First F-35s land in Israel:
Following seven months of severely strained relations, Turkey and Russia began to mend ties in late June 2016, when President Erdogan sent a conciliatory letter to his Russian counterpart. After the attempted coup d’état in Turkey three weeks later, Russian President Putin called Erdogan to express his support, providing added impetus to the normalisation process. By contrast, delayed and cautious reactions by Western leaders, as well as their criticism of the measures taken by the government after the failed coup, have caused disappointment in Turkey, where anti-Western sentiment is on the rise. While these developments have largely been discussed in terms of their implications for the Middle East, they have also affected Turkey and Russia’s shared neighbourhood in the South Caucasus, including Georgia and its breakaway region of Abkhazia. The Turkish-Russian crisis called into question Abkhazia’s strong ties with the large and active Turkish Abkhaz diaspora, an important economic and societal actor in the defacto state. In Georgia proper, the impact has been more ambivalent, with potential implications for the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration processes.
Since his appointment in 2012, French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian is concerned about the threats in cyberspace. With reason. CIA suspicions about the role played by Russian hackers in the election of Donald Trump to the fears expressed by the German Chancellor, the "cyber-menace" is now omnipresent. On the occasion of the inauguration on Monday of a skill center on cyber defense in Rennes as well as a new building with 7,000 sensors to house the cyber experiments of the Directorate General of Armaments (DGA) in Bruz (Ille-et-Vilaine), Jean-Yves Le Drian announced in a way the creation of a 4th army, or at least its matrix, that of cyberspace, to complete the army of the last century built on the triptych land, air and sea.
The future cyber force will be based on three missions:
- intelligence (identification of faults, detection of hostile actions),
- protection (building walls of cyber fortress)
- and finally computerized offensive fight (neutralization of tools used by the cyber - opponent).
But Jean-Yves Le Drian goes further: "If a cyber attack is akin to an act of war, notably by the seriousness of its effects, an adequate response must be imposed, even beyond the neutralization of infrastructures alone Involved, in a logic this time of open conflict. "
Clearly, the Minister of Defense warns that in the event of an attack, France reserves the right to retaliate by a cyber or conventional counter-attack. It is the first time that France officially warns its potential opponents that it can qualify a cyber attack in act of war and to respond accordingly. "A major computer attack, given the damage it would cause, could constitute an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and justify the invocation of self-defense," the Minister said. So to replicate in a "proportional" way, we need a cyber-army.
On Monday, the minister summarized the efforts made and the road ahead. Under the latest military planning law, the force under construction will reach 3,200 people by 2018, double the number in 2012. Given the high level of technical skills required, the minister is also proposing to build a reserve of 4,400 specialists , Of which 400 are capable of offensive action. There, it is a matter of multiplying by ten the effort. Finally, on the side of the DGA, the effort must be multiplied by three to go from 250 to 650 experts. Over 2014-2019, the appropriations devoted to the cyber-war amount to 440 million euros.
Finally, the minister announced the imminent appointment of a new cyber operations commander, a four-star general who will be placed directly under the authority of the chief of staff. In order to carry out military operations, the French army will have its commander-in-chief, which will "have authority over all operational units specializing in cyber defense of the ministry, belonging to all armies, ie 2,600 digital fighters by 2019". Vice-Admiral Arnaud Coustillière, appointed general officer in cyber defense in July 2011, is approached. Decrees and decrees will be promulgated to institutionalize this cyber defense. For the minister, the white collar war is just beginning. In this respect, he often referred to the Stuxnet weapon, the undetectable virus transmitted on Iranian nuclear centrifuges, which delayed Iran's advances in nuclear enrichment by at least two years. 'uranium.
----
Depuis sa nomination en 2012, le ministre français de défense, Jean-Yves Le Drian s'inquiète des menaces dans le cyberespace. Avec raison. Des soupçons de la CIA sur le rôle joué par des hackeurs russes dans l'élection de Donald Trump aux craintes exprimées par la chancelière allemande, la « cyber-menace » est désormais omniprésente. A l'occasion de l'inauguration ce lundi d'un pôle de compétences sur la cyberdéfense à Rennes ainsi que d'un nouveau bâtiment doté de 7.000 capteurs pour abriter les expériences cyber de la Direction générale de l'armement (DGA) à Bruz (Ille-et-Vilaine), Jean-Yves Le Drian a annoncé en quelque sorte la mise sur pied d'une quatrième armée, ou tout du moins de sa matrice, celle du cyberespace, pour compléter l'armée du siècle passé, construite sur le triptyque terre, air et mer.
La future force cyber s'articulera autour de trois missions : le renseignement (identification des failles, détection des actions hostiles), la protection (édification des murs de la forteresse cyber) et enfin la lutte informatique offensive (neutralisation des outils employés par l'adversaire). Mais Jean-Yves Le Drian va au-delà : « Si une attaque cyber s'apparente à un acte de guerre, notamment par la gravité de ses effets, une riposte adéquate s'impose, au-delà même de la neutralisation des seules infrastructures impliquées, dans une logique cette fois de conflit ouvert. »
En clair, le ministre de la Défense avertit qu'en cas d'attaque, la France se réserve le droit de riposter par une contre-attaque cyber ou conventionnelle. C'est la première fois que la France prévient ainsi officiellement ses adversaires potentiels qu'elle peut qualifier une attaque cyber en acte de guerre et y riposter en conséquence. « Une attaque informatique majeure, eu égard aux dommages qu'elle causerait, pourrait constituer une agression armée au sens de l'article 51 de la Charte des Nations unies et justifier l'invocation de la légitime défense », affirme le ministre. Donc pour répliquer d'une manière « proportionnelle », il faut une cyber-armée.
Une réserve de 4.400 spécialistes
Le ministre a dressé ce lundi un bilan des efforts fournis et du chemin qui reste à parcourir. La force en construction atteindra selon la dernière loi de programmation militaire 3.200 personnes à l'horizon 2018, soit le double des effectifs de 2012. Au vu des compétences techniques de très haut niveau nécessaires, le ministre propose aussi de bâtir une réserve de 4.400 spécialistes, dont 400 aptes à des actions offensives. Là, il s'agit de multiplier par dix l'effort. Enfin, du côté de la DGA, l'effort doit être multiplié par trois pour passer de 250 à 650 experts. Sur 2014-2019, les crédits consacrés à la cyber-guerre atteignent 440 millions d'euros.
Enfin, le ministre a annoncé la nomination imminente d'un nouveau commandant des opérations cyber, un général quatre étoiles qui sera placé directement sous l'autorité du chef d'Etat-major. Pour mener des opérations militaires, l'armée française aura son commandant en chef, lequel « aura autorité sur toutes les unités opérationnelles spécialisées dans la cyberdéfense du ministère, appartenant à toutes les armées, soit 2.600 combattants numériques à l'horizon 2019 ». Le vice-amiral Arnaud Coustillière, nommé officier général à la cyberdéfense en juillet 2011, est pressenti. Des décrets et arrêtés vont être promulgués pour institutionnaliser cette cyberdéfense.
Pour le ministre, la guerre en col blanc ne fait que commencer. Il a, à cet égard, souvent fait allusion ce lundi à l'arme Stuxnet, ce virus indétectable transmis sur les centrifugeuses nucléaires iraniennes qui a permis de retarder d'au moins deux ans les avancées de l'Iran en matière d'enrichissement d'uranium.
Tag: cyberattaquecybersecurityarmée françaiseFranceDrianDRC president Joseph Kabila speaking at the United Nations in New York. (MONUSCO Photos)
For the second time in 16 years, the United States is preparing to inaugurate a president-elect who has lost the popular vote. While his opponents are organizing a number of dubious recounts in Midwestern states, his own supporters retort by spreading untruths about massive amounts of voter fraud in California. The president-elect himself is under fire for unprecedented conflicts of interest. And then there are strong suggestions that a foreign power meddled in the election process, possibly tipping the scales in favor of its preferred candidate.
Meanwhile, in Ghana, a majority of voters cast their votes for the candidate who proceeded to win the election. The current office holder promptly conceded. This marks the seventh peaceful political transition in a row in the West African country. Of course, democracy has long since ceased to be the province of America alone. In Africa, Ghana is perhaps the best example.
Alas, for every Ghana, there is a Democratic Republic of Congo. The DRC is a paradigm of the kind of state that people often associate with the African continent: weak governance, instability, violence, and a trend towards autocratic rule. However, current president Joseph Kabila had an opportunity to make history. Constitutionally barred from running for a third term, Kabila could have set a precedent by handing over power peacefully. He instead chose to do the opposite.
In the late 1990s, his father Laurent Kabila wrestled control over the DRC from long-time dictator and connoisseur of hats Mobutu. Upon Laurent’s death, Joseph was handed the reigns and then went on to win the presidential elections in 2006. These were widely regarded free and fair. However, inconsistencies and allegations of fraud marred his re-election bid in 2011, and his rule has become increasingly autocratic ever since.
Members of the Congolese community in Toronto protest the 2012 election results in the DRC, in which President Joseph Kabila was named the winner (Wikimedia)
According to the DRC’s constitutional rules, presidential elections were supposed to take place in November. Kabila and his supporters have argued that logistical and budgetary constraints have made this impossible. While there may be some merit to these concerns, these are clearly strawman arguments.
The constitution bars Kabila from running for a third term. He is wildly unpopular in the country, as fewer than 10% of Congolese want him to remain in power. He and his allies are trying to protect the economic and political gains they have amassed over the past 15 years in power. Kabila himself appears to have little to no interest in leaving the DRC for a position as an elder statesman in the mold of former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo. In his mid-40s, he is still young. There is also a sense that his camp has safety concerns. They fear that handing over power to the opposition will lead to prosecutions.
Kabila’s solution has been to drag his feet on organizing elections. He now wants to delay them until 2018. Protests have been met with violent repression. In September, security forces reportedly killed more than 50 people over two days. While the opposition is vocal, it is also weak and disorganized. Meanwhile, the international community has been slow to respond. All the ingredients for the outbreak of major conflict are there.
What happens in the DRC has never been limited to a domestic political issue. Over the past two decades, conflict and instability in the country have tended to pull in both neighboring countries and those further afield. For reasons ranging from security concerns to maintaining resource access, various states have involved themselves in counterproductive ways by funding rebel groups and sending military troops. In particular, Rwanda and Uganda have repeatedly meddled in Congolese affairs, helping to destabilize the DRC in the process. Renewed outbreak of tensions will therefore make it more likely that Congo’s neighbors will once again intervene, which could have implications for regional stability and development.
The situation in the DRC takes place in a context in which several African leaders have recently tried to circumvent constitutional rules on term limits. Examples include neighbors Rwanda, Burundi, and the Republic of Congo. In Uganda, Yoweri Museveni has held on to power for 30 years. These autocrats will be emboldened by Kabila’s desperate attempt to cling on to the presidency.
Lastly, as the site of the most expensive peacekeeping operation in UN history, the DRC could be among the first tests for incoming UN Secretary-General António Guterres. With no end in sight in the Syrian civil war, and a U.S. president-elect likely disinterested in supporting UN missions, there is potential for the international community to turn a blind eye to what is going on in the DRC. While the MONUSCO mission is supersized by UN standards, it is already struggling to maintain order as it is. Already, the eastern provinces of the country are among the largest sources of refugees and internally displaced people worldwide. As the long-time head of UNHCR, Guterres may find himself in familiar territory sooner rather than later.
UN peacekeepers shortly before the 2006 presidential elections (United Nations Photo)
The reasons for instability in the DRC are varied and complex. The worst kind of colonial rule under Belgium, Cold War meddling by the United States and the Soviet Union, and some thirty years of Mobutu have left the country in ruins. It is barely a state. It ranks 147th in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, 184th in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index, and 176th in the UN Human Development Index.
Now, Joseph Kabila is pouring oil into the fire. While the U.S. will probably survive Donald Trump’s autocratic tendencies, Kabila’s might be the final straw for the DRC.
The post Instability in the DRC: The Kabila Problem appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.