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Last week, the Chautauqua Institution dedicated its programming to “Redefining Europe.” Then, last Friday, amid all the Europe talk, both the Greek parliament and the Eurozone finance ministers approved a bailout to keep Greece in the Eurozone. European Commissioner Jean-Claude Junker acknowledged that EU leaders have “looked into the abyss” of a Eurozone breakup this year, suggesting that they are now back from the brink of it. Eurozone leaders, once again, showed their intent to preserve the Euro and have chosen to take politically difficult actions to defend the credibility of the European Union. But Junker’s abyss is still there, even if the Eurozone has backed away from it. Europe still must be “redefined.” Part of that “redefining,” as the past few months have shown, will involve concessions to keep Europe’s perennially weaker economies in step with its stronger ones. Beyond that, how does Europe need to be “redefined”?

It is far from an academic question, and the Chautauqua speakers had some ideas. New York Times columnist Roger Cohen defended the EU as the 20th century’s “dullest miracle” for preserving peace during its tenure despite continually wrestling with budgetary and immigration issues. The EU has achieved its fundamental aim: preserving Europe’s stability.

To buy into the argument that EU expansion in any way pushed Russia into its current aggression in Ukraine, Cohen suggested, was to accept a myth that serves Putin. Meanwhile France and Italy, he argued, are powers to be taken more seriously than America currently sees them. In response to the Charlie Hebdo shootings in early 2015, France has explored enhanced intelligence capabilities to address domestic terrorist threats. Italy, meanwhile, under the leadership of Prime Minister Matteo Renzi and with Mario Draghi leading the European Central Bank, has assumed a greater role in EU affairs than it did under former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi.

Finally, German Chancellor Angela Merkel finds Germany in the EU’s captain’s chair, a state of affairs the EU itself was designed to prevent. America has prodded Merkel to lead Europe, in a manner that she, her fellow Germans, and many of her fellow Europeans (Greeks, in particular) find discomforting. Reluctance towards German leadership stems from a firm historical base, and the best that can be hoped for, Cohen argued, is a Germany that does just enough to keep Europe stable. Proactive leadership, particularly in the realm of defense, is asking too much.

Constanze Stelzenmuller, Robert Bosch Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, painted a different picture. German leaders, she argued, hold both the lessons of their nation’s past and the need for its contemporary leadership concurrently in their minds. In her view, Germany is intent on playing all of the leadership roles — economic and strategic — that its economic weight begs of it.

Stelzenmuller spoke of her advisory role on a current German Defense Ministry initiative to reassess the role of the German military in light of the renewed Russia threat. Tellingly, this initiative includes town hall meetings with German citizens to calibrate what level of support to expect for a more assertive strategic stance. Germans have balked at such efforts in the past; attempts to re-establish a standing army in West Germany early in the Cold War met with ambivalence among politicians and protests among citizens. Stelzenmuller suggests that decades-long tide is turning. Still, Germany’s leaders preserve the anti-Nazi graffiti that was placed on Berlin’s Reichstag by that cities’  liberators for a good reason. Germany’s role in Europe’s defense will change only after careful and public consideration.

It was not a coincidence that the writings of the late Tony Judt were discussed repeatedly. Judt, a former New York University professor and author of the classic Cold War history of Europe Postwar, analyzed the fundamental differences between the development of democracy in Europe and the United States. Building off the pre-World War II example of the Fabians in Britain, the role of democratic government in Europe had less of a free market character than America. Even before the rise and fall of the Nazis underscored the connection between economic and strategic stability, a broader belief prevailed in Europe than in America that government should maintain backstops for basic human needs.

As a result, taxes that were high enough to provide universal health care and stronger unemployment and social insurance have a level of support in Europe they do not, and likely will not, have in America. But Judt’s point is broader: Apples-to-apples comparisons of American and European democracy, while tempting, are not possible. Having endured the horrors of war on their own soil, many European countries see government as a force that stabilizes society. More insular and self-sufficient than most of Europe, many Americans still see government as a financial drag and creative constraint on its citizens’ inherent dynamism. When another post-World War II generation comes of age, the gap between the two may close. For now, it remains.

The EU’s latest actions towards Greece demonstrate an enduring commitment to the European project. Without minimizing its challenges, “redefining,” or even “reforming” Europe is a simpler job than rebuilding it. That is a blessing, and a mark in the EU’s favor during a challenging time in its history.

LoveStar est un génie. Il a libéré le monde des câbles électriques et de l'emprise de l'électronique après avoir percé le mystère des ondes émises par les sternes arctiques. L'« homme moderne et sans fil » apparaît comme la nouvelle étape de l'évolution. Depuis la vallée d'Oxanadalur, propriété du héros en (...) / Communication, Culture, Entreprise, Littérature, Mutation, Science, Technologies de l'information, Technologie, Fiction, Islande, Marketing - 2015/08

On annonce assez bruyamment un peu partout la disparition prochaine des livres. Faut-il à ce propos prendre modèle sur Démocrite, le philosophe que le spectacle du monde faisait s'esclaffer, ou sur Héraclite, qui au contraire en pleurait ? A moins qu'il ne faille, comme Spinoza, préférer « ne pas (...) / Crise des valeurs, Culture, Internet, Livre, Mutation, Société, Technologies de l'information, Technologie - 2015/08

Nicht die mangelhafte Integration, sondern der Salafismus als Religion verführt junge Menschen,...

La Cour suprême du Sénégal a confirmé jeudi la condamnation de Karim Wade, ancien ministre sénégalais et fils de l'ex-président du pays, à six ans de prison pour enrichissement illicite.

Die Terrororganisation Boko Haram wird auf mittlere Sicht die innen- und sicherheitspolitische Agenda in Kamerun bestimmen. Für das Land erwächst daraus eine doppelte Herausforderung, denn es weist ungeachtet der von Boko Haram ausgehenden Bedrohung eine unterschätzte, strukturell und politisch bedingte Krisen- und Konfliktanfälligkeit auf. Die Fähigkeiten von Staat und Gesellschaft Kameruns, diese zweifache Herausforderung zu meistern, sind sehr viel begrenzter, als es das oft bemühte Diktum vom »regionalen Stabilitätsanker« erwarten lässt. Die deutsche Außenpolitik sollte jetzt Ansätze für die Krisenprävention entwickeln.

US-ally Saudi Arabia is leading a war against Houthi rebels in Yemen. But after nearly five months, the Houthis have entrenched themselves in captured territory, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS or ISIL) have gained ground, and the war has created a humanitarian catastrophe, with over 4,000 dead and aid agencies warning of impending famine.

Le 20 août 2015, le Lieutenant de vaisseau Le Hénaff a mis fin au 129ème mandat de la mission Corymbe, débuté deux mois plus tôt lors de son arrivée à Dakar. Durant cette période, il a assuré la permanence que la Marine nationale maintient dans le golfe de Guinée depuis des années au service des intérêts Français. Par un engagement direct dans les domaines de la coopération militaire et de la formation, le LV Le Hénaffa également contribué à la montée en puissance des marines des États riverains.

L'objet du présent texte n'est pas d'analyser sous l'angle technique les juridictions pénales internationales, ni leur jurisprudence. Le propos est davantage de politique juridique. Près de deux décennies après la création des premiers tribunaux internationaux spéciaux et près d'une décennie après l'entrée en vigueur du Statut de Rome instituant la Cour pénale internationale, diverses questions d'ordre général se posent toujours à leur sujet. Ces questions de principe sont suffisamment importantes pour constater dès le départ que les juridictions pénales internationales n'ont pas encore assuré leur présence, ni consolidé leur institutionnalisation dans la galaxie des organisations internationales. (…)

Alors que les tensions persistent au Burundi, le président Pierre Nkurunziza a prêté serment, jeudi, devant le Parlement. L'opposition estime que cette réélection est anticonstitutionnelle.

J'ai publié dans le numéro d'été consacré au "nucléaire militaire", un article un peu théorique sur la sphère stratégique nucléaire (ci-dessous, intro, plan détaillé, conclusion). Sachez que je travaille pas mal sur ces questions de dissuasion en ce moment. On verra ce que ça donnera. Mais je profite de ce court billet pour recommander chaudement le numéro de la RDN, qui est passionnant et extrêmement complet. Il vaut réellement le détour.

L’arme nucléaire apparue au milieu du siècle dernier a profondément structuré les stratégies militaires d’un grand nombre d’Etats, qu’ils en soient dotés ou non. Elle a donné naissance à une « sphère stratégique nucléaire » qui s’articule avec les grandes stratégies mais aussi avec les autres stratégies de milieu (terre, mer, air …). Cette sphère stratégique obéit à un certain nombre de principes, les uns portant sur la dialectique stratégique, les autres sur les capacités, ce qui a entraîné de profondes conséquences sur la mise en œuvre de l’arme.

I La sphère stratégique nucléaire

Je décris cette notion, évoquée dans "Introduction à la cyberstratégie".

II Principes de doctrine stratégique

Le système français repose sur une double série de principes, les uns portant sur la dialectique stratégique, les autres sur les capacités. Quatre principes portent sur la dialectique stratégique : ceux de volonté, d’omni-direction, de continuité et de flou. Trois principes portent sur la capacité stratégique : ceux de crédibilité, de permanence et de suprématie. Ces sept principes ont plusieurs conséquences stratégiques, propres à cette mécanique de la dissuasion.

Conclusion

L’arme nucléaire constitue donc une sphère stratégique autonome. Si elle ne saurait ordonner tous les conflits, elle demeure toutefois structurante au point de profondément affecter l’ensemble de calculs stratégiques. La sphère nucléaire, en tant que sphère stratégique, présente une caractéristique : elle est issue de la maîtrise scientifique de la matière et en cela, elle peut être perçue sous son seul aspect d’innovation technologique. Pourtant, l’essentiel n’est pas là : il est dans le caractère artificiel et anthropogène de cette arme et donc de cette sphère stratégique. Celle-ci, pour la première fois dans l’histoire, n’est pas simplement un milieu naturel qui est dominé par la technologie, elle est une création humaine, un « milieu » artificiel (même si, on l’a compris, le mot milieu est inadapté et justifie qu’on ait adopté celui de sphère stratégique).

Elle présente des caractéristiques propres (les sept principes énoncés) qui emportent de multiples conséquences que nous avons esquissées. Cependant, malgré sa totalité, la sphère nucléaire ne saurait réduire à néant toutes les rivalités de puissance qui trouvent d’autres lieux pour s’exprimer, que ce soit dans d’autres champs (guerre économique, cyber conflictualité) ou d’autres modalités (conflits irréguliers). Mais la sphère nucléaire organise les relations westphaliennes qui demeurent, aujourd’hui, centrales. C’est ce qui assure la pérennité de l’arme et milite pour poursuivre les efforts de mise à niveau afin notamment de maintenir les compétences (dans le domaine nucléaire –arme, vecteur, porteur) plus encore que dans d’autres, quand on abandonne une compétence, il faut trente ans d’efforts pour la récupérer.

Pourtant, les possibilités stratégiques de contournement de la sphère nucléaire semblent se profiler. Au fond, elles reposent sur la négation du caractère absolu de la puissance nucléaire. L’apparition de nouvelles formes de puissance stratégique et technologique est envisageable, mais encore à un horizon encore lointain. D’ici là, l’arme nucléaire est incontournable et il serait inconséquent de renoncer à la maintenir.

Le weekend du 5 au 6 août 2015, l’équipe de France enduro Armée de Terre – fédération française de motocyclisme (EEAT-FFM) s’est rendue en Finlande pour participer à la 3e épreuve du championnat d’Europe d’enduro. Des spéciales sélectives (sable et sous-bois) et surtout une liaison compliquée ont donné du fil à retordre aux 180 pilotes présents pour l’évènement.

Le Sénégal est en deuil. Le pays a perdu mercredi un monument de sa culture, le percussionniste Doudou Ndiaye Rose. À 85 ans, celui-ci était classé par l'Unesco "trésor humain vivant".

Carb-loading for the autumn ahead

In these dog days of summer, there’s not much happening in the world of EU politics. Except the on-going debates on the third Greek bailout, arguments about managing asylum applicants and immigrants and the simmering British renegotiation. And the third of these is very much the least, certainly in Continental terms.

To date, the renegotiation has been very low-key: a round of visits to capitals by David Cameron, the briefest of discussions at a European Council and now more substantive talks about nuts and bolts. With most of the British principals on holiday, fighting leadership contests or generally keeping a low profile, it’s an opportunity to see some of the underlying currents more clearly.

This week’s mini-revelation was an article in the Times, claiming that former health secretary, Andrew Lansley, had told a private meeting that the government’s plan is to have a confected ‘row’ with the French, which would be ‘won’ by the British, about the time that the renegotiation was coming to a head, so that the British public could be presented with a stronger-looking package on which to vote (in September 2016, according to Lansley).

Cue much comment from those on the ‘no’ side, decrying the cynicism and the brazenness of the claims.

On the face of it, this is an odd state of affairs. Lansley is one of the more pro-EU figures in the party,  and not obviously a fool, but it’s hard to see how he couldn’t have foreseen his comments being used by others against him. Perhaps he intended his words to be comfort to his audience, in that there would be something to show for the government’s efforts, but one has to wonder.

However, whatever his intentions, the leaking of Lansley’s comments are indicative of the way this renegotiation and referendum campaign have been going.

To date, the main thrust of debate has been procedural, rather than substantive. Cameron has kept his list of objectives deliberately vague, leading to the odd situation where his actual words bear little difference to the rhetoric of reform found in other capitals or in Brussels. Consequently, different groups produce their own wishlists of reforms, but without producing any public debate, beyond that linked to specific issues in the news (most obviously immigration).

Instead, the talk has been about how things are being organised: what’s the wording of the question? what’s the franchise? what limits on campaigning will there be? what about purdah?

The reason for this is two-fold. The first, already mentioned, is that there’s little of substance to discuss. The second is the neither side has any great trust in the other. Certainly, the ‘no’ side seem to hold a genuine fear that each and every opportunity that the government and the ‘yes’ side can take to win some advantage, they will do just that.

Now, one could argue that this is all just part of the way that referenda work, especially when they are within the gift of the government. As the old (political) truism goes, you only hold a referendum when you know what the result is going to be. In this case, Cameron’s hand was forced somewhat, but that doesn’t change the basic calculation, namely that he needs to win this vote and he will do what he can to achieve that. Put like that, one could imagine a sceptical government in this position entertaining similar ideas about generating some helpful outrage as a prelude to a vote on leaving the EU. That doesn’t make it right – certainly in the eyes of voters who are already pretty disillusioned with politicians – but it does make it more understandable.

Of course, by printing Lansley’s comments, the Times has done something more cunning. It has closed down much of the benefit of the potential opportunities to create a positive story around the renegotiations. Imagine that the government does genuinely have a spat (journalese alert) with another member state, which it genuinely resolves to its advantage: even if everyone says it wasn’t contrived, it will be easy for the ‘no’ camp to point to this week’s story and say “I told you so.” In short, this is a lovely bit of political jujitsu, turning a ‘yes’ gain into a loss.

The upshot of this is that no-one is talking about the referendum as a point of resolution, but as a staging post to the next round of the debate. Short of a very substantial majority on a high turnout, the losing side will be able to claim that the vote wasn’t ‘fair’ and that they must fight on – and both sides are willing to do that.

As noted before on this blog, if that meant that there was a national debate about what the UK’s role in the world should be, then that might be alright, but so far this referendum smells of party politics and opportunism. All might well be fair in love, war and referenda, but it doesn’t address the long-term problems confronting the country or the state of democracy.

The post Playing dirty in the EU Referendum appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The Crisis Observatory of the Hellenic Foundation of European & Foreign Policy and the  Europe Direct ELIAMEP Information Center launch a call for papers on “Economic Governance and Democratic Legitimacy in the European Union”. Those interested may submit scientific papers regarding the economic, social and political consequences of the crisis on member states of the Eurozone, the institutional reforms promoted in the context of economic governance by the EU and the Eurozone, the emergence of institutional weaknesses within the Eurozone, the investigation of democratic legitimacy of institutional reforms and/or policies implemented both at member-state and European Union/Eurozone levels.

The best papers will be presented at the 3rd Annual Conference of the Crisis Observatory and some of them will be honored with monetary awards.

Eligible to participate are postgraduate students, Master’s Degree holders and PhD candidates in the fields of economic, political and social sciences.

The papers must be written in Greek.

Paper Submission Deadline: 30 September 2015 

More information you can find here.

Application form