Ideas on Europe Blog

The political attachment many Europeans feel towards the EU has become increasingly fragile. In the 2024 European elections, just half of eligible voters cast their ballots, and the rise of Eurosceptic parties signals a growing erosion of trust. At the same time EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen sees in contrast to Putin and Trump, a “once-in-a-generation chance to build a stronger, more secure and more prosperous Europe”. Yet this depends not only on institutional reforms but on addressing a deeper cultural and political void: A European political identity. 

I suggest a critically realistic and interpretive perspective, informed by phenomenological insights: political identity cannot be prescribed, it must evolve through lived experience, shared meaning, and resonant practices. 

No Demos on the Horizon 

While numerous theories of political identity exist, the term itself often remains vague, inconsistently defined, and conceptually overloaded. Closely tied to this is the debate over a European demos, the idea of a common political people. Yet this concept, too, is based on diverging definitions and nation-state ideal types. 

For some, the demos is simply the sum of eligible voters within a democratic system, as argued by Jochen Roose. Others, such as Gerard Delanty or Fritz Scharpf, argue that it presupposes linguistic and cultural homogeneity. By this standard, Europe falls short: it lacks a shared language, common history, religion, educational system, and unified public sphere. 

In contrast deliberative thinkers, notably Jürgen Habermas, reject the idea of the demos as a pre-political condition. Instead, they argue, it can emerge from political practice and civic participation. Daniel Innerarity goes even further, envisioning the EU as capable of developing a post-demos model: a pluralistic stakeholder structure that embraces difference not as a barrier, but as a constitutive feature. 

But regardless of theoretical leanings, a firmly rooted, common European demos, understood as a politically capable and solidaristic community, “is not even in sight”, as Dieter Grimm already stated in 1995. Three decades on, that observation still holds. 

Output Alone is not Enough  

What follows from this? Joseph Weiler is cautiously optimistic: “Although there is no demos now, the possibility for the future is not precluded a priori”. Fritz Scharpf, by contrast, draws a more sobering conclusion from the “no-demos thesis”: without a demos, there can be no input legitimacy. The EU then can only rely on its problem-solving capacity, the so-called output legitimacy. Yet while this argument is logically consistent, it is functionally limited: it does not resolve the EU’s democratic deficit but rather renders it chronically persistent. 

The demos, however, is not just a normative ideal. It is essential for the acceptance of majority decisions in pluralistic societies. Democratic processes inevitably produce political losers. Without a sense of collective belonging, there is little willingness to accept decisions that contradict one’s own interests. This, however, is the very basis for solidarity-driven action: fiscal transfers and taxation, security cooperation or the joint management of crises all require a minimal degree of shared self-location.  

Yet between the absence of a fully integrated political people and complete fragmentation lies a political space in which a shared European identity could develop as a functional substitute below the demos ideal. Interestingly the EU has once recognised this, aiming in the first article of its treaties to create “an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe”, not a singular people. As following two empirical cases show, the EU has not just failed to fill this space – it is widening the very gaps it needs to bridge. 

“We” Against the “Others” 

Fault lines also appeared with the issue of migration policies. Poland and Hungary have consistently voted against EU migration reforms addressing binding relocation quotas as affronts to their national sovereignty. What initially appeared as a moral divide with the Commission and Western states blaming Eastern obstruction, has since become a generalised trend towards national retreats. In 2025, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, France, Denmark, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Sweden, Belgium, and notably Germany, reintroduced internal border controls in response to migrant flows. Germany’s move, which drew criticism from Poland, illustrates how former proponents of EU migration solidarity now prioritise domestic legitimacy and border sovereignty – A erosion of mutual trust and symbolic cohesion within the Union. 

The return of the Russia question underpins this erosion further. After the end of the cold war, East–West divisions were already palpable but rhetorically glossed over under the banner of the European idea. A telling moment came with the Second Gulf War: while millions in Western Europe marched under the slogan “Not in my name”, expressing a postnational, pacifist ethos, while Eastern European governments, shaped by recent memories of Soviet domination, actively supported the U.S.-led intervention, seeking security through transatlantic alignment. The cultural and political rift was evident, yet the EU was able to project an image of harmonious “post- and supranational civility”, as Wolfgang Streeck notes. In fact, the slogan “Not in my name” itself illustrates the early problem: lots of “I” is not the same as a “we”, however many there are. Today, the rhetoric of unity no longer masks tensions – it enforces them. The EU increasingly defines itself as a bloc of democratic forces aligned against internal adversaries. Critics of integration from East or West, are increasingly blamed as allies of an external adversary, namely Russia. When EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen calls for a “coalition of the willing”, it demonstrates that unity no longer arises through internal democratic negotiation, but through predefined output goals – and through the exclusion of those who deviate from them. 

“Us for Ourselves” 

Both cases show that what the EU emerges is not the absence of a political identity, but the emergence of a fragile, exclusionary identity, reactive rather than reflexive. A sustainable European identity, however, requires not an “us against them”, but an “us for ourselves”. 

Normatively, we might ask: Can a politically enacted European identity below the demos threshold foster democratic acceptance – not by closing the input-legitimacy gap, but by making political loss, dissent, and redistribution more bearable? Theoretically, how can identity be understood not as a fixed attribute or cultural ideal, but as something enacted through practice and shaped by the structural conditions that make collective agency possible or impossible? Empirically, where does the EU constrain such conditions, and where might potential lie for more grounded, collectively enacted forms of identification to emerge? 

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Passengers boarding planes in Europe today enjoy the benefits of deregulated and integrated air transport network – thanks to the creation of the EU single market in air services in the 1990s. But the EU aviation policy did not stop at regional borders. Having been repeatedly dismissed in the past, the European Commission now conducts a fully-fledged EU External Aviation Policy (EAP), complete with formal strategies, institutions and legal frameworks.  

This shift is striking, because, to this day, international aviation remains a system dominated by sovereign nation states. The EU lacks formal legal status within the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), the main forum for discussing global air transport, and cannot sit at the table as a full member. Yet somehow, it is widely perceived as a key player in this policy domain.  

How is this possible? 

This blog post reflects on the evolving role of the European Union as a sui generis actor in global aviation governance, drawing on my doctoral research presented at the 2025 UACES Graduate Forum in Athens. It explores how the EU has created and expanded the EAP, not through treaty reform or a one-time transfer of power , but by using a mixture of legal assertiveness, technical expertise, regulatory entrepreneurship, and narrative-building to firmly anchor itself within the international aviation system.  

Achieving a foothold 

Historically, international aviation has been dominated by state-to-state arrangements under the 1944 Chicago Convention. In this Chicago-bilateral system, sovereignty is paramount, and states are reluctant to allow changes.  

Following the U.S. deregulation, the European Community established a common internal aviation policy. However, when it comes to relations with non-EU countries, Member States have successfully blocked any transfer of power to the European level.  

This began to change in 2002, when the European Court of Justice ruled on European Court of Justice decision on the “Open Skies” Agreements cases. While the ruling did not grant the Commission exclusive competence, it did provide partial recognition over certain technical areas and deemed = nationality clauses in bilateral Air Service Agreements (ASAs) to be incompatible with EU law.  

Crucially, the Commission seized this narrow legal opening and used it as a springboard for broader international engagement.  

Complex and ongoing construction  

Although 2002 is often considered as the formal beginning of the EAP, the development of this policy does not tell a story of clear legal handover or the Commission’s sudden empowerment. Rather, it is a case of strategic manoeuvring and the effective bypassing of legal constraints – a decades-long process that is yet to conclude. 

Taking a closer look reveals that it unfolds through four interconnected areas of action.  

The first and most prominent pillar is aimed at expanding legal competencies in practice. Despite Member States retaining control and only granting the Commission a negotiating mandate on a case-by-case basis, with defined guidelines, the EU has steadily built a significant portfolio of successful ASAs. It has also developed accompanying legal instruments, such as Bilateral Agreements on Civil Aviation Safety (BASAs) and various Working Arrangements covering technical matters, while also expanding the thematic scope of these agreements to include issues such as environmental protection and social standards. 

Alongside these legal actions, the Commission has invested heavily in building technical expertise. They have drawn on experience from internal market deregulation, and have established thematic directorates and staffed technical teams. The EASA also played a role here acting as specialized agency that collects data on safety (and later, environmental protection) and as a body that certifies third-country operators and oversees compliance with EU standards.  

Regulatory activity has also become a tool for establishing global presence. The Commission leveraged their legislative initiative to introduce rules that extend beyond EU borders, either through the conditionality of access to the EU market, regulatory convergence, or the broader ‘Brussels effect’. This also provided an opportunity to engage further with third countries at an operational level through audits and assistance schemes. The Commission also seeks to actively support ICAO’s regulatory efforts, thus solidifying the EU presence in the network. 

Finally, we can observe EU efforts to gain external recognition through its relationships with incumbent sectoral organizations at a regional and global levels. The strategies employed vary depending on the context.  

Regionally, the EU has gradually eclipsed the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) as the regional forum for discussing aviation issues in Europe, and vehicle for coordinating the positions among European states ahead of global negotiations. It has also positioned itself as a central player in relation to EUROCONTROL, to the point where the organisation is sometimes mistaken for an EU agency – despite being a separate body with a broader European membership of 43 states.  

Meanwhile, at a global level, unable to achieve full membership in ICAO, the EU still built a daily (hybrid) presence through its own representative office in Montréal. They play an active role at the technical and preparatory levels, providing data and expertise; and engage in technical cooperation, conducting supervision, and supporting international projects.  

Political persistence  

What this story also reveals is a sustained political determination that has endured over time, particularly within the European Commission. Despite changes in leadership, the agenda has remained quite consistent. EU officials have shown remarkable persistence, and while political resistance and legal ambiguity still exist, the Commission has succeeded in establishing a role for the EU that far exceeds its formal powers. This makes the EAP a valuable case study in how the EU exercises agency under constraints and how it shapes international governance, even without a formal seat at the table. 

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by Manuela Moschella (Professor of Political Science, University of Bologna) and Lucia Quaglia (Professor of Political Science, University of Bologna)

The European Union (EU) stands at a critical juncture. Global competition, technological disruption, and geopolitical fragmentation challenge the economic framework that has defined the EU for over three decades. Two landmark reports — Much More Than a Market by Enrico Letta and The Future of European Competitiveness by Mario Draghi — outline a bold vision for Europe’s economic future. In our article “Much More Than a Report: The Search for Europe’s New Political Identity and the Politics of Competitiveness” in the Journal of Common Market Studies, we examine these reports and show that they signal a decisive shift from internal market efficiency to external competitiveness as the bloc’s strategic priority. These shifts imply a redefinition not only of the EU’s economic priorities, but also of its political identity.

A New Economic Playbook

A central theme uniting the two reports is the call for a more assertive and state-driven economic policy. The authors advocate a departure from the EU’s long-standing emphasis on non-interventionism and free-market orthodoxy. This includes supporting “European champions”, strengthening industrial policy, and ensuring economic security through investment and regulation.

Investment emerges as a key area for transformation. Letta proposes expanding and rebranding the Capital Markets Union as a “Savings and Investments Union” to unlock private capital for long-term growth. Draghi goes further, calling for joint EU borrowing and the creation of European financial instruments to fund strategic initiatives, particularly in defence, energy, and digital infrastructure. The message is clear: Europe must scale up its financial tools to cope with contemporary challenges and match its ambitions.

The Need for Institutional Reforms

Both reports also recognize the importance of institutional reforms. They criticize slow decision-making and regulatory fragmentation in the EU, arguing that streamlined governance is essential for swift and effective action. However, the challenge is not merely institutional: it is profoundly political. Implementing this new strategy requires broad-based legitimacy not only from EU institutions and national governments, but also from the public. Increased defence spending and targeted industrial subsidies may raise concerns about diverting resources from social welfare or education. Without transparent communication to the public and political ownership, these initiatives run the risk of being met with public resistance in the member states, which, ultimately, might be reluctant to go ahead.

At stake is not merely a set of economic policies but a redefinition of the EU’s identity. The push toward economic sovereignty, industrial protectionism, and strategic autonomy raises fundamental questions: Can the EU maintain its commitment to openness, legal predictability, and multilateralism while adopting more interventionist tools? How can it balance market freedom with national interests and supranational coordination?

Letta and Draghi do not deny these tensions. Strategic autonomy may require selective protectionism. Economic security may necessitate more public spending. But ultimately, these are not technocratic but political choices that require public debate and shared vision.

The Road Ahead

The EU has often moved forward in times of crisis — from the creation of the Euro to the NGEU funding package adopted in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. The current situation calls for a similar resolve. However, technocratic reports alone are not enough. Political leadership, especially at the national level, will be essential to translate vision into action and to mobilize public support.

As the EU seeks to turn a corner in its economic development, the choice is not simply about adopting new tools. It is about affirming a coherent vision of what Europe stands for both economically and politically. Whether the Union can successfully recalibrate its economic model while maintaining cohesion and legitimacy will shape not only its competitiveness but the future of European integration itself.

Manuela Moschella is Professor of Political Science at the University of Bologna and Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins SAIS Europe. Her research focuses on European and global economic governance, central banking, and the politics of economic policymaking. She is one of the editors of the Review of International Political Economy.

 

 

Lucia Quaglia  is Professor of Political Science at the University of Bologna. She has published 9 books, 7 of which with Oxford University Press and has guest co-edited 7 special issues of academic journals. Together with Manuela Moschella and Aneta Spendzharova, she has published a textbook on European Political Economy (Oxford University Press, 2024).

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EUHealthGov were delighted to host Óscar Fernández (Maastricht) on 11 June 2025. Óscar discussed findings from his recent ENSURED report on the Intellectual Property and Public Health Regime Complex (co-authored with Mirko Heinzel), and a forthcoming report on Global Health Security after COVID-19, as well as his current work-in-progress. What follows is a summary of some of the key points from Óscar’s presentation – a recording is available here.

ENSURED is a Horizon Europe project on “Transforming and Defending Multilateralism: European Union Support for more Robust, Effective and Democratic Global Governance” coordinated by Maastricht University. This project is generating further reports on the Pandemic Agreement and on WHO reform.

Regime complexity – characterised by high institutional density – offers a distinctive perspective for examining global health. While there exists significant scholarship on the constitutive fora of regime complexes, there is considerably less on how different actors navigate these, and the EU’s role appears largely overlooked. Fernández is addressing this, inter alia, with a 2025 JCMS article, and current research question of the circumstances under which the EU has pursued an increase in regime complexity in global health.

Regime complexity in connection with global health is characterised by the trilateral cooperation between the WTO, WIPO, and WHO. The EU’s role in this has evolved from initial reluctance in the 1990s to today’s position of being a largely status quo player, highly favourable towards the WTO. This has prompted two key questions of whether the EU seeks an increase in regime complexity, and whether the EU ends up benefitting from increased regime complexity. Answers to these questions can frame the EU in various roles.

Fernández also discussed a forthcoming ENSURED report on the Pandemic Agreement, agreed in April 2025 and recently adopted by the World Health Assembly. This identifies key further challenges including its modest ambition, quick ratifications not being guaranteed, and the WHO’s financial crisis. A further consideration is that while the Pandemic Agreement might be seen as a diplomatic win for the EU (with caveats), it does not improve the EU’s image as a global actor.

A recording of the presentation is available here.

 

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Sesame project https://www.sesame.org.jo/

Marina Cino Pagliarello

Diplomacy is under pressure – from climate change and trade inequalities to military conflicts on multiple fronts. Russia’s war in Ukraine continues to test the continent’s democratic resolve. The crisis in the Middle East underscores the limits of formal diplomacy. Across regions, authoritarianism is on the rise, and even established democracies are witnessing growing constraints on academic freedom.

In this context, universities are stepping up not only as knowledge producers, but as institutional actors with growing diplomatic relevance. Yet as this role expands, so does the vocabulary surrounding it. Terms like science diplomacy, knowledge diplomacy, and informal diplomacy are gaining traction, but are often used interchangeably or without clear distinctions. This piece aims to offer a more precise grammar for academic diplomacy by distinguishing between these overlapping but distinct paradigms. Greater clarity is not a semantic exercise: it is essential for enabling more effective policy, alliance-building, and strategic positioning across the higher education sector.

 

Science diplomacy: strategic reach, structural limits

Science diplomacy has long been a tool of statecraft, initially aimed at bolstering national prestige and influence through scientific collaboration to promote international understanding, prosperity, and evidence-based policymaking (Flink & Schreiterer, 2010). It has since evolved to address global challenges and support sustainable development, while reinforcing domestic research and innovation systems (The Royal Society, 2010; Ruffini & Krasnyak, 2023).

The European Union has developed a particularly ambitious model of science diplomacy. Through Horizon Europe, it aligns scientific cooperation with sustainability, equity, and foreign policy goals, while maintaining global competitiveness (Lopez de San Roman & Schunz, 2018). EU bodies such as the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Joint Research Centre (JRC), and the EU Satellite Centre play a key role in integrating science and foreign policy. Reflecting this, the European Commission has recently called for science diplomacy to become a core instrument in the EU’s diplomatic toolbox, identifying it as a key element in leveraging Europe’s power and partnerships for a global role. The EU also employs two central frameworks: ‘diplomacy for science,’ promoting global research collaboration, and ‘science for diplomacy,’ using science to advance EU foreign policy objectives. As a normative power, it emphasizes reciprocal access, ethical standards, and equitable partnerships (Lavenex, 2015).

Yet the traditional model of science diplomacy presents structural limitations. Its top-down, state-centric approach often fails to capture the relational and adaptive dynamics that define effective transnational collaboration. Universities, by contrast, operate through decentralised, network-based infrastructures that prioritise education, academic freedom, and long-term societal engagement. This divergence creates friction: while science diplomacy often responds to geopolitical goals, universities pursue missions that resist transactional alignment.

The SESAME project in the Middle East exemplifies these tensions. While celebrated as a scientific facility and peacebuilding initiative, some viewed its political framing as intrusive and misaligned with local realities (Rungius et al., 2022). Despite its technical success, SESAME revealed how science diplomacy can undermine trust and autonomy when co-opted by diplomatic agendas. Recognising these limits is essential if universities are to be fully recognised as autonomous diplomatic actors.

 

Knowledge diplomacy: strategic engagement through higher education

Knowledge diplomacy has emerged as a framework for understanding how higher education, research, and innovation contribute to international cooperation and the resolution of global challenges. Defined by Jane Knight as “the role of international higher education and research in building and strengthening relations between and among countries” (Knight, 2018, p. 8), it reflects a shift toward multilateralism and the growing role of non-state actors in diplomacy. Unlike science diplomacy, which often remains state-centred, knowledge diplomacy integrates academic institutions as core participants in global engagement, fostering networks of trust, cultural exchange, and shared problem-solving. This broader vision includes not only research but also teaching, training, and the formation of epistemic communities. Universities function as hubs of innovation and platforms for intercultural dialogue, extending their influence beyond knowledge production to norm-shaping. They increasingly serve as drivers of cognitive soft power, advancing values, worldviews, and institutional models across borders.

However, the promise of knowledge diplomacy is undercut by persistent limitations, with many initiatives relying on unidirectional flows of knowledge. This dynamic perpetuates intellectual hierarchies, may impose external agendas that overlook local expertise — especially in the Global South and conflict-affected areas like Ukraine — and contradicts the very principles of inclusivity and co-creation that knowledge diplomacy seeks to promote. As Anna Wojciuk’s (2018) concept of empires of knowledge highlights, powerful institutions in wealthy nations dominate the global knowledge system, marginalizing under-resourced universities and reinforcing systemic inequalities.

An additional ambiguity lies in the fine line between diplomacy and branding. In practice, efforts branded as knowledge diplomacy may serve reputational or competitive objectives rather than reciprocal engagement. This instrumentalisation risks emptying the concept of its collaborative ethos.

To be effective, knowledge diplomacy requires more than content delivery. It demands strategic vision, one that recognises the need for equitable partnerships, adaptive frameworks, and long-term capacity-building. Without this, the term risks remaining aspirational – conceptually rich, but operationally limited.

 

Informal diplomacy: relational mechanisms and the power of trust

Informal diplomacy refers to trust-based dialogue and cooperation led by non-state actors, a tradition rooted in Track II or multi-track diplomacy theory (Montville, 2006). Unlike state-driven approaches, it relies on adaptive, relational processes outside formal diplomatic frameworks. This mode of engagement is particularly well suited to addressing global challenges where flexibility, co-creation, and mutual learning are essential. Building on this tradition, universities are increasingly operating as infrastructures of informal diplomacy. Rather than serving as passive instruments of national policy, they act as autonomous actors: convening stakeholders, mediating cross-border cooperation, and fostering soft-power relationships.

Findings from HEIDI (Higher Education Informal Diplomacy) project illustrate this role. Based on a survey of 201 universities across 52 European alliances and complemented by around 30 interviews to senior university leaders, the data show that 96.49% integrate internationalisation into their institutional strategy, and 91.87% prioritise partnerships with non-EU actors. These partnerships are not confined to academia. Alliances reported active collaborations with 134 embassies, 116 NGOs, 75 UN agencies, and 66 humanitarian organisations (Cino Pagliarello, 2025). These are not coordinated by governments: rather, they reflect universities’ own diplomatic agency.

What sustains these collaborations is not regulation, but trust. Across interviews, trust consistently emerged as the key mechanism enabling continuity and speed, particularly when formal structures were absent or uncertain. This approach was especially visible in the immediate response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Within days, university alliances mobilised to support displaced students and staff. Some created dedicated platforms, others offered relocation assistance or language programmes. These actions were not symbolic. As one alliance representative observed: “These were soft power in action.”

But informality should not be mistaken for institutional weakness. On the contrary, it demands strategic clarity, long-term coordination, and autonomy from state control. Its strength lies in its adaptability — the ability to operate across governance gaps, respond to crisis, and build diplomatic ties grounded in shared purpose. For universities acting on the global stage, informal diplomacy is no longer peripheral: it is a core infrastructure of international engagement.

To clarify the conceptual distinctions outlined in this piece, the table below compares science diplomacy, knowledge diplomacy, and informal diplomacy across key features: actors, objectives, modes of engagement, and limitations. While overlapping in purpose, each model reflects a different logic of international cooperation — from state-driven influence to relational trust-building — and highlights the need for a more precise grammar of academic diplomacy.

Table 1: Comparing the three diplomacy models

Feature Science diplomacy Knowledge diplomacy Informal diplomacy Main actor States, institutions Universities, research networks Universities, alliances, NGOs, etc. Objective National influence, research collaboration Knowledge exchange, academic partnerships Trust-building, adaptability, collaboration Approach Top-down, policy-driven Institutional, capacity-building Relational, flexible, transnational Limitations Lacks grassroots engagement Reinforces power imbalances Harder to institutionalise

Source: Author’s synthesis.

 

Conclusion: toward a clearer grammar of academic diplomacy

As universities step into roles once reserved for governments and multilateral bodies, the vocabulary surrounding their international engagement must evolve with precision. The proliferation of terms – science diplomacy, knowledge diplomacy, informal diplomacy – reflects real transformations, but without conceptual clarity, the risk of semantic inflation is high.

A sharper grammar is not a matter of academic neatness, but of institutional effectiveness. When universities understand the affordances of each mode of diplomacy, they can calibrate strategies accordingly. But greater clarity also raises harder questions. Who legitimises academic diplomacy? What qualifies a university to act not just as a knowledge provider, but as a diplomatic actor in its own right?

Universities cannot be treated as mere facilitators of diplomacy. They are already acting as agents. The task now is to name that agency and equip it with a vocabulary that is both precise and politically consequential.

Marina Cino Pagliarello is Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow at the Florence School of Transnational Governance, European University Institute (Italy), Visiting Fellow at the LSE European Institute, and honorary lecturer at the Department of Political Science, University College London (UK).

 

Literature

Chou, MH & Demiryol, T. (2024) Knowledge power or diplomacy? University alliances and the Belt and Road Initiative. High Educ, 87, 1693–1708.

Cino Pagliarello, M. (2025). Higher Education Informal Diplomacy (HEIDI) Survey, European University Institute. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/1814/77751

Flink, T., & Schreiterer, U. (2010). Science diplomacy at the intersection of S&T policies and foreign affairs: Toward a typology of national approaches. Science and Public Policy, 37(9), 665–677.

Knight, J. (2022). Knowledge diplomacy in international relations and higher education. Springer.

Lavenex, S. (2014). The power of functionalist extension: How EU rules travel. Journal of European Public Policy, 21(6), 885–903.

López de San Román, A., & Schunz, S. (2018). Understanding European Union science diplomacy. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 56, 247–266.

Montville, J. V. (2006). Track two diplomacy: The work of healing history. Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy & International Relations, 7, 15.

Rungius, C., Flink, T., & Riedel, S. (2022). SESAME – A synchrotron light source in the Middle East: An international research infrastructure in the making. Open Research Europe, 1, 51.

Ruffini, P. B., & Krasnyak, O. (2023). Science diplomacy from a nation-state’s perspective: A general framing and its application to Global South countries. Science and Public Policy, 50(4), 771–781.

Wojciuk, A. (2018). Empires of knowledge in international relations: Education and science as sources of power for the state. Abingdon: Routledge.

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by Nicolás Pose-Ferraro (Assistant Professor of International Studies at the Universidad de la República, Uruguay)

Since 2023, there have been renewed efforts to conclude the long-awaited European Union (EU)–Mercosur preferential trade agreement (PTA), including a 2024 successful renegotiation of the 2019 ‘agreement in principle’ between both parties. However, the agreement’s completion remains uncertain. What is driving these efforts? What threatens its conclusion?

In a recently published JCMS article, I explore the reasons for the latest push to conclude the agreement, as well as the reasons for the challenges it faces.

A geopolitical boost, but enough?

I show that a marked reduction in opposition from Mercosur’s expected distributional losers—namely, the manufacturing industry—combined with increased geopolitical incentives in the EU to conclude a deal, created conditions conducive to renegotiation. This, in turn, allowed the European Commission (EC) to address and reduce opposition from EU-based environmental civil society organizations (CSOs), ultimately paving the way for an understanding between the EC and Mercosur. However, the EU continues to face domestic political economy constraints, particularly due to the influence of distributional losers from the PTA—namely, agricultural producers—who retain the capacity to sway key actors within the EU’s decision-making process. This ongoing resistance continues to pose challenges to the agreement’s ratification. In this way, I highlight the current tension between a geopolitically-driven trade initiative of the EU and the EU’s domestic political economy constraints derived from the distributional effects of a PTA.

The article contributes to the literature on the EU–Mercosur negotiations in two main ways. First, it highlights the substantial reduction in Mercosur’s domestic political economy constraints to reaching an agreement. Second—and centrally—it highlights that the 2024 updated agreement ratification is still uncertain, despite the EU’s recent geopolitical push and the inclusion of stronger environmental commitments in the revised text.

At the theoretical level, the case study seeks to contribute to current debates on the increasing role of geopolitics in shaping trade agreements and flows as it adds the nuance that domestic political economy constraints may counteract geopolitically-driven initiatives.

The negotiation in three stages

My analysis is organized around three pre-specified stages: (1) the negotiation process that led to the ‘agreement in principle’ (2016 to mid-2019); (2) the paralysis within the EU (mid-2019 to 2022); and (3) the renegotiation that led to an updated agreement with an uncertain prospect (2023–2024).

During Stage 1, I found a marked reduction in the opposition of Mercosur’s distributional losers. This, coupled with the European Commission’s relative insulation from agricultural influence, low levels of politicization (in contrast to initiatives like CETA and TTIP), and high geopolitical incentives arising from the protectionist turn in U.S. trade policy under the Trump administration and the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU, culminated in the 2019 agreement.

In contrast, during Stage 2, much of this changed. The agreement now had to be approved by the EU Council and ratified by the European Parliament (EP), thus opening new veto points through which opposing EU agricultural producers could exert influence. In addition, the Brazilian government’s management of the Amazon wildfires, which involved denying climate change and blaming ‘global elites’ in a narrative inspired by Trump’s position, led to greater environmental CSO opposition to the deal. The result was the formation of an opposing agrarian–environmental coalition, which secured the approval of symbolic motions against the deal in the EP and several national parliaments of EU members.

So, what changed during Stage 3? ‘Increasing geopolitical challenges,’ in the words of the EC and the High Representative of the Union, such as the consolidation of the US/EU–China systemic rivalry, rising concern about the strategic implications of economic interdependence that followed COVID-19 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the longstanding crisis of the multilateral trading system, and the threat to transatlantic ties represented by an eventual return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency (confirmed in November 2024), combined to increase the geopolitical attractiveness of a deal with Mercosur.

However, as opposition within the EU remained high, the EC undertook a renegotiation with Mercosur. Its aim was to reinforce the deal’s environmental commitments, thereby appeasing opposing environmental CSOs. In exchange, the EC accepted several key demands from Mercosur. Specifically, it agreed to Brazil’s demand to exclude its health sector from the Public Procurement chapter—a point it had insisted on including in the 2019 agreement. The EC also accepted to extend the transition period for the removal of Mercosur’s tariffs on industrial goods like electric vehicles, agreeing to periods exceeding 15 years, a duration it had explicitly rejected in the past. Furthermore, it accepted the inclusion of a ‘rebalancing mechanism’ designed to compensate Mercosur countries should forthcoming European Green Deal legislation undermine their market-access gains from the PTA.

The described trade-off led to an updated agreement, which was announced in December 2024. However, ratification in the EU is far from guaranteed. While the inclusion of newer binding commitments linked to the Paris Agreement as a result of the renegotiation did appease environmental CSO opposition, agricultural producers continue to be mobilized against the deal and find in countries like France and Poland a voice to express their opposition at the EU Council. Whether these countries may be able to form a ‘blocking minority’ at the Council to prevent its approval is still an open question.

In any case, the analysis illustrates that the Mercosur agreement is in the middle of a clash between geopolitical incentives and domestic political economy constraints.

Dr. Nicolás Pose-Ferraro is Assistant Professor of International Studies at the Universidad de la República (Uruguay) and member of Uruguay’s National Researchers System. His research focuses on the political economy of trade negotiations and the processes of trade policy preference formation within business associations in Mercosur countries.

 

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In 1997, a little-known Russian political thinker, Aleksandr Dugin, published The Foundations of Geopolitics. Inside, he laid out a blunt and chilling plan.

Russia, he argued, would not rise again through tanks and bombs alone. It would use propaganda, political subversion, disinformation and destabilisation, especially across the West. One of Dugin’s most striking claims was that Russia should work to cut the United Kingdom off from the European Union.

He described Britain as “an extraterritorial floating base of the U.S.” – a piece of Europe that, in his view, needed to be severed from the EU’s institutional core. Many analysts now argue that after Vladimir Putin came to power, the Kremlin began acting on elements of Dugin’s vision.

Putin has never formally endorsed Dugin, and the two are not personally close. Even so, the pattern is difficult to ignore. Some observers caution against overstating Dugin’s influence. But the parallels between his 1997 blueprint and the Kremlin’s later actions are striking.

From the annexation of Crimea to hybrid operations across Europe, Russia’s moves have often echoed the geopolitical logic laid out in Dugin’s book: expanding Moscow’s influence, disrupting Western alliances, and weakening the EU from within.

Nearly two decades later, Britain’s decision to leave the European Union appeared, to many, to be a domestic rebellion: against elites, globalisation, or Brussels bureaucracy, depending on whom you asked. Yet beneath the headlines, growing evidence points to something more deliberate and far-reaching: signs of a Russian effort to divide and destabilise Europe by exploiting internal political fractures.

This article does not seek to blame Leave voters, who took part in the 2016 referendum in good faith. Instead, it asks deeper questions about the context that shaped the Brexit landscape: the long-running Russian strategy, the Kremlin’s evolving hybrid tactics, and the hidden networks of influence, and money that reached into British political life.

We will explore how Dugin’s ideas appear to have influenced Putin’s worldview, how Russia’s hybrid operations targeted both Britain and the wider European project, and why Brexit should be seen not just as a national rupture, but as part of a broader international strategy.

This is a story few have heard – about how a major turning point in British history may have been shaped by a geopolitical doctrine conceived in Russia in 1997.

Russia’s covert war on Europe

Aleksandr Dugin’s The Foundations of Geopolitics (1997) was not just an academic exercise. It became one of the most influential works shaping Russian geopolitical thinking in the post-Soviet era.

In it, Dugin argued that Russia’s revival as a great power would not come through military conquest alone. Instead, it would require systematically weakening the cohesion of its Western rivals, particularly the European Union and NATO. He called for Russia to disrupt Western alliances, encourage separatist movements, spread anti-Americanism and form tactical partnerships with countries hostile to the US-led international order.

One striking recommendation was to separate Britain from the European Union. Dugin saw the UK as a key bridge between the United States and the European continent, a link that, if broken, could seriously weaken both.

His prescriptions were not limited to diplomacy or trade. They included the use of psychological operations, disinformation, political influence and subversive campaigns to sow division and encourage fragmentation.

While Dugin remained a theorist, Vladimir Putin became the figure who later brought many of these ideas into practice. Rising through the ranks of the post-Soviet security services, Putin came to power in 2000, determined to restore Russia’s national pride and global standing. While Dugin himself remained outside official structures, his ideas found an audience among military strategists, foreign policy thinkers, and nationalist advisers close to Putin.

For Putin, the collapse of the Soviet Union was, as he famously put it:

“the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.”

Under his leadership, the Kremlin invested heavily in state-controlled media outlets like RT (formerly Russia Today), online troll farms such as the Internet Research Agency, covert financing of populist movements and cyber capabilities designed to hack, leak and disrupt Western democracies.

While global attention often focused on Russia’s military interventions in Chechnya, Georgia and later Ukraine, much of its most damaging influence work occurred in the shadows. These efforts encouraged political division, amplified extremist voices and systematically undermined Western institutions from within.

Experts argue that this approach closely mirrors the blueprint laid out in Dugin’s Foundations of Geopolitics.

Chace A. Nelson, writing for The Strategy Bridge, stated:

“A single book, written in 1997, signalled every significant foreign policy move of the Russian Federation over the following two decades.

“From the annexation of Crimea to Britain’s exit from the European Union, the grand strategy laid out in Aleksandr Dugin’s Foundations of Geopolitics has unfolded beautifully in a disastrous manner for the western rules-based international order.”

Stanford University’s Europe Center has described the book as “one of the most influential works in post-Soviet Russia,” noting its significant impact on Russian military, police and foreign policy elites. The Atlantic Council warned in a 2017 report that Russia was conducting “an intensifying campaign of hybrid attacks across our allied territories, interfering directly in our democracies, sabotaging industry and committing violence.”

Bengt Jangfeldt, summarising Dugin’s strategy, noted that it includes:

“Sowing geopolitical chaos in the United States’ internal politics… and encouraging separatism, conflict, extremism, and racial division.”

Andrei Kolesnikov of the Carnegie Endowment observed that:

“the nationalist-imperialist worldview that the Putin regime is imposing on Russians is intended to feed on the past and exploit historical memories and concepts to reshape and manage the mass consciousness of the Russian people.”

Observers such as former Labour Minister for Europe Dr Denis MacShane warned in 2017 that Putin resented dealing with the EU as a bloc, and saw Brexit as a strategic opportunity to fracture Europe, not just diplomatically, but geopolitically.

As MacShane wrote at the time:

“The Russian president told Bloomberg in September 2016 that Brexit would lead to a smaller EU. Putin has always resented having to deal with the EU and insisted that only bilateral relations mattered for Russia.”

Crucially, Putin’s strategy has never been only about projecting power abroad. It is also about reshaping the geopolitical environment so that Russia can advance its interests without direct confrontation. At the centre of this effort lies a calculated push to unravel the transatlantic alliance, weaken the European Union and, critically, drive deeper wedges between Britain and its European neighbours.

And nowhere was this destabilising strategy more consequential than in the United Kingdom.

Russia’s fingerprints on Brexit

The 2016 Brexit referendum was one of the most consequential political moments in modern British history. It also became a high-profile target for Russian interference.

By mid-2016, Moscow had already tested its hybrid tactics across Europe and the United States. The US intelligence community’s January 2017 assessment concluded that Russia had interfered in the 2016 US presidential election, using cyber operations, propaganda and influence campaigns to undermine confidence in Western democratic processes.

In May 2015, the NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, publicly warned that Russia was employing a wide range of “hybrid tactics” to undermine Western democracies. These tactics, often referred to as hybrid warfare, include the coordinated use of military, political, economic, and information strategies to destabilise target countries.

The Brexit referendum became a prime opportunity for Moscow to apply its hybrid strategy by encouraging the UK’s separation from the European Union — a move that would weaken the Western alliance and disrupt European cohesion. One of the most visible forms of interference came online.

A 2017 investigation by the University of Edinburgh identified over 400 Twitter accounts operated by the St Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency (IRA), Russia’s so-called “troll farm,” which had actively posted about Brexit in the months leading up to the June 2016 referendum.

According to the BBC’s October 2018 report, more than 10 million tweets posted by suspected state-backed Russian and Iranian “troll farms” were shared online by Twitter in an attempt to influence public opinion. Early analysis by the BBC’s data journalism team indicated that the word “Brexit” was mentioned in 3,789 tweets linked to the Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA), nearly all of which were published on the day of the vote or afterwards.

In 2017, Facebook admitted for the first time that some Russia-linked accounts may have used its platform to try to interfere in the EU referendum vote in June 2016.

But Russian activity extended beyond social media.

In 2019 the UK Parliament’s Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) Committee concluded that Russian state media outlets such as RT and Sputnik had “spread disinformation and promoted discord” during the referendum. The committee found that this coverage disproportionately supported Leave campaigns and undermined trust in EU institutions.

Questions were also raised by the UK Parliament, the Electoral Commission, journalists and intelligence experts about possible links between prominent Brexit campaign figures and Russian interests.

Arron Banks, the co-founder of Leave.EU, was reported by The Guardian in November 2018 to have held multiple meetings with Russian diplomats before the referendum. These meetings prompted concerns about potential financial offers or influence. No evidence of crimes was found and no charges were brought.

Banks has consistently denied any improper dealings or Russian backing. In 2022 he partly won a libel case against journalist Carole Cadwalladr, with the High Court finding that her claims caused serious harm. However, the court also upheld the public interest defence for much of her reporting.

Further concerns emerged around Boris Johnson’s connections to Russian-born media mogul Evgeny Lebedev, son of former KGB officer Alexander Lebedev. In 2023 Channel 4’s Dispatches documentary Boris, the Lord & the Russian Spy reported that British intelligence had warned Johnson against elevating Lebedev to the House of Lords. Johnson proceeded regardless, overruling those concerns.

The documentary also noted that Italian intelligence had monitored Johnson’s unguarded visit to the Lebedev villa in Umbria in April 2018.

At a private diplomatic gathering after the referendum, then Russian ambassador Alexander Yakovenko is reported to have said:

“We have crushed the British to the ground. They are on their knees, and they will not rise for a very long time.”

This quote was cited by journalist Luke Harding in his book Shadow State and independently reported by others.

Senior Conservative figures also raised concerns. Dominic Grieve, former Attorney General and Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, repeatedly warned of the government’s reluctance to investigate Russian influence. Patience Wheatcroft, a Conservative peer, argued that transparency over foreign interference was essential to protect democracy.

Perhaps most troubling is the UK government’s response, or lack of one. In its 2020 Russia Report, the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament stated that “the government had not seen or sought evidence of successful interference in UK democratic processes,” effectively acknowledging that no meaningful investigation had been carried out.

By contrast, the United States launched multiple high-profile inquiries into Russian interference, including the Mueller Report of March 2019.

The UK’s Russia Report concluded that the UK had “actively avoided looking for evidence.” As the committee warned:

“Protecting the UK’s democratic discourse and processes from hostile foreign interference is a central responsibility of Government, and one which it is failing to fulfil.”

At the press conference launching the Russia Report in July 2020, ISC Chair Julian Lewis emphasised the need for stronger inter-agency coordination and urged Government-wide action to safeguard UK democratic systems from foreign interference.

In 2025, new Parliamentary debates revived these concerns. MPs cited evidence that the group known as Conservative Friends of Russia had played a role in cultivating Kremlin access and influence within British politics. Despite multiple warnings, ministers continued to resist calls for a full inquiry.

As former Europe Minister Dr Denis MacShane wrote back in 2017:

“If more evidence surfaces that the narrow Brexit result was influenced by an unfriendly foreign power, it will be harder to argue that a stolen poll should be the final word on Britain’s relationship with its friendly neighbours.”

The implications are serious. If foreign actors exploited vulnerabilities in Britain’s political and media systems to influence the outcome of a constitutional referendum, it raises urgent questions about the integrity of British democracy. That concern applies not only to the events of 2016, but to all future elections and referendums.

Without proper investigation or accountability, the UK remains at risk from similar campaigns in the years to come.

 The Russia Report cover-up

In July 2020, after months of political delay, the UK Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) finally released its much-anticipated Russia Report. The document raised serious concerns about Moscow’s interference in British political life, and, perhaps more significantly, the British government’s failure to respond.

The report concluded that no government department or agency had taken responsibility for investigating Russian interference in the Brexit referendum, or in UK democratic processes more broadly.

The ISC said it was “astonished” that ministers had not even asked the intelligence agencies whether Russia had interfered in the 2016 vote. According to the committee, this amounted to a deliberate political decision. As the report put it:

“The government had not seen or sought evidence of successful interference in UK democratic processes. We were told they had not seen any evidence, but it was not clear whether they had actively looked for it.”

Public anger intensified when the government delayed publication of the report until after the December 2019 general election. This delay fuelled widespread suspicion that damaging political information was being suppressed.

Green Party MP Caroline Lucas condemned the delay as “utterly reprehensible,” adding that the public deserves clarity on what the government knew and when, and called for full transparency to safeguard democratic integrity.

The decision to release a heavily redacted version of the report drew further criticism. Key sections were withheld from public view, prompting concern that damaging political connections were being concealed.

Despite intelligence warnings following the 2018 Salisbury poisoning, there is no public evidence that Theresa May’s government launched any serious investigation into Russian interference in Brexit.

Subsequent Conservative governments under Boris Johnson and Rishi Sunak, and the Labour government under Keir Starmer, have also declined to initiate a formal inquiry into the 2016 referendum’s vulnerability to foreign influence.

Adding to public concern is the network of political links between Russian-connected individuals and senior figures in British politics. The Russia Report raised questions about the Conservative Party’s ties to wealthy Russian donors. Many of those donors had gained UK citizenship or residency through the now-abandoned “golden visa” scheme.

One notable example was the Conservative Friends of Russia, a lobbying group later rebranded as the Westminster Russia Forum. It was established in 2012 to promote UK–Russia ties. Although the group was presented as a networking platform, critics argued that it served as a convenient backchannel for Kremlin influence, especially after the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

In 2025, Parliamentary debates revived these concerns. MPs cited evidence that the Conservative Friends of Russia had provided access and influence to Russian officials, including former ambassador Alexander Yakovenko.

The Russia Report warned that the UK had become a “top Western intelligence target” for Moscow, not only because of Britain’s global diplomatic influence but also due to its “very favourable business environment”, a diplomatic way of describing London’s reputation as a hub for dirty money, influence-buying and financial secrecy.

Despite the known risks, the ISC found no evidence that the government had taken systematic steps to defend British democracy. The refusal to investigate Russian interference in the Brexit vote is not just a matter of historical record. It raises serious questions about the present and future integrity of UK elections.

Without proper accountability, the country remains exposed to further attempts at influence and disruption, a threat that has grown since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and amid rising geopolitical tensions in 2025.

Chatham House analysts echoed the concern in a 2021 report, warning that:

“Failing to investigate foreign interference leaves the UK dangerously exposed to continuing hybrid attacks, including disinformation, cyber operations, and political influence.”

 The legal battle to expose Russian interference in Brexit

With the UK government’s refusal to investigate Russian interference in the Brexit referendum, despite warnings from the Intelligence and Security Committee, a critical legal question has emerged:

Does a government have a duty to safeguard the democratic process when credible foreign interference is alleged?

This question now sits at the heart of a landmark case before the European Court of Human Rights.

A cross-party group of British MPs, peers and campaigners, including Caroline Lucas (Green Party), Ben Bradshaw (Labour), Alyn Smith (SNP) and Molly Scott Cato (Green Party), brought the legal challenge in 2021. They argued that the government’s failure to investigate potential Russian interference in the Brexit vote violates citizens’ rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, specifically the right to free and fair elections and democratic participation.

Explaining their decision, Caroline Lucas told The Guardian in March 2022:

“As President Putin wages a war of terror on the Ukrainian people, he’s been waging another war on the very principles of democracy.”

“The Russia report is clear that there is credible evidence of Russian interference in UK electoral process – and yet our government has consistently refused to investigate these serious conclusions.”

Ben Bradshaw echoed this concern, stating:

“When a hostile foreign power interferes in our democratic processes and the government does nothing to investigate, that is a betrayal of the public trust and a breach of its legal obligations.”

Lord Ricketts, who was national security adviser from 2010 to 2012 and is supporting the legal action, commented:

“Given the importance of knowing the extent of past Russian interference in assessing the risk for future elections, I do not understand why the government would choose not to investigate.”

The seriousness of the issue was underlined in December 2023, when a junior Conservative minister, Leo Docherty, Minister for Europe, acknowledged in the House of Commons:

“The Russian Federal Security Services, the FSB, is behind a sustained effort to interfere in our democratic processes.”

Caroline Lucas, speaking again in Parliament in April 2024, added:

“There has still been no serious investigation into Russian interference in the Brexit vote. What is the Government afraid of?”

Despite these warnings and the legal action, successive UK governments — under Boris Johnson, Rishi Sunak and now Keir Starmer — have declined to launch a full investigation into the 2016 referendum or broader concerns about foreign interference in British democracy.

This legal battle has implications not only for Britain, but for Europe as a whole. Governments across the continent are wrestling with how to defend against hybrid threats and preserve the integrity of democratic elections.

From Russian interference in French and German elections to Kremlin-linked disinformation in Central and Eastern Europe, the challenge is escalating. In Romania, TikTok was reportedly used to spread pro-Russian narratives during electoral campaigns. Investigations are ongoing, and Romanian authorities have raised concerns with EU partners.

Critics argue that without effective mechanisms for accountability or redress, democratic systems remain wide open to future interference — whether from Russia, China, or other actors intent on exploiting political vulnerabilities.

At the same time, the ECHR case faces political resistance.

Brexit itself was partly driven by opposition to European institutions. In recent years, UK governments have signalled their intention to reduce reliance on rulings from the European Court of Human Rights — or even to leave the ECHR altogether. Nonetheless, the legal challenge highlights that this is not merely a political debate. It is a question of fundamental rights.

As the case progresses, it will test the limits of democratic safeguards in the age of hybrid warfare.

 Beyond Brexit: Why all Europe is now worried

While Brexit was a significant milestone in Russia’s strategy to destabilise the West, it is increasingly clear that Moscow’s ambitions extend well beyond cyberattacks and disinformation.

Across the continent, European nations are preparing for the possibility of direct military conflict with Russia.

In the United Kingdom, Defence Secretary John Healey warned in June 2025 that Russia is “attacking the UK daily” through cyber operations. He stressed the need for Britain to be “battle-ready” and announced plans to invest £6 billion over five years in munitions production and to procure up to 7,000 long-range weapons.

The UK government also released a new strategic defence review. It described the most significant overhaul since the Cold War. The review included plans to acquire up to 12 nuclear-powered submarines and to establish a new cyber command focused on Russian-linked threats.

Prime Minister Keir Starmer reinforced the urgency of the situation. Speaking in June 2025, he said:

“The threat from Russia is real, and it is growing. We must stand united with our European allies to ensure the defence of democracy and peace across the continent.”

Germany has also accelerated military preparedness. In May 2025, General Carsten Breuer, the country’s top military official, warned that NATO must be ready for conflict with Russia by 2029. He cited intelligence that Moscow is stockpiling weapons far beyond those used in Ukraine.

Poland, acutely aware of its location and its history, has responded by transforming itself into what many now call a military powerhouse. This response has been driven by growing fears about Putin’s long-term intentions. Under successive governments, and particularly under centrist and pro-European Prime Minister Donald Tusk, Poland has rapidly expanded military training, defence procurement and civil readiness.

By late 2024, analysts described Poland as having the strongest military in Europe. Its capabilities were said to surpass those of Germany, France and the United Kingdom. This transformation has been credited to record defence budgets, modernised weapon systems and a society-wide focus on deterrence.

Following national elections in June 2025, the new Polish President Karol Nawrocki, a right-wing Eurosceptic, declared:

“Russia remains the biggest threat to Poland and to peace in Europe.”

The Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, have all increased defence budgets and expanded civil preparedness measures, fearful of an attack by Russia. Each country remains acutely aware of its border proximity to Russia and its own history under Soviet occupation.

Finland and Sweden, also fearful of Russian aggression, have both joined NATO, abandoning long-standing neutrality in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its broader threats.

French President Emmanuel Macron issued a similar warning in April 2024. He said:

“Europe must be prepared to defend itself. No one can pretend Russia’s ambitions will stop at Ukraine.”

Despite Moscow’s repeated denials of aggressive intent, European governments remain deeply sceptical. They recall how President Putin repeatedly claimed there were no plans to invade Ukraine, right up until Russian forces crossed the border in February 2022.

Analysts continue to debate Putin’s ultimate goal. Some argue he seeks to expand Russia’s borders and restore an imperial sphere of influence. Others believe his aim is to destabilise Europe enough to preserve his own regime and maintain geopolitical leverage.

As The Conversation noted in March 2024:

“Putin has no successor, no living rivals, and no retirement plan, and his eventual death will likely set off a vicious power struggle inside Russia.”

Whatever his long-term intentions, European leaders are no longer treating the threat as hypothetical. The UK’s experience with Brexit is now viewed as part of a broader Kremlin strategy to divide and weaken Europe. Defending democracy, national sovereignty and territorial security across the continent will require a united, coordinated and long-term approach. The stakes are no longer only political. They are existential.

This isn’t just about Brexit. It’s about Europe’s survival. This investigation does not aim to blame Leave voters. Many made their decision in good faith, motivated by sincere beliefs about sovereignty, identity and the future of Britain. But it does seek to uncover a more difficult truth.

The Brexit vote was not simply a domestic decision. It was influenced by a broader international strategy, shaped by decades of Russian planning, manipulation and interference.

Aleksandr Dugin’s The Foundations of Geopolitics, published in 1997, laid out a long-term vision. It called for the separation of Britain from Europe, the fracturing of the transatlantic alliance, and the weakening of institutions that held Western democracies together.

In the years that followed, Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin adopted and adapted many of these strategic ideas. It deployed a sophisticated arsenal of hybrid tactics: cyberattacks, disinformation, covert funding and political influence. Brexit was a significant success in that campaign. Not because it aligned ideologically with Russian goals, but because it disrupted European unity and destabilised one of NATO’s key members.

The implications go well beyond 2016. If the UK can hold a constitutional referendum without properly investigating potential foreign interference, what does that say about the resilience of its democratic systems? If external actors can amplify political divisions, spread falsehoods and build quiet relationships with influential figures, what defences are truly in place?

This challenge is not unique to Britain. Across Europe, the Kremlin has worked to destabilise democracies, embolden extremist movements and undermine international alliances. From the annexation of Crimea to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, from targeted assassinations to acts of sabotage, Russia’s ambitions have only grown more aggressive.

In 2006, former FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko was murdered in London using radioactive polonium-210. The UK High Court later ruled that this was an act of state-sponsored nuclear terrorism.

In 2018, former double agent Sergei Skripal and his daughter were poisoned in Salisbury, and British citizen Dawn Sturgess died, after exposure to a military-grade nerve agent that was capable of killing thousands. This prompted the coordinated expulsion of Russian diplomats by Western allies.

In 2019, Georgian exile Zelimkhan Khangoshvili was shot dead in a Berlin park by an assassin linked to Russian security services.

In 2020, prominent Russian opposition leader, Alexei Navalny, was poisoned by the Novichok nerve agent while on a domestic flight over Siberia. He survived after being treated by doctors in Germany, but then went on to die, allegedly killed, in a Russian prison in 2024.

In 2021, Germany accused the Russian security services of mounting a “wholly unacceptable” cyberattack on members of the Bundestag.

In 2022, Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, despite President Putin claiming just hours before the attack that Russia had no intention of occupying Ukraine or using force.

In 2023, the UK government disclosed a Russian campaign to hack MPs, journalists and think tanks. Ministers confirmed the FSB was behind a “sustained effort to interfere in our democratic processes.”

In 2024, EU authorities warned that Kremlin-backed disinformation campaigns were targeting the European Parliament elections, promoting far-right parties and undermining public trust in EU democracy.

In 2025, Russia-linked hackers posing as journalists targeted staff at Britain’s Ministry of Defence.

These were not isolated incidents. They were part of a systematic strategy: to intimidate, to destabilise and to project Russian power across Europe.

As Russia expert Mark Galeotti wrote in We Need to Talk About Putin (2019),

“For Putin, violence is not a last resort but a tool of statecraft, a signal to the world that Russia cannot be ignored, and a warning to any who would challenge his rule.”

Human Rights Watch, in its 2021 global report, noted that:

“Russia’s government systematically uses violence, coercion and fear not only to silence domestic critics, but to project its authoritarian reach across borders.”

In May 2025, the UK government announced the construction of six new weapons factories. This marked an acknowledgement that the Russian threat is no longer merely informational or political. It is military, material and potentially existential.

By June 2025, the warnings had escalated. Fiona Hill, a former White House adviser and one of the world’s foremost experts on Russia, told The Guardian that “Russia is at war with the UK”, adding:

“We are already in a war situation, a hot war.”

Dr Hill also warned that the United States “is no longer a reliable ally”, and urged Europe to act with unity and urgency.

In June 2025, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte warned in London that Russia was arming faster than the entire NATO alliance and could be ready to launch an attack within five years.

“Russia produces in three months what the whole of NATO does in a year … Russia could be ready to use military force against NATO within five years. We are all on the eastern flank now.”

The NATO Secretary General added that without a major increase in defence spending, British people “better learn to speak Russian”.

That warning was echoed just days later in the UK government’s own security strategy. In June 2025, Prime Minister Keir Starmer confirmed that Britain must now prepare for the possibility of an attack on UK soil, citing Russia’s military build-up and Iran’s use of overseas operatives as direct threats to national security.

The report, as covered by The Guardian, described the UK as facing a future in which domestic war could no longer be ruled out. It comes amid growing evidence of Russia’s hybrid warfare tactics – from cyberattacks to political interference – already undermining democracies from within.

This is not a distant or hypothetical threat. The Kremlin’s interference in British democracy was part of a broader pattern. It was a warning that too many ignored.

Military readiness is important, but it is not enough. Defending democracy also requires political will, legal accountability and a firm commitment to protecting the information space. That includes public inquiries, strong electoral safeguards, stricter regulation of political finance, and a more informed and resilient public.

Above all, it requires recognition of what is truly at stake. Brexit was not just a domestic decision. It was a product of an international hybrid campaign designed to weaken the West from within. Until that is understood and confronted, the UK and Europe will remain exposed.

Brexit may have been decided in Russia in 1997 – but the defence of democracy must be decided now.

• Watch: Putin and Brexit – The interference they tried to bury

• Join the discussion about this post on Facebook, LinkedIn, YouTube, Instagram, BlueSky

• My other articles about Russian interference:
• March 2025 – Europe united against Putin and Trump
• February 2025 – How Brexit played into Putin’s hands
• February 2024 – The Russian Connection – update
• February 2023 – A vote for Brexit was a vote for Putin
• March 2022 – Putin’s fingerprints are all over Brexit
• February 2022 -Back to the USSR?
• November 2017 – European Union or a new Soviet Union?
• December 2013: Latvia From Soviet Union to European Union

Some further reading

This section lists some of the sources referenced or relevant to the investigation of Russian interference in British democracy and the Brexit referendum. 

1. Geopolitical Doctrine and Dugin’s Influence

• Aleksandr Dugin – The Foundations of Geopolitics (1997)

This 1997 book lays out a strategic vision for Russia to reassert itself by destabilising the West, not through military force but via ideological, economic, and informational subversion. Dugin called for the severance of the UK from Europe, described Britain as a U.S. outpost, and advocated for disrupting NATO and the EU. Though never officially endorsed by Putin, the book has reportedly been used in Russian military academies and closely reflects many elements of Kremlin hybrid warfare.

No official English translation exists, but two credible English-language sources provide detailed summaries:

Putin’s Playbook by Chace A Nelson

Stanford Europe Center – Dugin’s Foundations

2. Russian Hybrid Warfare Strategy

• Atlantic Council – Strategy of ‘Constrainment’

This 2017 report sets out how the West should respond to Russian hybrid threats. It outlines how Russia uses economic coercion, disinformation, political influence, and cyber operations to destabilise adversaries. It argues for a coordinated Western strategy to contain and deter Kremlin aggression without triggering di

3. Political and Financial Influence in the UK

• Catherine Belton – Putin’s People

Belton’s book investigates how Putin and former KGB operatives used state power and illicit finance to consolidate control in Russia and extend influence abroad. It documents Kremlin efforts to build financial networks in the UK and co-opt elites. The book strengthens the case that Russia’s use of money and kompromat is strategic and imperialist in aim.

Publisher’s page (HarperCollins)
The Guardian review

• The Guardian – The Westminster Whistleblower (2025)

This article recounts how a whistleblower named Sergei sought to expose a Kremlin-linked effort to influence British political decisions. It highlights both personal testimony and the wider context of UK-Russia connections. The piece underscores the risks taken by insiders trying to reveal covert foreign influence.

5. Parliamentary and Government Reports

• ISC Russia Report (2020)

The UK Intelligence and Security Committee’s report found that the British government had not properly investigated Russian interference in the Brexit referendum. It accused ministers of failing to ask intelligence a gencies to assess Kremlin influence, and concluded that the UK was a ‘top target’ for Russian political disruption. The report’s delayed release and heavy redactions prompted allegations of political suppression.

UK Parliament PDF download
Gov.uk summary page

6. Legal and Electoral Challenges

• European Court of Human Rights Case – Interference in Brexit Referendum

Filed in 2021 by British parliamentarians and campaigners, this ECHR case argues that the UK government violated citizens’ rights by failing to investigate credible evidence of foreign interference in the 2016 referendum. Applicants claim this undermined democratic integrity, breaching Articles 3 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

7. Investigative Documentaries and Original Material

• PBS Amanpour – Interview with Carole Cadwalladr

In this televised interview, journalist Carole Cadwalladr describes Russian disinformation as a form of ‘military assault’ on the West. She discusses the vulnerabilities of democratic institutions to manipulation and the lack of accountability in the UK after Brexit. Her statements support the framing of hybrid warfare as an ongoing, systemic threat.

 

The post Was Brexit decided in Russia in 1997? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Vanessa Aichstill

On 7 May 2025, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Court delivered its highly anticipated ruling in Joined Cases E-1/24 TC and E-7/24 AA, offering crucial guidance on the interpretation of European Economic Area (EEA) rules on access to beneficial ownership information. The questions arose: how should this provision, originally part of the Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (Directive 2015/849, AMLD IV) and now incorporated into the EEA Agreement, be interpreted under EEA law, especially considering that the CJEU had declared it invalid for breaching fundamental rights and considering that the AMLD V revision process remained stalled?

The EFTA Court, which has no jurisdiction to declare EEA provisions invalid, was now tasked with providing advisory opinions in two cases:

• In Case E-7/24 AA, the request was denied on the ground that the applicant was not typically involved in anti-money laundering efforts and thus lacked a legitimate interest.
• In Case E-1/24 TC, access was refused because the applicant named only the alleged beneficial owners, without identifying the specific legal entities concerned.

This judgment marks a significant development in the evolving relationship between fundamental rights and transparency in EEA law and raises important questions about judicial dialogue, legal coherence, and the limits of the competence of the EFTA Court.

Setting the Scene: C-37/20 and C-601/20 Luxembourg Business Registers

The AMLV IV adopted in 2015, marked a significant step in the EU’s effort to enhance financial transparency and combat the misuse of corporate structures. A key feature was the introduction of public access to registers of beneficial ownership allowing anyone to identify the natural persons ultimately owning or controlling legal entities. The aim was to strengthen the fight against money laundering, terrorist financing, and financial crime by increasing corporate transparency and accountability across the internal market.

The cases centred on the interpretation of Article 30(5)(c) of AMLD IV, which allowed access to beneficial ownership information for any person or organisation demonstrating a “legitimate interest”. In its judgment in C-37/20 and C-601/20 Luxembourg Business Registers, the CJEU held that this amendment infringed upon the fundamental rights to respect for private life and the protection of personal data, enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR), and therefore declared it invalid. Consequently, this provision was amended by the Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (Directive 2018/843, AMLD V), which significantly broadened access by granting any member of the general public the right to obtain such information.

Right of Access to Beneficial Ownership Information Legitimate interest

The first questions answered by the EFTA court concerned the notion of “legitimate interest,” which is not legally defined in this context. While it generally refers to a lawful or justified interest, its meaning in the AML framework must be interpreted in light of the directive’s transparency objective. The substantiation of a legitimate interest is both a necessary and sufficient condition for accessing information in the beneficial ownership register. EEA States may further specify this concept in national law and even introduce legal presumptions, in line with the principle of national procedural autonomy. They may also adopt or maintain stricter rules, including broader access rights for other purposes, provided these comply with EEA law, the GDPR, and fundamental rights. Accordingly, the Court held that persons whose sole link to money laundering or predicate offences is the harm suffered to their financial interests may have a legitimate interest under Article 30(5)(c) AMLD IV but are subject to a case-by-case assessment.

While such access may interfere with fundamental rights, that interference can be justified if it is appropriate, necessary, and proportionate. Proper application of national rules implementing Article 30(5)(c) AMLD IV, particularly regarding the notion of legitimate interest and evidentiary standards, helps safeguard this balance. Accordingly, the Court found that access to beneficial ownership information constitutes a proportionate interference with fundamental rights, provided the applicant can demonstrate a legitimate interest.

Identification of specific legal entities

While AMLD IV sets out the requirement to demonstrate a legitimate interest as the sole substantive condition, EEA States retain procedural discretion under the principle of national procedural autonomy (see recital 42 of the AMLD V), subject to compliance with the principles of effectiveness and equivalence. However, such procedural rules must not make access to information excessively difficult. Importantly, a legitimate interest may exist even where the applicant cannot name the legal entity, especially in cases involving investigative journalism or concealed ownership structures. Requiring such identification as an absolute condition could undermine the directive’s purpose and fundamental rights. Therefore, once a legitimate interest is demonstrated, access cannot be denied solely due to the applicant’s inability to identify the relevant entity.

Finally, the Court confirms again that the AML framework does not, as such, prevent EEA States from granting broader access for other legitimate purposes, provided that data protection rules are respected. Importantly, it emphasises that access to beneficial ownership information is not merely a matter of balancing privacy rights against public interest in combating financial crime, but must also be viewed through the lens of the right to information as part of the freedom of expression (see Tandberg).

Protection of Fundamental Rights

The Liechtenstein Government argued that the request was inadmissible, as AMLD IV had not yet entered into force in the EEA at the time. The Court recalled that under Article 98 EEA Agreement, incorporation and repeal of acts require a Joint Committee decision, and that Article 102 EEA Agreement obliges the Committee to safeguard legal certainty and homogeneity. Citing the second recital and Article 1(1) EEA Agreement, the Court emphasized the special relationship between the EU and EFTA States and the goal of extending the internal market across the EEA. It also noted that a gap between the two EEA pillars has existed since 1992 and has widened over time. This gap refers to the growing backlog in incorporating EU legal acts into the EEA Agreement, which delays their application in the EEA EFTA States and challenges the principle of homogeneity that underpins the internal market.

One of the major developments in EU law is the adoption of the CFR, which, along with its case law, is also relevant for interpreting EEA law. While the EEA Agreement does not contain an explicit fundamental rights provision, its first recital affirms shared commitments to peace, democracy, and human rights. The EFTA Court has consistently held that fundamental rights form part of the general principles of EEA law and must guide its interpretation. National courts are therefore obliged to interpret and apply EEA law in a manner consistent with fundamental rights. In doing so, the Court draws on common constitutional traditions and international human rights instruments, particularly the ECHR, to which all EEA States are parties. The ECHR and ECtHR case law are key reference points, and pursuant to Article 52(3) CFR, rights under the Charter have the same scope as their ECHR counterparts, though EU law may offer higher protection. Articles 7 and 8 CFR, which protect private life and personal data, mirror and reinforce the safeguards found in Article 8(1) ECHR. As such, there are no compelling grounds under EEA law to consider that the level of fundamental rights protection diverges from that under EU law. The Court invokes fundamental rights to justify interpreting the provision as it stood before the contested amendment, effectively setting aside its legal effects within the EEA context.

Conclusion

The judgment marks a significant development for the EEA legal order. While the issue of divergent validity between EU and EEA provisions previously arose in cases such as Schrems (C-362/14) and Test-Achats (C-236/09), timely action by the EEA Joint Committee ensured that invalidated EU provisions were removed or amended within the EEA framework. This is the first time the EFTA Court has directly addressed such a mismatch, setting an important precedent, especially in the fundamental rights context.

Critically, the judgment also reflects the pragmatic nature of the relationship between the EU and EEA legal orders, shaped by the structural backlog in incorporating EU law into the EEA Agreement. As the Court acknowledged (para 51), the temporal and legal gaps between the two pillars have continued to widen. Against that backdrop, the ruling demonstrates a flexible, case-by-case approach to safeguarding the homogeneity of the EEA while recognising the practical constraints of legal alignment in real time.

 

This article is based on discussions that took place during the workshop organised at the Salzburg Centre of European Union Studies on 15-16 May 2025 as part of EUCHALLENGES, a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence co-funded by the European Commission under grant agreement no. 101127539.

—

Vanessa Aichstill is a PhD Candidate/Research and Teaching Assistant at the Salzburg Centre of European Union Studies, University of Salzburg.

The post Between Two Pillars: Validity Gaps and Legal Reality in the EEA appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The team of the Salzburg Centre of European Union Studies (SCEUS) will bring you fresh commentaries and analyses on current challenges to European integration. We are an interdisciplinary group focusing on the economic, legal, and political developments of the European Union and currently a Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence.

It is through the Centre of Excellence that we came to the idea of launching a new blog series on Ideas of Europe. While the current project focuses on economic governance, migration, and the rule of law as core challenges to European integration, our team is interested in a wider range of issues, such as foreign policy, climate, cohesion, and digital policies. Combined with our expertise in EU and domestic institutions, we aim to offer you a fresh perspective on ongoing debates related to EU policy-making, democracy, and integration.

Our aim is to use this blog as an inclusive platform to express views and commentaries from a wide range of members, from our European Union Studies students to guests, and participants of our many events.

We hope that you will be interested in our work and look forward to discussing many challenging topics with you!

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It was exactly 50 years ago, on 6 June 1975, that the UK learnt the result of its first-ever national referendum, on whether to remain in the European Community.

The result was emphatic. Over 67 percent voted to stay, a 35 percent margin in favour of remaining, a decisive outcome. All four nations of the UK voted to remain. Britain spoke with one voice, and that voice was for Europe.

Now compare that with the second referendum, held on 23 June 2016.

Out of just over 33 million valid votes, only 17.4 million were for Leave. That amounted to a margin of just 4 percent, well within the margin of error for a decision of such historic weight.

And unlike in 1975, the UK did not speak with one voice. Only England and Wales voted to leave. Scotland and Northern Ireland voted to remain, as did Gibraltar.

So, while the 1975 referendum was decisive and united the country, the 2016 referendum was divisive  and split it, by nation, generation, education, and worldview.

Brexit supporters often claim the issue is settled. But democracy is never a one time event. Polls now show a clear and consistent majority believe Brexit was a mistake and would vote to rejoin the EU if given the chance.

Britain was never truly united behind Brexit.

Millions directly affected were denied a vote, and half the nations of the UK rejected leaving the EU. And yet, we are told the decision cannot be revisited.

What other major national decision is treated as untouchable, no matter how much has changed? Even in our personal lives, we revisit past decisions. We change course when circumstances change.

Democracy did not stop in 1975. It did not stop in 2016. Nor should it now.

One day, the people must have the chance to review Brexit, in a new, free and fair vote.

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Three weeks before the EU referendum, Sir John Major issued a stark warning to the British people.

On 5 June 2016, the former Conservative Prime Minister appeared on the BBC’s Andrew Marr Show and accused the Leave campaign of being “fundamentally dishonest” and “verging on the squalid.”

He warned that the public was being fed “a whole galaxy of inaccurate and frankly untrue information.” He was angry. Rightly so.

John Major called out the key flaw at the heart of the Brexit campaign: it was all promise, no plan.

“What they have NOT done is to tell us what would be the position if we were to vote to leave.”

That line rings louder with each passing year.

He dismissed claims that Brexit would boost jobs and trade as pure fantasy. “We would lose a huge amount in terms of national income through trade,” he said – because UK businesses would sell less to the EU’s Single Market.

He foresaw the damage. He foresaw the deceit. And he made it clear who would suffer most:

“the everyday man and woman in the street.”

John Major wasn’t alone. Many of those who understood how the EU works tried to sound the alarm. But the truth was drowned out by slogans and misinformation – and by Brexiters who refused to say what would happen if they won.

And now? Everything he warned of has happened – and worse. There’s been no trade boom, only red tape. No £350 million a week for the NHS, just staff shortages and collapsing services. And far from taking back control, the UK is isolated, its influence diminished.

• Watch the video. Hear his words. And ask: what if we’d listened?

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• Transcript of full John Major interview

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Following the EU-UK summit last month, I’ve finally got my ducks in a row on trying to track the substance of what follows.

You’ll recall that apart from the Security & Defence Partnership, there was not a single definitive legal instrument. Instead, there was lots of language about ‘working towards’ things or ‘exploring possibilities’: all very nice, but not really enough in an era of questions about the depth of international commitments.

Hence the tracker. As I’ve noted in my Bluesky thread on this, I’m only tracking those elements that seem to produce a formal agreement between the parties: potentially the list could grow, but let’s wait and see.

Rob Francis has written that Commission mandates for SPS, ETS linkage and Youth Experience aren’t coming until the autumn of this year, so formal negotiations seem unlikely until the back end of 2025. Given that each of these could throw up a bunch of issues (such as how much the UK is prepared to accept EU rules, and how much this is going to cost in contributions), reaching an agreement on any of these by the time of next spring’s summit looks hopeful.

Hence the tracker covers the entire lifetime of this Parliament.

Of course, if polls continue to be as unclear as now, the shadow of a non-Labour government is liable to cast a shadow on any negotiations from about 2027 onwards (given the time it’ll take to conclude, ratify and implement any individual deals), so this is the best opportunity for both sides to nail things down and minimise the chance of new administrations making bold choices.

As for the rest of the list, I’ve seen nothing to indicate timelines. Even if most of it is highly technical, it’ll still need work and political attention, something that’s been in short supply so far.

So the big question is whether long-term incentives will outweigh short-term distraction.

PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic141

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In early June 2016 – nine years ago – the UK stood on the edge of a knife.

YouGov’s poll-of-polls showed Remain and Leave running neck and neck ahead of the EU referendum. On 26 May, Remain led with 46% to Leave’s 42%. But by 1 June, the two were tied at 44%.

Even on the eve of voting day, no one could confidently predict the outcome. Some polls gave Leave the edge; others put Remain just ahead.

A day earlier, or a day later, and the outcome could have flipped. That’s how precarious the decision was.

For most of Britain’s 43 years as an EU member, public opinion leaned against Brexit. Ipsos Mori polling in June 2015 showed a record 75% in favour of staying in the EU.

But in the turbulent months before the vote, millions shifted to Leave, swayed by a campaign later revealed to be influenced by Russian disinformation and targeted anti-migrant sentiment.

[Watch theRussianConnection.co.uk]

Yet there was another key factor: turnout. Nearly 13 million eligible voters stayed home. According to the first post-referendum poll (Ipsos/Newsnight, 29 June 2016), these non-voters leaned towards Remain by a 2:1 margin. If they had voted, the result might have swung the other way.

On top of that, millions directly affected by the result were excluded: Britons abroad for over 15 years, and EU citizens living, working, and paying taxes in the UK.

A single day’s vote, on a question so close and unresolved, should never be allowed to lock a country in for generations.

General elections happen every few years. Voters can correct past choices and change governments. But with Brexit, no such democratic correction has been allowed. Since the referendum, the UK has had three general elections. Yet there has been no opportunity to revisit Brexit – no further referendum, no fresh public mandate, no attempt to see whether the public has changed its mind.

That is not how a mature democracy should handle a decision of such scale and permanence. Especially when the original vote was so finely balanced, so easily swayable by time and circumstance, and clearly left the nation divided.

A democratic decision isn’t a one-day contract for eternity. It must allow room to adjust, revisit, and renew based on the evolving will of the people. Britain deserves another say – not because democracy was ignored in 2016, but because true democracy doesn’t stop.

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About a new Issue of Public Reason, a Journal of Political and Moral Philosophy.

• How did It All Begin?

The Volumes contain Papers presented at the ECPR Summer School of Political Epistemology on July 27-31, 2020. The ECPR Standing Group on Kantian Political Thought organised the Summer School. Keele University and Jagiellonian University co-convened the Summer School.

The purpose of the Summer School was to convene scholars at different stages of academic careers. The aims were to meet and discuss key methodological issues in normative political theory, in particular in political epistemology.

There were 9 teaching sessions and 9 delegate presentations during the 5 days. I participated as a Paper presenter, hoping to receive feedback, make contacts, and that a scientific publication could grow out of this project.

Finally, authors from Canada, Estonia, Germany, Poland, the UK, and the US contributed to the Volumes.

• The Content of the Volumes

Jakub Szczepanski (Jagiellonian University) summarises in “Introduction” that the presentations discussed the role of knowledge and justification in politics; the problem of deep disagreement; epistemic injustice; democracy; the role of theory in politically relevant epistemic processes; constructivist and contractual accounts of justice; the role of sincerity and trust in politics; the epistemic value of electoral processes; the use of ignorance in political processes, included populism, propaganda and manipulation; uncertainty, and freedom of speech.

Robert Weston Siscoe (University of Notre Dame), “Epistemic Democracy and the Truth Connection.” The author discusses epistemic democracy and its relationship with truth. Siscoe argues that democracies have a truth-tracking feature and that they trace truth better than other political institutions. The article also discusses what truth is and how to trace it.

Lingyu Jing (University of York), “Speaking Truth to Power? A Foucauldian Theory of Whistleblowing in a Nihilistic World.” The article departs from the view that there is no truth outside power in our post-truth era. Therefore, the argument goes, whistleblowing, that has always been subjective, is even more losing its meaning.

Manuel Knoll (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München), “The Significance of Deep Disagreements on Justice, Values, and Morals for Political Epistemology.” The author asks whether there is knowledge about values, the good, the just, and the morally right that could be applied to political issues. Knoll argues that there is no ultimate moral knowledge to ethically orientated political decisions but deep disagreements. The article refers to deep disagreements as disagreements in good faith that cannot be resolved through the use of reasons and arguments. Deep disagreements are resistant to rational solution because of a clash of underlying principles or framework propositions. Although political decisions are usually based on some kind of knowledge, the central question of political epistemology is whether there is any knowledge that can ethically orientate political decisions

Jaanika Erne (University of Tartu), “On the Meaning of Democracy in the European Union.” The author focuses on the limits of defining democracy. The aim is to show the functional nature of law, and the politics of meaning. Although law is aiming at being complete, it functions in the context of incompleteness of even the broadest research units – categories. Because empirics in itself cannot explain empirics, an empirical analysis can only circle. This happens even when one increases the number of categories. Only the question „Why?” will unveil the explanatory and interpretive dimensions. 

Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (Birkbeck, University of London), “Political Knowledge: Measurement, Elitism, and Dogmatism. Public Reason.” The author shows the importance of the question of measurability of knowledge specifically in political elections. Ahlstrom-Vij asks what political knowledge is and how is it measured. The article argues that standard political knowledge tests measure political knowledge. The author uses counterfactual modeling to show the difference such knowledge can make to political choice.

John E. Roemer (Yale University), “Epistemological Issues in the Theory of Equality of Opportunity.” The author asks about the optimal policy of equal opportunities. In the end of the article he states that recruiting for social positions on the basis of merit alone is now quite rare.

• About Public Reason

Public Reason characterises itself as a peer-reviewed open-access journal of political and moral philosophy. The journal is also available in print. It publishes articles, book reviews, and discussion notes from all fields of political philosophy and ethics, included political theory, applied ethics, and legal philosophy.

Public Reason publishes also texts from other areas of philosophy if they are relevant for issues of moral and political philosophy.

The journal is committed to a pluralistic approach. It promotes interdisciplinarity and original perspectives, the ideals of critical thinking and clarity. The journal addresses the international philosophical community, and a broader public interested in political and moral philosophy. See the journal’s website at https://publicreason.ro/home

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Starmer’s new EU deal may be a “Brexit reset” – but Britain remains adrift, and the damage isn’t undone.

We’re still outside the Single Market, with lost rights, new barriers, and no real plan to go back in.

That said, the new agreement this week between the UK and EU is a welcome sign of thawing relations – a shift away from the confrontational politics of the past decade.

For that, the Labour government deserves some credit. The deal removes some Brexit barriers – including student exchanges, pet travel, food exports, security cooperation, and a proposed Youth Mobility Scheme for young people.

These are practical changes that will make life easier for businesses, students, and travellers alike. It also signals an intention to rebuild trust with our European neighbours.

Yes, this is a fresh attempt to improve UK–EU relations after years of damage and division. But we should be clear: this is still Brexit.

• The UK remains outside the EU Single Market and Customs Union.
• British citizens have lost freedom of movement.
• UK companies still face costly trade frictions.
• Musicians still struggle with touring.
• Brits still need extra paperwork to live, work, study or retire in the EU.
• And EU nationals here remain subject to the Hostile Environment – from renting a flat to crossing the border.

For sure, this new agreement is better than what came before. But it’s nowhere near as good as what we once had.

We left Erasmus+ – only now to seek partial re-entry.

Freedom of movement is gone – and the new “Youth Mobility Scheme” may only allow limited, temporary stays for young people. Even if finalised, it cannot replicate the full rights we lost.

And while this new deal softens the blow for some sectors, it does not undo the deep economic harm caused by Brexit.

According to the OBR, the UK economy is now forecast to be 4% smaller than it would have been had we remained in the EU – a lasting hit to wages, growth, and tax revenues.

Rejoining the Single Market would bring far greater benefits.

Full EU membership would go further still: giving us back a seat at the table, a voice in decisions, and rights we once took for granted.

The new deal shows that rebuilding our relationship with Europe is possible. But it also highlights the absurdity of what we threw away – and how hard it is to claw back even fragments of what we had.

Call it a reset if you like – but the only real reset is rejoining the EU.

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One of the joys of listening to Radio 4 is that while having my regular daily walk yesterday I heard a lovely discussion about the 50th anniversary of Jaws, the film that created the summer blockbuster and gave us some top meme-worthy comment.

It feels apposite to mention this because one of my main takeaways from this week’s UK-EU reset summit was the realisation that we are now entering a semi-permanent state of negotiations between the two, which in turn means more work for me and further vindication of my decision to stick with studying UK-EU relations. Truly one of the last jobs for life that people used to have.

Since I’ve been busy having such thoughts, I come late in the day to the business of analysing the various documents produced on Monday: the Joint Statement, the Common Understanding and the one actually-concluded document, the Security and Defence Partnership (SDP; half of which is cribbed from the EU-Japan piece, as Anton Spisak notes) . You’ll also want to read the Commission’s Q&A, since it’s less ambiguous about what’s what.

If you want run-throughs, then I recommend Anton’s piece, as well as David Henig‘s and Steve Peers‘, the last of which is worth quoting at a bit of length for its conclusions, with which I fully concur:

Finally, it’s notable how many Rubicons have been crossed with this reset deal. As noted already, the UK now accepts the market access/integration trade-off. But the EU now accepts agreeing this trade-off with the UK in limited fields: the UK can have one foot several steps up the Barnier escalator, but the other one firmly on the ground. The EU has also accepted a Swiss-like complex legal relationship with the UK, having opposed it in principle for years. (In fact, the EU already conceded this point when agreeing the TCA; but that treaty hid its legal complexity better than the reset deal does). The UK has accepted an agreement with the EU as regards movement of (some) EU citizens; although it might claim this arrangement will simply resemble its youth mobility treaties with many other countries, the extent of that similarity will be dependent upon the details of the final deal. Above all, the EU, having accepted freer movement of some goods and demanded the freer movement of some people, can no longer lecture the UK on cherry-picking or cake-eating – what with all the crumbs and cherry juice smeared across the EU’s own mouth.

Rather than rehashing all these colleagues’ fine efforts, I’ll stick to adding some further thoughts.

Substantively, the package here is both more extensive than most had anticipated and less developed. Rather than sticking the Nick Thomas-Symond’s three-basket model we have a Common Understanding with five main headings, plus the bits that don’t fit in within them, like fisheries and the very idea of regular UK-EU summits.

At times, this all reads like someone has asked ministries/DGs to throw in anything they’d like to see discussed, which might not be a million miles from how the process went in the UK, but it sets a wide open terrain for negotiation.

And it is negotiation. Barring the SDP, there is not a single final decision. Even the fisheries access that generated much interest in the British press is only a political agreement, with a legal text at least a month away. As I note in my summary graphic below, there are a handful of commitments to negotiate, plus more vague intentions to do more together or to ‘explore possibilities’.

PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic140

Moreover, there’s not a single date for any of this to happen, even the topics that both sides agree will be negotiated. Therefore an early marker of how much effort is being put into this will be the speed with which the Commission produces and agrees mandates for SPS, Emissions trading, Energy market integration and youth mobility/experience.  The speedy release of the competition cooperation text on Tuesday might be a good sign, but equally the fact it wasn’t ready to go with this package suggests that none of this will be easy.

On that point, it’s clear that this is not an era of unbridled euphoria and working together, but regular international relations, with each side pushing its interests hard. The French squeezed on fisheries over the weekend, just as the British evidently got youth mobility/experience parked to avoid more “it’s not freedom of movement” arguments that would just further link that scheme to freedom of movement in people’s minds (as more than one person has commented to me this week).

Indeed, it is the practice of the UK government in all this that raises the most concerns.

Across public policy there appears to be a profound aversion to open policy-making, instead keeping things in-house and driven by focus-group polling. It’s not necessarily wrong, but it does raise the risk of generating policy that lands badly. In this case, the harrumphs from devolved bodies, scrutiny bodies, sectoral interests and others with interest in the matter speak to the consequences.

A case in point is eGates. This was something that has been under negotiation for quite some time, held up by the EU’s delays in implementing the Entry/Exit System and some member states’ quibbles over legal barriers. The government decision to present this as an immediate benefit very quickly fell over in the face of, well, facts and took away from what was still a story that would have been a positive selling point.

If we are now entering a permanent negotiation then the government will need to work more on its narrative around this process. To return to Steve’s quote earlier, this isn’t an escalator back to membership, but equally it’s not clear what the underlying logic is. Put differently, everyone knows the government’s red lines, but it’s not clear why those are red lines.

As more and more cooperation occurs, that will mean more and more instances of the UK becoming a rule-taker: SPS, ETS and energy markets are all explicitly framed this way in the Common Understanding. That creates a discursive tension with the control that has been taken back, which requires some vision of why this works to be articulated.

Therefore, my second big indicator will be the extent to which the government is both able to articulate that vision and the effort it puts into so doing. The three-basket model was evidently a placeholder, but the public statements from Starmer this week don’t offer a replacement beyond the UK ‘being back’.

This will matter when the various negotiations start to come home to roost. While there is no explicit cross-linkage, undoubtedly that will occur at points when it suits one or more of the parties involved: remember too that all of this is happening on top of the previously-described reviews and negotiations within the TCA itself.

Youth mobility/experience is perhaps the most likely flashpoint. The wording on Monday was a classic piece of “we have agreed absolutely no principles or even whether it will happen at all”: as I’ve written for The Conversation, the problems are almost all domestically British ones, even as the EU genuinely struggles to see the issue. But now it’s a totemically-important item for some member states, there will have to be some kind of reckoning.

PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic127

So, early days on all this.

What matters is partly about political will on both sides, but also about capacity. The lack of interest in European media was palpable, reflecting the low salience of building more ambitious relations with a country with whom the EU already has a serviceable relationship. There has been no public discussion about whether the British machinery of government has the capacity or skills to run multiple, permanent negotiations of a kind that it hasn’t tried before.

Monday was full of good vibes and warm words, but it’s not those moments that will define how the relationship works in practice.

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Manfred Stock, Alexander Mitterle and David P. Baker

What do universities teach us?

A common trope in public discourse today is that the university serves as an ideological hub: a place that infuses the minds of the new generations with ideas that threaten contemporary worldviews. In such discussions, the sweeping impact higher education has on society is narrowed towards questions of gender, race, inequality, colonialism, global hegemony, and capital. The critique takes a staunch Hobbesian view of the university: who controls the university “programm[s]” what people think.

Only vaguely do such accounts discuss the educational impact of the university on the transformation of work. Without the cognitive and specific skills acquired in physics, law, engineering, or political science a vast number of jobs could not be performed adequately. Surprisingly, the professional function of advanced education is often perceived as just responding to the demands of the economy: Technological change and market forces create new occupations, and then universities simply respond with new degrees and curricula aimed at training future workers with specific new skills – often over-educating the demand.

Advancing earlier Parsonian and new institutionalist ideas on higher education, we emphasize an underappreciated yet growing concurrent alternative process: universities, with their global growth in numbers and enrolments, in concert with expanding research capacity, create and privilege knowledge and skills, legitimate new degrees that then become monetized and even required in private and public sectors of economies. A process we refer to as the academization of occupations and develop in our recent book, How Universities Transform Occupations and Work in the 21st Century: The Academization of German and American Economies (Stock, Mitterle, & Baker, 2024).

Such a process has tremendous implications for understanding the transformation of capitalism, new dimensions of social inequality, and resulting stratification among occupations, but it also emphasizes the non-linear relation between higher education and employment. If the university is productive in its own rights the knowledge and skills acquired in the university may create very different pathways into employment than envisioned by those instituting new degrees. In the following we briefly outline the argument for academization and then provide examples from seven case studies across two most-different OECD countries regarding education-to-work-pathways – Germany and the U.S.

 

The Academization of Occupations

Put succinctly, academization is a process by which more aspects of occupations, job content, and preparation are permeated by the full range of institutional products of formal education. As mass advanced education increases, the number of occupational fields of action and jobs in work organizations tailored to college graduates also increases, but academization also represents a profound transformation beyond expanding enrolment.

Take, for example, one of the key institutional products of academization and the cultural power of the university to transform occupations—the degree program. The expansion of applied degree programs in Germany and majors, minors, and graduate degrees in the U.S. reflects a logic of academization that implies material and social classification with consequences for job activities. The degrees awarded on successful completion of academic programs do not just represent and classify the curricular study programs nor just the corresponding expectations in terms of a graduate’s abilities, competencies, and skills in a material sense. They also classify programs as a legitimate and appropriate basis for performing specific practical tasks, providing services, and solving practical problems. As such, academic degrees also specify responsibilities for specific occupational fields and the working capacity of the graduates produced by universities.

Far beyond mere boundary maintenance among occupations, the combination of educationally enhanced cognitive functioning and specialized knowledge—acquired through degree competition—contributes to the human capital stock, productivity, wage differentials, and an education-oriented reordering of the occupational hierarchy, and thus to the social stratification system (cf. Baker et al., 2024; Mitterle et al., 2024). Degrees also classify and reclassify areas of professional responsibility and, hence, also employment positions. Often such classifications do not primarily stem from the world of work itself or even from work experience. Instead, over the long course of the university, they emerge from an academic process of knowledge production, redefining cultural ideas, and institutionalizing these with new areas and degrees in both countries examined here (Baker, 2011; Stock, 2016).

  Comparative cases of academization: institutionalizing expectations for the world of work

Contrasting country cases highlights consistencies in the process as well as the institutional forces from within national education systems that make certain dimensions of academization of occupations more salient. In each country, degree classifications are integrated with social classifications shaped by that nation’s unique educational structure. This mechanism aligns academic qualifications with occupational fields (such as public sector roles) in both material and social terms, thereby institutionalizing expectations regarding the practical applicability of academic skills, as well as the definition of roles within organizations and across occupations.

As a result, academization functions recursively across disciplines, occupations, societal expectations, and state regulations and policies. While each academic degree follows its own distinct trajectory, there are informative commonalities across cases—consider three of these.

First, across its various disciplines, the academic world increasingly classifies societal challenges as requiring authoritative interventions involving both high and low technologies. Entrepreneurship education, for example, emerged in response to the growing economic and technological significance of entrepreneurial activity, despite persistently high failure rates. Universities were tasked with studying and teaching entrepreneurship as a formal discipline, with the aim of reducing the frequency of start-up closures. Interestingly, this emphasis did not fundamentally reduce business closure rates, but it did make entrepreneurialism a theoretical—academic—subject for both teaching and research. The curricular focus of these programs reinforced an entrepreneurial culture that increasingly privileged the knowledge and practices of founding within “a theory of the company” as a rightful topic within universities.

A similar example is the set of academic business concepts behind full automation, developed within companies during the 1970s, which ultimately laid the groundwork for today’s digitalization agenda to emerge primarily as an academic endeavour. Both developments were further reinforced by the internal coherence of university mathematics, which reframed diverse occupational activities as mathematical problems, enabling the quantification of entrepreneurship and organizational efficiency.

Second, an expanding academic community constructs demand for new skills and services in specific occupational fields. This is accompanied by growing the number of graduates taking those skills into occupations, but this also includes the upgrading of skills and services based on the university’s knowledge systems. Thus, knowledge and competencies that can draw on scientific (i.e., all kinds of science, including behavioral and social sciences) evidence are valued more highly than those that are derived from generalizations based purely on experience or outdated knowledge. The fact that with educational expansion this is not merely an elite process but is now spread widely across all types of jobs and occupations adds further legitimacy to academization. When graduates with academic qualifications are available and lay claim to occupational areas of responsibility, this can devalue the knowledge base of those who have previously occupied these roles directly or indirectly.

The case of preschool education the U.S. shows the direct path: Scholarly research and the expansion of bachelor’s degree requirements went hand in hand, increasingly infusing early childhood education with cognitive skill requirements obtained in the university. In Germany, early childhood graduates met an institutionalized and highly valued and expansive vocational education system, leading to perceptions of mismatch in childcare practice among graduates, often channelling them into leadership or quality assurance positions. Indirectly they incrementally transform the discourse on early childhood education reframing the educational setting, parental views of child learning, and quality procedures in place.

Third, the construction of new skills through the academization process can lead to new job descriptions through synergy and also conflict: for instance, “architectural engineering” as a degree combines mathematical and technical skills with architectural imagination, anticipating and increasing overlap between the occupations, but also instituting new ways of combining building knowledge – such as in digital building modelling and maintenance. Learning therapy, in contrast, is structured through an academic struggle between pedagogy and psychology on the role of social and individual factors in learning problems, translating into different expectations and job profiles for practitioners.

In terms of both construction of new occupational and work categories to meet new social needs, the academization argument and the cases briefly presented here reconceptualize the relationship between university education and employment away from outdated historical social and material classifications.

The analysis of academization – as the first of its kind – built on country and case studies introduces the process of academization of occupations to the sociology of occupations, work, and ultimately the social stratification of post-industrial society. The cases do make clear that without a theory of academization many salient empirical trends of education, employment, worker skills, and advanced capitalism will remain underexplained.

 

Manfred Stock is at the Martin-Luther-University Halle-Wittenberg (Germany), Institute for Sociology. Alexander Mitterle is at the Martin-Luther-University Halle-Wittenberg (Germany), Centre for School and Educational Research / Institute for Sociology. David P. Baker is at the Pennsylvania State University (US), Department of Sociology and Criminology.

 

Literature:

Baker, D. (2011).  Forward and backward, Horizontal and Vertical: Transformation of Occupational Credentialing in the Schooled Society. Research in Social Stratification and Mobility: A Journal of the International Sociological Association, 29(1), 5-29. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rssm.2011.01.001

Mitterle, A., Mathies, A., Maiwald, A. & Schubert, C. (Eds.), Akademisierung – Professionalisierung. Zum Verhältnis von Hochschulbildung, akademischem Wissen und Arbeitswelt. Wiesbaden: Springer.

Baker, D., Schaub, M., Choi, J. & Ford, K. (2024). Education: The Great Equalizer, Social Reproducer, or Legitimator of New Forms of Social Stratification? In M. Berends, S. Lamb & B. Schneider (Eds.),  The Sage handbook of Sociology of Education. Sage.

Stock, M. (2016). Arbeitskraft- und Stellentypisierungen. Organisationssoziologische Überlegungen zum Zusammenhang zwischen Bildung und Beschäftigung. In M. S. Maier (Eds.), Organisation und Bildung (pp. 73-91). VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Stock, M., Mitterle A. and D. P. Baker (Eds.) (2024) How Universities                                                             Transform Occupations and Work in the 21st Century: The Academization of German and American Economies. Series on International Perspectives on Education and Society, Emerald Publishing: Bingley, U.K.

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Today marks 80 years since the end of the Second World War – Victory in Europe Day, 8 May 1945.

What has VE Day to do with the European Union? Everything.

The European Economic Community – which later became the European Union – was created in the aftermath of the war with one overriding purpose: to build a lasting peace on a continent that had torn itself apart.

That was the passionate aim of the EU’s founding architects, including our own wartime leader, Winston Churchill.

Afer all, Europe had been infamous for nations resolving their differences through violence, invasion and war. Both world wars began here.

So, the EU was never just about economics or trade.

It was a political and social project as much as an economic one – a community of European nations committed not only to working together, but to never again going to war with each other.

The founding vision, set out in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, was to create ‘ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ – not simply a union of states, but of citizens, bound together by shared values, cooperation, and peace.

Winston Churchill saw it clearly. In his landmark Zurich speech of 1946, he said:

“We must build a kind of United States of Europe. The structure of the United States of Europe, if well and truly built, will be such as to make the material strength of a single state less important.”

That dream took shape just over a decade later, when six nations – France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg – founded the EEC in 1957.

It was a remarkable feat. Some of these countries had been brutal enemies only a few years earlier. Four had been occupied by Nazi Germany.

And yet they came together, determined that war between them must become unthinkable.

It worked.

In the 80 years since 1945, no EU member has ever gone to war with another. That is an extraordinary achievement on a continent with such a violent history.

Whilst NATO has protected us – so far – from external threats, it’s the EU’s deep political and economic structure that has helped to prevent war between its members.

This is what many Brexiters never understood – or chose to forget.

The EU is not just a trading bloc. It’s a peace project. A human project. A bold, ongoing effort to build unity where once there was destruction.

By leaving, the UK sent a message: that we no longer value this remarkable peasce project as our neighbours do.

And that’s a tragedy.

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Reform UK party is making headlines.

In the most dramatic shift in local politics for a generation, the party won around 677 council seats across England according to early results – more than any other party – and gained control of several councils for the first time.

They also secured multiple mayoral positions, further cementing their newfound influence on the national stage.

And in Runcorn and Helsby – a former Labour stronghold – Reform won a Westminster by-election by just six votes, the narrowest margin since the Second World War.

But is this a true reflection of national sentiment? Or a political mirage?

The success of Nigel Farage’s Reform Party can be neither denied nor ignored. But it must be understood in context.

Local elections are often marked by low turnouts and protest votes. In Runcorn and Helsby, only around 15% of the electorate voted for Reform. That’s hardly a national mandate.

Reform’s online presence and media attention far exceed its actual share of the vote. In a general election context, with higher turnout and broader scrutiny, the picture could look very different.

Polling paints a different picture.

Consistently, surveys show that a majority of Britons now believe Brexit was a mistake. Support for rejoining the EU exceeds opposition, particularly among younger voters and professionals. The public mood is shifting – but that shift is not yet reflected in party politics.

The truth is, Brexit supporters have done what pro-Europeans have not: Built a coordinated, media-savvy, emotionally resonant campaign.

Farage has dominated the airwaves for years, with a message that is simple, repeated, and amplified. Reform’s rise is the product of that persistence. Meanwhile, the pro-EU side remains fragmented, underfunded, and largely absent from mainstream political discourse.

We have the facts, but we’re not telling the story. We have the public gradually moving our way, but we’re not offering a compelling, united vision to channel that support.

And I say this not to criticise others, but to speak plainly.

I’m just one journalist, working without the backing of any political party or organisation. I’ve been posting articles, videos, and graphics on this topic for over a decade. And I’m far from alone – many others are working tirelessly to present the case for EU membership.

But it’s not enough.

What’s needed now is a coalition of voices – campaigners, creatives, economists, and everyday citizens – who believe Britain’s future lies in Europe and are willing to say so, publicly and proudly. To challenge Reform and the forces behind it, we need more than scattered voices.

We need a coordinated, professional, long-term campaign to present the alternative: a hopeful, forward-looking vision of Britain’s place in Europe and the world.

We cannot change the past – but we can shape the future. If Reform’s rise tells us anything, it’s that the appetite for change is real. The question is: will we leave that hunger to be filled by anger and division? Or will we finally work together to offer a better way forward?

The choice, and responsibility, is ours.

Reform is loud. We are quiet. That’s the real problem.

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• Related post: Brexiters are outnumbered

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Linda Wanklin

Cecilia Ivardi

Cecilia Ivardi and Linda Wanklin

In Political Economy, we have historically examined the policies through which countries acquire skills as a national effort. Traditionally, skill provision has been considered a matter occurring within well-defined national borders. Scholars have investigated how economic elites secure the necessary skills and workforce for industries that foster economic growth (see research on growth regimes, Hassel and Palier 2021). However, we argue that this approach is no longer possible. Production increasingly spans multiple countries and value chains grow more intricate. Therefore, skill provision has evolved into a transnational endeavor that transcends national borders. We show that the strategies for sourcing skills now foster international networks.

 

International pressures on national skill needs

Rising political-economic pressures have a transnational nature. First, the geography of production is changing. Previously, companies often outsourced only lower value-added processes to low-income countries. However, consumer demand is stagnating in saturated advanced economies and only increasing in middle-income economies and BRICS countries. Companies now find it more profitable to “produce where they sell”, meaning producing goods directly in the markets where demand is growing instead of outsourcing parts of the production (Herrigel et al. 2015; Fort 2017; Tintelnot et al. 2018). Second, advanced economies face demographic decline. They have a shrinking labor force, which is a particularly serious problem for the mid-skilled jobs that often used to be filled through vocational education and training (VET).

These pressures have implications for countries trying to secure adequate skills for their industries. On the one hand, companies that now produce abroad require a skilled workforce that can conduct operations abroad. On the other hand, at home, countries must grapple with the need for labor migration to fill in the shortages in their labor markets and focus on attracting the influx of workers that they need.

 

Transnational skill formation

We conduct a case study of Germany since the financial crisis. Germany has traditionally been seen as a nationally anchored “skills machine” (Culpepper and Finegold 2001). Its economic model is based on exports and reliant on the skills provided by the national skill formation system (Baccaro et al. 2022). Thanks to the widespread availability of specialized mid-skilled labor trained in the VET system, the German export-led growth model has achieved unparalleled competitiveness.

However, the trends described above threaten the symbiosis between economic growth and the skill formation system. On the one hand, German companies have increasingly started to “produce where they sell”, meaning that they retain only high-level engineering and design in Germany while conducting most production activities in foreign locations (Herrigel et al. 2017). At the same time, VET has become less popular among youth, which, combined with demographic decline, creates an urgent problem of skills shortages particularly in the middle of the skills distribution, such as in the care, hospitality, retail, crafts, and construction sectors.

 

1.      VET transfer

We argue that a coalition of state actors and employers has devised a transnational approach to source skills for the German economy.  This strategy rests on two pillars. First, the coalition has intensified the transfers of VET to foreign contexts. They are financed through official development assistance to the VET sector (which has increased to 400 million USD/year in 2022). Skill formation transfers involve adapting domestic VET concepts, institutions, and training models to foreign contexts at the firm, sector, or system level (Li & Pilz 2023).

These transfers occur through bilateral cooperation on VET reforms, sectoral incentives to implement German training standards, and firm-level initiatives, including the modernization of training processes and the issuing of internationally recognized certificates. Transfers are managed by the ministry responsible for the economy, which funds the German Chambers of Commerce Abroad (AHKs). AHKs provide services to facilitate VET transfers tailored to the needs of German firms and – increasingly/more recently – link training abroad to the migration of mid-skilled workers to Germany. Large German multinational companies benefit from this strategy – however, they are not its frontrunners because, as is well known in Political Economy, they possess the resources needed to train workers on-the-job and do not require a coordinated infrastructure of VET transfers.

 

2.      Labor migration

The second pillar is the liberalization of labor migration. The coalition has increasingly opened the migration policy regime to mid-skilled workers, which was traditionally hard to access for anyone who was not highly skilled (e.g., in the IT and medical sectors) to access. They eased entry for mid-skilled workers through measures such as the 2012 Recognition Act, the 2016 Western Balkan Regulation, and the 2020 and 2023 Skilled Worker Immigration Acts. These reforms have linked foreign-trained workers to the German labor market, including standardized VET recognition abroad, transnational skill partnerships, and information platforms to streamline migration processes.

Increasing openness of the regime is visible in a four-fold increase in labor migration from non-EU countries since 2010, rising from 85,000 in 2010 to 351,000 in 2022. The ministry responsible for development cooperation has driven these efforts, among others, by changing its approach to migration. Once skeptical of the brain drain that labor migration can cause in the countries of origin, it now acknowledges the importance of funding training abroad to meet domestic labor market needs. Domestic employers’ associations, concerned about skill shortages, have encouraged labor migration to align with their needs and have obtained more autonomy in the recognition of foreign diplomas. Although the rise of right-wing populism in Germany has mobilized negative sentiments toward all migrants, this concern primarily affects refugees and asylum seekers and, to a lesser extent, labor migrants, towards which public opinion has remained more neutral – therefore, public opinion has not hindered these efforts.

 

Conclusion

Scholars interested in understanding how countries pursue economic growth must consider the way in which they source skills. In an age of globalization of production structures and skill shortages, skill formation has become a profoundly transnational effort. The approach to skills sourcing activities should be comprehensive, and not merely confined to the study of initial VET, as is common in studies of skill formation systems. Initiatives that transfer education systems and efforts to manage labor migration are seamlessly integrated into skill provision strategies and should be considered part of our research focus.

 

We encourage further research in this field and caution against perceiving the countries where labor is sourced as passive policy-takers, since these countries often recognize some benefits of migration, including reduced youth unemployment and increased remittances (Wanklin 2025). In conclusion, even institutions traditionally anchored within a national context, such as skill formation, are influenced by transnational processes and interdependencies that undermine their connections to the national political economy and their contours become increasingly transnational.

 

Cecilia Ivardi is a PhD candidate in Political Economy at the University of St.Gallen. She is involved in the research funded by the Swiss Leading House GOVPET, focused on the governance of Vocational Education and Training (VET). Her research focuses on how advanced democracies adapt to societal transformations such as the rise of the knowledge economy and examines the policy areas of education, labor markets and migration. She is particularly interested in the ideas and discourses through which national elites steer adaptation processes. To study these, she uses a mixed-methods approach that combines insights from discourse network analysis (DNA) with case studies.

Linda Wanklin is doctoral researcher at the University of St. Gallen, where she is finalising her PhD in International Affairs and Political Economy. As a researcher within the Swiss Leading House GOVPET, she is primarily interested in the governance of skill formation systems and policy transfer initiatives in the field of vocational education and training (VET), aiming to explain their rise. Her research is predominantly theoretical. In addition to her doctoral studies, Linda works as a thematic expert for the Donor Committee for dual VET in development cooperation (DC dVET). Her research interests are, among others, driven by her previous experience working in the field of international development for various organisations, including the German Development Cooperation (GIZ), the International Labour Organization (ILO), and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).

This blog post is based on their paper that won the 2023 Award for Excellent Paper from an Emerging Scholar from the ECPR Standing Group ‘Knowledge Politics and Policies’. The award was celebrated during the 2024 ECPR General Conference. This was the seventh time this prize was awarded. Previous winners are Anke Reinhardt, Adrienn Nyircsák, Alexander Mitterle, Justyna Bandola-Gill, Emma Sabzalieva, Olivier Provini and Que Anh Dang.

 

References

Baccaro, L., Blyth, M. and Pontusson, J. (2022) Diminishing Returns: The New Politics of Growth and Stagnation, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Culpepper, P.D. and Finegold, D. (2001). The German Skills Machine: Sustaining Comparative Advantage in a Global Economy. New York, Bergham Books.

Fort, T. C. (2017) ‘Technology and production fragmentation: Domestic versus foreign sourcing’, The Review of Economic Studies, 84, 650–687.

Hassel, A. and Palier, B. (2021). Growth and Welfare in Advanced Capitalist Economies: How Have Growth Regimes Evolved?, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Herrigel, G. (2015) ‘Globalization and the German industrial production model’, Journal for Labour Market Research, 48, 133–149.

Herrigel, G., Voskamp, U. and Wittke, V. (2017) ‘Einleitung: Globale Qualitätsproduktion – Annäherung an ein neues Muster transnationaler Produktion’. In Herrigel, G., Voskamp, U. and Wittke, V. (eds) Globale Qualitätsproduktion Transnationale Produktionssysteme in der Automobilzulieferindustrie und im Maschinenbau, Frankfurt am Main, Campus.

Li, J. and Pilz, M. (2023) ‘International transfer of vocational education and training: A literature review’, Journal of Vocational Education & Training, 75, 185–218.

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