Robbanás történt Oroszország legnagyobb bankjának egyik kijevi fiókjában. A Sberbank tájékoztatása szerint személyi sérülés nem történt.
China watchers around the world are alarmed at the significant fall in Chinese stock markets and many are warning that the recent crash has alarming prospects for the underlying Chinese economy. Their worries reached new heights following the 8.5% drop in the Shanghai Composite Index on Monday – the biggest fall in eight years. Many attempts were made to stem the decline in the stock markets, including the banning of short-selling and new listings, the threat to arrest short sellers, the freezing of close to half the companies traded, and massive influx of state capital to buy shares. Perhaps in an attempt to prop up the financial position of its exporters, a supposed one-time yuan devaluation of 1.9% was announced last Tuesday by the People’s Bank of China. Since then, the yuan (or renminbi) has had its value cut an additional two consecutive days.
Some prominent China watchers are calling into question the Communist Party’s ability to control not only its stock markets, but also other policy-making areas. Paul Krugman, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2008 and professor of economics and international affairs at Princeton University, calls the Chinese leadership “naked emperors” and says “they have no clue what they’re doing.” Despite Krugman’s admonition, the Party may have a few tricks up its sleeve.
Beijing has been expanding its reach in other markets, such as Africa, where ten out of the top twenty fastest-growing economies between 2013 and 2017 are located according to the International Monetary Fund. Indeed, it has done so for some time now, with China’s trade with Africa reaching an estimated $200 billion in 2012. Chinese companies are also winning massive infrastructure contracts to build railways, airports, highways and ports, typically supported by large, state-owned financial institutions such as the Export-Import Bank of China. Most of the financing of these large projects is tied to procurement of Chinese equipment, machinery and materials—a boost to its exporters. And many Chinese have flocked to Africa to set up small retail stores and sell cheap Chinese-made household items.
Yet, while providing new markets for Chinese state-owned enterprises and traders may help improve China’s gross domestic product (GDP), this strategy is not without risk. As Howard French, author of China’s Second Continent relates, it is “outcomes that count.” Chinese citizens and companies have been welcomed by many African leaders who believe they can quickly build much-needed infrastructure. And in many countries they have done just that. However, French reports in his many travels throughout Africa, that some of the Chinese-built infrastructure is substandard, with airports subject to flooding or newly-built highways crumbling. In another example, French points to the “outraged Ghanaians who seem to have awoken one recent day to the discovery that thousands of Chinese newcomers were scrambling illegally to take control of their country’s lucrative gold mining sector, digging up the countryside, despoiling the land, and bribing local chiefs and police officials in the process.”
If Chinese policy-makers want to sustain their stated GDP growth near 6-7 percent for the near future, increasing the number of countries their exporters have access to would certainly help. With Chinese-led initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the BRICS New Development Bank, and the Silk Road Fund, their exporters and state-owned enterprises could well gain access to new markets. But given the backlash many Chinese companies are now facing in Africa, new efforts will need to be undertaken to improve their behavior—lest better-governed countries turn to their competitors.
Nadiya Savchenko, third from left, is pictured before a deployment to Iraq in 2004. In Aug. 2015 she appeared in a Russian court to face murder charges, after allegedly being kidnapped from Ukraine. Many feel her trial is an example of Russia’s impropriety in seeking justice for casualties in the Ukraine crisis. Photo: Savchenko family via Washington Post
A covert agent disappears from his homeland, and next shows up days later in an enemy prison. The agent’s government claims he was kidnapped in a police operation and forcibly moved to enemy territory. The enemy claims the agent carried covert audio equipment and firearms, intending to execute a “covert operation.”
A Cold War-era spy thriller? On the contrary, this situation happened in 2014 and is very real. The agent in question—Estonian security officer Eston Kohver—was taken into Russian custody. He was convicted on charges of espionage, and sentenced to 15 years in prison last Wed., Aug. 19, 2015.
Just hours after Kohver’s sentencing, prosecutors in the southern Russian city of Rostov-on-Don sought a prison term of 20 years for Oleh Sentsov. A Ukrainian filmmaker, Sentsov is accused of plotting to destroy a statue of Lenin in Crimea. He is charged with terrorism.
Two days later a Ukrainian military officer, Nadiya Savchenko, was indicted on murder charges in Russia after allegedly being kidnapped from Ukraine. She is accused of carrying out a mortar strike that killed 2 Russian journalists.
High profile court cases have become the latest battleground between familiar adversaries: Russia and the West. All of these arrests result from the involvement of the FSB, Russia’s intelligence agency and main successor of the KGB, and evidence used in each of the trials has been deemed top secret and not been publicly released. Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, states that Moscow is on a “war footing” with the West, and the trials are another front.
Savchenko’s case has received particular attention around the world, as she was elected to Ukraine’s parliament while in prison. U.S. officials have identified Savchenko as a “hostage” and demanded her release. According to the Washington Post, Russia has offered to exchange Savchenko for two Russian soldiers being held in Ukraine. It is possible that the accused in the other trials could also end up as political bargaining chips in prisoner exchanges, but nothing is certain at this point. Some are accusing Russia of violating international laws by arresting Kohver, Sentsov, and Savchenko without sufficient evidence and holding biased trials.
These cases are certainly troubling, and represent yet another volatile area of contention with Russia. Relations with Russia are delicate, but it cannot be allowed to make unsubstantiated arrests and abduct suspects from other countries. This might be the beginning of a slippery slope no one wants to go down.
The first example of the nEUROn UCAV (Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle) has successfully completed its flight test campaign in the Perdasdefogu range, Sardinia, Italy.
The nEUROn is a full-scale technological demonstrator for a UCAV developed by an industrial team led by Dassault Aviation with the collaboration of Finmeccanica-Alenia Aermacchi, Saab, Airbus Defence and Space, RUAG and HAI representing France, Italy, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland and Greece that rolled out on Jan. 20, 2012, after five years of design, development, and static testing.
The shape of the nEUROn reminds that of the American X-47B (even though, from a certain angle it also shows a certain resemblance to the F-117 Nighthawk...).
During the deployment at Italian Air Force’s Decimomannu airbase, the stealth killer drone demonstrator flew 12 highly sensitive sorties to assess its low radar-cross section and low infrared signature, during missions flown at different altitudes and flight profiles and against both ground-based and air radar “threats”, using in this latter case, a Eurofighter Typhoon.
The next testing phase will see the European UCAV deploy to Vidsel Air Base, in Sweden, for more low observability tests and some live firing activity needed to validate the capability of the nEUROn to use weapons carried in the internal weapons bay.
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Role player under NSC or manager of foreign policy?
The recent Washington Post article by Karen DeYoung, outlining the burgeoning role of the National Security Council (NSC), raises issues that go beyond the foibles of any particular administration. Most salient is that “politics … have become so much more corrosive and challenging that it’s a natural instinct for the White House to say, ‘We’ve got to have an eye on this. On everything,’ ” as DeYoung quotes an ex-White House official.
Micromanagement is a common impulse of executives for complex or contentious matters. Foreign policy today is both. As General Stanley McChrystal notes in his book Teams of Teams, the post-modern world’s complexity makes prediction of external threats almost impossible. It is inevitable, as Daniel Drezner comments, that events will “catch the White House off guard and cause the opposition party to howl in protest.”
Foreign policy is rife with potential points of political vulnerability. The growth of the NSC’s role, and the proliferation of politically-appointed ambassadors and officials, reflects their location at the interface of politics with management of a large, multi-faceted institution. Executive branch discretion over foreign policy makes it a high-profile political arena. Contests of presidents and opposition parties increasingly overshadow functional considerations. As the political environment locks presidents more and more into a marketing function, control of the political enterprise takes priority over institutional management.
A major consequence is that the world now has to guess what makes America tick. Politics involves management of diverse interests high and low. Their assembly into coalitions means that diverse claims will always tug and push at foreign relations. But beyond this natural play of interests, as pundit Ian Bremmer notes, friends and foes alike really do not know what America wants. Adversaries easily find evidence that the U.S. seeks economic domination or debases moral codes, and their claims go unrefuted.
Micromanagement is inefficient, even politically. Managing foreign policy to a coherent message of its own would be simpler. During the Cold War, foreign policy clearly revolved around “Containment“ of the USSR. The Soviets’ full-spectrum opposition to U.S. interests made reaction to their efforts a clear priority. Today America must assert its own enduring priorities to formulate a consistent message. But choosing and sticking to priorities is difficult, even without a politics that precludes consensus. After the Arab Spring, Americans might conclude that making democracy a priority over stability (or vice versa) will look foolish (or craven) as events unfold. The New York Times notes Washington’s difficulty choosing Russia, ISIS, or North Korea as the top national security threat.
Most dangerously, inconsistent policy overshadows America’s conviction in unalienable rights. It portrays free people caring less about freedom than short-term gratification. The nation was conceived in a document justifying independence on the principle of rights; failure to validate that “self evident” truth undermines the premise of American legitimacy.
Validation, therefore, defines U.S. foreign policy’s fundamental purpose. It is a nuanced, complex concept; full understanding yields a non-political guideline for foreign policy management. If a free society can defend itself, serve its people’s needs, and honor its principles, not only will America survive, but U.S. influence and power will revive.
Political leaders must set the ongoing choices of foreign policy. Most popular concerns will fit with the validation of America’s creed. It requires defense and prosperity as well as fidelity to the ideals of human liberty. What politics lacks, however, is a function to keep policies aligned with America’s creed, and with each other. A NSC and any number of political appointees can push a president’s political enterprise. A permanent corps should carry the management rationale, framing issues in terms of America’s fundamental interest.
The U.S. diplomatic corps is naturally positioned for this function. Diplomats staff the foreign policy decision processes, represent policies abroad, and can report successes or shortfalls in projecting America’s purpose. A new genre of professional formation, steeping U.S. diplomats in the origins, questions, and debates around the creed of individual rights, will be necessary to equip them for this mission. Institutional practices and structures will also be needed; a corps invested in the mission will shape them best.
This training and these practices will require time and effort to implement. But embedding America’s founding rationale in foreign policy institutions will aid administrations in managing policy. Balancing political considerations with enduring priorities will show America’s basic nature, as a catalyst for human freedom.