Africa

IOM teams are assessing damage and delivering life-saving support to those in urgent need after a devastating earthquake in Afghanistan. Credit: IOM

By Jennifer Xin-Tsu Lin Levine
UNITED NATIONS, Sep 5 2025 (IPS)

United Nations aid organizations are rallying after a series of earthquakes and powerful aftershocks wreaked unprecedented havoc across eastern Afghanistan—particularly in the mountainous provinces of Kunar and Nangarhar.

Preliminary reports show that at least 1,400 people were killed and more than 3,100 injured. Widespread destruction of homes and critical infrastructure has displaced thousands more, while rockfalls and landslides have slowed rescue teams’ efforts to reach remote communities.

In response, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) released 10 million US Dollars within hours of the earthquake to provide shelter, food, water, child protection, and healthcare.

Countries including the United Kingdom and South Korea have pledged money through the United Nations—the UK does not recognize the Taliban government. Working alongside OCHA, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) is working with local partners to link immediate humanitarian assistance with long-term recovery and resilience-building strategies. The United Nations is also preparing an emergency appeal, with an initial USD 5 million from the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) already released.

UNHCR’s partner, AREWO, assesses the needs of the population affected by the earthquake that hit the region on 31 August. Credit: UNHCR/ARWEO

Despite these rapid mobilizations, questions remain about whether the flow of aid can be sustained. Tom Fletcher, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, warned, “This is the latest crisis to expose the cost of shrinking resources on vital humanitarian work. Massive funding cuts have already brought essential health and nutrition services for millions to a halt, grounded aircraft, which are often the only lifeline to remote communities, and forced aid agencies to reduce their footprint.”

He urged donors to “once again” step up for the people of Afghanistan, rallying resources for those in need.

Against this backdrop of urgency and shrinking resources, UNDP officials have sought to outline a vision for recovery that extends beyond immediate survival.

Stephen Rodriguez, UNDP’s resident representative in Afghanistan, addresses a UN press conference via videolink on the impact of the earthquakes on the country and its people. Credit: Jennifer Xin-Tsu Lin Levine/IPS

Stephen Rodriguez, UNDP’s resident representative in Afghanistan, emphasized that the country is facing a “perfect economic storm.”

In a press briefing, he shared data from the UN’s 25 assessment teams showing that 84,000 people have been affected by the earthquake so far.

Rodriguez also detailed the UNDP’s initiative of “community-driven recovery,” which includes cash support for families clearing rubble and rebuilding homes. Pointing to the success of a similar community-oriented approach after the 2023 earthquake in Herat, he called on member states to join the initiative in “building back better,” improving infrastructure and uniting communities.

Both Rodriguez and other UN representatives also addressed the additional challenges created by restrictions on women and girls in Afghanistan and how they affect UN work.

Aid groups are barred from recruiting female aid workers, and as UN Women Afghanistan Special Representative Susan Ferguson said, “women and girls could miss out on lifesaving assistance or information in the days ahead.”

However, Rodriguez denied any organized effort to block women’s access to humanitarian services and medical aid. He described reports of women being prevented from getting emergency medical care as “isolated incidents… rather than a systematic restriction.”

Despite these concerns and the reluctance of some countries to channel funds through Afghanistan’s authorities, UN officials stressed that the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, and independence remain central to their engagement with the Taliban.

Rodriguez recalled difficulties during the 2023 earthquake recovery that have since been resolved and stated that closer coordination has enabled aid to reach mountainous areas with the Taliban’s helicopters.

He called the “growth” in the relationship between the UN and the Taliban “exemplary,” citing their “full understanding that humanity comes first, tending to those most in need, irrespective of ethnicity, of gender, of anything else.”

For now, the focus remains on immediate survival—reaching those trapped beneath debris or isolated from aid, providing food and clean water, and preventing disease outbreaks. But UN officials emphasize that rebuilding shattered homes and livelihoods will require far more than emergency aid—it necessitates sustained support and long-term commitment.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Excerpt:

After a series of earthquakes and aftershocks struck Afghanistan this week, the United Nations and its member states have been prioritizing “community-driven recovery.”

By CIVICUS
Sep 5 2025 (IPS)

 
CIVICUS discusses recent protests in Angola with Florindo Chivucute, founder and executive director of Friends of Angola, a US-based civil society organisation established in 2014 that works to promote democracy, human rights and good governance in Angola.

The Angolan government’s 1 July decision to remove diesel subsidies, sharply pushing up public transport costs, triggered a series of protests. Angola is one of Africa’s biggest oil producers, but many have seen little benefit from its oil wealth and continue to live in poverty. People have taken to the streets in unprecedented numbers to demand an end to corruption and mismanagement, presenting the ruling party, in power for 50 years, with its biggest test. Security forces have responded to incidences of looting and vandalism with lethal violence. At least 30 people have been killed, 277 injured and over 1,500 arrested.

What triggered the protests?

Fuel subsidy cuts sparked the crisis. The protests began on 28 July, after the government’s decision to remove diesel subsidies immediately pushed up fuel prices. What started as a drivers’ strike in Luanda, the capital, quickly spread to other provinces and escalated into bigger protests.

The impact was devastating. For many families, even a small rise in fuel costs is crushing, because wages have been eroded by years of recession and currency devaluation. When transport costs rise, food prices and school fees rise too, leaving those already struggling unable to make ends meet.

But fuel was just the trigger. The unrest reflected much deeper frustrations, including high unemployment, particularly among young people, growing poverty and anger at corruption and mismanagement. People see public resources channelled into luxury spending and infrastructure deals benefiting a few powerful figures connected to the ruling People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), while basic services and jobs are neglected. Combined with the immediate shock of higher fuel prices, these grievances fuelled widespread anger.

Why are people struggling in such a resource-rich country?

This is the irony at the heart of the crisis. Angola produces large quantities of oil, along with diamonds, yet most people don’t see the benefits. Mismanagement and entrenched corruption are central to the problem. Revenues from natural resources have too often been captured by networks close to political power and channelled abroad or invested in ways that don’t create jobs.

Angola’s dependence on fuel imports makes the situation worse. We don’t have sufficient domestic refining capacity. Instead of using oil revenues to build refineries and strengthen local industry, a system emerged in which those with political connections profited from importing refined products back into the country. This removed incentives to invest in local processing or agriculture. The result is a tiny wealthy elite and a large majority with very low wages and limited access to services.

What do these protests reveal about the government’s grip on power?

The protests have marked a turning point. The MPLA has dominated politics since independence in 1975, and large-scale protests are not common. The fact that so many people were willing to take to the streets, particularly in and around the capital, shows growing discontent with the government and ruling party.

The authorities’ reaction has been heavy-handed. Security forces have used teargas and live ammunition in some cases, and carried out numerous arrests, including of union leaders and journalists. In some areas protests were accompanied by looting and, tragically, by deadly clashes with security forces. Civil society has since called for investigations into the killings and for accountability for those responsible.

The government’s strategy risks backfiring. By responding with force and detentions, it risks creating a greater sense of mistrust and frustration, which could influence how people engage with political processes as we approach the 2027 election.

How is civil society organising and what challenges does it face?

Civil society – including church groups, trade unions and local associations — has mobilised quickly to call for accountability and transparency. New coalitions are forming; for example, groups such as the Bishops’ Conference of Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe’s Episcopal Commission for Justice and Peace, Friends of Angola, the Justice, Peace and Democracy Association and Pro Bono Angola are working with religious organisations to push for investigations into the killings and provide humanitarian support to families affected by the unrest.

But the environment is hostile. Funding for democracy and human rights work is scarce, so organisations struggle to pay staff or sustain programmes.

State surveillance creates another barrier. The state has invested heavily in surveillance infrastructure, and civil society organisations are often targeted by cyber intrusions and closely monitored. The legacy of communist authoritarian rule creates deep mistrust, which makes organising more difficult.

Language barriers limit international support. Much of the work happens in Portuguese, which limits reach to the wider international audience that often communicates in English, French or Spanish.

Additional restrictions threaten to further tighten civic space. Recent draconian measures include the 2024 National Security Bill and the Bill on the Crime of Vandalism of Public Goods and Services. In addition, the 2023 draft law on Non-Governmental Organizations, approved by presidential decree, imposed harsh regulations. These restrictive laws and policies undermine fundamental freedoms and, if fully implemented, risk worsening the already limited environment for civil society in Angola.

What would it take to address the underlying problems?

Strong political will is needed to tackle corruption and manage public finances transparently. This means opening up procurement and fiscal data, pursuing accountability for past abuses, and ensuring resource revenues are channelled into public priorities such as hospitals, local industry and schools. Investment in education, healthcare and small-scale agriculture would create jobs, strengthen livelihoods and reduce dependence on imports.

Institutional reform is equally vital. This means protecting property rights, improving the business environment so investment generates employment and strengthening an independent judiciary and electoral processes so people can seek change through democratic channels.

International partners have a role to play by supporting electoral transparency and demanding accountability from companies and governments that operate in Angola.

The 2027 election will offer a crucial test. The international community should pay close attention and support reforms that increase transparency and electoral integrity. Electoral reforms and the clear, public release of results at the local level would go a long way towards restoring confidence in democratic processes.

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SEE ALSO
Angola: ‘Criticising the government means risking arbitrary detention, intimidation and physical assault’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Pedro Paka 30.Jul.2025
Angola: Repressive new laws threaten civic space CIVICUS Monitor 15.Sep.2024
Angola: ‘The untrue government narrative reveals an aversion to civil society denouncing malpractice’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Emilio José Manuel 01.Jan.2025

 

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Football legends George Weah and Didier Drogba are among the high-profile names on a new Fifa panel which aims to bolster efforts to tackle racism in the game.

The group has allegedly carried out murder, rape and other crimes, a UN report says.

It remains unclear how many people died - figures range from two to 1,000.

Elephants at the Kappukadu elephant rehabilitation center in Kottoor.

By Bharath Thampi
NEW DELHI, Sep 5 2025 (IPS)

In the early part of this year, two deaths in Kerala garnered major media attention. A farmer in Wayanad and a female plantation worker in Idukki were killed in two separate events, within a matter of a few days, by wild elephants.

Arikomban, another wild elephant, has become a media favorite recently due to his brushes with human settlements near his habitat. Named so because of his love for ari (rice), the elephant had been relocated from Kerala to Tamil Nadu in 2023 following constant protests from people who also claimed him to be ‘life-threatening.’ Kerala’s news outlets widely covered Arikomban’s relocation.

These aren’t one-off cases in Kerala, which has seen a spike in human–wildlife conflict, especially involving elephants.

According to a news report, 451 people have been killed in wildlife conflicts in the past five years alone in the state, with 102 of them caused by elephants.

However, wildlife biologists and environmentalists have been at odds with the narratives promoted by the media and society regarding what constitutes conflict.

“I think we shouldn’t be using the terminology ‘wildlife conflict’ itself. I would prefer addressing it as ‘negative wildlife interaction,’” says Dr. P.S. Easa, who holds a PhD on Elephant Ecology and Behavior and is a member of the National Board for Wildlife and the IUCN, Asian Elephant Specialist Group.

The conflict between wild animals and humans has been going on for centuries, and what we witness in the current era has been influenced by the transformation in the behavior of both these groups, as well as humans’ perception towards wildlife in general, he adds.

In Kerala’s social framework, the rising phenomenon of human–elephant conflict takes on a much deeper and more complex meaning than the broader topic of conflict with wildlife. Elephants have been an integral part of Kerala’s culture and tradition for centuries—domesticated not just for heavy labor but also as part of temple festivals. In the last few decades, machines have replaced elephants in much of the labor environment in the state, yet the land giants continue to be a part of the festival parades. Animal behavioral experts and activists have been consistently raising their voices against this practice in this century, citing the need to treat elephants as solely wild animals.

Easa refuses to even use the term “domesticated” for them.

“Captive elephants are the only right way to address them in this age and time,” he says.

In 2024 alone, there had been nine reported deaths in Kerala by such captive elephants. The Hindu reported six such deaths, including an elephant mahout, within the first two months of this year. Although there have been stricter rules and regulations in recent years on using captive elephants for temple festivals, they have mostly been restricted to paper. The religious nature of the festivals that these elephants are made to be a part of makes the topic even more sensitive, and political parties tend to stay away from addressing the issue.

Kerala’s elephant reserves have been categorized mainly into four regions, namely Wayanad, Nilambur, Anamudi, and Periyar. Periyar Reserve had the highest count of elephants, followed by the Anamudi Reserve. According to the Kerala Government’s Forest Statistics and the report of the ‘Wild Elephants Census of Kerala,’ the four reserves have a combined total extent of 11,199.049 sq. km., out of which only 1,576.339 sq. km. is assessed to be devoid of elephant population. According to a 2024 official assessment, Kerala had an elephant population of just under 1800, a decline of more than 100 from the previous year.

As Kerala’s elephant reserves border the neighboring states of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, natural factors that affect the elephant population, like extreme drought and heavy, abrupt rainfall, influence the elephants’ migration across the states during the year.

In Kerala, particularly, shrinking forest habitats caused by deforestation and the increasing presence of human settlements in regions historically occupied by elephant populations, coupled with climate change and the invasive plant species erasing the elephants’ natural food sources, are some of the factors causing unnatural elephant migration, according to experts, and as a consequence, resulting in frequent interactions with humans.

The phrase “descent of wildlife into human settlements” itself is a misnomer, Eesa says.

“In almost all such cases, human settlements had crossed over to those places where the wildlife had existed peacefully before. Wayanad and Idukki are classic examples of this.”

“There was a report that I had come across a while ago—of an ‘elephant attack’ that happened in Sholayar Forest Reserve. Look at the irony of that news. It’s a forest reserve—the habitat belongs to the elephant, not the people who were driving through it. What I’m saying is, every time an elephant conflict is reported, you need to dissect all the circumstances surrounding it. Where—was it within the jungle or outside it? When was it, during the daytime or at night? And how? What were the circumstances leading up to the interaction?” he explains.

The drastic increase in food waste owing to tourism in Kerala has been another factor for wild animals encroaching into human spaces lately. Elephants, wild boars, and monkeys have been observed to have come to human settlements to feed on the food waste.

There is no one, foolproof method to resolve the human–elephant conflict, scientists opine. Easa points out that several techniques that had been fruitful in African countries proved ineffective when used in countries like Sri Lanka and Indonesia.

A mahout is seen riding a captive elephant. Kerala continues to make use of elephants for temple festivals and parades.

Wildlife biologist Sreedhar Vijayakrishnan, in an interview given to Mongabay in 2023, suggests five main long-term measures that will help mitigate human-elephant conflict. This includes initiating long-term studies to understand elephant movements and spatiotemporal patterns of conflict, which will help ascertain where and how interventions are required; tracking areas of elephant movement and identifying regions of intense use while installing alert lights at vantage points that can be triggered in case of elephant sightings; raising awareness among local populations to discourage feeding elephants or unwanted interactions; training local rapid response teams to prevent negative interactions and indiscriminate drives; and fitting satellite collars on elephants that frequently cause issues.

Kerala also has an elephant rehabilitation center established in Kottoor, Thiruvananthapuram, for rescuing, rehabilitating, and protecting both captive and wild elephants. The state, like other forest reserves in India, has historically chosen to turn many of the captured conflict-making elephants into ‘Kumkis’ (a Kumki elephant is a specially trained and domesticated elephant used in rescue operations and to train other wild elephants and manage wildlife conflict).

Apart from the above, one of the most effective measures that has been implemented in Kerala is through the Wayanad Elephant Conflict Mitigation Project by the Wildlife Trust of India (WTI). The project, first initiated in 2002–2003 by WTI, has evolved into a successful model for tackling human–elephant conflict in Kerala. The model has focused on relocating human settlements from places identified as ‘elephant corridors’ in the Wayanad district of Kerala. Wayanad, spanning a total of 2,131 sq. km., has an elephant reserve spread over 1,200 sq. km., with an elephant density of 0.25 elephants/sq. km.

Shajan M.A., a Senior Field Officer with WTI who handles the project currently, tells me, “Our method is to buy such sensitive land from the people, including both tribal and other communities, and relocate them to safer regions, away from wildlife conflict.” Ultimately, WTI hands over the purchased land to the Kerala Forest Department.

In regions like the Tirunelli–Kudrakote elephant corridor, the human–elephant conflict had escalated so much that it had resulted in several human deaths. For the communities, leaving a land they had occupied for decades and considered home is never easy, Shajan acknowledges. But of all the tried and tested methods to deal with the human–wildlife conflict, this approach has been the most effective in the long run, he points out.

Shajan also muses on the question of what exactly comprises a ‘conflict.’

“Conflict can hold different meanings. From a monkey stealing food from the house to a tiger or an elephant attack on a human, even leading to deaths, it’s all considered a human–wildlife conflict. Sadly, we, as a society, tend to be reactive once it transforms into a conflict and place the blame wholly on the wildlife.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Fatou Diene, an oyster farmer in the mangroves near Dionewar Island, Senegal. Across the globe, farmers are adopting low-emission practices, restoring degraded lands, and protecting biodiversity. With the right support, they can do much more. Credit: ©FAO/Sylvain Cherkaoui

By Kaveh Zahedi
ROME, Sep 5 2025 (IPS)

Despite absorbing a quarter of climate-related losses and having the potential to reduce one-third of global emissions, agrifood systems receive less than 8% of climate finance. This imbalance threatens progress in addressing global climate challenges. If we’re serious about solutions, we need to start where the impact—and the promise—is greatest: investing in the systems that feed the world.

As countries move forward along the Baku to Belem Roadmap and the collective goal of mobilizing $1.3 trillion in climate finance by 2030, a critical juncture is fast approaching. At the upcoming Standing Committee on Finance Forum, to be held at the headquarters of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in Rome, governments will have a chance to correct this imbalance – and seize an opportunity that is already yielding results.

No serious path to achieve climate goals exists without agriculture. Yet despite this central role, the sector remains chronically overlooked in climate finance strategies and often is associated only with high perceived risks instead of its potential.

No serious path to achieve climate goals exists without agriculture. Yet despite this central role, the sector remains chronically overlooked in climate finance strategies and often is associated only with high perceived risks instead of its potential

The result is a persistent underinvestment in one of the few areas where mitigation, adaptation, and development gains can be achieved together—and at scale. Strategic investments in agriculture can strengthen national resilience, deliver measurable climate mitigation, reduce inequality, and expand economic opportunities.

Small-scale producers, who grow a third of the world’s food, received less than 1% of climate finance in the most recent two-year window. Livestock systems, which are major contributors to methane emissions, drew just 2% of climate development funding in 2023.

This gap represents a missed opportunity to accelerate progress on climate, food security, and livelihoods – especially in vulnerable regions.

We know what works. Between 2000 and 2022, emissions per value of agricultural production declined by 39%. Smarter, more efficient food systems are already taking shape. While current emissions from the agriculture sector are a major concern, these early successes demonstrate the potential of large-scale investments.

When we invest in agrifood systems, we are doing more than reducing emissions. We are expanding access to nutritious food, creating jobs in rural communities, increasing productivity, and restoring ecosystems. These are compound gains, spanning development and climate priorities alike.

Unlocking this potential will require deploying the full range of financing tools. The $1.3 trillion target cannot be met through public finance alone. It will require a mix of public, private, and domestic resources, aligned with countries’ needs and grounded in strong partnerships. Bilateral and multilateral finance will continue to play an important role.

Recent debt relief initiatives, including those from the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, are also expected to help countries create the fiscal space needed to prioritize agrifood transformation.

The private sector is beginning to respond. From 2016 to 2021, climate-focused blended finance transactions targeting smallholder farmers grew from 26% to 36%, with 60% achieving both adaptation and mitigation benefits.

But this momentum must be sustained and expanded. Private investors still face real barriers: limited data, unclear policies, and a lack of investment-ready projects. Initiatives like FAO’s Green Climate Fund Readiness Programme are helping countries close those gaps and attracting greater capital into agricultural transformation.

Carbon markets offer another avenue to unlock value. Properly designed, they can reward farmers and rural communities for climate-positive practices. But current structures in voluntary carbon markets fall short.

As of 2023, agrifood projects made up just 1% of credits from voluntary carbon markets, with three-quarters concentrated in five countries. Smallholders and low-income economies are effectively excluded.

New global mechanisms under the Paris Agreement Article 6 offer a chance to reset this system. Countries need support to prepare robust measurement frameworks, reliable data and inventories, and inclusive governance. With the support from the Global Environment Facility in over 70 countries, this foundation is already being laid.

There are also powerful opportunities in optimizing how existing public funds are spent. Modelling in 6 Sub-Saharan countries shows that reallocations across different policy-support measures can generate additional agrifood GDP growth points, create almost a million off-farm jobs, lift more than 2 million people out of poverty, and reduce more than 700,000 tons of greenhouse gas emissions.

This is not unique to a country. Through the GEF Food Systems Integrated Programme, co-led by FAO and IFAD, countries around the world are finding ways to make public budgets go further—generating climate benefits, economic growth, and social inclusion at once.

The challenge before us is simple to state, but difficult to resolve. Mobilizing climate finance is not simply a function of volume but also of the quality of the investments and the people it serves.

Without greater ambition, climate finance will not flow at the necessary scale and with the appropriate instruments. But climate ambition will stall unless finance reaches the sectors most capable of delivering transformation.

The Rome forum is a critical moment. It is a chance to align climate finance with climate opportunity. Through partnerships like the Food and Agriculture for Sustainable Transformation (FAST) Partnership and with a growing coalition of public and private actors, we can mobilize new resources, build better systems, and deliver real outcomes.

Farmers are already leading the way. Across the globe, they are adopting low-emission practices, restoring degraded lands, and protecting biodiversity. With the right support, they can do much more.

The window for action is narrowing. But the opportunity in agriculture is wide open. The question now is whether we will invest in it – at the scale and speed this moment demands.

Excerpt:

Kaveh Zahedi is the Director of the Office of Climate Change, Biodiversity and Environment at the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)

Playing for your country is the best feeling in the world, says Sak. But he never expected to get called up.

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A selection of best photos from across the continent and beyond from 29 August till 4 September 2025.

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Plastic waste washed up on a beach in India. Credit: Ocean Image Bank/Srikanth Man
 
The international push for consensus on a legally binding deal to end plastic pollution proved beyond the grasp of weary UN Member States meeting in Geneva in mid-August, as they agreed to resume discussions at a future date, according to UN News.
 
“This has been a hard-fought 10 days against the backdrop of geopolitical complexities, economic challenges and multilateral strains,” said Inger Andersen, Executive Director of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). “However, one thing remains clear: despite these complexities, all countries clearly want to remain at the table.”

By Craig Boljkovac
GENEVA, Sep 5 2025 (IPS)

The debacle that was the latest round of negotiations for a global treaty on plastics (including in the marine environment); known as “INC 5.2” has already been written about at length by many colleagues on all sides of the issues. Despite all the very informative posts, articles, and other analyses, I believe I have several key observations to make, particularly about the process to-date.

After being absent from the previous two INCs (INC-4 and INC-5), I may have a slightly different perspective from those who have been completely immersed in the process all the way along. I managed to observe virtually every (painful) minute of INC 5.2, and, below, I list some things that participants may want to consider as the process continues.

Backing up a bit, for those who may be less familiar with the issue, we clearly have a problem with plastics globally. Mounting evidence of the presence of plastics and a clear lack of recycling capacities: from blatantly visible plastics in the marine environment (massive floating gyres of overwhelmingly plastic garbage in our oceans – particularly in but not limited to the Pacific) to the presence of microplastics in our bodies (and those of wildlife as well), including in the placenta and mother’s milk, and the use of clearly harmful chemicals (such as endocrine disrupters released when certain plastics are used) in the manufacture of at least some plastics – has led to decisions on the international level that merely complement significant action at other levels of governance that are already in place.

This situation resulted in the decision, from March, 2022, by the UN Environment Programme’s UN Environment Assembly, to pass a resolution authorizing a negotiating process (the “Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee, or INC) to realize a global plastics treaty by 2024 (a highly ambitious timeline that, to many, was likely unachievable).

And, here we are, late in 2025, after six unsuccessful negotiation sessions and some preparatory work, without an agreed treaty text, and with, it seems, a wide gulf of differences between UN member states that seems, frankly, virtually unbridgeable.

Much has been written about the various positions of UN Members States, who have informally organized themselves (for the negotiations) into the “Like-Minded Group” of countries that want the treaty to focus mainly on waste management and not impinge on their plans to not only maintain, but greatly expand plastics production; and the “High Ambition Coalition” countries who, in part, want a strong global treaty that addresses plastics at all stages of their life cycle, severely limit “single-use plastics” and include human health concerns, particularly with regard to the harmful effects of chemical inputs to plastics production (which the “Like-Mindeds” reject, particularly for what some delegations say is a clear lack of evidence of harm to human health and the environment).

In my long experience with international environmental negotiations under the UN rubric, such differences in positions are not unprecedented, and have been solved by having a team of negotiators that are solutions-oriented, and a secretariat (the UN staff assigned to coordinate and facilitate the negotiations) and chair (usually a diplomat or high-level civil servant from an environment or similar ministry) that work together to bridge differences in a transparent, inclusive, and participatory manner, where trust is built over time and solutions are eventually found.

Something is clearly blocking the process. The secretariat and bureau (including the chair, in particular) have shown commitment, but the goal of an agreed treaty, despite the presentation of many textual proposals by negotiators, several chairs’ drafts, and some movement on at least some of the issues, has not been realized over six energy- and resource-intensive negotiation sessions.

Why is this the case? A few thoughts/observations from my side (the list is not comprehensive):

1) Apart from some closed events earlier on in the negotiations, there now seems to be an almost total lack of intersessional activities (both formal and informal) essential for the further building of trust and understanding of each other’s positions (although some may be planned but are not yet announced). Regional efforts, in particular, might help to bridge some of the wide differences that are apparent, even within regions (where there is clearly a lack of consensus as well).

2) There has been a clear lack of transparency and communication in/from both subsidiary groups (such as contact groups, where various issues are “unpacked” and grouped for more detailed negotiations) and, more significantly and consistently, at the broader level (directly led by the chair/bureau and supported by the secretariat) such as plenary sessions (which were few and far between and even resoundingly brief – one was 43 seconds at the latest INC). Relatively untransparent processes have worked in the past (such as with the climate change negotiations); but from what I understand there was more trust and confidence in the chair/bureau and secretariat than exists in our present negotiations.

3) The chair, bureau and secretariat were always present, but rarely available. The absence of regular plenary sessions was keenly felt. There was also a clear lack of consistency in the way contact groups operated – some put textual proposals on a screen for all to see and negotiate with; while others simply heard interventions and then came out with proposals for text at the very end (not the most transparent of ways to operate!). In addition, there was a heavy reliance on informal negotiations throughout (this became apparent with news, in the final plenary, of a long, closed negotiation on the final day chaired by Chile and Japan). A lot seemed to be going on, but only a limited number of participants (including a fair number of government delegations that I conversed with) seemed only vaguely aware of them, if at all.

4) During the course of this, the sixth negotiating session, positions taken by both the Like-Minded Group and the High Ambition Coalition more closely resembled opening salvos that one might expect would be typical of the early stages of negotiations – not positions that would still be raised at such a late stage, when one would expect at least some compromises to have been made along the way. To me, this is symptomatic of a lack of trust in the process to-date.

This apparent situation (lack of clear negotiating milestones/organization, lack of visibility of the chair and lack of transparency) seems to have, in my opinion, possibly been used by delegations to hold back on reaching any sort of even basic compromises.

How to solve this as we try to move forward?

1) Make every possible attempt to put into place a proper, formal, and transparent intersessional process (along with informal and regional activities as needed), even if it results in a significant delay until the next INC (5.3). A rumour is going round that INC 5.3 may be scheduled for February, 2026. In my opinion this is far too soon if a properly designed intersessional process, focused on bridging the key gaps and reaching some sort of consensus, at least informally, is to be realized. An adequate “break” is needed to clearly think through all the options. If needed, even keep bringing in the UN Secretary-General to “knock heads together” to find some compromises in advance of the next negotiations. And report back to all INC participants regarding the process of intersessional work on a regular basis.

2) Hold in-depth “debriefs” and “lessons learned” sessions for the secretariat and bureau, with additional participants from the INCs who have valuable observations to contribute (both from government and observer delegations). A suggested focus could be on how to expand the obvious organizational strengths of the secretariat into other areas, such as a finer level of facilitation aimed at bridging differences among delegations through improved intersessional activities (see 1), above).

3) Without formally reopening the original (2022) resolution, seek backing from UNEA-7 for the original mandate (since delegations have clearly not followed the original resolution, particularly regarding the scope of the convention, during the INCs. A complementary resolution which could guide member states towards a possible framework convention would also allow negotiation of the difficult and time-consuming issues in a more extended, party-based process.

4) Once experiences and lessons learned are gathered, consider holding a special, more internally-focused intersessional process between secretariat and the chair and bureau, in order to have a detailed set of lessons learned so far, and to try to readjust the relationship as we move forward. Perhaps such a process could have a trusted and even renowned external facilitator that could help find some new and more effective way of working together. Such trust-building exercises were essential in other forums that I have participated in (although they were done more up-front, towards the beginnings of such processes, it’s never too late!).

5) At the next, eventual INC (presumably 5.3 will take place), put into place more plenary time (at least brief plenaries) where regular updates can be given. This would display more transparency, potentially build more confidence in the process, and benefit small delegations in particular, who cannot cover the breadth of different negotiations we saw in previous INCs.

In conclusion, there is no doubt in my mind that we have a huge task still at hand, but not an insurmountable one. Recently, Forbes published what I think is a fantastic, forward-looking piece that basically says the “train has left the station” for the plastics industry. Even if the global process fails (which I firmly believe will not happen), at other levels of governance from California to the EU and beyond, clear commitments have been made that are even above and beyond the current UNEA mandate.

This will drive the investments and planning of the industry for decades to come. The writing is on the wall. Now is the time to find compromises at the global level (even a framework treaty like the Paris Agreement on climate change would be a good start!) to ensure a sustainable future for all in this field. Otherwise, we may be facing a failure that results in a long-term stalemate where no treaty (or alternative) is agreed for the foreseeable future.

1 https://www.forbes.com/sites/trondarneundheim/2025/08/16/plastics-manufacturing-at-crossroads-pivot-to-lead-or-lose/

Craig Boljkovac is a Geneva-based Senior Advisor with a Regional Centre for the Basel and Stockholm Conventions, and an independent international environmental consultant with over 35 years of experience in relevant fields. His opinions are his own. He has participated in several INCs and related meetings for the global plastics agreement.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Google's first data center in Chile lies in the industrial sector of the municipality of Quilicura, on the northern outskirts of Santiago. It has no symbols or logos to identify it, but covers an extensive area. Water vapor is visibly emitted as part of the process to cool the servers. Credit: Orlando Milesi / IPS

By Orlando Milesi
SANTIAGO, Sep 4 2025 (IPS)

Chile wants to be a hub in Latin America in data storage and transmission by developing data centers, leveraging its wealth of renewable energy, and its optimal digital interconnection.

In contrast, the massive water required for cooling servers and resistance from social and local organizations who were not consulted are the main obstacles in this strategy.

The authorities are promoting a tech hub, as the concentrator or logistical connection point for centralizing numerous nodes of a computer network is called, where companies, investments, and talent converge.“Chile's technological development is at a turning point that will define our position as a relevant player in the region. In the future, this could mean having the capacity to host infrastructure for training large artificial intelligence models”–Andrés Díaz.

A key step in this direction is the National Data Center Plan (PData), launched by the government of leftist president Gabriel Boric in December 2024.

PData complemented the Cybersecurity Framework Law, enacted in April 2024, which established minimum requirements for the prevention, containment, resolution, and response to cybersecurity incidents, applicable to state agencies and private companies.

PData aims to position this elongated South American country as a Latin American hub for data centers.

It was launched 10 months after an environmental court in Santiago, the capital of this country of 18.4 million people, halted a multi-million dollar Google project in the municipality of Cerrillos, on the outskirts of Santiago, preventing it from using water to cool its servers.

The stoppage was a victory for residents organized in the Socio-Environmental Community Movement for Water and Territory (Mosacat), an environmental coalition that emerged in Cerrillos.

Google had announced it would modify the cooling system to use less than the planned 169 liters of water per second. But, following the court decision, it suspended the project and a US$40 million investment in what would have been its second data center in the country, after the one operating since 2015 in Quilicura, also on the outskirts of Santiago.

Tania Rodriguez, a spokesperson for Mosacat, praised the strength of the residents to “convince a multinational that its project was not possible with such scarce water resources. Companies are the ones that must become aware of the excessive use of our resources,” she stated in an interview with a union media outlet.

New reality

To promote data centers, the Boric government brought all interested parties together and managed to finalize PData, with the goal of providing certainty to all sectors and enabling their massive installation in the country.

Chile has abundant low-cost renewable energy, 62,000 kilometers of optical fiber, a network of 69,000 kilometers of submarine cables, as well as 3.8 million devices connected to the 5G network.

Alejandro Barros, a professor of engineering and researcher at the Public Systems Center  of Industrial Engineering at the public University of Chile, told IPS that the main lesson after the crisis with Google was the need to equip Chile with a public policy for the establishment and management of data centers.

According to Barros, PData “advances very significantly by establishing the governance model for these projects because multiple state institutions will be involved. How synergy and coordination is achieved across all sectors linked to these projects is relevant.”

“My concern is that the plan was presented at the end of an administration,” he said, recalling that Boric’s term concludes in March 2026.

“The question is what will the next administration do. Data centers will have to be built, but how do we agree so that Chile meets standards, has good dialogue with communities, and we don’t start from scratch again?” he asks.

Google’s fenced and patrolled data center in Quilicura, on the outskirts of Santiago, where huge water tanks are visible. The tech company was unable to establish another data center in the Chilean capital due to a court ruling against the massive use of water. Credit: Orlando Milesi / IPS

Microsoft installs its regional cloud

In 2017, there were six data center projects in Chile. Today, 38 are in operation.

It seems more likely that companies of various sizes will export data and processed information from Chile to meet external demand.

According to Fitzgerald Cantero, Director of Studies and Projects at the  Latin American Energy Organization  (Olade), the growth in the use of artificial intelligence will exceed an annual rate of 31% by 2029.

In the Latin American region, 78% of data centers are currently concentrated in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico.

During the Data Centers and Energy forum, organized by the Institute of the Americas  and held in Santiago on August 21, Cantero said that investment in artificial intelligence in 2025 will be 7 billion dollars and will jump to 10 billion in 2029.

Juan Carlos Olmedo, Chile’s electrical coordinator, stated at the forum that the electrical energy required by data centers in this country will quadruple by 2032, rising from the current 325 megawatts (MW) to 1,360.

On June 18, Microsoft opened its first Data Center Region in Santiago to support economic growth, technological innovation, and social development, indicated the transnational tech company.

According to Microsoft, this state-of-the-art infrastructure will provide digital services to businesses and public organizations, improving their speed, privacy, security, and data storage in compliance with local regulations and high availability

The new network of data centers, called the Microsoft Cloud Region, is also located in Santiago, consisting of three independent physical locations, each with one or more data centers, and will provide services to several South American countries.

According to the U.S.-based software developer, the opening of this regional Data Center will generate US$35.3 billion in net income over the next four years, both for Microsoft and for partners and customers using its cloud.

“Of that total, approximately US$3.3 billion will be invested directly in Chile, contributing to this country’s development and creating about 81,041 jobs between 2025 and 2029,” detailed the tech company.

At the time, Boric expressed his joy for this new project, calling it a show of confidence for Chile to continue integrating and transforming into a major tech hub in Latin America.

Chile is now connected to a global network that spans the planet, he said, which reinforces the country as “an excellent destination for investment, placing us at the regional forefront of innovation and technology.”

“Data centers and the digital economy are transforming society, and this is not just for some sectors—it is for everyone,” emphasized the president.

Representatives from companies, Latin American energy institutions, Chilean electrical sector authorities, and academics gathered in Santiago for a forum on Data Centers and Energy, which debated the challenges and conditions for Chile to become a regional hub. Credit: Orlando Milesi / IPS

The pros and cons of data centers

Andrés Díaz, director of the School of Industrial Engineering at the private Diego Portales University, believes that Chile has managed to position itself as a tech hub by attracting investments in digital infrastructure.

Regarding the projections for this strategic industry, he maintains that the important thing is to send clear signals of stability and security.

“The country has favorable conditions, from natural resources to technical capabilities; however, confidence to ensure the attraction of investment remains key,” he told IPS.

According to this academic, “Chile’s technological development is at a turning point that will define our position as a relevant player in the region. In the future, this could mean having the capacity to host infrastructure for training large artificial intelligence models.”

Data centers enable the operation of applications such as instant messaging or viewing content on platforms. And they are essential for sending, storing, and interconnecting information for companies, public administration, hospitals, and banking entities.

If a data center stops functioning, it would affect everything from traffic lights to email and ATMs. Teleworking, video calls, food delivery, and home cinema are also activities derived from their operation.

So-called data centers have thus become critical infrastructure, like other basic services.

“Both in Europe and the United States, the demand for massive data processing is exponential, especially because of what is happening with artificial intelligence,” professor Barros told IPS.

“This is what we see in the technological infrastructure plans driven by the United States and China, with all their positive and negative variables,” he added.

He warned of risks and challenges as a result, especially for the environment, including the type of energy that will be used: renewable or fossil-based.

“In Europe, they are starting to reuse nuclear energy again, and in the United States, they are beginning to use fossil-based energy. Chile has the advantage of its very significant renewable energy production,” he explained.

In 2024, renewable energies contributed nearly 68% of Chile’s electricity generation, with 35% coming from variable sources such as solar and wind.

But the main challenge is water due to the large volumes consumed to cool the servers, given that air cooling is less efficient.

“That means having clarity about how much water will be consumed, what impact it will have on the area where the data centers will be installed, and knowing if it is an area with water problems or drought for long periods,” emphasized Barros.

He also highlighted the importance of providing greater transparency and access to information when discussing the issue of water with local communities, specifying how much will be required and what impact it will have on basins or human consumption.

Droughts have affected various regions of Chile over a 40-year period, from 1979 to 2019. Furthermore, northern Chile is one of the driest regions in the world, and the central region, which is home to 70% of the national population, has had a permanent water deficit since 2010.

Leaders of the involved localities insist that data centers be required to undergo the Environmental Impact Assessment System, which includes a government evaluation and a citizen consultation.

Currently, to install a data center, only an Environmental Impact Declaration must be made, where the company itself reports on potential risks.

England's poor form in white-ball cricket continues as they are beaten by South Africa to lose the second one-day international and the series with a game to spare.

Health officials urge people to take preventive measures following a new outbreak of the deadly virus.

Joseph Malanji was convicted of acquiring properties and helicopters that were suspected to be the proceeds of crime.

Spyros Blavoukos, Head, EU Institutions & Policies Programme, ELIAMEP; Professor, Athens University of Economics & Business

& Panos Politis Lamprou, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP

The content of the Commission President’s speech is inevitably connected to the current year’s action programme, but it must also respond to international developments.

This year, the Commission is focusing on two main pillars: the competitiveness of the European economy, and the strengthening of European security and defence. With regard to the first, the EU is aiming to speed up the simplification of procedures, and the development of strategies, aimed at improving European competitiveness. Preparing the productive base for the challenges (and opportunities) presented by globalization, digitization and the green transition was a key point of last year’s State of the Union address, in which the President presented her vision for her second term of office to the plenary of the European Parliament. In relation to the second pillar, the White Paper on the future of European defence and the plan to rearm Europe, of which the SAFE Regulation is an integral part, have dominated the effort to consolidate European security. The main priority and common denominator remains the creation of a coherent framework for the development of European defence capabilities that will help the bloc achieve the strategic autonomy it seeks.

International developments—with the return of President Trump and the (neo)-protectionism he advocates, the continuing need to support Ukrainian resistance, but also the volatility of the global geo-economic and geopolitical environment—require similar objectives for the EU and the Commission. The two aforementioned pillars are thus expected to dominate von der Leyen’s speech this year. However, security is not limited to its military dimension. It is also linked to European society’s preparedness in the face of various forms of crises, the diversification of supply chains, energy autonomy, economic growth, and the resilience of democratic institutions and values—all of which are expected to emerge as priorities for the next programming period. The Union’s new (existential?) narrative is therefore taking shape around a “comprehensive defence” in which security and defence cut across every aspect of its internal policies, from energy to social cohesion, and the implementation of the proposals in the Letta and Draghi reports is a key priority to prevent the EU becoming the “grass that’s trampled when elephants fight”.

Alekos Kritikos, Senior Policy Advisor, ELIAMEP; Former senior official, European Commission; former Secretary General, Ministry of the Interior

This year’s State of the Union address by the Commission President will be delivered at a juncture when Europe is seemingly being reduced ever more to the role of an observer of global developments rather than a protagonist in them. The Trump system’s dismissive treatment of the EU and the Shanghai summit are just two examples that point to this being the case.

The EU’s room for manoeuvre has narrowed dishearteningly—if it has not already been eradicated entirely—and it is of existential importance that the Union take immediate and comprehensive action. Ursula von der Leyen’s State of the Union speech should respond to this need by adopting the proposals made in the Letta and Draghi reports, and summarized afresh in Mario Draghi’s recent speech at the Rimini meeting, without further delay, hesitation or pettiness.

The completion of the internal market, the boosting of EU competitiveness, the development of a wide-ranging industrial policy, the unification of Europe’s capital markets, the pursuit of strategic and defence autonomy, the coordinated Research and Technology development, and the ongoing promotion of economic and social cohesion are the most fundamental, and there are certainly others of crucial importance. The implementation of these proposals will need to be accompanied by the defence of democratic values and the European social model, and by an immigration policy which, while respecting European values, preserves social cohesion while also helping the EU secure the human resources it needs for its economic and demographic growth. All of this will be very hard to achieve, however, unless it is accompanied by a bold political and institutional reorganization of the EU, leading to new forms of European integration.

On 10 September, we will know whether the European Commission has got the message.

Stella Ladi, Panteion University and Queen Mary University of London; Research Fellow, ELIAMEP

In the annual State of the Union address by the Commission President, we should focus not only on what is said, but also on what is left unsaid. The tense international situation, with its multiple conflicts but especially those in Gaza and Ukraine, and the new transatlantic (im)balance make it near certain that the common defence and security of Europe will be the main theme. And we would expect our partnerships and trade relations to figure centrally—those with Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, for instance, now that it is clear the EU needs to diversify and expand its trading networks. However, the most interesting question will be how much emphasis is placed on the two former flagships of European policy: the green economy and the regulation of new technologies and artificial intelligence. Because this year more than any other, the audience will not only be European citizens; it will also be the President of the United States, who would like to see backpeddling on both. It is critical for Europe’s dignity and global credibility that these priorities remain centre-stage, even if only at the symbolic level of this annual address.

Elena Lazarou, Director General, ELIAMEP

2025 finds the European Union facing external challenges and the threat of internal rifts. The annual State of the Union address by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, is an opportunity to chart a strategic course, but also to reinforce the conviction that the Union can respond to the political, economic, social and geopolitical challenges of our times.

At the heart of the speech is the long-term budget (2028-2034), which is causing political tensions between member states, agricultural and industrial interests, and political groups. Von der Leyen will be seeking to balance liberal and green priorities and issues such as re-industrialisation, social cohesion and immigration, and will also voice support for the proposed (enhanced) budget, with its added flexibility.

The key points of the speech, however, will relate to foreign policy: support for Ukraine and the need to strengthen European defence. Presenting a targeted plan for transatlantic relations will pose a major challenge to the Commission President, as the recent EU-US trade agreement has already come in for harsh criticism from many parts of the EU.

The President will reaffirm the importance of democracy and the international legal order, as well as the need for the EU to support both in an era in which anti-democratic forces are on the rise and international and humanitarian law is breaking down.

The European Union is presented with a choice: advance towards strategic autonomy and unity, or be immobilized by internal contradictions and external coercion.

Manos Matsaganis, Professor, Polytechnic University of Milan; Head of ELIAMEP’s Greek and European Economy Programme

The threats Europe is currently facing have no precedent in its 80-year history.

Some may have arrived suddenly, but their roots run deep: Russian aggression, American antipathy, Chinese expansionism, conflict in the Middle East.

Others are the product of internal weaknesses that were not addressed in time, and have now festered: economic sluggishness, an innovation deficit, ageing populations, institutional inertia, political fragmentation.

Their combined impact means that our children and our children’s children are at risk of growing up in a continent that is vulnerable and insecure, unable to defend itself, with an obsolete economy, stagnant living standards, and angry societies.

The train of events that would make this a grim reality can be easily described. A Le Pen (or Bardella) victory in the 2027 presidential elections puts France on a collision course with the EU, while simultaneously paralyzing any attempt at a coherent European response. In the confusion that follows, each country tries to salvage what it can. I leave it to the reader’s imagination to work out what this might mean for Estonia, or for Denmark (and — why not? — for Cyprus or Greece).

The alternative scenario begins with the acknowledgement that no country can go it alone. This implies the need for close cooperation in defence, the economy, and immigration. It isn’t the likeliest scenario. It will be politically demanding. But it is the only thing that can save us from worse trouble ahead.

 

 

Ursula von der Leyen’s second term at the helm of the European Commission is structured around seven thematic priorities that reflect the executive branch’s effort to integrate diverse policy areas in pursuit of the prosperity of the European citizenry. The Commission’s 2025 Work Programme introduces 51 new initiatives and places particular emphasis on simplification and the reduction of administrative burden, highlighting the shift towards “a faster and simpler Union”. At the same time, there is a clear tendency for the EU to assume a more active role in policy domains where supranational involvement has traditionally been limited. For Greece, both the Union’s achievements to date and its forthcoming actions have a direct impact on key national sectors. Meanwhile, the Greek government is preparing for the decisive role it will play in the negotiations on the new Multiannual Financial Framework 2028–2034.

• The forthcoming State of the European Union address, though generally framed in broad terms, provides a clear indication of the EU’s trajectory for member states, citizens, businesses, and external partners, enabling them to adapt and align with upcoming initiatives.
• It is not merely a stock-taking exercise; rather, it represents a critical test of credibility, as it will raise the question of whether and to what extent the Commission can translate its announcements and ambitions into tangible measures. The shift from theory to action will determine both the Commission’s institutional credibility and citizens’ trust in the European project.
• At the same time, the new structure of the Commission will also come under scrutiny. Nine months after the creation of new portfolios within the College of Commissioners, it remains to be assessed whether these have delivered on their intended functions.
• Greece, holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2027, will be at the forefront of negotiations that will determine the scope of financial instruments across all policy areas. For Athens, the challenge will be not only to forge common ground among member states but also to advance its own national priorities.

The article is authored by Panos Politis Lamprou, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP.

Introduction

Ursula von der Leyen’s second term at the helm of the European Commission is structured around seven thematic priorities, based on the political guidelines she presented before the European Parliament in July 2024. The priorities for the 2024–2029 period are as follows: sustainable prosperity and competitiveness, European defense and security, supporting people, strengthening societies and the social model, preserving quality of life, protecting democracy and safeguarding values, Europe in the world, and preparing the Union for the future.

The 2025 Work Programme was published in February 2025 and is organized around these political priorities, while also taking into account the guidelines and mission letters assigned to members of the College of Commissioners. In total, it introduces 51 new initiatives, at least 18 of which are legislative. Particular emphasis is placed on simplification, with more than 60% of the legislative proposals falling within this scope. The Commission President has repeatedly stressed the urgent need to reduce administrative burden and simplify legislation. In her political guidelines, she explicitly referred to her vision of “a faster and simpler Union.”

In view of this year’s State of the Union address, during which Ursula von der Leyen is expected to present the achievements of the College of Commissioners since taking office (1 December 2024), attention now turns to the analysis of the policies to be advanced in the near future. The address, though generally framed in broad terms, provides a clear indication of the EU’s trajectory for member states, citizens, businesses, and external partners, enabling them to adapt and align with forthcoming actions.

While awaiting the address, it is useful to examine what has been achieved so far. This analysis is structured around the Commission’s political priorities and presents illustrative examples of its most significant actions from December 2024 to the present. These actions have taken different forms (e.g. legislative proposal, strategy, action plan, roadmap, etc.), depending on the political maturity and objectives of each initiative.[1]

The analysis then turns to the Greek perspective on both the Commission’s achievements and its planned actions. The final section looks ahead to what can be expected in this year’s State of the Union address. 

Sustainable Prosperity and Competitiveness

Mario Draghi’s September 2024 report served as the foundation for the Competitiveness Compass, published at the end of January 2025. In short, the Compass sets out how the Union can: (a) strengthen innovation, (b) shift towards cleaner and more affordable energy, and (c) diversify its supply chains. In this direction, the Commission has released a series of strategies and other documents (e.g. the Clean Industrial Deal in February, the Startup and Scaleup Strategy and the Single Market Strategy in May, and the Quantum Europe Strategy in July). As expected, however, a considerable share of the Commission’s output consists of (proposals for) legislative initiatives aimed at simplification. In particular, six “Omnibus” packages covering a wide range of policy areas have been tabled. Moreover, the political agreement in principle reached in the trade negotiations with four MERCOSUR states (December 2024) underscores the Union’s continued commitment to promoting free and mutually beneficial trade. As shown in Table I, proposals for six legislative initiatives, one strategy, and one plan are expected to be submitted later this year.

Table I: Illustrative list of pending Commission initiatives for 2025 (sustainable prosperity and competitiveness)

Type Title Legislative proposal Revision of the Sustainable Finance Disclosures Regulation Legislative proposal Digital Package Legislative proposal European Business Wallet Legislative proposal Accelerating industrial decarbonisation Legislative proposal Revision of the REACH Regulation (on chemicals) Legislative proposal Digital Networks Strategy/Legislative proposal Bioeconomy Strategy Plan Sustainable Transport Investment Plan

 

European Defense and Security

European defense and security have become a top priority for the Commission due, among other factors, to the war in Ukraine, broader Russian assertiveness, and U.S. disengagement from Europe. In this adverse geopolitical environment, Ursula von der Leyen created the portfolio of the Commissioner for Defense and Space, signaling the importance of this new dimension. The Commission subsequently announced the White Paper on the Future of European Defense and the “ReArm Europe” plan, which could channel up to €800 billion into strengthening Europe’s defense readiness.

Beyond strictly military initiatives, the Union appears to be embracing the ideas of the Niinistö’s Report of October 2024 and promoting strategies linked to the concept of “total defense.” Within this framework, the Preparedness Union Strategy, the proposal for a Critical Medicines Act, the Medical Countermeasures Strategy, the Stockpiling Strategy, combined with the Internal Security Strategy, the proposal for a Common European System for Returns, and the Action Plan on Cybersecurity for Hospitals and Healthcare Providers, all aim to provide a holistic safety net against multiple threats. Preparedness has thus become a central concern within the European family. In several national capitals, discussions are underway on reviving military conscription, moving towards a Scandinavian-style “total defense” model combining military and civilian dimensions. While the implementation of the SAFE Regulation appears to be the Commission’s main priority, Table II presents the three initiatives expected to be announced in the near term.

Table II: Illustrative list of pending Commission initiatives for 2025 (European defense and security)

Type Title Legislative proposal New rules on drug precursors Legislative proposal Firearms Trafficking Directive Strategy Migration and Asylum Strategy Supporting People, Strengthening Societies and the Social Model

The cost of living, social inequalities, and the center–periphery divide have undermined the European way of life, while the modern era demands new skills for businesses and workers to adapt to evolving circumstances. With the aim of reinforcing the European social model, the Commission launched the Union of Skills in March, designed to upgrade citizens’ skills and enable the Union to attract and retain talent in critical sectors within its borders. Although the 2025 Work Programme does not include new initiatives on the housing crisis, the Commission President has pledged to: (a) present a plan for affordable housing, and (b) cooperate with the European Investment Bank to establish an investment platform for affordable and sustainable housing.[2] By the end of the year, three initiatives are expected to be published to strengthen the social dimension, as indicated in Table III.

Table III: Illustrative list of pending Commission initiatives for 2025 (supporting people, strengthening societies and the social model)

Type Title Action Plan European Pillar of Social Rights Roadmap Quality Jobs Agenda Consumer Agenda 2030 Preserving Quality of Life

Agriculture is considered an integral part of the European way of life. Its support is a prerequisite for the Union’s sustainable growth and competitiveness. With the goals of food self-sufficiency and support for the food value chain, the Commission has placed particular emphasis on simplifying the procedures of the Common Agricultural Policy, while announcing the Vision for Agriculture and Food (February) to make farming and food sectors more attractive to young people. At the same time, the Commission has tabled a proposal to amend the European Climate Law (July), seeking to establish a 2040 climate target. Finally, the Ocean Pact and the Water Resilience Strategy, both announced in June 2025, aim to boost the blue economy and protect water resources, whose resilience “is regarded by the EU as a matter of security and crisis preparedness”. According to the current Work Programme, no new initiatives are expected in this policy area.

Protecting Democracy and Safeguarding Values

At a time when liberal democracy is under challenge, strengthening democratic resilience and societal preparedness are key objectives for the Commission. Furthermore, the defense and reinforcement of the rule of law remain a central duty of the EU’s executive branch as the “guardian of the Treaties.” In this context, the Roadmap for Women’s Rights (March) seeks to eliminate gender-based violence and ensure equal treatment of women. By year’s end, three initiatives are expected to be presented, as shown in Table IV.

Table IV: Illustrative list of pending Commission initiatives for 2025 (protecting democracy and safeguarding values)

Type Title Communication European Democracy Shield[3] Strategy Strategy to Support, Protect and Empower Civil Society Strategy Equality Strategies for LGBTIQ and Anti-Racism Europe in the World

As the international environment grows increasingly dangerous and hostile to EU interests, the European family must be able to leverage its strength and build meaningful partnerships with like-minded actors. Accordingly, the Union unveiled its Black Sea Strategy (March), built on three pillars: (a) security, (b) sustainable development and connectivity, and (c) environment and preparedness. Beyond the eastern flank, however, the Union is also placing emphasis on its southern neighborhood, as evidenced by the creation of a dedicated Mediterranean portfolio within the College of Commissioners and the establishment of a new Directorate-General for the Middle East (DG MENA). At the same time, preparations for the announcement of a Mediterranean Pact and the development of a coherent Middle East strategy reflect the Union’s clear interest in its southern dimension. Additionally, the EU is seeking to deepen ties with other regions across the globe, illustrated by the growing number of security and defense partnerships.[4] In the field of transatlantic relations, the Union reached an agreement with President Trump in July 2025 on tariff levels, while also striving to secure U.S. support for any future peace-monitoring mission in Ukraine. Table V presents the two initiatives expected to be announced shortly.

Table V: Illustrative list of pending Commission initiatives for 2025 (Europe in the world)

Type Title Pact Pact for the Mediterranean Joint Communication EU–India Preparing the Union for the Future

One of the Commission’s most significant priorities is the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2028–2034. Early preparation of the proposal ensures stability and predictability in the Union’s resources. According to the Commission’s proposal, the new budget will approach €2 billion, representing on average 1.26% of the EU’s Gross National Income per year. The innovation lies in structuring the funds around four pillars: (a) national and regional partnership plans, including cohesion and agricultural policy; (b) cross-cutting programmes and instruments, such as EU funds; (c) external dimension and Common Foreign and Security Policy; and (d) European public administration. At the same time, the Commission is expected to table proposals to prepare the Union for potential enlargement.

The Greek Perspective: Priorities and Challenges

For Greece, the Union’s actions have a direct impact on key national sectors. In the field of security and defense, Athens supports the new European initiatives and, in July 2025, formally submitted a request for loans worth at least €1.2 billion under the SAFE Regulation, seeking to bolster its defense capabilities through low-interest borrowing. Nonetheless, certain contentious issues remain, the most sensitive being the partial involvement of the Turkish defense industry in European schemes. Regarding the Union’s interaction with third actors, Greece seeks closer cooperation with like-minded partners while promoting stability in relations with the United States for both strategic and trade reasons. The Black Sea Strategy holds particular significance for Greece, as it explicitly states that “it proposes multiple avenues to forge closer cooperation with… Turkey,” highlighting that coordinated engagement with the neighboring country is “important” and that Turkey is “an EU partner of strategic importance.” At the same time, Greece aims to draw the attention of other member states to regions that have been partly sidelined due to the war in Ukraine, such as the Mediterranean and the Middle East, which directly affect the Union’s overall policy agenda (e.g. the war in Gaza and the crisis in the Red Sea).

With regard to preserving quality of life, as a coastal state with a strong shipping and fisheries sector, Greece is particularly interested in the sustainability of oceans and the management of marine resources, in cooperation with Cyprus and the Cypriot Commissioner responsible. The agricultural sector also remains crucial, especially amid growing pressures. As a predominantly agricultural country, Greece advocates for policies that will support farmers’ incomes during this difficult period. Transport is likewise a Greek priority, with an emphasis on safe and sustainable networks, reflected in the country’s strong interest in key positions both in the College of Commissioners and in the European Parliament. In the field of tourism, Greece, as a major tourist destination, looks forward to the European strategy for sustainable tourism, which is expected to include proposals to enhance the sector’s resilience and competitiveness. Finally, the housing crisis is becoming one of the most pressing social challenges in Europe. In Greece, it creates a suffocating environment for young people and the middle class, both struggling to cope with housing costs. As a key factor of social cohesion and demographic stability, Athens is keen to see whether the Commission will advance more targeted housing policies, drawing also on EU financial instruments.

All of these political priorities are closely linked to the issue of the new MFF 2028–2034. Greece, holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2027, will be at the forefront of negotiations that will determine the scope of funding across all the aforementioned policy areas. For Athens, the challenge will be not only to find common ground among member states but also to advance its own priorities.

What Lies Ahead?

The multitude of initiatives launched by the Commission may be welcomed as a sign of dynamism and an eagerness to act across key policy domains. However, the central question is not the announcement of new strategies, but their timely and effective implementation. The shift from theory to practice will ultimately determine the credibility of the institutions and citizens’ trust in the Union. In this context, the role of member states becomes pivotal.

Against this backdrop, this year’s State of the Union address will not merely be a stock-taking exercise, but rather a “credibility test.” The key question will be whether, and to what extent, the Commission can turn its ambitions into concrete action for the Union’s collective good. At the same time, the new structure of the Commission will also come under scrutiny. The creation of the two new portfolios for Defense and Space, and for the Mediterranean signals the Union’s evolving priorities in critical sectors and regions where its previous contribution and involvement were comparatively limited. Nine months after their establishment, it will be assessed whether these portfolios have delivered on their intended r

[1] As provided by the Treaties (Article 17 TEU), the European Commission holds the “right of initiative” and is responsible for proposing new EU legislation in policy areas where it has competence. For such proposals to acquire the force of secondary law, they must be adopted either through the ordinary legislative procedure or a special legislative procedure. In parallel, there are non-legally binding acts that serve as documents outlining political direction in specific areas. These carry less weight than legislative acts (which are adopted by the European Parliament and/or the Council of the EU), as they primarily express the Commission’s views. Although they emerge following consultations with stakeholders and member states, these may not fully endorse the same positions (or their exact implementation). Strategies, usually framed as “communications” to other institutions, set out the Commission’s stance and priorities on specific issues. Action Plans, Pacts, and Roadmaps generally fall into this same category.

[2] In December 2024, the European Parliament established a temporary Special Committee on the Housing Crisis in the EU, tasked with examining the causes of the current crisis and submitting specific proposals to address it.

[3] In December 2024, the European Parliament decided to create a Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield to assess existing and planned legislation and policies. According to an EPRS briefing, the communication is “widely expected to be postponed”.

[4] The EU currently has security and defense partnerships with eight partners (Albania, North Macedonia, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, Moldova, Norway, and South Korea).