Les prix des terrains sur la montagne de Jelovica deviennent de plus en plus chers, alors que de nombreux hôtels et restaurants y voient le jour, parfois sans permis.
- Le fil de l'Info / Une - Diaporama, Monitor (Monténégro), Environnement dans les Balkans, Monténégro, EnvironnementLa confédération africaine de football a dévoilé la liste élargie de Djamel Belmadi pour la CAN-2023. Une liste dans laquelle les noms de 50 joueurs […]
L’article CAN 2023 : la CAF dévoile la liste élargie de Djamel Belmadi est apparu en premier sur .
Dans le cadre de son implantation, l’Agence Algérienne de Promotion de l’Investissement (AAPI) ouvre un concours de recrutement avec à la clé plusieurs postes de […]
L’article Emploi en Algérie : l’Agence Algérienne de Promotion de l’Investissement (AAPI) recrute est apparu en premier sur .
Après 18 mois de revirements et de rebondissements autour du projet de loi d’immigration en France, l’Assemblée nationale a enfin approuvé définitivement, tard mardi soir, […]
L’article Nouvelle loi d’immigration en France : un texte « fort et ferme » adopté au Parlement est apparu en premier sur .
What triggers municipalities to engage in revenue bargaining with citizens and what strategies do they use? These questions are explored here based on a comparative case study design in Mozambique which include more than 100 interviews with representatives from public administration, political institutions and civil society in 11 municipalities. The results indicate that there are two particularly strong triggers for municipalities’ efforts to engage with citizens in revenue bargaining: the unreliability of the fiscal transfer system and political competition. Furthermore, in terms of strategies the results show that municipalities’ outreach activities remain predominantly unidirectional and limited, whereby they are largely unsuccessful in engaging revenue providers broadly in a bargaining process. Also, some doubts arise concerning ownership and sustainability of initiatives when they appear to be driven by external actors, in particular by donors. Finally, civil society organizations are identified as generally too weak to play an essential role as third party supporting and coordinating revenue providers’ voices. Overall, the results provide insights into the predisposition of government to conduct revenue bargaining, but also point to the preconditions required for meaningful revenue bargaining to emerge and influence the definition of new fiscal contracts.
What triggers municipalities to engage in revenue bargaining with citizens and what strategies do they use? These questions are explored here based on a comparative case study design in Mozambique which include more than 100 interviews with representatives from public administration, political institutions and civil society in 11 municipalities. The results indicate that there are two particularly strong triggers for municipalities’ efforts to engage with citizens in revenue bargaining: the unreliability of the fiscal transfer system and political competition. Furthermore, in terms of strategies the results show that municipalities’ outreach activities remain predominantly unidirectional and limited, whereby they are largely unsuccessful in engaging revenue providers broadly in a bargaining process. Also, some doubts arise concerning ownership and sustainability of initiatives when they appear to be driven by external actors, in particular by donors. Finally, civil society organizations are identified as generally too weak to play an essential role as third party supporting and coordinating revenue providers’ voices. Overall, the results provide insights into the predisposition of government to conduct revenue bargaining, but also point to the preconditions required for meaningful revenue bargaining to emerge and influence the definition of new fiscal contracts.
What triggers municipalities to engage in revenue bargaining with citizens and what strategies do they use? These questions are explored here based on a comparative case study design in Mozambique which include more than 100 interviews with representatives from public administration, political institutions and civil society in 11 municipalities. The results indicate that there are two particularly strong triggers for municipalities’ efforts to engage with citizens in revenue bargaining: the unreliability of the fiscal transfer system and political competition. Furthermore, in terms of strategies the results show that municipalities’ outreach activities remain predominantly unidirectional and limited, whereby they are largely unsuccessful in engaging revenue providers broadly in a bargaining process. Also, some doubts arise concerning ownership and sustainability of initiatives when they appear to be driven by external actors, in particular by donors. Finally, civil society organizations are identified as generally too weak to play an essential role as third party supporting and coordinating revenue providers’ voices. Overall, the results provide insights into the predisposition of government to conduct revenue bargaining, but also point to the preconditions required for meaningful revenue bargaining to emerge and influence the definition of new fiscal contracts.