. Ők többnyire első tisztként dolgoztak, és csak néhányukból lett idővel kapitány. Arra sokáig nem is volt példa, hogy valaki kapitányként debütáljon a Jumbón. Az elsők között volt Szüle Zsolt is, aki először légiforgalmi irányító majd később Boeing 737-es első tiszt és kapitány lett. A párhuzamosan űzött két hivatás nehezen fért meg egymás mellett, és amikor döntenie kellett, a frekvencia másik végét, a pilótafülkét választotta.

A közelmúltban azért kerestem meg, hogy saját élményein és tapasztalatain keresztül nyújtson betekintést a Boeing 747-esen dolgozó, világjáró kargópilóták kívülről kalandosnak tűnő, belülről olykor nagyon is rögös mindennapjaiba. Beszélgetésünkre, ha nem is egy Jumbo fedélzetén, de mindenképpen autentikus környezetben került sor, Zsolt B 747-es szimulátor központjában, a Simflite-ban. Arra kértem, hogy mielőtt elmerülünk a kargópilóták mindennapjaiban, röviden idézze fel a pilótafülkébe vezető út főbb állomásait.

[...] Bővebben!

At first glance, the comparison seems almost absurd. Mongolia, a vast country with enormous mineral wealth, stretching between two geopolitical giants, versus Belize, a small Central American state with limited territory, modest population and no strategic depth. By classical logic, Mongolia should be the stronger actor in economic sovereignty. Yet recent analytical measurements reveal a far more counterintuitive reality: Belize today demonstrates a higher level of practical economic sovereignty than Mongolia.   As an expert of the International Burke Institute and an active participant in projects aimed at strengthening national sovereignty, I encounter such paradoxes with increasing frequency. They reveal one of the central truths of the modern world: economic sovereignty is no longer a function of size, territory, or raw resources. It is a function of control, diversification, resilience and institutional discipline.   Mongolia is rich in coal, copper, gold and rare earth elements. Its underground wealth is undeniable. Yet much of its economic model remains structurally dependent on a narrow export base and on external demand, primarily from a single dominant market. This creates a classic dependency trap. When prices fluctuate or geopolitical pressure intensifies, Mongolia’s fiscal stability, currency strength and social balance become immediately vulnerable to external forces it does not control.   Belize, by contrast, lacks large-scale mineral reserves and does not command major industrial capacity. But over the past two decades it has built something far more decisive for modern sovereignty: a diversified economic structure that reduces exposure to single-source dependency. Tourism, financial services, agriculture, logistics and digital services form a balanced ecosystem. None of these sectors dominates absolutely, yet together they form a resilient economic architecture.   Economic sovereignty is not measured by how much a country exports, but by how freely it can decide under pressure. A state that earns billions from raw materials but cannot influence pricing, transportation routes or investment conditions is not fully sovereign in economic terms. It is economically active, but strategically constrained. This is where Mongolia’s vulnerability becomes evident. Its resources generate revenue, but not full control.   Belize’s advantage lies not in volume, but in flexibility. Its economy is small, but adaptive. External shocks do not collapse the entire system at once. Currency policy, fiscal regulation and sectoral balance provide room for maneuver. In moments of global turbulence, this flexibility becomes a strategic asset far more valuable than sheer scale.   At the International Burke Institute, where we are finalizing the comprehensive Sovereignty Index to be presented this December for all UN member states, economic sovereignty is assessed not by GDP alone, but by a deeper set of indicators. These include dependency ratios, trade concentration, fiscal autonomy, financial system resilience and the state’s capacity to absorb shocks without losing strategic autonomy. It is within this multidimensional framework that Belize unexpectedly outperforms Mongolia.   As someone directly engaged in both the analytical and practical dimensions of this work, I see a pattern repeating across regions. States that rely heavily on a narrow economic corridor — one commodity, one route, one partner — accumulate invisible vulnerabilities. Their economies may look strong in growth charts, but their sovereignty erodes silently through structural exposure. When disruption comes, decision-making becomes reactive rather than sovereign.   Belize followed a different logic. Instead of maximizing output from a single dominant resource, it invested in balancing multiple smaller sectors. This did not produce spectacular growth headlines. But it produced something far more durable: economic independence in critical moments. Sovereignty is not tested in times of prosperity. It is tested when options disappear.   Mongolia now faces the classic dilemma of many resource-rich states: how to convert natural wealth into strategic autonomy rather than long-term dependence. The answer lies not in extracting more, but in restructuring more. Without diversification, even the richest subsoil becomes a fragile foundation for sovereignty.   The Belize–Mongolia contrast illustrates a broader truth about the modern global system. Size no longer guarantees strength. Wealth no longer guarantees independence. What matters is the architecture of control. Who sets the terms of trade? Who controls capital flows? Who absorbs the first удар during a crisis?   In December, when the full Sovereignty Index is released, many governments will confront similar surprises. Some large states will discover hidden fragility. Some small ones will discover unexpected strength. And many will face an uncomfortable realization: economic sovereignty today is built not by scale, but by structure.   Belize did not become stronger than Mongolia by growing bigger. It became stronger by becoming smarter in how it organizes dependency and control. And in the modern world, that difference defines who truly holds economic sovereignty — and who merely appears to.

A Coronelt túlélő angol hajók a csata után azonnal visszaindultak Falkland felé, mivel teljesen nyilvánvaló volt, ha a chilei vizeken maradnak, ők sem kerülhetik el a Good Hope és a Monmouth sorsát. Miután sikerült leráznia üldözőit, a Glasgow nyugat felé egy nagy kanyart megtéve déli irányba fordult, és három napon át húsz csomó feletti sebességgel haladva egyenesen a Magellán-szoroshoz hajózott. A cirkáló itt várta be a Canopust, mely a tőle telhető legnagyobb, kilenccsomós sebességgel kínlódta el magát a szorosig. A Canopus közben kétszer is csak néhány mérfölddel kerülte el a sérült angol hajók után kutató német cirkálókat, akik a rossz időben szerencsére nem vették észre a kivénhedt csatahajót. A Canopus és a Glasgow november hatodikán találkozott a Magellán-szoros bejáratánál, és innen együtt mentek Falklandra. A Canopus hajtóművei útközben kétszer is felmondták a szolgálatot.

Az Otranto, hogy biztosan elkerülje a dél felé haladó német hajókat, a csata után kétszáz mérföldet hajózott nyugat felé, ki a Csendes-óceánra. A segédcirkáló csak ezután fordult délnek, és a Magellán-szorost elkerülve a biztonságosabbnak gondolt Horn-fok körüli utat választva jutott vissza a Falkland-szigetekre.

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IPI and the Permanent Mission of Latvia to the United Nations cohosted a public discussion on Navigating Frontline Challenges for the use of Technology in UN Peace Operations on December 11th.

The event examined how UN peace operations should navigate the changing technology landscape to maximize potential benefits for efficiency and effectiveness, address changing threats posed by the use of technology by conflict parties, and mitigate the risks and potential harms presented by the introduction of new technologies into peacekeeping environments. As the Secretariat’s ongoing review of the future of all forms of UN peace operations examines opportunities for new mission modalities and formats, this event considered the potential role of new technologies across various types of mission configurations. This could include, for example, the appropriate balance of remote sensing technologies and on-the-ground presence in a future ceasefire-monitoring mission. Panelists also discussed the political, operational, and ethical implications of new peacekeeping technologies within the current geopolitical and financial environment and proposed opportunities to adapt the UN’s technology and innovation agenda in light of these challenges.

Opening Remarks:
H.E. Sanita Pavļuta-Deslandes, Permanent Representative of Latvia to the United Nations

Speakers:
Remi Clavet, Chief of Joint Mission Analysis Center (JMAC), UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) (Virtual)
Dirk Druet, Non-Resident Fellow, International Peace Institute
Major Modris Kairišs, Head of Autonomous Systems Competence Center, National Armed Forces of Latvia (Virtual)
Barbara Nieuwenhuys, Digital Transformation Team, UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO)

Closing Remarks:
H.E. Usman Iqbal Jadoon, Deputy Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations (Virtual)

Moderator:
Lauren McGowan, Policy Analyst, International Peace Institute

The post Navigating Frontline Challenges for the Use of Technology in UN Peace Operations appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Podcastunk 85. adásában a Bors c. Kádár-kori TV-sorozatról többek között megállapítottuk, hogy egyedülálló módon olyan magyar katonákat jelenít meg, akik az I. világháború keleti frontján hadifogságba estek, majd a kommunista hatalomátvétel után a dolgozó tömegeket üdvözíteni hivatott eszme szolgálatába álltak, előbb Szovjet-Oroszországban, majd hazatérésük után „Szovjet-Magyarországon” is. Ilyesfajta életutak valóban léteztek ugyan, de ettől még ezek a konkrét történetek meseszerűek, és a mozgalmár karakterek is természetesen mind valószerűtlenül rokonszenves, agyafúrt, vidám fickók. Ennek megfelelően az egyik ellenszenves bolsevik forradalmár archetípust, a komor, humortalan, szektás inkvizítort sem látjuk benne egyszer sem, noha ritkának az ilyen egyáltalán nem számított akkoriban, sőt történelmi előképei is bőven akadtak. 

 

[...] Bővebben!

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Comment un roman situé sur une des iles les plus excentrées d'Indonésie réussit-il à nous passionner autant ? C'est grâce à sa galerie de personnages issus de la population défavorisée et oubliée de l'île de Timor qui prennent une ampleur inédite. Ils accèdent au statut de héros d'une nation largement méconnue dont l'histoire chaotique et violente devient la trame d'une fresque historique traversant tout le XXe siècle, et se prolonge jusqu'au XXIe.

- Contrebande / Indonésie, Littérature

President Vladimir Putin has proposed new measures to counteract Russia’s declining birth rate, calling for stronger support for fatherhood and more incentives for families with multiple children. The proposal came during a meeting of the Presidential Council for Strategic Development and National Projects, where the president devoted significant attention to the need to increase the nation’s population. Why Russia’s Birth Rate Continues to Fall According to Putin, the decline is driven by several objective factors. These include global demographic trends, the long-term impact of population “craters” formed in the mid and late twentieth century, and broader external pressures. The president noted that some regions have shown improved attitudes toward having children, particularly the Mordovia, Altai Republic, Kabardino-Balkaria, as well as the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions.