Agrégateur de flux

Despite making commitments to act on recommendations from its second UPR cycle, South Africa has struggled to stop attacks on the businesses and homes of refugees, asylum-seekers, and migrants, denying that such attacks were motivated by xenophobia or other forms of intolerance. The government has also failed to realize the right to education for an estimated half-a-million children with disabilities.

Violence against women, including rape and domestic violence, remains very high. Although annual crime statistics for 2015 released by the South African Police Services showed that sexual offences decreased slightly by 3 percent, many gender activists and human rights groups expressed concerns about the continued under-reporting of rape and the failure of the government to introduced a national strategy to combat violence against women. 

 

Rights of Children and People with Disabilities

The South African government has yet to fulfil its obligation to guarantee the right to education for many children and young adults with disabilities, affecting an estimated half-a-million children. Despite the government’s international and domestic obligations, many children with disabilities do not have equal access to primary or secondary education and face multiple forms of discrimination and barriers when accessing schools. They are turned away from mainstream schools and referred to special schools by school officials or medical staff simply because they have a disability. The referrals system needlessly forces children to wait for up to four years at care centers or at home for placement in a special school. Children with disabilities who attend special schools pay school fees that children without disabilities do not, and many who attend mainstream schools are asked to pay for their own class assistants as a condition to stay in mainstream classes. Once in school, many children with disabilities do not have access to the same curriculum as children without disabilities. Many children are exposed to high levels of violence and abuse by teachers and students.

In 2001, the government adopted a national policy to provide inclusive education for all children with disabilities, but key aspects of the policy have not been implemented to-date. South Africa has not adopted legislation that guarantees the right to inclusive education for children with disabilities. The majority of the government’s limited budget for learners with disabilities is allocated to special, segregated schools rather than to inclusive education.

South Africa became the first country to endorse the Safe Schools Declaration at a global conference in Norway in May 2015. By joining the Declaration, it agreed to protect students and education in times of conflict, and to avoid using educational building for military purposes.

Recommendations:

• Adopt new measures to guarantee quality inclusive education for all children, access to free and compulsory primary education and to secondary education, enforce people with disabilities’ right to access adult education, and ensure adequate resources are invested in inclusive education.
• Implement the Guidelines on Protecting School from Military Use during Armed Conflict in its domestic military doctrine, practice and trainings.

 

Asylum seekers and foreign nationals

The situation of foreign nationals and asylum seekers in South Africa is precarious and remains an area of serious concern.

In April 2015, thousands of people looted foreign-owned shops and attacked non-South African nationals in Durban, KwaZulu-Natal province. The targets of the widespread violence were immigrants of African origin, mostly from Zimbabwe, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic, Mozambique, Malawi, and Somalia. Although the police arrested at least 22 people following the violence, the authorities neither thoroughly investigated nor successfully prosecuted those involved. No one was held to account for the attacks.  Authorities also failed to prosecute those who had incited the violence against foreign nationals.

Government officials denied the violence was motivated by xenophobia or other forms of intolerance and said it was a result of “pure acts of criminality.” The secretary general of the African National Congress (ANC) Gwede Mantashe told the media in April 2015 that he believed the solution to xenophobia is the establishment of refugee camps. Xenophobic violence in 2008 led to the deaths of over 60 people across the country.  

Recommendations:

• Ensure that asylum seekers, refugees, and foreign nationals are protected from xenophobic violence throughout South Africa.
• Ensure justice and accountability for xenophobic crimes.

Sexual orientation and gender identity

South Africa has a progressive constitution that prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and protects the human rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people. The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development has taken significant steps to improve coordination between government and civil society in combatting violence (including rape and murder) against lesbians and transgender men. Despite the country’s progressive legislation on the rights of LGBT people, discrimination remains institutionalized in families, communities, and in the behaviour of some government officials, such as police, some health care workers, and educators.

Recommendations:

• Require the police services, in collecting data on physical and sexual violence, to disaggregate the data by motive to track incidents of homophobic and trans-phobic violence;
• Ensure the police and prosecution services have the requisite training to effectively identify crimes motivated by homo and trans phobia;

• Work with the National Prosecuting Authority to ensure that cases of sexual and physical violence against women and transgender persons come to trial in a timely manner, and that prosecutors prioritize cases involving sexual offences.
   

 

 

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Women and children displaced by attacks of the Sudanese government Rapid Support Forces outside caves in rebel-controlled territory in Jebel Marra, Darfur, March 2, 2014. 

© 2015 Adriane Ohanesian Summary

On January 13, 2017, US President Barack Obama issued a presidential executive order that suspended the United States’ comprehensive economic sanctions on Sudan in response to “sustained progress” on several fronts.

However, the order did not identify clear benchmarks for progress or explicitly require improvements to the human rights situation before making the suspension permanent. This is a remarkable oversight considering that human rights concerns were among the factors driving the imposition of sanctions for the last 20 years.

While there may be good reasons to suspend comprehensive economic sanctions, the decision to do so permanently or not should be measured, and reached only after due regard to Sudan’s respect for key and fundamental human rights obligations.  The executive order states that within six months, or by July 2017, the sanctions revocation becomes permanent if Sudan continues to show progress. Yet six months is not sufficient to determine Sudan’s progress on the criteria mentioned in the order, or on improvements to deeper human rights problems.

Sudan has for decades carried out massive and systemic violations of human rights and humanitarian law. After the current government seized power in a military coup in 1989, the US pursued a policy of isolation, in part in response to Sudan’s human rights violations. In 1997, it imposed broad economic sanctions, citing massive human rights abuses committed during the 22-year civil war in the South.  A decade later it imposed additional sanctions, including targeted ones against individuals, for atrocities in Darfur.

The human rights situation has not improved. Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and aligned forces, notably the newly created Rapid Support Forces, have continued to attack civilians in Darfur, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile with utter impunity.  National security agents engage in entrenched patterns of repression, targeting civil society leaders, human rights activists, and students for harassment, arbitrary detentions, and torture; restricting civil society organizations and independent media; and using lethal force to disperse protesters, killing hundreds in broad daylight.

Given Sudan’s long, violent, and extensively documented record of abuses against civilians, any assessment of “progress” needs to include an assessment of human rights improvements too. US engagement with Sudan and further normalization of relations should be contingent on meaningful and lasting human rights improvements. These benchmarks for human rights improvements are necessarily broad and informed by international norms, and include:

1. Respect for the right to life, including ending attacks on civilians and indiscriminate bombing;
2. Steps toward accountability for the gravest crimes;
3. Unimpeded humanitarian access to conflict-affected areas;
4. Releasing arbitrarily held detainees;
5. Ending excessive force against peaceful protesters;
6. Greater respect for freedoms of assembly, association, and expression;
7. Allowing human rights monitoring and cooperation with international institutions;
8. Carrying out essential reforms to the National Security Act and other key legislation. 

Human Rights Watch believes the US government should: defer evaluation of Sudan’s progress to a later date, and continue to monitor the broader set of human rights benchmarks; revise and update its Sudan sanctions policy; enforce and impose additional individual targeted sanctions against those deemed responsible for serious abuses; consider new individual sanctions in light of evidence that has surfaced in recent years; and appoint a special envoy for Sudan and South Sudan,as under the two previous administrations.

I.   Background Civil Wars and Political Repression

Violence and political repression have marred much of the last three decades in Sudan.  After seizing power by military coup in 1989, the National Islamic Front (NIF) embarked on comprehensive purges of the judiciary, civil service, army, and security forces; banned all political parties, cultural, and social associations; and imposed a countrywide state of emergency.[1] Led by Hassan al-Turabi, the NIF espoused a strict Islamist ideology, and was known for highly repressive tactics, including torture and arbitrary detentions in secret, illegal security-run prisons knowns as “ghost houses.”[2]

Under this government, Sudan continued its extremely abusive civil war, ongoing since 1983, against Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) rebels in Southern Sudan and in the Nuba mountains region of Southern Kordofan.  Government forces and allied militia committed crimes on a massive scale during two decades of war, playing on ethnic divisions and pitting southerners against each other. More than 2 million civilians died, and more than 4 million were displaced internally and to neighboring countries.

By 2002, internationally-brokered peace talks, hosted by Kenya, led to several important agreements, including a ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains and agreement to cease attacking civilians, followed by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. The government and SPLM/A agreed to a six-year transitional period during which a national unity government would implement the peace deal. By 2011, southerners would vote in a referendum for or against independence.

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Fighters of the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces in captured vehicles celebrate a victory against the rebel Justice and Equality Movement, Goz Dango, South Darfur, April 28, 2015. 

© 2015 Reuters

The CPA did not address the crisis in Darfur, where starting in 2003 the Sudanese government and allied militias committed crimes against humanity and war crimes, including sexual violence, as part of its counterinsurgency campaign. The United Nations

estimates that at least 300,000 people were killed in attacks or died of conflict-induced starvation and disease, and more than 2 million people were forced to flee to refugee or internally displaced persons’ camps.[3] The government and rebel groups peace deals did not hold, and conflict between their forces continued alongside inter-communal fighting.

Meanwhile, the parties to the CPA made little progress implementing the agreement, especially pertaining to the arrangements for the border states of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, and Abyei, the oil-rich region straddling the north-south divide. The delays fueled tensions and sparked clashes between northern and southern forces at Abyei in 2008: SAF soldiers killed civilians and extensively looted and destroyed homes in the town.[4] 

In Southern Kordofan in June 2011, fighting resumed between SAF and former SPLM rebels from the area, now known as SPLM/A-North, and spread to Blue Nile by September. In both states, government forces used abusive tactics, forcing hundreds of thousands of people to flee to other parts of Sudan or to refugee camps in South Sudan and Ethiopia.[5]

Following South Sudan’s independence, Sudan’s government stripped southerners of citizenship, and conflict-related abuses and political repression continued. Sudan has responded violently to growing civil unrest, often triggered by austerity measures amid worsening economic conditions. It has further empowered the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), and bolstered the army via the creation of the Rapid Support Forces, composed of former militia from Darfur, to conduct highly abusive operations.

International Isolation

Sudan’s international reputation deteriorated after the 1989 coup. NIF’s violent repression of dissent and brutal tactics in the long-running civil war, including abduction and slavery, earned wide condemnation. So did support for Islamic jihadist movements, known terrorists such as Osama bin Laden and Carlos the Jackal, its role in the failed 1995 assassination of Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, and links to the Lord’s Resistance Army.[6]  During these years, the United States, United Nations, and European Union imposed various sanctions

1993: Clinton administration isolates the hardline government by vetoing international lending, puts Sudan on the list of countries that sponsor terrorism.

1994: EU follows, imposes arms embargo in response to civil war abuses.[7]  

1996: UN passes a resolution condemning Sudan for refusing to extradite a suspect in the attack on Mubarak, urges countries to limit interactions and entry to Sudanese officials. [8] US closes its embassy in Khartoum.

1997: US imposes a comprehensive economic embargo in response to “support for international terrorism, efforts to destabilize neighboring governments, and the prevalence of human rights violations including slavery and the denial of religious freedom.”[9] The embargo prohibits most business and financial transactions.

1998: US-Sudan relations reach all-time low when, after Al-Qaeda attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, US bombs Sudan’s al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant that it suspects of involvement with the alleged embassy bombers and chemical weapons.[10]

2001-2005:  Bush administration continues isolation policy, intensifies civil war mediation. Some groups lobby successfully for Western oil companies to divest in Sudan.[11] 

2003-2004: Darfur conflict begins in February 2003, continues despite African Union-brokered humanitarian ceasefire deals. By September 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell says US government believes a genocide has occurred.[12] UN appoints commission of inquiry; finds grave violations of international human rights, humanitarian law.[13]

2005: UN imposes arms embargo on Darfur and individual sanctions on several individuals believed responsible for atrocities.[14] In an unprecedented step, in March 2005 the Security Council refers the situation to the International Criminal Court. It brings charges including of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide against President al-Bashir, among others.[15]

2006: US imposes additional sanctions against individuals deemed responsible for crimes in Darfur.[16]

The EU still retains its arms embargo on Sudan and incorporates the UN’s sanctions on Darfur. Its member states implement these bilaterally, but are not precluded from doing business in Sudan.[17]  The African Union, like the UN, has played a key role in responding to Sudan’s crises through mediation, monitoring, and peacekeeping, but has not imposed sanctions.  Several of its member states, primarily Sudan’s neighbors, have had troubled relations with Sudan at various times. During its international isolation, Sudan pursued economic, political, and military trade with allies including Iran, Iraq, China, former Soviet republics, India, and Malaysia.[18]  

Shift Towards Engagement

In a significant about-face in 2015, Sudan expelled several Iranian groups from Khartoum and joined Saudi Arabia’s military operations in Yemen. The United Arab Emirates has provided large loans, and Saudi Arabian businesses have around US$15 million in investments in Sudan.[19] In 2016, Sudan severed diplomatic relations with Iran.[20]   

Sudan has persistently lobbied the US to roll back sanctions, which after renewed diplomatic talks in 2016 resulted in President Obama’s decision to reverse the two-decade policy of comprehensive economic sanctions in January 2017.[21] According to a US Treasury statement, the decision was “the result of sustained progress by the Government of Sudan on several fronts,” including “a marked reduction in offensive military activity, a pledge to maintain a cessation of hostilities in conflict areas in Sudan, steps toward improving humanitarian access throughout Sudan, and cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism and addressing regional conflicts.”[22]

At the same time, Sudan also embarked on new engagements with the EU, which launched a regional program for migration management in sub-Saharan Africa in 2014 via bilateral partnerships with African states and regional projects under the Khartoum Process.[23] In 2016, the EU announced €100 million (approximately $106 million) to Sudan in a “special support measure.”[24]

EU officials now refer publicly to Sudan as a “partner” nation and have highlighted debt relief as a key incentive to offer in exchange for further cooperation.[25] While additional funding has yet to be disbursed, civil society has criticized the EU project for de-prioritizing human rights in favor of meeting migration targets.[26] In recent months, it appears to have emboldened the government’s most abusive actors.[27]

II.      Missing Human Rights Benchmarks

Then-President Obama’s January 13, 2017 order states that permanent revocation of the economic sanctions is conditional on Sudan continuing to display “positive action” on several fronts, but the order lacks any benchmarks or guidance for how the State Department and other agencies should assess Sudan’s progress. Critically, it lacks reference to the need for human rights improvements. The following list of eight benchmarks suggest key areas for improvements and some steps Sudanese authorities could take in each, but is by no means exhaustive.

1. Respect for the Right to Life by Ending Attacks on Civilians and Indiscriminate Bombing

Sudan should cease all unlawful attacks on civilians, and permit independent monitoring and reporting by relevant agencies, including international human rights organizations and independent media.

Sudanese forces have a long record of committing serious violations of the laws of war -- war crimes -- and crimes against humanity during the civil war in southern Sudan, and in conflicts in Darfur, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile. Government forces and allied militias have been responsible for killings, rape and sexual violence, and looting and destruction on a massive scale during ground operations. They have also bombed and shelled indiscriminately in civilian areas, especially in rebel-held territories, and targeted clinics and markets in bombing campaigns.

During government offensives in Darfur in 2014-2015, the Rapid Support Forces led massive attacks on hundreds of villages, burning and destroying homes, and committing serious abuses, including rape and killings that may be crimes against humanity.[28] Government forces also launched a major offensive with ground and air forces on Jebel Mara in 2016, destroying hundreds of villages and displacing up to 195,000 people.[29] Amnesty International reported on allegations of chemical weapons use during the offensive.[30]

In Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, attacks since 2011 have killed and maimed hundreds of civilians, damaged dozens of schools and clinics, and forced hundreds of thousands to flee their homes. In 2016 alone, the government dropped hundreds of bombs that killed at least 45 people in the Nuba mountains, including six children in Heiban on May 1.[31]

In June 2016, the government declared a unilateral ceasefire in Southern Kordofan, which it extended to the end of June 2017 and to all the conflicts. There has been a reduction in clashes and attacks on civilians. But in December 2016, local monitors reported new clashes and government bombing in Nuba Mountains, and in early 2017 media reported government and militia attacks on civilians in the Jebel Mara region of Darfur.[32]  

2. Steps toward Accountability for the Gravest Crimes

Sudan should take steps to cooperate with the ICC, including through the surrender of suspects, and make efforts to genuinely investigate and prosecute those responsible for human rights abuses in conflict and non-conflict settings.

To date, the government has failed to implement key recommendations from the Human Rights Council’s 2007 Group of Experts’ report on Darfur, and its Universal Periodic Reviews (UPRs).[33] Its efforts to prosecute crimes in Darfur and elsewhere have fallen short.[34]  Since 2011, the government has made no tangible progress in providing accountability for crimes committed in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, including the killing of peaceful protesters, ill-treatment and torture of detainees, and other serious abuses.

Sudan continues to refuse any form of cooperation with the only meaningful route at present to criminal accountability for grave crimes committed in Darfur, the International Criminal Court, which has brought charges against al-Bashir and six other individuals for atrocities in Darfur.[35] Suspects are charged with genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Darfur, and remain fugitives from the court.

 3. Allow Sustained, Unimpeded Humanitarian Access to All Conflict-Affected Areas

Sudan should grant sustained and unimpeded access to all conflict locations in Darfur, Southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile and allow independent impartial humanitarian organizations to operate without arbitrary restrictions and onerous bureaucratic requirements. 

The Sudanese government has used a wide range of strategies to delay, limit, and deny access by humanitarian agencies to civilians in need of assistance during the civil war in the south, as well as in Darfur. These include flight bans; denials or massive delays in the processing of travel permits; limitations on the numbers of staff and expulsions of aid officials; and unnecessarily bureaucratic or arbitrary procedures for importing and transporting relief materials. In past decades, these policies have indirectly contributed to the deaths of tens of thousands of people from famine and diseases.[36]

In Darfur, access has been particularly difficult, especially to conflict-affected areas. In 2009, after the ICC announced charges against President al-Bashir, Sudan expelled 10 international aid groups working there and increased restrictions; authorities have since expelled or forced the departure of other humanitarian aid groups and staff and vowed to nationalize aid delivery.

In Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, Sudan’s government has obstructed access for organizations providing essential humanitarian assistance, including food and medical supplies. Many women and girls in the states have had extremely limited, if any, access to reproductive health care. Sudan has denied humanitarian organizations permission to access rebel-held areas from within Sudan. Both the government and the rebel SPLM-N have failed to agree on modalities for delivering impartial aid.[37]   

In December 2016, the government adopted new  regulations to ease movement by aid groups to non-conflict areas, but continues to restrict movement in conflict zones where humanitarian access counts the most.[38] It has allowed one aid organization to operate in government-controlled parts of Jebel Mara in Darfur, and allowed more UN officials in Kadugli and Damazin, but has not improved access to other key government and rebel areas where they have denied international humanitarian groups access.
 

4. Release Arbitrarily Held Detainees, and End Torture and Ill-Treatment

The National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) regularly detains activists, students, lawyers, doctors, community leaders, human rights defenders, and perceived government critics. It often holds detainees for long periods, without access to a lawyer or family visits.[39]   

Many NISS detention centers are in unmarked homes or offices, reminiscent of the “ghost houses” from the 1990s known for torture and ill-treatment. Detainees are beaten, abused,
and some tortured; some female activists have reported being sexually harassed in detention.[40] To date, no NISS officers have been held accountable for abusing detainees.

Sudanese authorities should release arbitrarily held detainees, including those held for their human rights work or perceived opposition to the government. They should issue clear instructions to national security officials to end all forms of ill-treatment and torture, and investigate any allegations that detainees were abused.  They should also allow independent monitors access to detainees in official and secret detention facilities so that improvements may be observed.

5. End Excessive Force against Peaceful Protesters

Sudanese forces continue to use excessive force—beatings, tear-gas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition—to disperse peaceful protests over a range of social grievances. This has resulted in hundreds of deaths and injuries in recent years. In September 2013 alone, more than 170 protesters were killed, mostly by bullets to the head or torso by men believed to be security forces.[41] In 2005, government forces killed 21 protesters in Port Sudan.

Sudan should introduce measures to ensure an end to the use of excessive force against peaceful protesters. Authorities should order security forces to use force only in accordance with UN guidelines and hold to account those responsible for abuse and killings of protesters through impartial investigations and prosecutions in line with international standards.

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Sudanese men at the funeral of Salah Sanhouri, 26, who was killed during protests by security forces on September 27, 2013, pray over his body. Protests over subsidy cuts on fuel and food have been taking place across Sudan since September 2013.

© 2013 AP Photo/Khalil Hamra

6. Respect for Freedoms of Association and Expression

Authorities restrict civil society by targeting activists who criticize the government or support international justice, and by leveling bogus charges of espionage and crimes against the state against them.[42] These practices should end immediately (as above). 

Sudan also controls civil society through bureaucratic restrictions and oversight, including interference by national security officers in organizations’ work. It has repeatedly blocked individuals’ participation in various international events, including Sudan’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in 2016 at the UN Human Rights Council.[43]  

Authorities have long restricted media via censorship, confiscations, and harassing, threatening, and detaining journalists. A key test of commitment to improving on these issues will be whether Sudan stops undue interference and harassment of civil society activists and groups, and NISS censorship of media and interference in editorial choices.

7. Allow Human Rights Monitoring, Cooperate with International Bodies and Institutions

A key test will be whether the government facilitates the African Union/UN Hybrid operation in Darfur -- UNAMID’s -- operations, in particular by granting human rights monitors’ access to conflict-affected areas, and responding positively to requests from other international organizations for access to Sudan.

Sudan has routinely denied UNAMID access to conflict-affected areas so they can effectuate their mandate to protect civilians and monitor human rights. It has denied visas to incoming staff, and closed the human rights section’s liaison office in Khartoum; al-Bashir has ordered the mission to adopt an exit strategy.

Authorities have also expelled other UN officials, including in 2016 the top UN humanitarian.[44]  The government also denied or delayed entry to UN special rapporteurs and diplomatic missions and denied entry to international human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch. It has refused access for UNAMID or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to follow up and on allegations by Amnesty International that chemical weapons were used in Darfur.

8. Legislative Reforms

Sudan should take steps to reform its most repressive laws. The National Security Act of 2010 allows national security agents to detain individuals for more than four-and-a-half months without judicial review, well beyond the international standard, which requires detainees be brought promptly before a judicial authority. Even in conflict or a state of emergency, ‘prompt’ should be no more than a matter of days.  A patchwork of immunities in various laws shields security forces from prosecution for human rights violations and all such immunities should be repealed. Immunity for the Rapid Support Forces is particularly problematic in light of their documented record of abuse, including sexual violence.[45]

Public order laws—which proscribe private matters such as clothing choice or keeping company with someone from the opposite sex, and carry penalties of fines and flogging— discriminate against females, particularly those from marginalized and non-Muslim communities, and should be reformed.[46] Penalties of lashing, stoning, and other forms of cruel and unusual punishment that international law prohibits should be repealed. 

Other laws restricting civil society and media freedoms should also be revised in line with international standards. Any new constitution should include full protections for human rights including explicitly women’s rights, and Sudan should ratify key international human rights treaties, including the Convention against Torture, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, and the Convention on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances.

 

[1] Human Rights Watch, In the Name of God: Repression Continues in Northern Sudan, vol.6, no.9, November 1994, https://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/sudan/.

[2] Human Rights Watch, Behind the Red Line: Political Repression in Sudan, May 1996, https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1996/Sudan.htm

[3] “Darfur deaths ‘could be 300,000,’” BBC, April 23, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7361979.stm

[4] Human Rights Watch, Sudan- Abandoning Abyei: Destruction and Displacement, May 2008, July 2008, https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/07/21/abandoning-abyei/destruction-and-d...

[5] Human Rights Watch, Under Siege: Indiscriminate Bombing and Abuse in Sudan’s Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, December 2012, https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/12/11/under-siege/indiscriminate-bombing-and-abuses-sudans-southern-kordofan-and-blue 

[6] Human Rights Watch, “Foreign Corporate Complicity, Foreign Government Support,” in Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2003), p. 510.

[7] “EU arms embargo on Sudan,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, November 23, 2012, https://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/sudan

[8] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1070 (1996), S/RES/1070 (1996), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N96/214/20/PDF/N9621420.pd...

[9] United States Executive Order 13067—Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Sudan, November 1997, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/13067.pdf

[10] Sudan called for a UN investigation into the bombing, which the US blocked. Robert O. Collins, A History of Modern Sudan, p. 239; Human Rights Watch, Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights, p. 637-8.

[11] Human Rights Watch, Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights, p. 633

[12] “Powell declares genocide in Sudan,” BBC News, September 9, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/3641820.stm

[13] International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, September 18, 2004,  http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf

[14] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1556 (2004),  S/RES/1556 (2004), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Sudan%20SRES1556.pdf; United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1591 (2005), S/RES/1591 (2005), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1591%20%282005%29

[15] “Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court,” United Nations Security Council press release, March 31, 2005, SC/8351, http://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sc8351.doc.htm

[16] United States Executive Order 13400, Blocking Property of Persons in Connection with the Conflict in Sudan’s Darfur Region, April 26, 2006,  https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/13400.pdf

[17] Guidance: Embargoes and sanctions on Sudan, UK Department for Business, Innovation & Skills and Foreign & Commonwealth Office, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/arms-embargo-on-sudan. The UK has aligned more closely with the US and Norway in the “Troika” group, while Germany and Italy have engaged more with Sudanese government, and France with the opposition, whose leaders often stay there.

[18] Lydia Polgreen, “China, in New Role, Presses Sudan on Darfur,” New York Times, February 23, 2008, (accessed April 21, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/23/world/africa/23darfur.html (describing Chinese investment).

[19] “Engagement Beyond the Centre: An Inquiry Report on the Future of UK-Sudan Relations,” All Party Parliamentary Group for Sudan and South Sudan, February 2017, p.15

[20] Liz Sly, “Bahrain cuts ties with Tehran as crisis widens in Saudi-Iran split,” Washington Post, January 4, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/bahrain-cuts-ties-with-tehran-as-crisis-widens-in-saudi-iran-split/2016/01/04/145c8824-b271-11e5-8abc-d09392edc612_story.html?utm_term=.9bea5fe0d9a8

[21] United States Executive Order 13761, Recognizing Positive Actions by the Government of Sudan

and Providing for the Revocation of Certain Sudan-Related Sanctions, January 18, 2017,  https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/sudan_eo_01132017.pdf

[22] “Treasury to Issue General License to Authorize Transactions with Sudan,” US Treasury Department Office of Public Affairs news release, January 13, 2017,  https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/sudan_fact_sheet.pdf.

[23] The Khartoum Process, or the EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative, was launched in November 2014 as a forum for political dialog and cooperation between EU member states and several countries from the East and Horn region, including Sudan. See www.khartoumprocess.net

[24] European Union action document for the special support measure for Sudan, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/eu-emergency-trust-fund/horn-africa_en

[25] Joint Commission-EEAS non-paper on enhancing cooperation on migration, mobility and readmission in Sudan, ARES (2016) 1325584, March 16, 2016,  http://www.statewatch.org/news/2016/mar/eu-com-eeas-readmission-sudan-7203-16.pdf

[26] All-Party Parliamentary Group for Sudan and South Sudan, “Engagement Beyond the Centre: An Inquiry Report on the Future of UK-Sudan Relations,” February 21, 2017, p. 31-32.

[27] The head of the Rapid Support Forces, Brig. Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, or “Hemeti,” has made public statements suggesting his forces’ operations, including border control and interdictions of migrants near the Libyan border, were done at the behest of the EU. Sudanese authorities have also continued to deport Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees. At the same time, agreements with Italy and Jordan led to the deportation of hundreds of Darfuris to Sudan in 2016. In March 2017, France said it would deport 27 Sudanese [failed] asylum-seekers back to Sudan.

[28] Human Rights Watch, Men With No Mercy: Rapid Support Forces Attacks against Civilians in Darfur, Sudan , September 2015, https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/09/09/men-no-mercy/rapid-support-forces-attacks-against-civilians-darfur-sudan

[29] Jehanne Henry, “Inaction on Darfur, Again,” Human Rights Watch dispatch, February 17, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/17/dispatches-inaction-darfur-again; Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005), January 9, 2017, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?
symbol=S/2017/22

[30] Amnesty International, Scorched Earth, Poisoned Air: Sudanese Forces Ravage Jebel Mara, September 2017, http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/scorched-earth-poisoned-air-s...

[31] Human Rights Watch, World Report chapter 2016, Sudan chapter, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/sudan

[32] Shangil Tobaya, “Attacks cause new displacement from Darfur’s Jebel Marra,” Dabanga, Febrauary 9, 2017, https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/attacks-cause-new-displacement-from-darfur-s-jebel-marra; “Sudan Insider: More Violence in Darfur, More Ceasefires Breached,” Nuba Reports, January 31, 2017, https://nubareports.org/
sudan-insider-more-violence-in-darfur-more-ceasefires-breachednocache1/; “Sudan Insider: SAF and SPLA-N Trade Ceasefire Breach Accusations,” February 28, 2016, https://nubareports.org/sudan-inside-saf-and-spla-n-trade-ceasefire-breach-accusations/

[33] Human Rights Watch, Ten Steps for Darfur: Indicators for Evaluating Progress in the HRC Group of Experts Process, September 24, 2007, https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/09/24/ten-steps-darfur/indicators-evalua... “Sudanese Government Should Investigate and Prosecute Those Responsible for Human Rights Violations,” Human Rights Watch news release, September 21, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/21/sudanese-government-should-investigate-and-prosecute-those-responsible-human-rights

[34] Human Rights Watch, Lack of Conviction: Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur, June 2006, https://www.hrw.org/report/2006/06/08/lack-conviction/special-criminal-court-events-darfur; “No Justice for Protester Killings,” Human Rights Watch news release, September 22, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/22/sudan-no-justice-protester-killings

[35] International Criminal Court investigation in Darfur, Sudan, https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur#cases. One of those cases was closed when the judges did not confirm the charges against him and another has been dropped due to the death of the suspect. 

[36] Human Rights Watch, Darfur: Humanitarian Aid Under Siege, May 2006, https://www.hrw.org/report/2006/05/08/darfur-humanitarian-aid-under-siege; Human Rights Watch, Famine in Sudan, 1998: The Human Rights Causes, (New York: Human Rights Watch: February 1999).

[37] Human Rights Watch, Humanitarian Aid under Siege; Human Rights Watch, Sudan-No Control, No Choice: Obstructions to Reproductive Healthcare in Rebel-held Southern Kordofan, forthcoming.

[38] Ministry of Welfare and Social Security Humanitarian Aid Commission, amended directives, December 15, 2016, on file with Human Rights Watch.

[39] “Sudan: Urgent Concern for Rights Defender on Hunger Strike Over Unlawful Detention,” Human Rights Watch news release, February 14, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/14/sudan-urgent-concern-rights-defender-hunger-strike-over-unlawful-detention.

[40] Human Rights Watch, Good Girls Don’t Protest: Repression and Abuse of Women Human Rights Defenders, Activists, and Protesters in Sudan, May 2016, https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/03/23/good-girls-dont-protest/repression...

[41] Human Rights Watch, We Stood, They Opened Fire: Killings and Arrests by Sudan’s Security Forces during the September Protests, April 2014, https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/04/21/we-stood-they-opened-fire/killings...

[42] “Tracks-affiliated rights defenders sentenced,” African Center for Justice and Peace Studies statement, March 8, 2017, http://www.acjps.org/sudan-tracks-affiliated-rights-defenders-sentenced-fined-and-finally-released-after-ten-months-of-arbitrary-detentio/

[43] ”Sudan blocks civil society participation in UN-led human rights review,” joint NGO statement, March 31, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/31/sudan-blocks-civil-society-participation-un-led-human-rights-review

[44] “Humanitarian official effectively expelled from Sudan, says UN,” Guardian, May 23, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/may/23/un-humanitarian-official-effectively-expelled-sudan

[45] Human Rights Watch, Men With No Mercy

[46] See the discussion of public order laws in Human Rights Watch, Good Girls Don’t Protest

A segélyhívószámokra érkező hívások hetven százaléka semmilyen beavatkozást nem igényel – közölte az Országos Rendőr-főkapitányság ügyeleti főosztályának vezetője az M1 aktuális csatornán. Hablicsek Nikoletta felhívta a figyelmet: a segélyhívószámok rendeltetéstől eltérő használata szabálysértés.

Elmondta, 2014 májusa óta a 112-es egységes európai segélyhívószámon és a 107-es nemzeti, rendőrségi számon, két központban, Miskolcon és Szombathelyen fogadják a segélyhívásokat. Ez a két központ fogadja 2016 januárja óta a katasztrófavédelem 105-ös nemzeti segélyhívójára érkező bejelentéseket is.

Hozzátette: a központokban be tudják azonosítani, honnan érkezik a hívás, a mobiltelefonról és nyilvános fülkéből érkező hívásokat térképes felületen jelenítik meg, vezetékes telefonról érkező hívásnál pedig az előfizető adatait látják.

A főosztályvezető közölte, a segélyhívások hetven százaléka semmiféle beavatkozást nem igényel, van, hogy kisgyerekek szórakoznak álhívásokkal, főleg iskolai szünetekben, van, hogy valaki a véleményét mondja el a segélyhívó vonalon, és az is előfordul, hogy valótlan bejelentéseket tesznek szándékosan azért, hogy a hatóság figyelmét eltereljék egy másik szabálysértésről, bűncselekményről.

Megjegyezte, hogy 2013 szeptemberétől létezik a segélyhívószámok rendeltetéstől eltérő igénybevételének szabálysértési tényállása. Súlyosabb esetekben – ahol megállapítható a hatóság félrevezetése, vagy bombával fenyegetés miatt a közveszéllyel fenyegetés – akár szabadságvesztést is ki lehet szabni az elkövetővel szemben.

A műsorban elhangzott: a rendőrség kampányt indít, hogy visszaszorítsák a 112-es segélyhívó számra érkező vakriasztásokat. A tájékoztatás szerint tavaly hárommillió felesleges hívás futott be a segélyhívókra, és csaknem 92 ezren kifejezetten rossz szándékkal telefonáltak, azaz minden ötödik percben álriasztást adtak, kitalált esethez próbálták küldeni a mentőket, tűzoltókat, rendőröket.

En 1989, il y avait plus de 400 cinémas en Roumanie. Aujourd'hui, il en reste moins de 30... C'est l'histoire d'un combat. Celui de Victor, directeur de cinéma depuis plus de 40 ans et cinéphile militant, qui se bat au quotidien avec ses deux employées pour tenter de sauver sa salle, l'une des dernières de Roumanie. Baigné entre nostalgie et rêves d'avenir, Victor tente de résister avec passion.
Pour tenter de gagner des places pour la sortie nationale prévue le 17 mai, envoyez un mail à l'équipe du (...)

Az ötödik alkalommal zajló akció során pénteken Kevi, Buránysor és Felsőhegy településeken takarítottak a falubeliek, majd szombaton Zentán folytatódott a közterületek szépítése.

Megérkezett Az ígéret című film előzetese, méghozzá magyar felirattal. A Christian Bale főszereplésével készülő film egy kifejezetten kényes témát dolgoz fel, méghozzá az örmény népirtásét.

A filmet a témában viszonylag jártas Terry George írja, aki a Hotel Ruandával című, szintén népirtással kapcsolatos filmmel lett ismert. Az ígéret egy szerelmi háromszögön keresztül mutatja be az örmény nép tragédiáját, amiben egy örmény orvostanhallgató, egy francia nő és egy amerikai újságíró között alakul ki kellemetlen párkapcsolati viszály.

Quelques milliers de personnes ont participé samedi soir à Al-Hoceïma (Nord du Maroc) à un concert de casseroles, une nouvelle forme de contestation dans cette région théâtre depuis six mois de manifestations contre l'Etat.

Cet article Maroc : concert de casseroles à Al-Hoceïma contre « l’Etat corrompu » est apparu en premier sur JeuneAfrique.com.

Az SZNT-nek meggyőződése, hogy létezik Székelyföldön olyan szellemi potenciál, amely megfelelő válaszokat tud adni a jövő kihívásaira. A Székely Nemzeti Tanács úgy ítéli meg, hogy az április 19-e és 21-e között Marosvásárhelyen, Csíkszeredában és Sepsiszentgyörgyön lezajlott III. Székely Kongresszus...

Les auditions des neuf candidats à la direction générale de l'Unesco, organisées à Paris les 26 et 27 avril, ont été marquées par une féroce bataille diplomatique.

Cet article Unesco : quel candidat a le plus de chances d’être élu à la direction générale ? est apparu en premier sur JeuneAfrique.com.

« La sueur épargne le sang », dit-on quand il s’agit de se préparer au combat. Pris au sens premier, cette condition est nécessaire mais pas suffisante étant donné qu’il faut également maîtriser des savoir-faire afin de pouvoir réagir au mieux en toute situation. « La réalité des champs de bataille est qu’on n’y étudie pas; simplement on […]

Cet article Quand le Centre d’entraînement au combat de l’armée de Terre ouvre ses portes est apparu en premier sur Zone Militaire.

Igazi kézműves műhelyekben készítették el a szabadkai cserkészek az anyák napi meglepetéseket szombaton a református templom udvarában felállított standoknál.

Un accident de bus, samedi dans le nord de la Tanzanie a tué 32 élèves, deux professeurs et le chauffeur, selon un nouveau bilan publié par la police qui estime que la vitesse est la cause probable du drame.

Cet article Accident de car scolaire en Tanzanie : 35 tués, vitesse en cause est apparu en premier sur JeuneAfrique.com.

Au terme d'une campagne inédite et électrique, les Français choisissent dimanche le huitième président de la Ve République, entre un novice en politique à l'ascension inattendue et une candidate d'extrême droite.

Cet article Macron ou Le Pen? La France élit son nouveau président est apparu en premier sur JeuneAfrique.com.

Nyíltan, egyenesen kell beszélni a romániai magyar nyelvű oktatás helyzetéről – jelentette ki Kelemen Hunor szövetségi elnök szombaton Marosvásárhelyen, az RMDSZ által szervezett  pedagógusfórumon. A szakmával közösen kell döntéseket hozni, gyorsan és felelősen, különben az egyes problémák az egész ...

May 6, 2017 (KHARTOUM) - A Sudanese expert on international law and border disputes Saturday has strongly contested Sudan's ability to take Egypt to International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) over the disputed Halayeb area.

An international maritime border arbitrator, Osman Mohamed al-Sharif, disclosed that Sudan was planning to take Egypt to a binding arbitration before the ITLOS over the disputed Halayeb area, adding that Khartoum's recently lodged objection with the United Nations against Cairo's annexation of the region to its maritime border.

However in an interview with Sudan Tribune on Saturday, an international law expert, Faisal Abdel Rahman Ali Taha said that the courts established under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea do not have any jurisdiction over the maritime area of Halayeb as long as the land dispute over the triangle has not yet been settled.

Taha stressed, however, that the arbitral tribunal, which might be constituted under annexe VII to the Convention on the Law of the Sea, "would not consider a dispute concerning the Halayeb maritime area because that would necessarily entail consideration of the sovereignty dispute over the Halaib land. This matter is not about the application or interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea But governed by other rules of international law."

"Maritime rights derive from the coastal state's sovereignty over the land because the land dominates the sea," he stressed.

The Halayeb triangle, which is a 20,580 km area on the Red Sea, has been a contentious issue between Egypt and Sudan since 1958, shortly after Sudan gained its independence from the British-Egyptian rule in January 1956.

The area has been under Cairo's full military control since the mid-1990's following a Sudanese-backed attempt to kill the former Egyptian President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak.

Egypt has used to reject Sudan's repeated calls for referring the dispute to international arbitration. The international law provides that the agreement of the two parties is needed to arbitrate a dispute by the tribunal.

STRAIGHT BASELINE

Moreover, Taha refused Sharif's statement that Sudan's filing of the straight baseline was a measure intended to create a third route after a refusal of the direct negotiations and the international arbitration.

Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir issued a decree on March 2 on the straight baselines from which the sea areas of the Republic of Sudan are measured, opposing the Cairo Declaration, which touches the Sudanese maritime border north of Line 22 and lists it as maritime coordinates of Egypt.

Al-Sharif said that Khartoum's move to deposit with the UN coordinates of the baselines from which its maritime areas are measured after 27 years since former President Hosni Mubarak lodged the maritime borders of Egypt doesn't strip Sudan of its sovereignty over Halayeb and the equivalent Red Sea waters.

But Taha stressed that the role of the UN Secretariat has no authority "to refer the dispute on the straight baselines to the arbitration or to force the concerned States to do so".

"The Secretary-General of the United Nations is the depositary of the Convention on the Law of the Sea under article 319. As to what he said that the (UN chief) is the guarantor of the Convention, there is no such a provision in the Convention about that."

Al-Sharif claimed that the UN Secretary General as guarantor to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea can end the fait accompli which was established by Egypt in Halayeb in 1995, saying the maritime borders of the Sudan in Halayeb are fixed and complementary to the land border.

(ST)

Az Állatok HiperParádéja elnevezésű rendezvényen több mint 100 négylábú vonul fel, vesz részt rátermettségi, ügyességi és hűségpróbán, a mentő-, drogkereső, csendőr- és rendőrkutyáktól a gadátlan ebekig. A kutyabemutató vasárnap délelőtt 11 órakor kezdődik és délután fél 5-ig tart. Helyszín a Cora m...

La pièce "ça peut servir", comédie labellisée par la mission du centenaire de la Mission centenaire 14-18, sera donnée par la compagnie "Le moral des troupes" le vendredi 12 mai 2017 à l'espace AGAPIT à Saint-Maixent-L'Ecole.

Elle est présentée à l'initiative de la Société des Membres de la Légion d'Honneur (section des Deux-Sèvres) , avec le soutien de la municipalité de Saint-Maixent l'Ecole. Toutes les recettes seront intégralement reversées à l'association "Terre-Fraternité".

Billetterie :
- tarif unique : 15 euros ( chèque à l’ordre de « Le moral des troupes).
- à réserver par courrier ou mail à Société des Membres de la Légion d’honneur des Deux-Sèvres : Colonel O. SASTRE, 15 rue Haute de la Croix – 79400 Saint-Maixent l’Ecole ou smlh79@laposte.net ou au 06.64.76.00.51 et enfin sur place, le jour du spectacle (par chèque ou en espèces).

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A Rómában élő illegális bevándorlók embertelen életkörülményeiről forgatott egy riportfilmet a Matrix stábja, mikor a tudósítás hirtelen félbeszakadt, és a riporternő sikoltozva rohant el a helyszínről. Kis idő múlva kiderült, hogy a pályaudvar aluljárójában lévő migránsok hirtelen körbevették, és megtámadták őt és a stábját is.

Az élő közvetítés miatt nem csak a talkshow vezetője és a meghívott nézők, hanem a televíziós csatornát néző összes ember láthatta, hogy menekülnek a csapat munkatársai.

Az adás megszakadt, de a műsorvezető nem volt hajlandó folytatni a műsort: addig szólongatta a riporternőt, amíg újból meg nem hallotta a hangját. A nő ekkor elmondta, hogy megtámadták őket, majd bemenekült a stáb kocsijába, és egészen addig ottmaradt, amíg meg nem érkezett a rendőrség. A bevándorlók a támadás után a stáb felszerelését is összetörték – derült ki helyszíni tudósításokból.

Des milliers de Polonais se sont réunis samedi à Varsovie, Plac Bankowy, pour participer à une « marche de la liberté » contre le PiS

Comprendre l'Europe centrale pour 6€/mois Je m'abonne Je me connecte

A levélpetrezselyem (Pet­ro­se­linum crispum) konyhánk hagyományosan használt zöldségei közé tartozik. Nem a tápértéke számottevő, hanem az ízesítőképessége. A jó húslevesnek mindenesetre fontos kelléke a petrezselyemgyökér és annak a lombja is – vagyis a petrezselyemzöld.
Már az ókori népek is fogyasztották a gyökerét és a levelét. A legtöbb országban legalább annyira kedvelt és termesztett, mint a gyökérpetrezselyem. Vad alakjai a Földközi-tenger környékén nőnek, főként a források környékén, patakok nyirkos partján, köves, kavicsos területeken.
Kétéves növény. Rövid főgyökere elágazó, sok oldalgyökeret fejleszt. Gyökerének sárgásfehér színe hasonló a gyökérpetrezselyeméhez, de a belseje nem húsos, hanem rostos. A gyökérpetrezselyemmel ellentétben a gyökerek fő funkciója nem a raktározás, hanem a rögzítés és szilárdítás.
A kissé duzzadt gyökérnyakból indulnak ki a tőlevelei. Az emberi táplálkozás szempontjából értéktelen gyökérzetével szemben dús levélzetet fejleszt. Ezek a levelek, illetve a második éves növény alsó levelei többszörösen szárnyasan összetettek, a levélkék szeldeltek. A levélszél csipkézett és fodrozott. A levélnyél hosszú és halványzöld. A levél színe tompa sötétzöld, de előfordulnak sárgászöld színű fajták is. A második évben kialakuló magszáron a levelek tagoltsága és a levélnyelek, hossza a virágzat felé fokozatosan csökken. 100–150 cm magas csupasz magszára szögletes és belül üreges, általában elágazó. Második évben, a magérés után a növény befejezi fejlődését és elhal. A szár csúcsán összetett ernyővirágzat képződik.

Környezeti igénye
A sárgarépához hasonlóan hidegtűrő, de még annál is kisebb a hőigénye. Teljesen kifejlett állapotban a -10 °C-ot is elviseli. Vethető tél alá, de ha nyár végén vetjük, akkor a fagyokig megerősödik, míg ha késő ősszel, akkor a mag telel át és kora tavasszal, már 2-3 °C-os talajhőmérsékleten csírázásnak indul. A meleget is jól bírja. A félárnyékot, gyenge fényt is elviseli, árnyéktűrő növény. Szerény fényigénye miatt kiválóan alkalmas téli hajtatásra. Felmagzásra az első évben egyáltalán nem hajlamos, ez is növeli termesztésének biztonságát.
Erősen elágazó, mélyre törő gyökere jó vízfelvevő. Apró magjainak magas olajtartalma miatt csírázása sokszor elhúzódik, különösen akkor, ha kevés a csapadék. Ezért tavasszal, amint rá lehet menni a talajra, vessük el, mert ilyenkor a talajba került téli csapadék még elegendő számára. A későbbi vetést ajánlatos öntözni. Vigyázzunk, hogy a talaj felszíne ne cserepesedjen, mert a csírázásnak indult magok befulladnak. A kelést követően 3-4 hétig lassan fejlődik, főleg, ha a talaj felső rétege kiszárad és a kis gyökerek nem tudnak elegendő vizet felvenni. Későbbi öntözést nem igényel, sőt, a túl sok csapadék károsan hat a hozamára.
A talajjal és annak kémhatásával szemben közömbös. A gyökérzöldségekkel ellentétben minden talajon jól termeszthető, de a jó tápanyagtartalmú kötött talaj a legmegfelelőbb számára. Pangó víz vagy túl magas talajvízszint esetén levélhozama csökken. Közepesen tápanyagigényes, külön szervestrágyázni nem szükséges. A gyökérpetrezselyemmel ellentétben alacsony a foszforigénye, viszont jóval nagyobb a nitrogénszükséglete.

Termesztése
Hosszú tenyészideje miatt a gyökérzöldségekhez hasonlóan szabadföldön, főnövényként termesztik. Sárgarépa után nem ajánlatos termeszteni, mert azonosak a kártevőik. Ősszel a talajt elegendő 20-25 cm mélyen lazítani, ezzel egy időben szórjuk ki a műtrágyák egy részét: 20-30 dkg szuperfoszfátot és ugyanannyi kálisót 10 m² területre. A pétisót – 10 m²-re 30-40 dkg-ot – két, esetleg három részletben a következő évben szórjuk ki.
Kora tavasszal, amilyen korán csak lehet (már márciusban), a talajegyengetés után azonnal megkezdhetjük a vetését. Meg lehet kísérelni az úgynevezett tél alá vetést is ősszel, októberben. Az apró magvak vetését követően a talajt enyhe taposással tömörítsük. A tömörebb magágy nem szárad ki gyorsan és az amúgy is lassú kelés nem húzódik el még jobban. Laza és kötött talajon egyaránt 2-3 cm mélyre szórjuk a talajba a magokat. A sorok egymástól való távolsága 20-30 cm.

Ápolási munkák és betakarítás
A gyökérpetrezselyemmel ellentétben kelés után túlzottan nem szükséges egyelni, hiszen a gyökér vastagsága nem lényeges. Az ápolási munkák közül az ágyás gyomtalanítása a legfontosabb. Öntözésre nem szorul, de a kelés utáni öntözést gyorsabb növekedéssel hálálja meg.
Gyenge kezdeti fejlődése miatt a petrezselyemmag-vetés mindig ki van téve az elgyomosodás veszélyének. Ennek ellenére ne használjunk a kiskertben gyomirtó szert! Ezek a vegyszerek ugyanis specifikus hatásúak, vagyis a gyomokat irtják, de a petrezselymet megkímélik. Igen ám, de a kiskertben egymás mellett élnek a legkülönbözőbb növények, és a leggondosabb munkával is elkerülhetetlen, hogy a gyomirtó szer, amely az egyik haszonnövényt megmenti az elgyomosodástól, a másikat ne pusztítsa el.
Amikor a növénykék elérték a galambtoll-nagyságot, ki kell egyelni őket. A kihúzkodott kis növények lombját már fel lehet a konyhában használni. A levelek szedését május második felétől kezdhetjük. A teljesen kifejlett leveleket a levélnyéllel együtt kézzel tőből tépjük ki. Egy-egy tőről egyszerre a lomb harmadánál többet ne szedjünk, hogy egyenletesen fejlődjön.
Elterjedt a hajtatása is. Késő ősszel, a többi gyökérféléhez hasonlóan, felszedik a gyökerét. A fagymentes helyen tárolt gyökereket az igények szerint bármikor levélhozásra serkenthetjük, ha 10-20°C-os hőmérsékletű helyiségben nedves talajba ültetjük. Jóval egyszerűbb módszer a helyben teleltetés. Ekkor a magokat nyáron (július-augusztusban) vetjük el, így a növények a télbe megerősödve, dús lombozattal jutnak.
Öntözéssel és folyamatos tápanyag-utánpótlással nagy zöldtömeget fejleszt, 6–8 kg/10 m² termésre számíthatunk. Az első szedés (június) után teljesen távolítsuk el a sérült, sárguló leveleket. A további szedések havonta esedékesek. Kiskertekben, ahol csak egy-két tő van, ne taroljuk le teljesen, folyamatosan szedjük, kívülről befelé haladva.
Betegségekre a gyökérpetrezselyemmel szemben kevésbé érzékeny. Ritkán előfordulhat a fuzikládiumos levélfoltosság, illetve a szeptóriás betegség. Valamivel gyakrabban okoz gondot a lisztharmat, amelynek elszaporodása értéktelenné teheti az egész állományt.
Levélpetrezselyem-fajták: Ti­tan, Ma­runka, Rial­to, Petra, Fes­ti­val, Уро­жай­ная, Ги­ган­тел­ла, Парамоунт.

Felhasználása
A lombját ételízesítőnek, díszítésre használják. A petrezselymes újburgonya egyike a legfinomabb tavaszi eledeleknek és a köretnek (például a rizsnek is) üde zamatot és étvágygerjesztő külsőt kölcsönöz.
Az összevágott lomb alufóliába csomagolva mélyhűtőben olyan friss marad, mintha most vágták volna le a tövéről. A levélzetet nyáron eredményesen lehet szárítani. Kis csomókba kötve szellős, de nem napfényes helyen egy hét alatt megszárad; az összemorzsolt leveleket jól záródó üvegben tartva egész télen lehet hasznosítani.
Kevesen tudják, hogy a petrezselyem nemcsak ételízesítő, de gyógynövény is: mind a gyökeréből, mind a lombjából veseműködést serkentő, vesekőhajtó és hólyaghurut elleni teák készíthetők. A gyökérből kipréselt lé fokozza az emésztőrendszer működését, gyógyítja a gyomor- és májbetegségeket, valamint étvágygerjesztőként is hatásos.

Balog Nóra, a „Pro agricultura Carpathica”
Kárpátaljai Megyei Jótékonysági Alapítvány munkatársa