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Le Front Polisario a annoncé ce mardi 31 mai la mort de son chef, Mohamed Abdelaziz, « des suites d’une longue maladie ». Il dirigeait le mouvement pour l’indépendance du Sahara occidental depuis 1976.

This report is for media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall cross-border traffic increased at both BCPs.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 20 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with no or little luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits increased overall from 10,736 to 10,917[1] per day for both BCPs compared to last week; the average net flow for both BCPs went from plus 219 (i.e. more entries into the Russian Federation) to minus 60 (i.e. more exits from the Russian Federation).  

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP. The cross-border movements registered at both BCPs accounted for almost 38 per cent of all entries/exits in Rostov region1.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of men and women in military-style outfits, crossing the border in both directions, decreased from 141 last week to 111 this week at both BCPs; 52 of them crossed into the Russian Federation while 59 of them crossed into Ukraine. Approximately 86 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP. Men and women continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed by foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, busses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

During the reporting period, the OTs observed families, often with elderly people and/or children, crossing at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage or travelling in heavily-loaded cars; four families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation while eight were observed crossing into Ukraine.

Bus connections

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (Luhansk region) and cities in the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the busses do not state their route; instead they just have a sign on the windshield saying “Irregular”.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Alchevsk-Kharkiv-Kyiv, Rovenki-Kyiv, Luhansk-Kyiv, Stakhanov-Luhansk-Kyiv, Luhansk-Anapa, Sevastopol and Kharkiv.

During the reporting week, on some occasions the OTs at the Donetsk BCP observed busses with children on board crossing the border in both directions.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their busses. The majority of long-distance coaches commuting between Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have license plates issued in Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM continued to observe trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the number of trucks decreased from 788 to 727; 396 of these trucks crossed to the Russian Federation and 331 crossed to Ukraine.

Most of the trucks observed by the OTs were registered in Luhansk region.

Separately, the OTs also observed tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. The number of tanker trucks decreased from 51 last week to 48 this week. These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. These trucks, for the most part, had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks have hazard signs, indicating that they are transporting propane or a mix of propane with butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian officials, which may include an X-ray check. During the reporting period no X-ray checks could be observed at the Gukovo BCP since the Observation Team has no view of the mobile X-Ray, but it could be heard operating several times during the reporting period. 152 X-ray checks were observed at the Donetsk BCP. Out of these 152 trucks scanned during the reporting period, 102 trucks (67 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 50 trucks (33 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

During the reporting period, the OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2], crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly registered in Luhansk region; however, the OTs frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation.

Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 360 to 342; 161 crossed to the Russian Federation and 181 to Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up on the sound of trains running on the train tracks located approximately 150 meters south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on ten occasions; the OTs estimated that five trains were going to the Russian Federation and five trains were bound for Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine was informed about the trains bound for Ukraine. Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees in between the train tracks and the BCP and unfavorable light conditions.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border have license plates issued in Luhansk region or in the Russian Federation.

The OTs continued to observe vehicles with Ukrainian license plates, including articulated trucks with “LPR” or “Novorossiya” stickers, or in rare cases “DPR” stickers on their license plates masking the Ukrainian flag.

During the reporting week the OTs at the Donetsk BCP observed ambulances on seven occasions. These ambulances were registered in both Ukraine and in the Russian Federation and were crossing the border in both directions. No wounded or injured persons were observed on board these ambulances.

During the reporting period, on two occasions the OTs at the Donetsk BCP observed several bikers bearing the insignia of the “Night Wolves” motorcycle club crossing the border in both directions.

Convoy  

On 26 May 2016 at 06:33hrs (Moscow time), a Russian convoy arrived at the Donetsk Border Crossing Point (see the OM Spot Report of 26 May). A total of 47 vehicles – 40 cargo trucks and seven support vehicles – were checked by the Russian border guards and customs services; two service dogs were present and were used to check some of the cargo trucks from the outside. Ukrainian officials were present on site, both when the convoy crossed into Ukraine and when it returned to the Russian Federation. All of the 47 vehicles had crossed back into the Russian Federation by 14:45hrs on 26 May.

 

[1] Data received from Rostov region Border Guard Service

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving license C1).                              

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A sepsiszentgyörgyi, Kovászna megyei átlagbér növelése az önkormányzati gazdaságfejlesztési politika egyik célja – szögezte le kedden az épülő szépmezői ipari parknál tartott sajtótájékoztatón Antal Árpád.
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The Russian foreign minister said earlier that "Turkey is obliged to apologize" for downing a Russian warplane.

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Elvis Rroshi, the mayor of Kavaja in central Albania, resigned after admitting being convicted in Italy - the first major casualty of a new law aimed at forcing people with criminal records out of politics.

Huszonhatodik alkalommal rendezték meg a Tudászt, a középiskolások általános műveltségi vetélkedőjét Székelyudvarhelyen, a volt Stúdió Mozi nagytermében. Az izgalmas verseny témája az első világháború volt.
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BÉCS. Ugyan Líbiából leginkább a Földközi-tengeren át érkeznek a menekültek, Ausztriának mégis elsősorban Magyarországra kell figyelnie és követnie kell a migránsok útvonalának alakulását - jelentette ki Hans Peter Doskozil osztrák védelmi miniszter kedden Brüsszelben osztrák sajtójelentések szerint.

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM observed a high number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, similar to the level observed on the previous day. With the exception of Stanytsia Luhanska, Luhansk region remained largely calm. The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, and noted armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. The Mission’s freedom of movement was restricted several times, mostly in areas not controlled by the Government, and once at a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site.*

The SMM recorded a high number of ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region similar to the level observed the previous day. Most violations occurred in the evening and at night. Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard between 20:50 on 29 May and 05:05 on 30 May, among others, 235 undetermined explosions 5-10km north and north-north-west of its position. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM between 00:59 and 01:22 heard 70 undetermined explosions 8-10km north-west of its position. Whilst in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard between 17:55 on 29 May and 03:00 on 30 May, among others, 71 explosions 3-4km south-east of its position. Positioned in government-controlled Volnovakha (53km south of Donetsk) the SMM heard at 21:20 on 29 May 18 undetermined explosions 5km south-south-east of its position. On the night of 29 May, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted in “DPR”-controlled Mineralne (10km north-east of Donetsk) two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) firing four rounds in a north-western direction – in the general area of government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) – after two explosions had just occurred within 200 metres of their position.

The following day, positioned 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard and saw two explosions assessed as impacts of mortar rounds, plus one explosion assessed as an impact and one undetermined explosion, and heard 18 undetermined explosions and nine bursts of small-arms fire, 2-6km north, north-north-east and north-west of its position. Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 26 undetermined explosions, 24 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire and 16 bursts and 132 single shots of small-arms fire, 1-5km south-west, north-west, and west of its position. Positioned in Avdiivka, the SMM heard, inter alia, 67 explosions 1.5-8km east, south-east and south-south-east of its position.

Similar to the previous reporting day, Luhansk region was relatively calm, with the exception of the area south of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk). Positioned there, the SMM heard between 20:20 on 29 May and 00:38 on 30 May 156 explosions (74 assessed as caused by mortars and 82 as automatic grenade launchers (AGS, 30mm) or recoilless guns (SPG-9, 73mm), plus 12 bursts of machine-gun, one burst of heavy-machine-gun and multiple shots of small-arms fire, all 3-6km south and south-west of its position. Whilst in the government-controlled part of Zolote (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one explosion assessed as caused by an anti-tank mine, and observed a plume of black smoke, 4km south of its position.

On 29 May, the SMM followed up on reports of alleged shelling of two kindergartens in “DPR”-controlled Kuibyshevskyi district in Donetsk city (5km north-west of Donetsk city centre). At one of the kindergartens, the SMM noted shrapnel spray marks inside the dormitory, and on a south-eastern-facing exterior wall, outdoor fire escape stairs and an adjacent fence, all caused by what the SMM assessed as an artillery shell, fired from the north-north-west, that had exploded 15 metres away in the backyard of a nearby residential building. A security guard present told the SMM that the alleged incident had occurred in the early morning hours of 29 May. At the second kindergarten, 500 metres away, the SMM observed no indication of shelling. The SMM noted shattered windows in a number of residential houses approximately ten metres from the second kindergarten.

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of Measures, the SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage sites* whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines and observed that 42 tanks (T-72) and ten mortars (2B9M Vasilek, 82mm) were missing.

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines, but outside permanent storage sites, the SMM observed one tank (T-64) near government-controlled Iskra (90km west of Donetsk), and 20 tanks near “LPR”-controlled Kruhlyk (31km south of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures. The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification.

In violation of the withdrawal lines, the SMM continued to observe a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) near government-controlled Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 27 May 2016), and three anti-tank guided missile systems (9K111 Fagot, 120mm) near government-controlled Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk). In addition, on the night of 29 May an SMM long-rage UAV spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) in Mineralne and three towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) in “DPR”-controlled Yakovlivka (10km north of Donetsk).

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft weapon in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM observed one armoured personnel carrier (APC) near Berezove (30km south-west of Donetsk), one armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Svitlychne (54km north-west of Luhansk), two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Novotoshkivske (53km north-west of Luhansk), three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV; BMP-2) near Stanytsia Luhanska, two IFVs (BMP-2) near Orikhove, one IFV (BMP-2) near Teple (31km north of Luhansk), and one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23)  near Zolote. In addition, on the night of 29 May, a long-range SMM UAV spotted one APC near Krasnohorivka (23km north-west of Donetsk) and one APC near Avdiivka. In “DPR”-controlled areas, the SMM observed one IFV (BMP-2) in the Petrovskyi district of Donetsk city. In addition, on the night of 29 May, a long-range SMM UAV spotted seven APCs near Mineralne.

The SMM continued to monitor the presence of mines along the contact line, namely 12 anti-tank mines at an “LPR” checkpoint in Zolote. Previously, six anti-tank mines had been observed at the location (see SMM Daily Report 30 May 2016).

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. The SMM continued to monitor the repair of gas pipelines between government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) and “DPR”-controlled Oleksandrivka (20km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM was forced to withdraw from the area and work was suspended on the pipeline because of sporadic small-arms fire in the vicinity.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• Having had to wait 50 minutes before gaining access, the SMM was forced to cut short its weapons withdrawal monitoring at a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site. Three aggressive and visibly intoxicated Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers present verbally abused the SMM monitors. The SMM informed the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC).
• Armed “DPR” members prevented the SMM from proceeding to a location west of “DPR”-controlled Ozerianivka (35km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM had intended to launch a mid-range UAV in an effort to locate an SMM long-range UAV that had been downed in the area (see SMM Spot Report: SMM unmanned aerial vehicle downed near Horlivka, 27 May 2016). The JCCC was informed.
• An armed “LPR” member, acting aggressively, insisted on the SMM leaving “LPR”-controlled areas south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, explaining that SMM monitors stationed in government-controlled areas had no right to be in the area. The SMM had just crossed the bridge from government-controlled areas, and was forced to return.
• Armed “DPR” members continue to keep the power supply to SMM’s repeater in Donetsk city disconnected as they have been since 20 May. As a result, SMM remote monitoring equipment at “DPR”-controlled Oktiabr mine and in government-controlled Avdiivka are disabled (see SMM Daily Report 21 May 2016).

Delay:

• Armed “DPR” members at a checkpoint west of “DPR”-controlled Kominternove (23km north-east of Mariupol) delayed the SMM for 20 minutes, asking the patrol members if they had weapons and for details of their patrol plan, before allowing them to enter the village. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Conditional access:

• In Yasynuvata, “DPR” “traffic police” insisted on providing an “escort” to the SMM.

Other impediments:

• The Global Positioning System of an SMM UAV was jammed while flying over “DPR”-controlled areas in and around Yasynuvata and Mineralne.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. 

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Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, docteur en sciences politiques, est professeur à Sciences Po, directrice de recherche au CNRS et membre du comité d’orientation de la Cité nationale de l’histoire de l’immigration. Elle répond à mes questions à l’occasion de la parution de l’ « Atlas des migrations : un équilibre mondial à inventer », aux Éditions Autrement et cartographié par Madeleine Benoit-Guyod.

Sommes-nous passés d’un monde où la difficulté n’est plus de quitter son pays mais d’entrer dans un pays qui n’est pas le sien ?

Par le passé, de nombreux régimes autoritaires – aussi bien monarchistes que communistes – ont rendu très difficile la sortie du territoire national. Les populations étaient enfermées à l’intérieur de frontières, soit parce qu’elles constituaient une ressource agricole, fiscale et militaire, comme ce fut le cas aux XVIIIe et XIXe siècles, soit parce que les élites politiques ne souhaitaient pas leur permettre de fuir massivement vers d’autres horizons, comme ce fut le cas pour les régimes communistes. En revanche, particulièrement au XIXe siècle, les frontières étaient largement ouvertes pour l’immigration de travail et de peuplement. De même en Europe, jusque dans les années 70, les politiques frontalières étaient favorables aux travailleurs internationaux.

Nous sommes donc passés d’une situation mondiale où sortir d’un territoire était difficile et entrer dans un pays étranger l’était moins à une situation inverse, depuis la chute du communisme. Les pays du sud ont multiplié les distributions de passeport, car il était dans l’intérêt de la stabilité de leurs systèmes politiques (pas toujours démocratiques) de se vider d’une partie de leur population. Parallèlement, le monde contemporain a vu les politiques d’entrée se durcir considérablement. Ainsi, si le droit de sortie s’est démocratisé, avec la possibilité facilitée d’obtenir un passeport, le droit d’entrée s’est restreint au fur et à mesure qu’un arsenal de mesures sécuritaires et anti-terroristes étaient adoptées.

Vous estimez que l’Europe pourrait faire face à la crise actuelle des réfugiés en appliquant une directive de 2001 sur la protection temporaire des réfugiés. Qu’est-ce que cela impliquerait ?

Cette directive a été mise en place en 2001, essentiellement pour répondre aux flux migratoires en provenance d’ex-Yougoslavie. Elle stipulait que tant que les réfugiés connaîtraient une situation de conflit chez eux, ils étaient autorisés à rester pour une période limitée, mais renouvelable régulièrement, dans les pays d’accueil avec, selon les cas, la possibilité de travailler. Beaucoup sont désormais rentrés chez eux, soit dans le cadre de politiques de retour mises en œuvre par l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM), soit de leur propre gré. Cela permettait une certaine fluidité, et une marge de manœuvre appréciable pour les migrants qui pouvaient rester dans leur pays d’accueil ou prendre le chemin du retour.

Il serait tout à fait possible d’appliquer cette politique pour la crise syrienne actuelle. Cette directive a été peu évoquée au profit d’un droit d’asile pourtant très difficile à obtenir. Les catégories individuelles de la persécution ou de la crainte fondée de persécution, définies par la Convention de Genève de 1951, sont en effet interprétées de façon restrictive depuis les années 90.  Malgré l’ampleur de la crise, seuls 45% des migrants ont obtenu le statut de réfugié, selon la Convention de Genève

Les migrations sud-sud semblent moins visibles que celles nord-sud. Ne sont-elles pas pourtant en train de gagner en importance ?

Les migrations sud-sud sont surtout moins connues. Aujourd’hui, sur un total de 244 millions de migrants selon les Nations unies, on constate qu’il y a pratiquement autant de personnes qui se dirigent vers le nord que de gens qui vont vers le sud de la planète. L’essentiel des flux est évidemment compris dans les migrations sud-sud et sud-nord.

Les migrations sud-sud sont liées à plusieurs facteurs. Elles sont notamment dues à une régionalisation des migrations internationales. Aujourd’hui, il y a plus de gens qui proviennent de la même aire régionale que d’ailleurs, car de nouveaux flux ont gagné en importance : les femmes, les mineurs non accompagnés, les réfugiés ou encore les déplacés environnementaux qui n’entreprennent pas de long voyage faute de ressources ou de réseaux. Ainsi, les réfugiés choisissent en priorité un pays proche de leur terre d’origine. C’est le cas des Syriens qui pour l’essentiel sont allés en Turquie, en Jordanie et au Liban. Cela favorise le phénomène de régionalisation qui accroit les flux sud-sud. Quant aux déplacés environnementaux, ce sont pour les deux-tiers des déplacés internes, c’est-à-dire qu’ils migrent au sein même de leur pays.

Par ailleurs, des phénomènes nouveaux comme l’émergence économique de certains pays expliquent l’attractivité de pays du sud où il est plus aisé d’entrer que dans les pays du nord. Ainsi, les pays du Golfe sont la troisième destination migratoire au monde après l’Europe et les États-Unis.

Si ses forces armées exploitent des satellites à de fins de communication et de renseignement, la France exclut toute militarisation de l’espace et oeuvre pour l’empêcher. Cette position a été d’ailleurs réaffirmée par le dernier Livre blanc sur la Défense et la Sécurité nationale. Pour autant, comme l’a souligné, lors d’une audition à l’Assemblée, le […]

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Ten years ago, thousands of people risked their lives in wooden boats called cayucos to reach Spain’s Canary Islands. This sudden influx of tens of thousands of desperate migrants and refugees overwhelmed the islands and created a humanitarian crisis for Spain and the European Union. But a decade later, very few are heading to the Canaries.

What triggered the refugee crisis in the Canary Islands in 2006? What was the response? Why are almost no migrants and refugees heading to the Canary Islands today? And what lessons can be learned for other parts of the world? The latest report from IPI, by Walter Kemp, addresses these questions. It is the first in a series of reports on desperate migration and forced displacement.

Although the cayucos crisis differs from other migration crises in Europe—the Canaries are islands, most of the countries of origin were not failed states, and most of those arriving were migrants rather than refugees—the report identifies a number of lessons that could be transferable:

• Involvement of the whole government, effective leadership, and coordination among all stakeholders are necessary to develop an effective long-term approach.
• Pursuing a coherent regional strategy can help address the push and pull factors at the root of the crisis and ensure the problem is not simply displaced elsewhere.
• Saving lives should take precedence over border management.
• If migrants are to be pushed back to their point of departure, there must be mechanisms to ensure respect for their rights.

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Azem Syla, a prominent Kosovo politician from the ruling Democratic Party of Kosovo, is accused of being the head of a crime syndicate involved in property scams and money laundering.

Elkészültek a közösségi szemétlerakó munkálataival Székelykeresztúron, de a szolgáltatás beindítására még várni kell.
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A trois ans des Jeux africains 2019, l’Union africaine n’a toujours pas désigné de ville-hôte. Les candidats ne se bousculent pas pour accueillir ce grand événement sportif panafricain. Le salut pourrait toutefois venir de la Guinée équatoriale, qui a manifesté son souhait d’organiser cet événement.

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POZSONY. Robert Fico miniszterelnöknek ki kellene költöznie abból a lakásból, amelyet Ladislav Bašternák ad neki bérbe, továbbá nyilvánosságra kellene hoznia a Bašternákkal kötött bérleti szerződését és azokat az iratokat, amelyek bizonyítják a bérleti díj rendes fizetését –szólított fel az ellenzéki Szabadság és Szolidaritás, valamint az Egyszerű Emberek és Független Személyiségek.