Malgré le soutien du gouvernement, la plupart des Polonais s'opposent à l'adhésion de l'Ukraine à l'OTAN, ce qui met en évidence un clivage politique marqué et accroît la pression sur les espoirs de Kiev.
The post Une majorité de Polonais s’opposent à l’adhésion de l’Ukraine à l’OTAN appeared first on Euractiv FR.
La proposition de référendums par ANO, le parti le plus en vue, suscite des réactions hostiles dans tout le spectre politique tchèque, les critiques avertissant qu'elle pourrait renforcer les forces anti-européennes, malgré les dénégations d'Andrej Babiš.
The post En République tchèque, la proposition de référendums du parti populiste ANO agite la campagne électorale appeared first on Euractiv FR.
Les États membres de l'UE sont déjà tenus de reconnaître le sexe légal qu'une personne a obtenu dans un autre État membre.
The post Les personnes transgenres doivent bénéficier d’une carte d’identité conforme à leur identité de genre, selon la Cour de justice de l’UE appeared first on Euractiv FR.
Plastic waste washed up on a beach in India. Credit: Ocean Image Bank/Srikanth Man
The international push for consensus on a legally binding deal to end plastic pollution proved beyond the grasp of weary UN Member States meeting in Geneva in mid-August, as they agreed to resume discussions at a future date, according to UN News.
“This has been a hard-fought 10 days against the backdrop of geopolitical complexities, economic challenges and multilateral strains,” said Inger Andersen, Executive Director of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). “However, one thing remains clear: despite these complexities, all countries clearly want to remain at the table.”
By Craig Boljkovac
GENEVA, Sep 5 2025 (IPS)
The debacle that was the latest round of negotiations for a global treaty on plastics (including in the marine environment); known as “INC 5.2” has already been written about at length by many colleagues on all sides of the issues. Despite all the very informative posts, articles, and other analyses, I believe I have several key observations to make, particularly about the process to-date.
After being absent from the previous two INCs (INC-4 and INC-5), I may have a slightly different perspective from those who have been completely immersed in the process all the way along. I managed to observe virtually every (painful) minute of INC 5.2, and, below, I list some things that participants may want to consider as the process continues.
Backing up a bit, for those who may be less familiar with the issue, we clearly have a problem with plastics globally. Mounting evidence of the presence of plastics and a clear lack of recycling capacities: from blatantly visible plastics in the marine environment (massive floating gyres of overwhelmingly plastic garbage in our oceans – particularly in but not limited to the Pacific) to the presence of microplastics in our bodies (and those of wildlife as well), including in the placenta and mother’s milk, and the use of clearly harmful chemicals (such as endocrine disrupters released when certain plastics are used) in the manufacture of at least some plastics – has led to decisions on the international level that merely complement significant action at other levels of governance that are already in place.
This situation resulted in the decision, from March, 2022, by the UN Environment Programme’s UN Environment Assembly, to pass a resolution authorizing a negotiating process (the “Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee, or INC) to realize a global plastics treaty by 2024 (a highly ambitious timeline that, to many, was likely unachievable).
And, here we are, late in 2025, after six unsuccessful negotiation sessions and some preparatory work, without an agreed treaty text, and with, it seems, a wide gulf of differences between UN member states that seems, frankly, virtually unbridgeable.
Much has been written about the various positions of UN Members States, who have informally organized themselves (for the negotiations) into the “Like-Minded Group” of countries that want the treaty to focus mainly on waste management and not impinge on their plans to not only maintain, but greatly expand plastics production; and the “High Ambition Coalition” countries who, in part, want a strong global treaty that addresses plastics at all stages of their life cycle, severely limit “single-use plastics” and include human health concerns, particularly with regard to the harmful effects of chemical inputs to plastics production (which the “Like-Mindeds” reject, particularly for what some delegations say is a clear lack of evidence of harm to human health and the environment).
In my long experience with international environmental negotiations under the UN rubric, such differences in positions are not unprecedented, and have been solved by having a team of negotiators that are solutions-oriented, and a secretariat (the UN staff assigned to coordinate and facilitate the negotiations) and chair (usually a diplomat or high-level civil servant from an environment or similar ministry) that work together to bridge differences in a transparent, inclusive, and participatory manner, where trust is built over time and solutions are eventually found.
Something is clearly blocking the process. The secretariat and bureau (including the chair, in particular) have shown commitment, but the goal of an agreed treaty, despite the presentation of many textual proposals by negotiators, several chairs’ drafts, and some movement on at least some of the issues, has not been realized over six energy- and resource-intensive negotiation sessions.
Why is this the case? A few thoughts/observations from my side (the list is not comprehensive):
2) There has been a clear lack of transparency and communication in/from both subsidiary groups (such as contact groups, where various issues are “unpacked” and grouped for more detailed negotiations) and, more significantly and consistently, at the broader level (directly led by the chair/bureau and supported by the secretariat) such as plenary sessions (which were few and far between and even resoundingly brief – one was 43 seconds at the latest INC). Relatively untransparent processes have worked in the past (such as with the climate change negotiations); but from what I understand there was more trust and confidence in the chair/bureau and secretariat than exists in our present negotiations.
3) The chair, bureau and secretariat were always present, but rarely available. The absence of regular plenary sessions was keenly felt. There was also a clear lack of consistency in the way contact groups operated – some put textual proposals on a screen for all to see and negotiate with; while others simply heard interventions and then came out with proposals for text at the very end (not the most transparent of ways to operate!). In addition, there was a heavy reliance on informal negotiations throughout (this became apparent with news, in the final plenary, of a long, closed negotiation on the final day chaired by Chile and Japan). A lot seemed to be going on, but only a limited number of participants (including a fair number of government delegations that I conversed with) seemed only vaguely aware of them, if at all.
4) During the course of this, the sixth negotiating session, positions taken by both the Like-Minded Group and the High Ambition Coalition more closely resembled opening salvos that one might expect would be typical of the early stages of negotiations – not positions that would still be raised at such a late stage, when one would expect at least some compromises to have been made along the way. To me, this is symptomatic of a lack of trust in the process to-date.
This apparent situation (lack of clear negotiating milestones/organization, lack of visibility of the chair and lack of transparency) seems to have, in my opinion, possibly been used by delegations to hold back on reaching any sort of even basic compromises.
How to solve this as we try to move forward?
2) Hold in-depth “debriefs” and “lessons learned” sessions for the secretariat and bureau, with additional participants from the INCs who have valuable observations to contribute (both from government and observer delegations). A suggested focus could be on how to expand the obvious organizational strengths of the secretariat into other areas, such as a finer level of facilitation aimed at bridging differences among delegations through improved intersessional activities (see 1), above).
3) Without formally reopening the original (2022) resolution, seek backing from UNEA-7 for the original mandate (since delegations have clearly not followed the original resolution, particularly regarding the scope of the convention, during the INCs. A complementary resolution which could guide member states towards a possible framework convention would also allow negotiation of the difficult and time-consuming issues in a more extended, party-based process.
4) Once experiences and lessons learned are gathered, consider holding a special, more internally-focused intersessional process between secretariat and the chair and bureau, in order to have a detailed set of lessons learned so far, and to try to readjust the relationship as we move forward. Perhaps such a process could have a trusted and even renowned external facilitator that could help find some new and more effective way of working together. Such trust-building exercises were essential in other forums that I have participated in (although they were done more up-front, towards the beginnings of such processes, it’s never too late!).
5) At the next, eventual INC (presumably 5.3 will take place), put into place more plenary time (at least brief plenaries) where regular updates can be given. This would display more transparency, potentially build more confidence in the process, and benefit small delegations in particular, who cannot cover the breadth of different negotiations we saw in previous INCs.
In conclusion, there is no doubt in my mind that we have a huge task still at hand, but not an insurmountable one. Recently, Forbes published what I think is a fantastic, forward-looking piece that basically says the “train has left the station” for the plastics industry. Even if the global process fails (which I firmly believe will not happen), at other levels of governance from California to the EU and beyond, clear commitments have been made that are even above and beyond the current UNEA mandate.
This will drive the investments and planning of the industry for decades to come. The writing is on the wall. Now is the time to find compromises at the global level (even a framework treaty like the Paris Agreement on climate change would be a good start!) to ensure a sustainable future for all in this field. Otherwise, we may be facing a failure that results in a long-term stalemate where no treaty (or alternative) is agreed for the foreseeable future.
Craig Boljkovac is a Geneva-based Senior Advisor with a Regional Centre for the Basel and Stockholm Conventions, and an independent international environmental consultant with over 35 years of experience in relevant fields. His opinions are his own. He has participated in several INCs and related meetings for the global plastics agreement.
IPS UN Bureau
Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
Pour l'heure, la contribution des États-Unis à la protection de l'Ukraine contre de futures attaques reste à déterminer.
The post Emmanuel Macron annonce l’engagement de 26 pays à garantir la sécurité de l’Ukraine appeared first on Euractiv FR.
Les Bouches de Kotor sont inscrites à la liste du Patrimoine mondial depuis 46 ans, mais l'Unesco exige un moratoire immédiat sur les constructions et un plan de sauvegarde, au risque de retirer sa protection. Le Monténégro va devoir choisir.
- Articles / Culture et éducation, Littoral Monténégro, Monténégro, Monitor (Monténégro), EnvironnementPeut-on défiler sous la protection de la police ? Le débat a agité les militant.e.s LGBT+ de Belgrade durant cette semaine des Fiertés en Serbie, avant la Pride prévue samedi. La marche s'inscrira dans un esprit de contestation du régime et de refus d'une pseudo-« normalisation ».
- Le fil de l'Info / Courrier des Balkans, LGBT, Serbie, Populations, minorités et migrations, SociétéA héten zajlott a szolnoki helikopteresek szokásos kitelepült SAR gyakorlata, az Air Wolf Hunting Pipishegyen. Ott ugyan nem, de azért máshonnan nem lehetett nem megnézni őket ezen a gyönyörű estén a nyárvégi Mátrában :-)
15 szerint érkezik az egyik 145-ös, háttérben bölcsen figyel a Kékes.
A minap alpinoztak róla, most egy H225M repül el a (román olajfúrótoronyból avanzsált) sástói kilátó előterében.
Keleti terepről tér vissza az egyik 225-ös. Háttérben mátraaljai falvak.
Állóhelyen.
A Sár-hegy és Gyöngyös a nyugati terepek egyikéről visszatérő gép nyomvonalának hátterében.
Zord
Google's first data center in Chile lies in the industrial sector of the municipality of Quilicura, on the northern outskirts of Santiago. It has no symbols or logos to identify it, but covers an extensive area. Water vapor is visibly emitted as part of the process to cool the servers. Credit: Orlando Milesi / IPS
By Orlando Milesi
SANTIAGO, Sep 4 2025 (IPS)
Chile wants to be a hub in Latin America in data storage and transmission by developing data centers, leveraging its wealth of renewable energy, and its optimal digital interconnection.
In contrast, the massive water required for cooling servers and resistance from social and local organizations who were not consulted are the main obstacles in this strategy.
The authorities are promoting a tech hub, as the concentrator or logistical connection point for centralizing numerous nodes of a computer network is called, where companies, investments, and talent converge.“Chile's technological development is at a turning point that will define our position as a relevant player in the region. In the future, this could mean having the capacity to host infrastructure for training large artificial intelligence models”–Andrés Díaz.
A key step in this direction is the National Data Center Plan (PData), launched by the government of leftist president Gabriel Boric in December 2024.
PData complemented the Cybersecurity Framework Law, enacted in April 2024, which established minimum requirements for the prevention, containment, resolution, and response to cybersecurity incidents, applicable to state agencies and private companies.
PData aims to position this elongated South American country as a Latin American hub for data centers.
It was launched 10 months after an environmental court in Santiago, the capital of this country of 18.4 million people, halted a multi-million dollar Google project in the municipality of Cerrillos, on the outskirts of Santiago, preventing it from using water to cool its servers.
The stoppage was a victory for residents organized in the Socio-Environmental Community Movement for Water and Territory (Mosacat), an environmental coalition that emerged in Cerrillos.
Google had announced it would modify the cooling system to use less than the planned 169 liters of water per second. But, following the court decision, it suspended the project and a US$40 million investment in what would have been its second data center in the country, after the one operating since 2015 in Quilicura, also on the outskirts of Santiago.
Tania Rodriguez, a spokesperson for Mosacat, praised the strength of the residents to “convince a multinational that its project was not possible with such scarce water resources. Companies are the ones that must become aware of the excessive use of our resources,” she stated in an interview with a union media outlet.
New reality
To promote data centers, the Boric government brought all interested parties together and managed to finalize PData, with the goal of providing certainty to all sectors and enabling their massive installation in the country.
Chile has abundant low-cost renewable energy, 62,000 kilometers of optical fiber, a network of 69,000 kilometers of submarine cables, as well as 3.8 million devices connected to the 5G network.
Alejandro Barros, a professor of engineering and researcher at the Public Systems Center of Industrial Engineering at the public University of Chile, told IPS that the main lesson after the crisis with Google was the need to equip Chile with a public policy for the establishment and management of data centers.
According to Barros, PData “advances very significantly by establishing the governance model for these projects because multiple state institutions will be involved. How synergy and coordination is achieved across all sectors linked to these projects is relevant.”
“My concern is that the plan was presented at the end of an administration,” he said, recalling that Boric’s term concludes in March 2026.
“The question is what will the next administration do. Data centers will have to be built, but how do we agree so that Chile meets standards, has good dialogue with communities, and we don’t start from scratch again?” he asks.
Google’s fenced and patrolled data center in Quilicura, on the outskirts of Santiago, where huge water tanks are visible. The tech company was unable to establish another data center in the Chilean capital due to a court ruling against the massive use of water. Credit: Orlando Milesi / IPS
Microsoft installs its regional cloud
In 2017, there were six data center projects in Chile. Today, 38 are in operation.
It seems more likely that companies of various sizes will export data and processed information from Chile to meet external demand.
According to Fitzgerald Cantero, Director of Studies and Projects at the Latin American Energy Organization (Olade), the growth in the use of artificial intelligence will exceed an annual rate of 31% by 2029.
In the Latin American region, 78% of data centers are currently concentrated in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico.
During the Data Centers and Energy forum, organized by the Institute of the Americas and held in Santiago on August 21, Cantero said that investment in artificial intelligence in 2025 will be 7 billion dollars and will jump to 10 billion in 2029.
Juan Carlos Olmedo, Chile’s electrical coordinator, stated at the forum that the electrical energy required by data centers in this country will quadruple by 2032, rising from the current 325 megawatts (MW) to 1,360.
On June 18, Microsoft opened its first Data Center Region in Santiago to support economic growth, technological innovation, and social development, indicated the transnational tech company.
According to Microsoft, this state-of-the-art infrastructure will provide digital services to businesses and public organizations, improving their speed, privacy, security, and data storage in compliance with local regulations and high availability
The new network of data centers, called the Microsoft Cloud Region, is also located in Santiago, consisting of three independent physical locations, each with one or more data centers, and will provide services to several South American countries.
According to the U.S.-based software developer, the opening of this regional Data Center will generate US$35.3 billion in net income over the next four years, both for Microsoft and for partners and customers using its cloud.
“Of that total, approximately US$3.3 billion will be invested directly in Chile, contributing to this country’s development and creating about 81,041 jobs between 2025 and 2029,” detailed the tech company.
At the time, Boric expressed his joy for this new project, calling it a show of confidence for Chile to continue integrating and transforming into a major tech hub in Latin America.
Chile is now connected to a global network that spans the planet, he said, which reinforces the country as “an excellent destination for investment, placing us at the regional forefront of innovation and technology.”
“Data centers and the digital economy are transforming society, and this is not just for some sectors—it is for everyone,” emphasized the president.
Representatives from companies, Latin American energy institutions, Chilean electrical sector authorities, and academics gathered in Santiago for a forum on Data Centers and Energy, which debated the challenges and conditions for Chile to become a regional hub. Credit: Orlando Milesi / IPS
The pros and cons of data centers
Andrés Díaz, director of the School of Industrial Engineering at the private Diego Portales University, believes that Chile has managed to position itself as a tech hub by attracting investments in digital infrastructure.
Regarding the projections for this strategic industry, he maintains that the important thing is to send clear signals of stability and security.
“The country has favorable conditions, from natural resources to technical capabilities; however, confidence to ensure the attraction of investment remains key,” he told IPS.
According to this academic, “Chile’s technological development is at a turning point that will define our position as a relevant player in the region. In the future, this could mean having the capacity to host infrastructure for training large artificial intelligence models.”
Data centers enable the operation of applications such as instant messaging or viewing content on platforms. And they are essential for sending, storing, and interconnecting information for companies, public administration, hospitals, and banking entities.
If a data center stops functioning, it would affect everything from traffic lights to email and ATMs. Teleworking, video calls, food delivery, and home cinema are also activities derived from their operation.
So-called data centers have thus become critical infrastructure, like other basic services.
“Both in Europe and the United States, the demand for massive data processing is exponential, especially because of what is happening with artificial intelligence,” professor Barros told IPS.
“This is what we see in the technological infrastructure plans driven by the United States and China, with all their positive and negative variables,” he added.
He warned of risks and challenges as a result, especially for the environment, including the type of energy that will be used: renewable or fossil-based.
“In Europe, they are starting to reuse nuclear energy again, and in the United States, they are beginning to use fossil-based energy. Chile has the advantage of its very significant renewable energy production,” he explained.
In 2024, renewable energies contributed nearly 68% of Chile’s electricity generation, with 35% coming from variable sources such as solar and wind.
But the main challenge is water due to the large volumes consumed to cool the servers, given that air cooling is less efficient.
“That means having clarity about how much water will be consumed, what impact it will have on the area where the data centers will be installed, and knowing if it is an area with water problems or drought for long periods,” emphasized Barros.
He also highlighted the importance of providing greater transparency and access to information when discussing the issue of water with local communities, specifying how much will be required and what impact it will have on basins or human consumption.
Droughts have affected various regions of Chile over a 40-year period, from 1979 to 2019. Furthermore, northern Chile is one of the driest regions in the world, and the central region, which is home to 70% of the national population, has had a permanent water deficit since 2010.
Leaders of the involved localities insist that data centers be required to undergo the Environmental Impact Assessment System, which includes a government evaluation and a citizen consultation.
Currently, to install a data center, only an Environmental Impact Declaration must be made, where the company itself reports on potential risks.
À quelques mois des élections générales de 2026, une alliance politique se profile entre la Force cauris pour un Bénin émergent (FCBE) et les partis de la mouvance présidentielle, UP-R et BR.
Le parti des FCBE présidé par Paul Hounkpè a décidé de signer un accord de gouvernance avec les formations politiques de la mouvance présidentielle dans le cadre des élections générales de 2026.
Une signature d'accord politique avec l'Union Progressiste le Renouveau (UP-R) est annoncée pour ce vendredi 5 septembre 2025 en présence des responsables des deux partis. Cette rencontre devrait officialiser l'alliance, poser les bases du travail commun et définir les rôles de chaque parti dans le cadre des élections générales de 2026.
Un autre accord de gouvernance est envisagé avec le Bloc Républicain (BR).
Le code électoral exige 28 parrainages d'élus pour valider une candidature à l'élection présidentielle de 2026. Le parti FCBE qui n'a que quelques élus maires a besoin de l'appui d'autres formations politiques pour boucler la liste des 28 parrainages requis pour sa candidature à la présidentielle.
D'où la recherche d'accord politique avec l'UP-R et le BR.
A.A.A