Africa

People have no access to tools or machinery to conduct their rescue efforts, Save the Children says.

L'opération de distribution des fiches de parrainage aux maires et aux députés de l'Assemble nationale, démarrée mardi 2 septembre 2025, à la Commission électorale nationale autonome (CENA), se poursuit. A la date du vendredi 5 septembre, les statistiques affichent 135 retraits.

135 fiches retirées dont 97 pour les députés et 38 pour les maires : ce sont les chiffres concernant la distribution des formulaires de parrainage à la CENA, à la date de vendredi, dans le cadre de la présidentielle 2026. Des chiffres qui témoignent de l'implication progressive des élus dans le processus électoral.
L'opération de retrait des fiches de parrainage selon la CENA, va se poursuivre jusqu'au vendredi 12 septembre 2025, date de clôture officielle. Passé ce délai, aucun formulaire ne pourra plus être délivré, avertit l'institution en charge de l'organisation des élections au Bénin.
Le nombre total d'élus attendus à la CENA pour le retrait de parrainage est de 186 dont 109 députés et 77 maires.

F. A. A.

Les Guépards du Bénin ont battu les Worriors du Zimbabwe ce vendredi 5 septembre 2025, lors d'une rencontre comptant pour la 7e journée des éliminatoires de la Coupe du monde 2026.

Le Bénin peut toujours croire en une première qualification à une phase finale de la Coupe du monde. Au terme d'un match âprement disputé ce vendredi 5 septembre, la sélection nationale s'est imposée au Zimbabwe par un score étriqué de un but à zéro. Le seul but de la rencontre a été marqué en seconde partie par le capitaine Steeve Mounié, suite à une reprise de tête, un centre du latéral droit, Yohan Roche.

Cette victoire permet à la sélection nationale de totaliser 11 points, et d'occuper la 2e place comme le Rwanda ; en attendant l'issu de la rencontre entre le Nigéria et le Rwanda ce samedi.
Après le match contre le Zimbabwe, les Guépards affrontent le mardi 9 septembre prochain, la sélection du Lesotho, pour la rencontre comptant pour la 8e journée de ces éliminatoires.

F. A. A.

La famille de feu Emmanuel Golou, 2ᵉ vice-président du Conseil Économique et Social, reçoit les condoléances au domicile du regretté, à Cotonou.

Parents, amis, collègues et proches peuvent témoigner leur soutien et leur compassion à la famille de feu Emmanuel Golou. Les visites de condoléances sont ouvertes tous les jours de 9 h à 12 h et de 16 h à 20 h au domicile du défunt à Cadjehoun , deux rues après l'Eglise Bon Pasteur en allant vers Houeyiho. Emmanuel Golou est décédé le mardi 2 septembre 2025, des suites d'une courte maladie.

A.A.A

IOM teams are assessing damage and delivering life-saving support to those in urgent need after a devastating earthquake in Afghanistan. Credit: IOM

By Jennifer Xin-Tsu Lin Levine
UNITED NATIONS, Sep 5 2025 (IPS)

United Nations aid organizations are rallying after a series of earthquakes and powerful aftershocks wreaked unprecedented havoc across eastern Afghanistan—particularly in the mountainous provinces of Kunar and Nangarhar.

Preliminary reports show that at least 1,400 people were killed and more than 3,100 injured. Widespread destruction of homes and critical infrastructure has displaced thousands more, while rockfalls and landslides have slowed rescue teams’ efforts to reach remote communities.

In response, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) released 10 million US Dollars within hours of the earthquake to provide shelter, food, water, child protection, and healthcare.

Countries including the United Kingdom and South Korea have pledged money through the United Nations—the UK does not recognize the Taliban government. Working alongside OCHA, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) is working with local partners to link immediate humanitarian assistance with long-term recovery and resilience-building strategies. The United Nations is also preparing an emergency appeal, with an initial USD 5 million from the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) already released.

UNHCR’s partner, AREWO, assesses the needs of the population affected by the earthquake that hit the region on 31 August. Credit: UNHCR/ARWEO

Despite these rapid mobilizations, questions remain about whether the flow of aid can be sustained. Tom Fletcher, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, warned, “This is the latest crisis to expose the cost of shrinking resources on vital humanitarian work. Massive funding cuts have already brought essential health and nutrition services for millions to a halt, grounded aircraft, which are often the only lifeline to remote communities, and forced aid agencies to reduce their footprint.”

He urged donors to “once again” step up for the people of Afghanistan, rallying resources for those in need.

Against this backdrop of urgency and shrinking resources, UNDP officials have sought to outline a vision for recovery that extends beyond immediate survival.

Stephen Rodriguez, UNDP’s resident representative in Afghanistan, addresses a UN press conference via videolink on the impact of the earthquakes on the country and its people. Credit: Jennifer Xin-Tsu Lin Levine/IPS

Stephen Rodriguez, UNDP’s resident representative in Afghanistan, emphasized that the country is facing a “perfect economic storm.”

In a press briefing, he shared data from the UN’s 25 assessment teams showing that 84,000 people have been affected by the earthquake so far.

Rodriguez also detailed the UNDP’s initiative of “community-driven recovery,” which includes cash support for families clearing rubble and rebuilding homes. Pointing to the success of a similar community-oriented approach after the 2023 earthquake in Herat, he called on member states to join the initiative in “building back better,” improving infrastructure and uniting communities.

Both Rodriguez and other UN representatives also addressed the additional challenges created by restrictions on women and girls in Afghanistan and how they affect UN work.

Aid groups are barred from recruiting female aid workers, and as UN Women Afghanistan Special Representative Susan Ferguson said, “women and girls could miss out on lifesaving assistance or information in the days ahead.”

However, Rodriguez denied any organized effort to block women’s access to humanitarian services and medical aid. He described reports of women being prevented from getting emergency medical care as “isolated incidents… rather than a systematic restriction.”

Despite these concerns and the reluctance of some countries to channel funds through Afghanistan’s authorities, UN officials stressed that the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, and independence remain central to their engagement with the Taliban.

Rodriguez recalled difficulties during the 2023 earthquake recovery that have since been resolved and stated that closer coordination has enabled aid to reach mountainous areas with the Taliban’s helicopters.

He called the “growth” in the relationship between the UN and the Taliban “exemplary,” citing their “full understanding that humanity comes first, tending to those most in need, irrespective of ethnicity, of gender, of anything else.”

For now, the focus remains on immediate survival—reaching those trapped beneath debris or isolated from aid, providing food and clean water, and preventing disease outbreaks. But UN officials emphasize that rebuilding shattered homes and livelihoods will require far more than emergency aid—it necessitates sustained support and long-term commitment.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Excerpt:

After a series of earthquakes and aftershocks struck Afghanistan this week, the United Nations and its member states have been prioritizing “community-driven recovery.”

By CIVICUS
Sep 5 2025 (IPS)

 
CIVICUS discusses recent protests in Angola with Florindo Chivucute, founder and executive director of Friends of Angola, a US-based civil society organisation established in 2014 that works to promote democracy, human rights and good governance in Angola.

The Angolan government’s 1 July decision to remove diesel subsidies, sharply pushing up public transport costs, triggered a series of protests. Angola is one of Africa’s biggest oil producers, but many have seen little benefit from its oil wealth and continue to live in poverty. People have taken to the streets in unprecedented numbers to demand an end to corruption and mismanagement, presenting the ruling party, in power for 50 years, with its biggest test. Security forces have responded to incidences of looting and vandalism with lethal violence. At least 30 people have been killed, 277 injured and over 1,500 arrested.

What triggered the protests?

Fuel subsidy cuts sparked the crisis. The protests began on 28 July, after the government’s decision to remove diesel subsidies immediately pushed up fuel prices. What started as a drivers’ strike in Luanda, the capital, quickly spread to other provinces and escalated into bigger protests.

The impact was devastating. For many families, even a small rise in fuel costs is crushing, because wages have been eroded by years of recession and currency devaluation. When transport costs rise, food prices and school fees rise too, leaving those already struggling unable to make ends meet.

But fuel was just the trigger. The unrest reflected much deeper frustrations, including high unemployment, particularly among young people, growing poverty and anger at corruption and mismanagement. People see public resources channelled into luxury spending and infrastructure deals benefiting a few powerful figures connected to the ruling People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), while basic services and jobs are neglected. Combined with the immediate shock of higher fuel prices, these grievances fuelled widespread anger.

Why are people struggling in such a resource-rich country?

This is the irony at the heart of the crisis. Angola produces large quantities of oil, along with diamonds, yet most people don’t see the benefits. Mismanagement and entrenched corruption are central to the problem. Revenues from natural resources have too often been captured by networks close to political power and channelled abroad or invested in ways that don’t create jobs.

Angola’s dependence on fuel imports makes the situation worse. We don’t have sufficient domestic refining capacity. Instead of using oil revenues to build refineries and strengthen local industry, a system emerged in which those with political connections profited from importing refined products back into the country. This removed incentives to invest in local processing or agriculture. The result is a tiny wealthy elite and a large majority with very low wages and limited access to services.

What do these protests reveal about the government’s grip on power?

The protests have marked a turning point. The MPLA has dominated politics since independence in 1975, and large-scale protests are not common. The fact that so many people were willing to take to the streets, particularly in and around the capital, shows growing discontent with the government and ruling party.

The authorities’ reaction has been heavy-handed. Security forces have used teargas and live ammunition in some cases, and carried out numerous arrests, including of union leaders and journalists. In some areas protests were accompanied by looting and, tragically, by deadly clashes with security forces. Civil society has since called for investigations into the killings and for accountability for those responsible.

The government’s strategy risks backfiring. By responding with force and detentions, it risks creating a greater sense of mistrust and frustration, which could influence how people engage with political processes as we approach the 2027 election.

How is civil society organising and what challenges does it face?

Civil society – including church groups, trade unions and local associations — has mobilised quickly to call for accountability and transparency. New coalitions are forming; for example, groups such as the Bishops’ Conference of Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe’s Episcopal Commission for Justice and Peace, Friends of Angola, the Justice, Peace and Democracy Association and Pro Bono Angola are working with religious organisations to push for investigations into the killings and provide humanitarian support to families affected by the unrest.

But the environment is hostile. Funding for democracy and human rights work is scarce, so organisations struggle to pay staff or sustain programmes.

State surveillance creates another barrier. The state has invested heavily in surveillance infrastructure, and civil society organisations are often targeted by cyber intrusions and closely monitored. The legacy of communist authoritarian rule creates deep mistrust, which makes organising more difficult.

Language barriers limit international support. Much of the work happens in Portuguese, which limits reach to the wider international audience that often communicates in English, French or Spanish.

Additional restrictions threaten to further tighten civic space. Recent draconian measures include the 2024 National Security Bill and the Bill on the Crime of Vandalism of Public Goods and Services. In addition, the 2023 draft law on Non-Governmental Organizations, approved by presidential decree, imposed harsh regulations. These restrictive laws and policies undermine fundamental freedoms and, if fully implemented, risk worsening the already limited environment for civil society in Angola.

What would it take to address the underlying problems?

Strong political will is needed to tackle corruption and manage public finances transparently. This means opening up procurement and fiscal data, pursuing accountability for past abuses, and ensuring resource revenues are channelled into public priorities such as hospitals, local industry and schools. Investment in education, healthcare and small-scale agriculture would create jobs, strengthen livelihoods and reduce dependence on imports.

Institutional reform is equally vital. This means protecting property rights, improving the business environment so investment generates employment and strengthening an independent judiciary and electoral processes so people can seek change through democratic channels.

International partners have a role to play by supporting electoral transparency and demanding accountability from companies and governments that operate in Angola.

The 2027 election will offer a crucial test. The international community should pay close attention and support reforms that increase transparency and electoral integrity. Electoral reforms and the clear, public release of results at the local level would go a long way towards restoring confidence in democratic processes.

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SEE ALSO
Angola: ‘Criticising the government means risking arbitrary detention, intimidation and physical assault’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Pedro Paka 30.Jul.2025
Angola: Repressive new laws threaten civic space CIVICUS Monitor 15.Sep.2024
Angola: ‘The untrue government narrative reveals an aversion to civil society denouncing malpractice’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Emilio José Manuel 01.Jan.2025

 

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Football legends George Weah and Didier Drogba are among the high-profile names on a new Fifa panel which aims to bolster efforts to tackle racism in the game.

The group has allegedly carried out murder, rape and other crimes, a UN report says.

It remains unclear how many people died - figures range from two to 1,000.

Elephants at the Kappukadu elephant rehabilitation center in Kottoor.

By Bharath Thampi
NEW DELHI, Sep 5 2025 (IPS)

In the early part of this year, two deaths in Kerala garnered major media attention. A farmer in Wayanad and a female plantation worker in Idukki were killed in two separate events, within a matter of a few days, by wild elephants.

Arikomban, another wild elephant, has become a media favorite recently due to his brushes with human settlements near his habitat. Named so because of his love for ari (rice), the elephant had been relocated from Kerala to Tamil Nadu in 2023 following constant protests from people who also claimed him to be ‘life-threatening.’ Kerala’s news outlets widely covered Arikomban’s relocation.

These aren’t one-off cases in Kerala, which has seen a spike in human–wildlife conflict, especially involving elephants.

According to a news report, 451 people have been killed in wildlife conflicts in the past five years alone in the state, with 102 of them caused by elephants.

However, wildlife biologists and environmentalists have been at odds with the narratives promoted by the media and society regarding what constitutes conflict.

“I think we shouldn’t be using the terminology ‘wildlife conflict’ itself. I would prefer addressing it as ‘negative wildlife interaction,’” says Dr. P.S. Easa, who holds a PhD on Elephant Ecology and Behavior and is a member of the National Board for Wildlife and the IUCN, Asian Elephant Specialist Group.

The conflict between wild animals and humans has been going on for centuries, and what we witness in the current era has been influenced by the transformation in the behavior of both these groups, as well as humans’ perception towards wildlife in general, he adds.

In Kerala’s social framework, the rising phenomenon of human–elephant conflict takes on a much deeper and more complex meaning than the broader topic of conflict with wildlife. Elephants have been an integral part of Kerala’s culture and tradition for centuries—domesticated not just for heavy labor but also as part of temple festivals. In the last few decades, machines have replaced elephants in much of the labor environment in the state, yet the land giants continue to be a part of the festival parades. Animal behavioral experts and activists have been consistently raising their voices against this practice in this century, citing the need to treat elephants as solely wild animals.

Easa refuses to even use the term “domesticated” for them.

“Captive elephants are the only right way to address them in this age and time,” he says.

In 2024 alone, there had been nine reported deaths in Kerala by such captive elephants. The Hindu reported six such deaths, including an elephant mahout, within the first two months of this year. Although there have been stricter rules and regulations in recent years on using captive elephants for temple festivals, they have mostly been restricted to paper. The religious nature of the festivals that these elephants are made to be a part of makes the topic even more sensitive, and political parties tend to stay away from addressing the issue.

Kerala’s elephant reserves have been categorized mainly into four regions, namely Wayanad, Nilambur, Anamudi, and Periyar. Periyar Reserve had the highest count of elephants, followed by the Anamudi Reserve. According to the Kerala Government’s Forest Statistics and the report of the ‘Wild Elephants Census of Kerala,’ the four reserves have a combined total extent of 11,199.049 sq. km., out of which only 1,576.339 sq. km. is assessed to be devoid of elephant population. According to a 2024 official assessment, Kerala had an elephant population of just under 1800, a decline of more than 100 from the previous year.

As Kerala’s elephant reserves border the neighboring states of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, natural factors that affect the elephant population, like extreme drought and heavy, abrupt rainfall, influence the elephants’ migration across the states during the year.

In Kerala, particularly, shrinking forest habitats caused by deforestation and the increasing presence of human settlements in regions historically occupied by elephant populations, coupled with climate change and the invasive plant species erasing the elephants’ natural food sources, are some of the factors causing unnatural elephant migration, according to experts, and as a consequence, resulting in frequent interactions with humans.

The phrase “descent of wildlife into human settlements” itself is a misnomer, Eesa says.

“In almost all such cases, human settlements had crossed over to those places where the wildlife had existed peacefully before. Wayanad and Idukki are classic examples of this.”

“There was a report that I had come across a while ago—of an ‘elephant attack’ that happened in Sholayar Forest Reserve. Look at the irony of that news. It’s a forest reserve—the habitat belongs to the elephant, not the people who were driving through it. What I’m saying is, every time an elephant conflict is reported, you need to dissect all the circumstances surrounding it. Where—was it within the jungle or outside it? When was it, during the daytime or at night? And how? What were the circumstances leading up to the interaction?” he explains.

The drastic increase in food waste owing to tourism in Kerala has been another factor for wild animals encroaching into human spaces lately. Elephants, wild boars, and monkeys have been observed to have come to human settlements to feed on the food waste.

There is no one, foolproof method to resolve the human–elephant conflict, scientists opine. Easa points out that several techniques that had been fruitful in African countries proved ineffective when used in countries like Sri Lanka and Indonesia.

A mahout is seen riding a captive elephant. Kerala continues to make use of elephants for temple festivals and parades.

Wildlife biologist Sreedhar Vijayakrishnan, in an interview given to Mongabay in 2023, suggests five main long-term measures that will help mitigate human-elephant conflict. This includes initiating long-term studies to understand elephant movements and spatiotemporal patterns of conflict, which will help ascertain where and how interventions are required; tracking areas of elephant movement and identifying regions of intense use while installing alert lights at vantage points that can be triggered in case of elephant sightings; raising awareness among local populations to discourage feeding elephants or unwanted interactions; training local rapid response teams to prevent negative interactions and indiscriminate drives; and fitting satellite collars on elephants that frequently cause issues.

Kerala also has an elephant rehabilitation center established in Kottoor, Thiruvananthapuram, for rescuing, rehabilitating, and protecting both captive and wild elephants. The state, like other forest reserves in India, has historically chosen to turn many of the captured conflict-making elephants into ‘Kumkis’ (a Kumki elephant is a specially trained and domesticated elephant used in rescue operations and to train other wild elephants and manage wildlife conflict).

Apart from the above, one of the most effective measures that has been implemented in Kerala is through the Wayanad Elephant Conflict Mitigation Project by the Wildlife Trust of India (WTI). The project, first initiated in 2002–2003 by WTI, has evolved into a successful model for tackling human–elephant conflict in Kerala. The model has focused on relocating human settlements from places identified as ‘elephant corridors’ in the Wayanad district of Kerala. Wayanad, spanning a total of 2,131 sq. km., has an elephant reserve spread over 1,200 sq. km., with an elephant density of 0.25 elephants/sq. km.

Shajan M.A., a Senior Field Officer with WTI who handles the project currently, tells me, “Our method is to buy such sensitive land from the people, including both tribal and other communities, and relocate them to safer regions, away from wildlife conflict.” Ultimately, WTI hands over the purchased land to the Kerala Forest Department.

In regions like the Tirunelli–Kudrakote elephant corridor, the human–elephant conflict had escalated so much that it had resulted in several human deaths. For the communities, leaving a land they had occupied for decades and considered home is never easy, Shajan acknowledges. But of all the tried and tested methods to deal with the human–wildlife conflict, this approach has been the most effective in the long run, he points out.

Shajan also muses on the question of what exactly comprises a ‘conflict.’

“Conflict can hold different meanings. From a monkey stealing food from the house to a tiger or an elephant attack on a human, even leading to deaths, it’s all considered a human–wildlife conflict. Sadly, we, as a society, tend to be reactive once it transforms into a conflict and place the blame wholly on the wildlife.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Fatou Diene, an oyster farmer in the mangroves near Dionewar Island, Senegal. Across the globe, farmers are adopting low-emission practices, restoring degraded lands, and protecting biodiversity. With the right support, they can do much more. Credit: ©FAO/Sylvain Cherkaoui

By Kaveh Zahedi
ROME, Sep 5 2025 (IPS)

Despite absorbing a quarter of climate-related losses and having the potential to reduce one-third of global emissions, agrifood systems receive less than 8% of climate finance. This imbalance threatens progress in addressing global climate challenges. If we’re serious about solutions, we need to start where the impact—and the promise—is greatest: investing in the systems that feed the world.

As countries move forward along the Baku to Belem Roadmap and the collective goal of mobilizing $1.3 trillion in climate finance by 2030, a critical juncture is fast approaching. At the upcoming Standing Committee on Finance Forum, to be held at the headquarters of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in Rome, governments will have a chance to correct this imbalance – and seize an opportunity that is already yielding results.

No serious path to achieve climate goals exists without agriculture. Yet despite this central role, the sector remains chronically overlooked in climate finance strategies and often is associated only with high perceived risks instead of its potential.

No serious path to achieve climate goals exists without agriculture. Yet despite this central role, the sector remains chronically overlooked in climate finance strategies and often is associated only with high perceived risks instead of its potential

The result is a persistent underinvestment in one of the few areas where mitigation, adaptation, and development gains can be achieved together—and at scale. Strategic investments in agriculture can strengthen national resilience, deliver measurable climate mitigation, reduce inequality, and expand economic opportunities.

Small-scale producers, who grow a third of the world’s food, received less than 1% of climate finance in the most recent two-year window. Livestock systems, which are major contributors to methane emissions, drew just 2% of climate development funding in 2023.

This gap represents a missed opportunity to accelerate progress on climate, food security, and livelihoods – especially in vulnerable regions.

We know what works. Between 2000 and 2022, emissions per value of agricultural production declined by 39%. Smarter, more efficient food systems are already taking shape. While current emissions from the agriculture sector are a major concern, these early successes demonstrate the potential of large-scale investments.

When we invest in agrifood systems, we are doing more than reducing emissions. We are expanding access to nutritious food, creating jobs in rural communities, increasing productivity, and restoring ecosystems. These are compound gains, spanning development and climate priorities alike.

Unlocking this potential will require deploying the full range of financing tools. The $1.3 trillion target cannot be met through public finance alone. It will require a mix of public, private, and domestic resources, aligned with countries’ needs and grounded in strong partnerships. Bilateral and multilateral finance will continue to play an important role.

Recent debt relief initiatives, including those from the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, are also expected to help countries create the fiscal space needed to prioritize agrifood transformation.

The private sector is beginning to respond. From 2016 to 2021, climate-focused blended finance transactions targeting smallholder farmers grew from 26% to 36%, with 60% achieving both adaptation and mitigation benefits.

But this momentum must be sustained and expanded. Private investors still face real barriers: limited data, unclear policies, and a lack of investment-ready projects. Initiatives like FAO’s Green Climate Fund Readiness Programme are helping countries close those gaps and attracting greater capital into agricultural transformation.

Carbon markets offer another avenue to unlock value. Properly designed, they can reward farmers and rural communities for climate-positive practices. But current structures in voluntary carbon markets fall short.

As of 2023, agrifood projects made up just 1% of credits from voluntary carbon markets, with three-quarters concentrated in five countries. Smallholders and low-income economies are effectively excluded.

New global mechanisms under the Paris Agreement Article 6 offer a chance to reset this system. Countries need support to prepare robust measurement frameworks, reliable data and inventories, and inclusive governance. With the support from the Global Environment Facility in over 70 countries, this foundation is already being laid.

There are also powerful opportunities in optimizing how existing public funds are spent. Modelling in 6 Sub-Saharan countries shows that reallocations across different policy-support measures can generate additional agrifood GDP growth points, create almost a million off-farm jobs, lift more than 2 million people out of poverty, and reduce more than 700,000 tons of greenhouse gas emissions.

This is not unique to a country. Through the GEF Food Systems Integrated Programme, co-led by FAO and IFAD, countries around the world are finding ways to make public budgets go further—generating climate benefits, economic growth, and social inclusion at once.

The challenge before us is simple to state, but difficult to resolve. Mobilizing climate finance is not simply a function of volume but also of the quality of the investments and the people it serves.

Without greater ambition, climate finance will not flow at the necessary scale and with the appropriate instruments. But climate ambition will stall unless finance reaches the sectors most capable of delivering transformation.

The Rome forum is a critical moment. It is a chance to align climate finance with climate opportunity. Through partnerships like the Food and Agriculture for Sustainable Transformation (FAST) Partnership and with a growing coalition of public and private actors, we can mobilize new resources, build better systems, and deliver real outcomes.

Farmers are already leading the way. Across the globe, they are adopting low-emission practices, restoring degraded lands, and protecting biodiversity. With the right support, they can do much more.

The window for action is narrowing. But the opportunity in agriculture is wide open. The question now is whether we will invest in it – at the scale and speed this moment demands.

Excerpt:

Kaveh Zahedi is the Director of the Office of Climate Change, Biodiversity and Environment at the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)

Playing for your country is the best feeling in the world, says Sak. But he never expected to get called up.

Playing for your country is the best feeling in the world, says Sak. But he never expected to get called up.

A selection of best photos from across the continent and beyond from 29 August till 4 September 2025.

A selection of best photos from across the continent and beyond from 29 August till 4 September 2025.

Nigeria's Blessing Oraekwe says it is "heartbreaking" to be barred from the World Championships in Liverpool after missing the deadline for a new genetic sex test.

Nigeria's Blessing Oraekwe says it is "heartbreaking" to be barred from the World Championships in Liverpool after missing the deadline for a new genetic sex test.

Plastic waste washed up on a beach in India. Credit: Ocean Image Bank/Srikanth Man
 
The international push for consensus on a legally binding deal to end plastic pollution proved beyond the grasp of weary UN Member States meeting in Geneva in mid-August, as they agreed to resume discussions at a future date, according to UN News.
 
“This has been a hard-fought 10 days against the backdrop of geopolitical complexities, economic challenges and multilateral strains,” said Inger Andersen, Executive Director of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). “However, one thing remains clear: despite these complexities, all countries clearly want to remain at the table.”

By Craig Boljkovac
GENEVA, Sep 5 2025 (IPS)

The debacle that was the latest round of negotiations for a global treaty on plastics (including in the marine environment); known as “INC 5.2” has already been written about at length by many colleagues on all sides of the issues. Despite all the very informative posts, articles, and other analyses, I believe I have several key observations to make, particularly about the process to-date.

After being absent from the previous two INCs (INC-4 and INC-5), I may have a slightly different perspective from those who have been completely immersed in the process all the way along. I managed to observe virtually every (painful) minute of INC 5.2, and, below, I list some things that participants may want to consider as the process continues.

Backing up a bit, for those who may be less familiar with the issue, we clearly have a problem with plastics globally. Mounting evidence of the presence of plastics and a clear lack of recycling capacities: from blatantly visible plastics in the marine environment (massive floating gyres of overwhelmingly plastic garbage in our oceans – particularly in but not limited to the Pacific) to the presence of microplastics in our bodies (and those of wildlife as well), including in the placenta and mother’s milk, and the use of clearly harmful chemicals (such as endocrine disrupters released when certain plastics are used) in the manufacture of at least some plastics – has led to decisions on the international level that merely complement significant action at other levels of governance that are already in place.

This situation resulted in the decision, from March, 2022, by the UN Environment Programme’s UN Environment Assembly, to pass a resolution authorizing a negotiating process (the “Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee, or INC) to realize a global plastics treaty by 2024 (a highly ambitious timeline that, to many, was likely unachievable).

And, here we are, late in 2025, after six unsuccessful negotiation sessions and some preparatory work, without an agreed treaty text, and with, it seems, a wide gulf of differences between UN member states that seems, frankly, virtually unbridgeable.

Much has been written about the various positions of UN Members States, who have informally organized themselves (for the negotiations) into the “Like-Minded Group” of countries that want the treaty to focus mainly on waste management and not impinge on their plans to not only maintain, but greatly expand plastics production; and the “High Ambition Coalition” countries who, in part, want a strong global treaty that addresses plastics at all stages of their life cycle, severely limit “single-use plastics” and include human health concerns, particularly with regard to the harmful effects of chemical inputs to plastics production (which the “Like-Mindeds” reject, particularly for what some delegations say is a clear lack of evidence of harm to human health and the environment).

In my long experience with international environmental negotiations under the UN rubric, such differences in positions are not unprecedented, and have been solved by having a team of negotiators that are solutions-oriented, and a secretariat (the UN staff assigned to coordinate and facilitate the negotiations) and chair (usually a diplomat or high-level civil servant from an environment or similar ministry) that work together to bridge differences in a transparent, inclusive, and participatory manner, where trust is built over time and solutions are eventually found.

Something is clearly blocking the process. The secretariat and bureau (including the chair, in particular) have shown commitment, but the goal of an agreed treaty, despite the presentation of many textual proposals by negotiators, several chairs’ drafts, and some movement on at least some of the issues, has not been realized over six energy- and resource-intensive negotiation sessions.

Why is this the case? A few thoughts/observations from my side (the list is not comprehensive):

1) Apart from some closed events earlier on in the negotiations, there now seems to be an almost total lack of intersessional activities (both formal and informal) essential for the further building of trust and understanding of each other’s positions (although some may be planned but are not yet announced). Regional efforts, in particular, might help to bridge some of the wide differences that are apparent, even within regions (where there is clearly a lack of consensus as well).

2) There has been a clear lack of transparency and communication in/from both subsidiary groups (such as contact groups, where various issues are “unpacked” and grouped for more detailed negotiations) and, more significantly and consistently, at the broader level (directly led by the chair/bureau and supported by the secretariat) such as plenary sessions (which were few and far between and even resoundingly brief – one was 43 seconds at the latest INC). Relatively untransparent processes have worked in the past (such as with the climate change negotiations); but from what I understand there was more trust and confidence in the chair/bureau and secretariat than exists in our present negotiations.

3) The chair, bureau and secretariat were always present, but rarely available. The absence of regular plenary sessions was keenly felt. There was also a clear lack of consistency in the way contact groups operated – some put textual proposals on a screen for all to see and negotiate with; while others simply heard interventions and then came out with proposals for text at the very end (not the most transparent of ways to operate!). In addition, there was a heavy reliance on informal negotiations throughout (this became apparent with news, in the final plenary, of a long, closed negotiation on the final day chaired by Chile and Japan). A lot seemed to be going on, but only a limited number of participants (including a fair number of government delegations that I conversed with) seemed only vaguely aware of them, if at all.

4) During the course of this, the sixth negotiating session, positions taken by both the Like-Minded Group and the High Ambition Coalition more closely resembled opening salvos that one might expect would be typical of the early stages of negotiations – not positions that would still be raised at such a late stage, when one would expect at least some compromises to have been made along the way. To me, this is symptomatic of a lack of trust in the process to-date.

This apparent situation (lack of clear negotiating milestones/organization, lack of visibility of the chair and lack of transparency) seems to have, in my opinion, possibly been used by delegations to hold back on reaching any sort of even basic compromises.

How to solve this as we try to move forward?

1) Make every possible attempt to put into place a proper, formal, and transparent intersessional process (along with informal and regional activities as needed), even if it results in a significant delay until the next INC (5.3). A rumour is going round that INC 5.3 may be scheduled for February, 2026. In my opinion this is far too soon if a properly designed intersessional process, focused on bridging the key gaps and reaching some sort of consensus, at least informally, is to be realized. An adequate “break” is needed to clearly think through all the options. If needed, even keep bringing in the UN Secretary-General to “knock heads together” to find some compromises in advance of the next negotiations. And report back to all INC participants regarding the process of intersessional work on a regular basis.

2) Hold in-depth “debriefs” and “lessons learned” sessions for the secretariat and bureau, with additional participants from the INCs who have valuable observations to contribute (both from government and observer delegations). A suggested focus could be on how to expand the obvious organizational strengths of the secretariat into other areas, such as a finer level of facilitation aimed at bridging differences among delegations through improved intersessional activities (see 1), above).

3) Without formally reopening the original (2022) resolution, seek backing from UNEA-7 for the original mandate (since delegations have clearly not followed the original resolution, particularly regarding the scope of the convention, during the INCs. A complementary resolution which could guide member states towards a possible framework convention would also allow negotiation of the difficult and time-consuming issues in a more extended, party-based process.

4) Once experiences and lessons learned are gathered, consider holding a special, more internally-focused intersessional process between secretariat and the chair and bureau, in order to have a detailed set of lessons learned so far, and to try to readjust the relationship as we move forward. Perhaps such a process could have a trusted and even renowned external facilitator that could help find some new and more effective way of working together. Such trust-building exercises were essential in other forums that I have participated in (although they were done more up-front, towards the beginnings of such processes, it’s never too late!).

5) At the next, eventual INC (presumably 5.3 will take place), put into place more plenary time (at least brief plenaries) where regular updates can be given. This would display more transparency, potentially build more confidence in the process, and benefit small delegations in particular, who cannot cover the breadth of different negotiations we saw in previous INCs.

In conclusion, there is no doubt in my mind that we have a huge task still at hand, but not an insurmountable one. Recently, Forbes published what I think is a fantastic, forward-looking piece that basically says the “train has left the station” for the plastics industry. Even if the global process fails (which I firmly believe will not happen), at other levels of governance from California to the EU and beyond, clear commitments have been made that are even above and beyond the current UNEA mandate.

This will drive the investments and planning of the industry for decades to come. The writing is on the wall. Now is the time to find compromises at the global level (even a framework treaty like the Paris Agreement on climate change would be a good start!) to ensure a sustainable future for all in this field. Otherwise, we may be facing a failure that results in a long-term stalemate where no treaty (or alternative) is agreed for the foreseeable future.

1 https://www.forbes.com/sites/trondarneundheim/2025/08/16/plastics-manufacturing-at-crossroads-pivot-to-lead-or-lose/

Craig Boljkovac is a Geneva-based Senior Advisor with a Regional Centre for the Basel and Stockholm Conventions, and an independent international environmental consultant with over 35 years of experience in relevant fields. His opinions are his own. He has participated in several INCs and related meetings for the global plastics agreement.

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Google's first data center in Chile lies in the industrial sector of the municipality of Quilicura, on the northern outskirts of Santiago. It has no symbols or logos to identify it, but covers an extensive area. Water vapor is visibly emitted as part of the process to cool the servers. Credit: Orlando Milesi / IPS

By Orlando Milesi
SANTIAGO, Sep 4 2025 (IPS)

Chile wants to be a hub in Latin America in data storage and transmission by developing data centers, leveraging its wealth of renewable energy, and its optimal digital interconnection.

In contrast, the massive water required for cooling servers and resistance from social and local organizations who were not consulted are the main obstacles in this strategy.

The authorities are promoting a tech hub, as the concentrator or logistical connection point for centralizing numerous nodes of a computer network is called, where companies, investments, and talent converge.“Chile's technological development is at a turning point that will define our position as a relevant player in the region. In the future, this could mean having the capacity to host infrastructure for training large artificial intelligence models”–Andrés Díaz.

A key step in this direction is the National Data Center Plan (PData), launched by the government of leftist president Gabriel Boric in December 2024.

PData complemented the Cybersecurity Framework Law, enacted in April 2024, which established minimum requirements for the prevention, containment, resolution, and response to cybersecurity incidents, applicable to state agencies and private companies.

PData aims to position this elongated South American country as a Latin American hub for data centers.

It was launched 10 months after an environmental court in Santiago, the capital of this country of 18.4 million people, halted a multi-million dollar Google project in the municipality of Cerrillos, on the outskirts of Santiago, preventing it from using water to cool its servers.

The stoppage was a victory for residents organized in the Socio-Environmental Community Movement for Water and Territory (Mosacat), an environmental coalition that emerged in Cerrillos.

Google had announced it would modify the cooling system to use less than the planned 169 liters of water per second. But, following the court decision, it suspended the project and a US$40 million investment in what would have been its second data center in the country, after the one operating since 2015 in Quilicura, also on the outskirts of Santiago.

Tania Rodriguez, a spokesperson for Mosacat, praised the strength of the residents to “convince a multinational that its project was not possible with such scarce water resources. Companies are the ones that must become aware of the excessive use of our resources,” she stated in an interview with a union media outlet.

New reality

To promote data centers, the Boric government brought all interested parties together and managed to finalize PData, with the goal of providing certainty to all sectors and enabling their massive installation in the country.

Chile has abundant low-cost renewable energy, 62,000 kilometers of optical fiber, a network of 69,000 kilometers of submarine cables, as well as 3.8 million devices connected to the 5G network.

Alejandro Barros, a professor of engineering and researcher at the Public Systems Center  of Industrial Engineering at the public University of Chile, told IPS that the main lesson after the crisis with Google was the need to equip Chile with a public policy for the establishment and management of data centers.

According to Barros, PData “advances very significantly by establishing the governance model for these projects because multiple state institutions will be involved. How synergy and coordination is achieved across all sectors linked to these projects is relevant.”

“My concern is that the plan was presented at the end of an administration,” he said, recalling that Boric’s term concludes in March 2026.

“The question is what will the next administration do. Data centers will have to be built, but how do we agree so that Chile meets standards, has good dialogue with communities, and we don’t start from scratch again?” he asks.

Google’s fenced and patrolled data center in Quilicura, on the outskirts of Santiago, where huge water tanks are visible. The tech company was unable to establish another data center in the Chilean capital due to a court ruling against the massive use of water. Credit: Orlando Milesi / IPS

Microsoft installs its regional cloud

In 2017, there were six data center projects in Chile. Today, 38 are in operation.

It seems more likely that companies of various sizes will export data and processed information from Chile to meet external demand.

According to Fitzgerald Cantero, Director of Studies and Projects at the  Latin American Energy Organization  (Olade), the growth in the use of artificial intelligence will exceed an annual rate of 31% by 2029.

In the Latin American region, 78% of data centers are currently concentrated in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico.

During the Data Centers and Energy forum, organized by the Institute of the Americas  and held in Santiago on August 21, Cantero said that investment in artificial intelligence in 2025 will be 7 billion dollars and will jump to 10 billion in 2029.

Juan Carlos Olmedo, Chile’s electrical coordinator, stated at the forum that the electrical energy required by data centers in this country will quadruple by 2032, rising from the current 325 megawatts (MW) to 1,360.

On June 18, Microsoft opened its first Data Center Region in Santiago to support economic growth, technological innovation, and social development, indicated the transnational tech company.

According to Microsoft, this state-of-the-art infrastructure will provide digital services to businesses and public organizations, improving their speed, privacy, security, and data storage in compliance with local regulations and high availability

The new network of data centers, called the Microsoft Cloud Region, is also located in Santiago, consisting of three independent physical locations, each with one or more data centers, and will provide services to several South American countries.

According to the U.S.-based software developer, the opening of this regional Data Center will generate US$35.3 billion in net income over the next four years, both for Microsoft and for partners and customers using its cloud.

“Of that total, approximately US$3.3 billion will be invested directly in Chile, contributing to this country’s development and creating about 81,041 jobs between 2025 and 2029,” detailed the tech company.

At the time, Boric expressed his joy for this new project, calling it a show of confidence for Chile to continue integrating and transforming into a major tech hub in Latin America.

Chile is now connected to a global network that spans the planet, he said, which reinforces the country as “an excellent destination for investment, placing us at the regional forefront of innovation and technology.”

“Data centers and the digital economy are transforming society, and this is not just for some sectors—it is for everyone,” emphasized the president.

Representatives from companies, Latin American energy institutions, Chilean electrical sector authorities, and academics gathered in Santiago for a forum on Data Centers and Energy, which debated the challenges and conditions for Chile to become a regional hub. Credit: Orlando Milesi / IPS

The pros and cons of data centers

Andrés Díaz, director of the School of Industrial Engineering at the private Diego Portales University, believes that Chile has managed to position itself as a tech hub by attracting investments in digital infrastructure.

Regarding the projections for this strategic industry, he maintains that the important thing is to send clear signals of stability and security.

“The country has favorable conditions, from natural resources to technical capabilities; however, confidence to ensure the attraction of investment remains key,” he told IPS.

According to this academic, “Chile’s technological development is at a turning point that will define our position as a relevant player in the region. In the future, this could mean having the capacity to host infrastructure for training large artificial intelligence models.”

Data centers enable the operation of applications such as instant messaging or viewing content on platforms. And they are essential for sending, storing, and interconnecting information for companies, public administration, hospitals, and banking entities.

If a data center stops functioning, it would affect everything from traffic lights to email and ATMs. Teleworking, video calls, food delivery, and home cinema are also activities derived from their operation.

So-called data centers have thus become critical infrastructure, like other basic services.

“Both in Europe and the United States, the demand for massive data processing is exponential, especially because of what is happening with artificial intelligence,” professor Barros told IPS.

“This is what we see in the technological infrastructure plans driven by the United States and China, with all their positive and negative variables,” he added.

He warned of risks and challenges as a result, especially for the environment, including the type of energy that will be used: renewable or fossil-based.

“In Europe, they are starting to reuse nuclear energy again, and in the United States, they are beginning to use fossil-based energy. Chile has the advantage of its very significant renewable energy production,” he explained.

In 2024, renewable energies contributed nearly 68% of Chile’s electricity generation, with 35% coming from variable sources such as solar and wind.

But the main challenge is water due to the large volumes consumed to cool the servers, given that air cooling is less efficient.

“That means having clarity about how much water will be consumed, what impact it will have on the area where the data centers will be installed, and knowing if it is an area with water problems or drought for long periods,” emphasized Barros.

He also highlighted the importance of providing greater transparency and access to information when discussing the issue of water with local communities, specifying how much will be required and what impact it will have on basins or human consumption.

Droughts have affected various regions of Chile over a 40-year period, from 1979 to 2019. Furthermore, northern Chile is one of the driest regions in the world, and the central region, which is home to 70% of the national population, has had a permanent water deficit since 2010.

Leaders of the involved localities insist that data centers be required to undergo the Environmental Impact Assessment System, which includes a government evaluation and a citizen consultation.

Currently, to install a data center, only an Environmental Impact Declaration must be made, where the company itself reports on potential risks.

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