Donors talk about “African capacity” and “ownership,” while retaining the power to decide when, how, and even if the money will arrive. All of this is subject to the political tides and election cycles of the Global North. Credit: Flickr/UN Photo/Marie Frechon.
By External Source
ADDIS ABABA / NAIROBI, Jun 25 2025 (IPS)
Imagine investing US$14 billion, or even slightly less, to achieve universal literacy in 17 African countries where more than half the adult population still cannot read or write . Pair that with another US$36 billion to connect Africa’s landlocked nations through 12,000 kilometres of new railway lines along priority transport corridors.
These are not distant ambitions; they are costed, achievable interventions. And even after financing both, donors would still have billions left — if they had honoured the $71.74 billion in aid they pledged to Africa but never delivered.
The truth is the aid system is not “broken.” It’s working the same way it always has. Instead of transforming the Global South, the architecture of the aid system stabilizes the Global North. It protects commercial and foreign interests, rather than prioritizing efforts to end abject poverty
Over the last two decades, G7 and multilateral donors committed $292 billion of aid to Africa. But $71.74 billion of the promised funds were never disbursed. This is not mere bureaucratic slippage, it is Overseas Development Aid (ODA) debt: development funds owed but withheld. It is a debt that undermines the very premise of partnership.
Even when aid does arrive, it’s too short-term to support structural transformation. G7 projects now last an average of just 3.18 years, far below the standard five-year cycles of African national development plans.
In conflict-affected and fragile states, the durations are even shorter. Across all contexts, the problem is compounded by chronic disbursement delays: by year five, one-third of committed aid remains undelivered.
The African Union has declared 2025 the Year of Reparations, a recognition that today’s development crisis cannot be understood without considering centuries of slavery and colonial history and their continuation under the current global economic systems. But reparations are not just about the past.
They directly address the continuing drain on Africa’s potential while dressing up inequality in the language of “aid” and “development cooperation.”
The truth is the aid system is not “broken.” It’s working the same way it always has. Instead of transforming the Global South, the architecture of the aid system stabilizes the Global North. It protects commercial and foreign interests, rather than prioritizing efforts to end abject poverty.
Aid flows are often tied to commercial conditions, such as requiring recipient governments to purchase goods and services from the donor country. These arrangements boost the donor’s exports and support its domestic industries.
At the same time, aid enables donor countries to maintain political influence in strategic regions, aligning development cooperation with their foreign policy goals. It is neither altruism nor an attempt to correct historic injustice. Rather, it is an economic strategy cloaked in moral obligation.
Donors talk about “African capacity” and “ownership,” while retaining the power to decide when, how, and even if the money will arrive. All of this is subject to the political tides and election cycles of the Global North.
We are told to be accountable, yet the aid system itself remains deeply unaccountable. France has proposed slashing its development aid budget by 40%, despite having passed a law this year to increase its aid to meet the UN’s target of at least 0.7% of gross national income dedicated to ODA.
Belgium has announced a 25% cut. Meanwhile, the United States’ sweeping aid reductions have hit Africa particularly hard, undermining programs in health, nutrition, and food security. More Global North countries are expected to follow suit including Germany, the world’s second-largest ODA provider.
These are not isolated policy choices. These are symptoms of a global architecture that was never designed to deliver justice.
This is why the African Union’s Year of Reparations must become a rallying cry. Reparations are not just about colonial theft; they confront the ongoing conditions that perpetuate continued economic exploitation. The same extractive patterns that fuelled slavery and colonial empires now manifest in trade agreements, debt regimes, tax havens, and the aid system.
In this system, “global partnership” often feels more like containment. What is offered as “solidarity” is underpinned by hierarchy. This kind of “support” is not aid – it is managed underdevelopment.
Justice can be pursued through existing global and African-led mechanisms — from UN-led platforms such as the Financing for Development (FfD) process, to emerging African-led financing reforms. This is a call for meaningful political will to reorient the system.
Here’s what must change:
Development cooperation must be grounded in historical obligation and global solidarity, not donor discretion. Africa needs long-term, predictable financing aligned with national priorities, not three-year projects designed in Brussels or Washington.
The 0.7% target cannot remain symbolic. Donor pledges must be backed by binding frameworks, regular reporting, and consequences for non-compliance.
Aid delivery systems must shift control to African institutions. The current model, designed around donor risk management and political optics, must give way to one centred on recipient sovereignty.
Delays in disbursing committed aid are breaches of trust that must carry consequences. There is no justification for donors to operate without accountability when African governments often face penalties or interest for delayed payments.
The $71.74 billion that Africa was promised but never received over the past 20 years could have done so much. It still can – if it is repaid.
Africa is not asking for generosity. It is asserting its right to fairness, redress, and a future shaped on its own terms. Let us not pretend that another accountability dashboard or aid conference will fix this. The system must be reconstructed inclusively and grounded in justice—for Africa.
This article is co-authored by Martha Bekele (Co-founder, DevTransform), based in Addis Ababa, and Vitalice Meja (Executive Director, Reality of Aid – Africa), based in Nairobi.
La Commission prévoit d’assouplir les restrictions sur l’utilisation de substances dangereuses dans les cosmétiques, selon une ébauche de projet de texte visant à simplifier la règlementation sur les substances chimiques.
The post Cosmétiques : Bruxelles envisage d’assouplir les règles sur les substances chimiques dangereuses appeared first on Euractiv FR.
Written by Rebecca Zamponi and Annastiina Papunen.
The European Council meeting on 26-27 June has a full agenda. One year into the new institutional cycle, global affairs have grown tense and unpredictable. Although a discussion on the Middle East was not originally envisaged for the June European Council meeting, the rapidly developing situation in the region will require the EU leaders’ attention. EU leaders are also expected to discuss Ukraine, European defence and security, the EU in the world, competitiveness, migration, Moldova, the Western Balkans, internal security and EU preparedness. Some further items, such as the rules-based international order, may also feature on the agenda.
The discussion on internal reforms in the context of enlargement, envisaged in the Leaders’ Agenda for June, seems to have been postponed to a later date. Despite a full agenda, in his invitation letter European Council President António Costa stressed his intention to keep the meeting to one day.
GeneralThe meeting will start with the customary opening address by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, followed by an exchange of views with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. With Poland’s six-month EU Council presidency coming to an end, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk is likely to provide an overview of its results. Denmark will assume Council leadership on 1 July for six months.
Ahead of the meeting, several key gatherings have taken place: the G7 Leaders’ Summit in Kananaskis, Canada on 16-17 June, the EU-Canada Summit in Brussels on 23 June, and the NATO Summit in The Hague on 24-25 June. The reflections and conclusions are likely to feed into the European Council discussions.
European Council meeting UkraineAt the two most recent European Council meetings (6 March 2025 and 20 March 2025), EU leaders failed to reach a unanimous agreement on Ukraine. Hungary blocked the conclusions, which resulted in the other EU leaders releasing conclusions on Ukraine, agreed to by 26 of the 27 EU Member States. Sanctions is one aspect that the Hungarian Prime Minister has regularly threatened to veto. On 10 June 2025, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and the High Representative Kaja Kallas proposed an 18th package of sanctions against Russia. The package will notably target the oil price cap, the Russian shadow fleet, the banking sector and Nord Stream 1 and 2. As with previous rounds of sanctions against Russia, the European Council is likely to welcome the 18th package if it receives approval from ministers in the Council before the EU leaders meet.
At their meeting, EU leaders are likely to reiterate their condemnation of Russia’s continued attacks against civilian infrastructure in Ukraine and those who support Russia’s war – following reports from President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that Russia was using ballistic missiles made by North Korea. At the May 2025 Council meeting, foreign affairs ministers discussed possible EU security guarantees and military support to Ukraine, namely the initiative by the High Representative to provide Ukraine with 2 million rounds of large calibre ammunition in 2025. It is likely that EU leaders will discuss the military support needs of Ukraine, and maybe also debate possible security guarantees. In March 2025, MEPs adopted a resolution stating that the EU must ‘contribute to robust security guarantees for Ukraine’. In addition, EU leaders may also restate their support for Ukraine’s European path.
Middle EastThe European Council is expected to discuss developments between Israel and Iran. Tensions reignited on 13 June 2025, when Israel launched an attack targeting Iran’s nuclear programme and military targets. Since then, both parties have exchanged attacks – despite calls for restraint. On 22 June, the United States launched strikes against three Iranian nuclear facilities. EU foreign ministers and President Costa called for diplomacy and negotiation.
The European Council will discuss the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza and reiterate some of their previous calls for rapid, safe and unhindered distribution of aid, the unconditional release of all hostages, and a return to the ceasefire, leading to a just and lasting peace based on a two-state solution. EU leaders may welcome the outcome of the Paris Peace Forum, where civil society organisations promoted a two-state solution and peace and security in the region. Moreover, EU leaders may react to the interception by Israeli naval forces of a vessel bringing aid to Gaza. MEP Rima Hassan was onboard, and President Metsola was in contact with Israeli authorities to ensure the safety of Hassan and others on the boat. The Left group, of which Hassan is a member, has called for the immediate release of those who were on the intercepted boat, the immediate suspension of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, and an arms embargo on Israel. Back in February 2024, the leaders of Ireland and Spain had sent a letter to the Commission calling for an urgent review of the EU-Israel Association Agreement. On 7 May 2025, a formal request by the Netherlands, supported by 17 Member States, requested a review of Israel’s compliance with Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement. EU foreign affairs ministers met and discussed developments in the Middle East on 23 June. The outcome of those discussions and the review of the EU-Israel Association Agreement may feed into the European Council discussion on the Middle East.
EU leaders may again discuss the situation in Syria, reiterating previous calls for a ‘peaceful and inclusive transition’ in Syria. They may also welcome the agreement reached in the Council on the lifting of economic sanctions and the introduction of restrictive measures against human rights violators and those driving instability in Syria.
European security and defenceAt the European Council meeting on 20 March 2025, EU leaders committed to discussing all strands of work on the issue of European security and defence at this June meeting. In March, they also invited the Commission and the High Representative to report regularly on progress made in implementing European Council conclusions on defence. Therefore, EU leaders are likely to discuss the implementation of conclusions thus far and give further input where needed.
The four main aspects on security and defence addressed at recent European Council meetings were i) mobilising funding, ii) identifying and addressing capability gaps, iii) strengthening the EU’s defence technological and industrial base, and iv) partnerships. EU leaders are likely to discuss any further developments in these areas. Ahead of the European Council meeting, NATO members met in The Hague. Commitments on defence spending were set to be a key aspect of the meeting; with 23 of the 27 EU Member States also being members of NATO, it is quite likely that discussions in The Hague may feed into the European Council’s security and defence discussions.
EU in the worldThe European Council may discuss other high-level international summits that have taken place in recent days, such as the G7 summit in Canada – the first G7 summit for Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. EU leaders may also discuss upcoming summits and conferences such as the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, to be held in Seville from 30 June to 3 July 2025 and the Ukraine recovery conference in Rome in July. EU leaders will consider their relations with partners across the globe and reiterate their commitment to effective multilateralism and to the rules-based international order with the United Nations at its core. In addition, President Costa will brief EU leaders on his recent visits to Western Balkan countries, which took place in the lead-up to the most recent European Political Community meeting in Albania. Moreover, the European Council is likely to welcome the Commission and the High Representative’s presentation of the joint communication on the European Union’s strategic approach to the Black Sea region, and is expected to reiterate its support for Moldova in connection with the accession process. An EU-Moldova summit will take place in early July 2025. Finally, EU leaders may also discuss developments in Libya and the Sahel region.
CompetitivenessEU leaders are expected to discuss the latest economic developments and their impact on EU competitiveness. The spring economic forecast predicts moderate growth in times of global economic uncertainty: 1.1 % GDP growth in the EU and 0.9 % in the euro area in 2025 – figures similar to 2024. EU leaders are likely also to discuss the strengthening of the international role of the euro. ECB President Christine Lagarde argued recently that this is ‘Europe’s global euro moment’, meaning that the euro could gain greater international prominence. In addition, EU leaders are expected to endorse the Commission’s proposal on Bulgaria adopting the euro on 1 January 2026.
In April 2024, the European Council asked for ‘a new horizontal strategy for a modernised single market’ by June 2025 and reiterated this request in the Budapest Declaration with more specific wording. The strategy, published in May, builds on the Letta and Draghi reports’ recommendations. In this context, EU leaders may also mention the EU startup and scaleup strategy. Furthermore, to strengthen the EU single market in a strategic and quickly developing area, space, ahead of the European Council meeting the Commission is expected to publish an EU space act proposal and a strategy on the space economy. Back in April 2024, the European Council defined space as a sensitive sector in which dependencies should be reduced.
EU leaders are expected to mention simplification and better regulation as means to strengthen competitiveness. Furthermore, securing the supply of affordable and clean energy, also discussed at the March meeting, is essential to making Europe more competitive.
The current global trading situation might also be discussed, as the tariffs by the new US administration are causing disturbance on the markets. The EU is currently negotiating with the US with the aim of reaching ‘zero-for-zero’ tariffs before the 9 July deadline; on that date, the 50 % tariffs which US President Trump has threatened to impose – already postponed from their initial starting date of 1 June – would take effect. However, according to reports, there seems to be no appetite for zero tariffs on the US side, which is considering a 10 % tariff as the baseline for US trading partners. Recently, there has also been a dispute between the US and China concerning rare earth minerals and magnets, which are essential for sectors such as cars, defence and electronics.
In the Budapest Declaration, EU leaders asked the Commission to submit, by June 2025, proposals on ways of strengthening the EU’s technological capabilities and of accelerating the digital transformation, among other things. Some related proposals have been published, such as the AI continent action plan in April, and some are upcoming, such as the EU quantum strategy due in July, the Data Union Strategy in Q3 and the Digital Networks Act in Q4 of 2025. Furthermore, the Commission and the High Representative have published their new joint EU international digital strategy, requested by the European Council at its April 2024 special meeting. The strategy aims to boost both EU competitiveness on key technologies and support EU partners globally in their digital transition.
The European Semester spring package, which provides EU Member States with tailored recommendations to improve their economic performance, was published on 4 June. The European Council usually discusses the country-specific recommendations at its June meeting, to allow the conclusion of the European Semester.
MigrationEU leaders are expected to take stock of progress in implementing its previous conclusions on migration. An important development in this field is the fall in irregular EU border crossings by 20 % in the first five months of 2025, to 63 700, as announced by Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. Despite this, EU leaders are likely to encourage intensification of work on migration. Following the discussions at the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 13 June, the European Council is expected to invite the co-legislators to work on the Commission’s proposal on returns, on the establishment at Union level of a list of safe countries of origin, and on the application of the ‘safe third country’ concept.
As has been the case on previous occasions, President von der Leyen’s letter on migration will inform the discussion. In addition, the European Commission’s progress report on the state of play on the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, published on 11 June, will also feed into the EU leaders’ debate. Nevertheless, despite progress, migration remains a divisive topic at European and national level, as illustrated by the recent collapse of the Dutch coalition government over a disagreement on migration policy.
Internal securityFor the first time since 2021, internal security – which includes the fight against serious and organised crime, terrorism, radicalisation and violent extremism, as well as hybrid threats by state and non-state actors – will be discussed as an own agenda point by EU leaders. On 1 April 2025, the Commission published a new multiannual strategy, ProtectEU, for this policy area. The European Council is expected to call upon EU institutions and Member States to take further action, notably regarding the strengthening of law enforcement and judicial cooperation.
PreparednessFollowing the publication of the EU Preparedness Union Strategy, on 26 March 2025, EU leaders will return to the issue. In line with previous conclusions, EU leaders will encourage further work to enhance the EU’s and its Member States’ resilience, preparedness, and crisis prevention.
Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the European Council meeting on 26-27 June 2025‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.
Current Membership European Council-June 2025L’Union européenne a décidé d’autoriser les subventions aux coûts d’exploitation des entreprises énergivores afin d’empêcher leur délocalisation où l’électricité est moins chère.
The post L’UE assouplit ses règles sur les subventions pour freiner les délocalisations appeared first on Euractiv FR.
Le site de la Coopérative d'aménagement rural (CAR) de Obèkè-Ouèrè, dans la commune d'Adja-Ouèrè, a accueilli ce mardi 24 juin 2025, une campagne de plantation de palmier à huile. La campagne lancée par la secrétaire générale du ministère de l'agriculture, de l'élevage et de la pêche, vise à renouveler les vieilles plantations sur ledit site.
La campagne de plantation de palmier à huile sur le site de la Coopérative d'aménagement rural de Obèkè-Ouèrè, dans la commune d'Adja-Ouèrè, est à sa 6e édition. Pour cette édition, il est prévu la mise en terre de 12.870 plants sélectionnés, à installer sur une superficie de 90 hectares.
Selon les services de communications du gouvernement, au plan national, l'Agence Territoriale de Développement Agricole (ATDA 6), à travers le Programme national de développement de la filière palmier à huile, a mobilisé 1.180.649 plants sélectionnés à installer sur 8.250 hectares. Pour le directeur général de l'ATDA 6, Abdoulaye Chabi ISSA CHABI, il s'agit des plants sélectionnés produits par les pépiniéristes agréés, gage de bons rendements. Il recommande leur utilisation à tous les planteurs.
« La filière palmier à huile a été définitivement relancée avec l'élaboration du Programme National de Développement de la Filière Palmier à Huile, piloté par l'Agence Territoriale de Développement Agricole du Plateau, en collaboration avec les ATDA 4, 5, et 7, les Directions Départementales de l'Agriculture, de l'Élevage et de la Pêche, des pôles contributeurs et l'Institut National des Recherches Agricoles (INRAB) du Bénin à travers le Centre de Recherches Agricoles Plantes Pérennes (...) », a rappelé Madeleine MORA LAFIA, secrétaire générale du ministère de l'agriculture. « Le PAG 2021-2026, permettra de relever à coup sûr de grands défis qui incombent au développement de la filière afin qu'elle retrouve sa première place de culture industrielle d'exportation du pays », a-t-elle fait savoir avant de préciser que plusieurs initiatives visant à promouvoir la filière et à assainir le secteur sont en cours.
Pour Aminou LADOKE, représentant de la Coopérative, près de 150 hectares de vielles plantations de palmier à huile sont abattues et sont replantées progressivement sur leur site. Durant les campagnes précédentes, (2022, 2023 et 2024), près de 13.900 jeunes plants de palmier sélectionnés sont mis en terre, soit environ 97 hectares, a-t-il rappelé avant d'exprimer ses remerciements au président TALON pour avoir sorti définitivement les CAR de leurs crises perpétuelles, relançant ainsi la filière palmier à huile.
F. A. A.
La Commission européenne a présenté un nouveau dispositif facilitant les aides d’État des pays membres de l’UE pour développer les technologies bas carbone, y compris le nucléaire, face à la concurrence de la Chine et des États-Unis.
The post L’UE simplifie les aides d’État pour les technologies vertes et le nucléaire appeared first on Euractiv FR.
La Commission propose cinq nouveaux domaines politiques de cohésion, dont la défense. Les critiques affirment que les priorités traditionnelles de la cohésion territoriale sont désormais confrontées au risque d'un pivot politique générationnel.
The post Politique de cohésion : certains craignent un financement discret de la défense appeared first on Euractiv FR.