Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

As Cyprus assumes its second Presidency of the European Union, it steps into a role defined by crisis and change. The contrast with its first Presidency (2012) could not be sharper. Then, multilateralism prevailed; collaboration was possible, and conflict manageable. Today, multilateralism is under siege, conflicts dominate, and Europe faces existential challenges: its Union and Security, its Internal and Capital Markets, its Competitiveness, its Freedom and Values.

Every Presidency has one duty: to carry the Union’s business forward. For Cyprus, the central test will be guiding the negotiations on the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). This is an exercise in listening, negotiation, and compromise. More than anything, it will demand that Cyprus acts as an honest broker — a role where smaller member states often succeed more than larger ones.

Three Tests of Success

Like all Presidencies, Cyprus will be judged on three fronts:

• Institutional: Can it leave a footprint by steering the MFF to conclusion?
• Representational: Can it represent a policy theme, bigger than its national interest that endures? Water, as a scarce resource and driver of conflict and migration –with impact across continents -, could anchor a “Nicosia Declaration on Water.”
• Reputational: Can it use neutrality to build a legacy as a convener of peace and compromise?

It is commendable that Cyprus wants to include regional neighbors as observers in EU deliberations. The EuroMediterranean region — 500 million people, 10% of global GDP — is paradoxically the least interconnected in the world. Intra-regional trade is just one quarter of total trade. For a decade, progress has been negligible.

Cyprus, as the EU’s southeastern border, can help change this. By bringing neighbors into the European conversation, it can foster trade, collaboration, and peace. But this must be pursued with neutrality and as part of a long-term strategy and within EU’s governance model— not as a one-off gesture.

The Presidency is about Europe’s collective good, not national gain. Yet Cyprus’ reality cannot be ignored. It remains divided, with EU law barred from 30% of its territory. And, it is Europe’s only isolated island Member State.

This Presidency can remind Cypriots of the benefits of EU membership. It can remind Europeans of the reality that part of EU territory remains occupied by Turkey — an EU trade partner and NATO member. That contradiction must never be normalized, and it must never be replicated elsewhere.

Cyprus should not instrumentalize its occupation and division but deploy it as a precedent and the learnings which point to European security risks, given the current world order, prevailing Russia threats across the EU’s borders and continuing conflict between Israel, Palestine and regional actors.

Cyprus’ Presidency comes at a moment when Europe needs resilience and vision. It is an opportunity for a small state to leave a large footprint. To prove that neutrality can be strength. To show that Cyprus is not an island on the margins, but a player at the heart of Europe’s frontier.

Photo: Flickr

Depuis l'effondrement mortel de l'auvent de la gare de Novi Sad, le 1er novembre 2024, la Serbie se soulève contre la corruption meurtrière du régime du président Vučić et pour le respect de l'État de droit. Cette exigence de justice menée par les étudiants a gagné tout le pays. Suivez les dernières informations en temps réel et en accès libre.

- Le fil de l'Info / Courrier des Balkans, Vucic, Serbie, Politique, Société, Gratuit

Durrës devrait devenir le nouveau « Dubaï de la Méditerranée », avec la création d'une immense marina et le transfert du port actuel sur le site de Porto Romano. Oui, sauf que les appels d'offres ont été passés en toute opacité, que les investisseurs étrangers se sont largement retirés du projet, que le sol est argileux et la zone sismique...

- Articles / Une - Diaporama, Adriatique, PS Albanie, Albanie, Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso, Economie, Environnement, Une - Diaporama - En premier

L'entrée au Parlement des unionistes du Parti Démocratie à la maison, aux sympathies trumpistes affirmées, et le réseau social TikTok rebattent les cartes entre partisans de la « Grande Roumanie » et adeptes de la « Grande Moldavie ». Décryptage.

- Articles / Moldavie, Roumanie-Moldavie : gel, dégel et regel des relations bilatérales, Courrier des Balkans, Relations régionales, Politique, Une - Diaporama

Le Jardinier et la mort (Gradinariat i smurtta) de Guéorgui Gospodinov, traduit du bulgare par Marie Vrinat, Gallimard, 230 p., 21,50 €, numérique 15,99 €.

- Lettres de l'Est et des Balkans • Le blog de Pierre Glachant / Blogs - Diaporama, Bulgarie

This paper contributes to the extant literature by comparing and contrasting China’s and India’s rationale for leadership of the Global South in the Xi-Modi era and highlighting their motivations and strategies. Both China’s and India’s leadership styles can be characterized as flexible and pragmatic. Both have endeavoured to become the voice of the Global South, a goal pursued by organizing a myriad of international forums and conferences designed to facilitate dialogue, foster solidarity, and shape the collective agenda of developing countries on the global stage and by demonstrating a keen interest in championing the developmental aspirations of developing countries. In addition to diplomatic and political initiatives, both countries have focused on providing development-linked goods (including public goods) to nations within the Global South. However, their approaches to achieving this leadership exhibit notable differences, primarily in their engagement strategies and the extent of their global outreach.

This paper contributes to the extant literature by comparing and contrasting China’s and India’s rationale for leadership of the Global South in the Xi-Modi era and highlighting their motivations and strategies. Both China’s and India’s leadership styles can be characterized as flexible and pragmatic. Both have endeavoured to become the voice of the Global South, a goal pursued by organizing a myriad of international forums and conferences designed to facilitate dialogue, foster solidarity, and shape the collective agenda of developing countries on the global stage and by demonstrating a keen interest in championing the developmental aspirations of developing countries. In addition to diplomatic and political initiatives, both countries have focused on providing development-linked goods (including public goods) to nations within the Global South. However, their approaches to achieving this leadership exhibit notable differences, primarily in their engagement strategies and the extent of their global outreach.

This paper contributes to the extant literature by comparing and contrasting China’s and India’s rationale for leadership of the Global South in the Xi-Modi era and highlighting their motivations and strategies. Both China’s and India’s leadership styles can be characterized as flexible and pragmatic. Both have endeavoured to become the voice of the Global South, a goal pursued by organizing a myriad of international forums and conferences designed to facilitate dialogue, foster solidarity, and shape the collective agenda of developing countries on the global stage and by demonstrating a keen interest in championing the developmental aspirations of developing countries. In addition to diplomatic and political initiatives, both countries have focused on providing development-linked goods (including public goods) to nations within the Global South. However, their approaches to achieving this leadership exhibit notable differences, primarily in their engagement strategies and the extent of their global outreach.

This deliverable of the project REBOOT (Kandyla, A., Turan P. and Vlassis, A. (Eds). (2025)) offers an overview and description of the structure and contents of the public database on ‘European Union (EU) laws and cross-national frameworks relevant to the European Film Industry (EFI)’. Developed within the framework of Work Package 3 (WP3) of the REBOOT project, the database is organised into three distinct sub-databases, each addressing key dimensions on the laws and policies governing the promotion of the EFI at the international level: the regulatory framework for filmmaking at the EU level and across EU member states; institutional and policy models across the EU Member States, and EU legal and policy instruments relevant to the internationalisation of the EFI. D3.6 is meant to act as a guide to these resources. It outlines the main types of information and data included in each sub-database and details the methodology employed in their compilation, including documentary sources, data collection structures, and other relevant information. The full sub-databases will be released as part of the ‘Film industry competitiveness dashboard’ (Task 6.2), which is scheduled to be submitted in November 2025. The dashboard will offer an online platform providing public access to both original data collected within the REBOOT project and existing statistics. It will enable visualisations and support future analysis of the evolving competitiveness of the European film industry.

The deliverable is structured in three parts as follows:

(1) Part 1 introduces the sub-database on ‘Multi-level mapping of the legal norms informing and regulating filmmaking in the European Union’. This sub-database reflects the scientific output of the research conducted under Task 3.1, led by Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna (hereinafter referred to as ‘SSSA’). It offers a detailed mapping of legal and policy instruments across multiple governance levels (international, supranational, regional, and national) that influence filmmaking in the EU. It covers an array of areas critical to the sector’s competitiveness, including cultural diversity, copyright, media law, and the protection of minors. Norms have been extracted from legal instruments issued by organisations such as UNESCO, WIPO, WTO, the Council of Europe, the EU, and selected Member States.

(2) Part 2 presents the sub-database on the ‘Promotion of the EFI at the international level: Institutional and policy models across the EU Member States’. This sub-database reflects the output of Task 3.4, led by the University of Liège (ULIEGE), which explored how public institutions and practices contribute to the international promotion of their national film industries and, by extension, of the broader EFI. The sub-data includes quantitative data and materials, offering a structured, accessible, and comparative resource. Drawing on extensive documentary research, interviews, and market data, it provides a comparative mapping of public support strategies, funding mechanisms, and the actors involved in promoting the EFI across EU Member States and abroad.

(3) Part 3 presents the sub-database on ‘EU legal and policy measures on the promotion of the EFI on the international scene’. Developed as part of research conducted by the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) under Task 3.5, it catalogues a range of agreements concerning trade facilitation and cooperation negotiated by the EU with third countries and regions, covering agreements that are currently in force, as well as agreements pending signature and ratification. It also covers selected EU funding instruments with relevance to the international promotion of European audiovisual works and audiovisual cooperation with third countries.

 

The deliverable is available here.

DIW-Themenbericht zum Jahrestag der Deutschen Einheit – Finanz- und Wirtschaftskraft der Länder sehr heterogen – Ostdeutsche Länder weiter schwach, schließen aber zu ärmeren westdeutschen auf – Finanzstarke Länder setzen sich ab – Produktivitätslücke zwischen Ost und West schließt sich – Stattdessen ...

Despite growing awareness, the global regulation of facial recognition technology (FRT) remains fragmented, much like the governance of Artificial Intelligence (AI). International initiatives from the United Nations (UN), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and World Economic Forum (WEF) provide guiding principles but fall short of enforceable standards. On 27 July 2025, UN tech chief Doreen Bogdan-Martin warned that the world urgently needs a global approach to AI regulation, as fragmented efforts risk deepening inequalities. 
This policy brief explores how FRT challenges existing governance frameworks due to its rapid development, complexity and ethical implications. Our research shows that delays in regulation are not only caused by the rapid pace of technological change but also by whose voices are included in the debate. In FRT debates, early warnings from civil society about privacy and rights were sidelined until echoed by governments and major tech firms. This lack of representation, as much as the rapid pace of innovation, helps explain why regulation so often lags behind public concerns. To better govern FRT, the policy brief proposes an adaptive and inclusive model that balances flexibility with democratic legitimacy. Adaptive governance, marked
by decentralised decision-making, iterative policy learning, and responsiveness, helps address the uncertainties and evolving risks of narrow AI applications like FRT. Inclusivity is equally critical in legitimising FRT governance. 
We propose three policy recommendations to national regulators, multilateral bodies and regional policymakers for future AI governance: (1) require transparent labelling of AI systems, 
(2) reframe AI as a societal issue, not just a security tool, and (3) embed civil society in AI governance forums. Taken together, these actions would promote a more proactive, equitable and context-sensitive framework for regulating AI globally. These recommendations are particularly timely ahead of the AI Impact Summit, scheduled for February 2026 in Delhi, which will bring global policymakers together to shape an international vision for AI governance that includes FRT.

 

Despite growing awareness, the global regulation of facial recognition technology (FRT) remains fragmented, much like the governance of Artificial Intelligence (AI). International initiatives from the United Nations (UN), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and World Economic Forum (WEF) provide guiding principles but fall short of enforceable standards. On 27 July 2025, UN tech chief Doreen Bogdan-Martin warned that the world urgently needs a global approach to AI regulation, as fragmented efforts risk deepening inequalities. 
This policy brief explores how FRT challenges existing governance frameworks due to its rapid development, complexity and ethical implications. Our research shows that delays in regulation are not only caused by the rapid pace of technological change but also by whose voices are included in the debate. In FRT debates, early warnings from civil society about privacy and rights were sidelined until echoed by governments and major tech firms. This lack of representation, as much as the rapid pace of innovation, helps explain why regulation so often lags behind public concerns. To better govern FRT, the policy brief proposes an adaptive and inclusive model that balances flexibility with democratic legitimacy. Adaptive governance, marked
by decentralised decision-making, iterative policy learning, and responsiveness, helps address the uncertainties and evolving risks of narrow AI applications like FRT. Inclusivity is equally critical in legitimising FRT governance. 
We propose three policy recommendations to national regulators, multilateral bodies and regional policymakers for future AI governance: (1) require transparent labelling of AI systems, 
(2) reframe AI as a societal issue, not just a security tool, and (3) embed civil society in AI governance forums. Taken together, these actions would promote a more proactive, equitable and context-sensitive framework for regulating AI globally. These recommendations are particularly timely ahead of the AI Impact Summit, scheduled for February 2026 in Delhi, which will bring global policymakers together to shape an international vision for AI governance that includes FRT.

 

Despite growing awareness, the global regulation of facial recognition technology (FRT) remains fragmented, much like the governance of Artificial Intelligence (AI). International initiatives from the United Nations (UN), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and World Economic Forum (WEF) provide guiding principles but fall short of enforceable standards. On 27 July 2025, UN tech chief Doreen Bogdan-Martin warned that the world urgently needs a global approach to AI regulation, as fragmented efforts risk deepening inequalities. 
This policy brief explores how FRT challenges existing governance frameworks due to its rapid development, complexity and ethical implications. Our research shows that delays in regulation are not only caused by the rapid pace of technological change but also by whose voices are included in the debate. In FRT debates, early warnings from civil society about privacy and rights were sidelined until echoed by governments and major tech firms. This lack of representation, as much as the rapid pace of innovation, helps explain why regulation so often lags behind public concerns. To better govern FRT, the policy brief proposes an adaptive and inclusive model that balances flexibility with democratic legitimacy. Adaptive governance, marked
by decentralised decision-making, iterative policy learning, and responsiveness, helps address the uncertainties and evolving risks of narrow AI applications like FRT. Inclusivity is equally critical in legitimising FRT governance. 
We propose three policy recommendations to national regulators, multilateral bodies and regional policymakers for future AI governance: (1) require transparent labelling of AI systems, 
(2) reframe AI as a societal issue, not just a security tool, and (3) embed civil society in AI governance forums. Taken together, these actions would promote a more proactive, equitable and context-sensitive framework for regulating AI globally. These recommendations are particularly timely ahead of the AI Impact Summit, scheduled for February 2026 in Delhi, which will bring global policymakers together to shape an international vision for AI governance that includes FRT.

 

Panos Ruci, le père d'une victime de la catastrophe ferroviaire de février 2023, est en grève de la faim. Il réclame que des examens toxicologiques pour déterminer les causes de sa mort de son fils, et « pour tous les enfants qui ont perdu la vie » dans cet accident qui a fait 57 morts.

- Articles / Grèce, Courrier des Balkans, Une - Diaporama, Défense, police et justice, Personnalités, Trains Balkans

Le général Nebojša Pavković, condamné pour des crimes de guerre au Kosovo, a bénéficié d'une libération anticipée pour « raisons de santé ». Les autorités serbes ont chaleureusement accueilli « un héros qui a combattu pour la Serbie ».

- Le fil de l'Info / Kosovo, Serbie, Courrier des Balkans, Défense, police et justice, Relations régionales, Criminels de guerre

- Agenda / Région parisienne

This policy brief is authored by Dr. Isabelle Ioannides (Senior Research Fellow, South-East Europe Programme – ELIAMEP) and published in the context of the project EMBRACing changE – Overcoming Obstacles and Advancing Democracy in the European Neighbourhood (EMBRACE). EMBRACE is a multi-country research initiative (2022–2025) that seeks to strengthen the capacity of EU policymakers and pro-democracy actors to develop effective strategies for democracy promotion across five regions: the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus, the Middle East, and North Africa. It combines comparative analysis, stakeholder engagement, and new data collection to identify the obstacles and enablers of democratisation and to design practical policy tools for European democracy promotion.

Focusing on Work Package 7 – The Geopolitics of EUDP, this policy brief addresses the turbulent geopolitical landscape in which EU democracy promotion must operate. Russia’s and China’s assertive roles, including disinformation campaigns, combine with heightened regional instability, conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, and the spread of polarisation and populism within and beyond Europe. These developments create a volatile environment that constrains democratic progress in the EU’s neighbourhood and, in some cases, drives democratic backsliding. The brief stresses that the EU’s democracy promotion cannot be viewed in isolation from these broader geopolitical dynamics.

Against this backdrop, the EMBRACE project organised scenario-building workshops in North Macedonia, Serbia, Ukraine, and Georgia, and conducted stakeholder interviews in Algeria. These consultations had a twofold aim: to assess the democratic trajectories and risks facing each country by 2030, and to evaluate how the EU can mitigate challenges while reinforcing democratic enablers. The locally led approach ensured that country-specific insights and informal power dynamics were captured, helping to refine projections for how external and internal pressures may shape democracy in the coming years.

The brief concludes by offering recommendations for the EU to recalibrate its democracy promotion strategies under conditions of geopolitical competition and uncertainty. It underlines that effectiveness depends on tailoring approaches to local realities, anticipating risks through foresight and scenario planning, and reinforcing the EU’s credibility as a consistent and strategic actor. By integrating evidence-based insights and locally grounded perspectives, the policy brief contributes to EMBRACE’s broader mission of equipping the EU with more adaptive and resilient tools for advancing democracy in its neighbourhood.

Read the paper here in pdf.

Auf den Besuch des türkischen Präsidenten Recep Tayyip Erdoğan im Weißen Haus am 25. September hatte Ankara seit Jahren hingearbeitet. Die Begegnung mit US-Präsident Donald Trump war jedoch eine Mischung aus Schmeichelei und Zynismus. Zwischen wiederholten Komplimenten an die türkische Delegation machte Trump abfällige Bemerkungen über Wahlmanipulationen und drängte Erdoğan zum Verzicht auf russisches Gas und Öl. 

Nach der zweistündigen Arbeitssitzung fand keine Pressekonferenz statt. Offiziell war nur von einer »positiven Atmosphäre« die Rede. Hinter verschlossenen Türen dürfte es jedoch um altbekannte Streitpunkte gegangen sein: die mögliche Aufhebung der CAATSA-Sanktionen im Zusammenhang mit dem Erwerb russischer S-400-Flugabwehrsysteme durch die Türkei, eine Rückkehr ins F-35-Programm, den Wunsch nach F-16-Kampfflugzeugen sowie die Lage in Syrien. 

Seit dem Angriff Russlands auf die Ukraine versuchen beide Seiten, die Spannungen abzubauen. Zu diesem Zweck wurde im Mai 2022 eigens der »Strategische Mechanismus« eingerichtet. Nach seiner Wiederwahl 2023 deutete Erdoğan mit der Zusammensetzung seines Kabinetts eine Bereitschaft zu engerer Zusammenarbeit an. Dennoch blieben die Ergebnisse der Jahre unter Präsident Joe Biden mager und spiegelten einen Mangel an gemeinsamer strategischer Ausrichtung wider. 

Für Ankara erscheint eine zweite Amtszeit Trumps aussichtsreicher. Die türkische Regierung hat sich demonstrativ kooperativ gezeigt. So hob sie noch vor Erdoğans Reise die 2018 verhängten zusätzlichen Strafzölle auf manche US-Importe auf. Am Tag vor dem Treffen unterzeichnete das staatliche Unternehmen BOTAŞ einen 20-Jahres-Vertrag mit dem US-Unternehmen Mercuria über die Lieferung von Flüssigerdgas. Bereits im Dezember war die Türkei neben dem Vereinigten Königreich das erste Zielland für US-Flüssigerdgaslieferungen. Auch eine Absichtserklärung zur zivilen nuklearen Zusammenarbeit sowie ein Großauftrag zwischen Boeing und Turkish Airlines setzten Akzente. Zudem signalisierte Erdoğan die Bereitschaft, das umstrittene griechisch-orthodoxe Seminar von Chalki bei Istanbul wiederzueröffnen.

Asymmetrische Beziehungen

Es überrascht nicht, dass Ankara die Logik des Deal-Making versteht. Erdoğan und Trump teilen denselben politischen Instinkt: eine von Opportunismus und Transaktionen statt Prinzipien geprägte Machtpolitik. Die Annäherung bleibt jedoch asymmetrisch. Während Washington das Tempo vorgibt, zeigt Ankara Kooperationsbereitschaft – nicht zuletzt aufgrund technologischer Abhängigkeit, wirtschaftlicher Schwäche und sicherheitspolitischer Zwänge, insbesondere in Syrien. Dort ist die Türkei de facto Nachbarin Israels, ohne jedoch eine gemeinsame Vision für die Zukunft Syriens zu teilen. 

Gleichzeitig möchte Washington mit einer revisionistischen Sichtweise das Kräfteverhältnis in Eurasien neu ausrichten. Die Trump-Regierung stützt sich dabei auf zwei Säulen: Erstens die Etablierung der Energiehegemonie durch den Export von US-Öl und -Gas. In diesem Sinne dienen Energieabkommen mit der Türkei nicht nur der Verbesserung der bilateralen Beziehungen, sondern auch der Festigung der globalen Abhängigkeit von fossilen Brennstoffen. Zweitens zielen die USA auf die Eindämmung des Iran, Russlands und Chinas ab. In diesem Zusammenhang lobt Trump wiederholt den Beitrag der Türkei zum Sturz Assads, obwohl Ankara eine direkte Rolle dabei weiterhin ablehnt. 

Darüber hinaus signalisierte Washington sein Interesse an einer Zusammenarbeit bei der Konfliktbewältigung und Stabilisierung in Somalia, Sudan und Libyen, wo Ankara militärisch und wirtschaftlich präsent ist. Selbst der mögliche Frieden zwischen Armenien und Aserbaidschan wird in Washington mittlerweile als logistisches Infrastrukturprojekt betrachtet. Ankara hofft dabei auf amerikanische Unterstützung beim Ausbau seiner Ost-West-Verkehrskorridore. 

Trotz der überlappenden Interessen und auch Wünsche wurde ein echter Durchbruch beim Treffen noch nicht erzielt. Der Widerstand im US-Kongress gegen eine enge Zusammenarbeit mit der Türkei, insbesondere im Rüstungsbereich, und Meinungsunterschiede innerhalb der Trump-Regierung erschweren einen »Reset«.

Auch innerhalb der Türkei ist der Kurswechsel umstritten – sowohl innerhalb von Erdoğans Allianz als auch in den Oppositionslagern. Die außenpolitische Debatte schwankt zwischen antiwestlichen Stimmen, Spannungen sowie engem Interesse innerhalb von Erdoğans Regime, wirtschaftlicher Notwendigkeit und Rüstungsbedarf.

Die zentrale Erkenntnis dieses Treffens ist somit bemerkenswert banal und doch bedeutsam: Die alte Ordnung hält nicht mehr, aber eine neue ist noch nicht in Sicht. Washington und Ankara klammern sich aneinander – ob aus Überzeugung oder mangels Alternativen, wird die Zeit zeigen.