Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / Briefing Paper

Multilateralism has been in trouble for a while, particularly at the global level. Yet, the European Union (EU) and its member states have remained among its staunchest supporters. In their June 2019 Council Conclusions, EU leaders drew the outlines of a common European vision to uphold, extend and reform the multilateral system. Against an increasingly complex and contested geopolitical backdrop, these goals were further developed in the recent EU Communication on Multilateralism, published in February 2021.
Key messages:
• In the wake of COVID-19, European leaders have reaffirmed their support for multilateralism and their hope of reforming and carrying forward the multilateral system. This was most recently stated in the EU’s Communication on Multilateralism of February 2021. Strengthening multilateral cooperation will require partners. The African Union (AU) with its 55 member states could be an important partner, but it cannot be taken for granted.
• To build meaningful cooperation with African actors and work together towards constructive multilateralism, the EU and its members must accept that African states have their own views of shifts in the global order and the desirability of further change. For greater legitimacy of the multilateral system, the EU must move beyond simply protecting the status quo, combining its stance as a defender of human rights and other universal norms and values with support for reforms and efforts to strengthen meaningful African participation in multilateral fora.
• The EU must support reform of the UN Security Council to ensure that Africa gains proper representation. In the meantime, the EU should take further steps towards substantive cooperation. This includes improving internal coordination; increasing outreach to the A3, the AU and concerned African states; and working with the A3 early in the drafting process for resolutions that affect Africa.
• The EU should make the most of the G20 Italian Presidency in 2021 to facilitate participation of African actors in this forum, which has increasing sway over a range of sensitive issues for African countries, such as debt relief. The G20 should seek to build consensus around an inclusive recovery agenda, to “build back better” and advance structural cooperation in the financial and health sectors.
• COVID-19 has demonstrated the importance of health as an urgent area of multilateral cooperation. The EU should seek to work closely with African actors to reform and improve multilateral structures in the health domain, to respond effectively to the ongoing crisis and for future preparedness. This should include supporting African countries in developing local bio manufacturing capabilities, working together to reform and strengthen the World Health Organization (WHO) and to fully implement the “One Health” approach.
• The EU should engage with African countries now to formulate a common and mutually beneficial vision and position for the international climate and environmental negotiations set for this year. Particularly, this concerns decisions on the post-2020 biodiversity framework and post-2025 climate finance target and reporting standards. Key topics include the role of nature-based solutions in addressing and integrating multiple environmental issues and provision of more funds for climate adaptation.

In der Pandemie-Zeit sind viele Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländer in die Situation geraten, ihre Schulden nicht zurückzahlen zu können. Ein geregelter Erlass könnte zu mehr Klimaschutz und Gerechtigkeit führen.

Die Pandemie macht es deutlicher denn je: Bei globalen Krisen sitzen wir alle im selben Boot. Um schnell einen Impfstoff zu entwickeln, waren enorme Investitionen, Wissen, die Vernetzung globaler Wertschöpfungsketten und Infrastruktur sowie interdisziplinäre und transnationale Teams von Wissenschaftler*innen notwendig. Auch Herausforderungen wie den Klimawandel, Finanzkrisen oder Cyberkriminalität bewältigt kein Land im Alleingang. Die heutige Welt ist vernetzt, komplex und vielschichtig. Wissensnetzwerke sind ein Instrument, um gemeinsam Probleme zu definieren und Lösungen zu erarbeiten. Um dies leisten zu können, müssen sie interdisziplinär und transnational ausgerichtet sein sowie die einzelnen Bereiche der Welt als Ganzes betrachten. Das Managing Global Governance (MGG)-Netzwerk des Deutschen Instituts für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) ist ein Beispiel für solch ein Wissensnetzwerk. Es hat zum Ziel, nachhaltige Veränderungsprozesse auf sozialer, wirtschaftlicher und ökologischer Ebene voranzutreiben. Das Netzwerk dient dabei jungen Expert*innen aus verschiedenen Disziplinen und Ländern als Plattform, um an Lösungsansätzen zur langfristigen Steigerung des (globalen) Gemeinwohls zu arbeiten.

Wie kann das gelingen?

Die über zehnjährige Erfahrung des MGG-Netzwerks zeigt, dass es sich lohnt, in drei Dinge zu investieren: Vertrauen, eine gemeinsame Vision und Strukturen, die innovative Aktivitäten fördern.

Vertrauen ist der erste Grundpfeiler von Beziehungen, ohne die Netzwerke nicht funktionieren. Erfolgreiche Wissensnetzwerke bedürfen der stetigen Pflege von Beziehungen, um Vertrauen zu generieren und zu erhalten. Vertrauen erleichtert es, zusammenzuarbeiten und gemeinsam Probleme zu lösen. Entscheidungsprozesse werden effizienter, je höher das Vertrauen in die Netzwerkmitglieder, ihre Fähigkeiten und ihre Reputation aufgrund erfolgreicher Zusammenarbeit ist. Vertrauensvolle Kooperation stärkt Kreativität und Innovation. Anhand von greifbaren Konzepten wie Verlässlichkeit, Vorhersehbarkeit, Ehrlichkeit, Offenheit und persönlicher Nähe kann Vertrauen in der Praxis gesteigert werden. Vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen müssen ein Grundelement sämtlicher Netzwerkaktivitäten sein. Im MGG-Netzwerk wird immer Zeit für persönlichen Austausch eingeplant. Nur wenn ich meine Partner*innen kenne, kann ich ihnen auch vertrauen. Wichtig ist auch verlässliche, transparente und offene Kommunikation. Eine kontinuierliche Feedback- und Reflexionskultur stärkt das gegenseitige Vertrauen.

Eine gemeinsame Vision für das Netzwerk zu entwickeln, ist der zweite wichtige Grundpfeiler, um Potenzial für gesellschaftliche Transformation innerhalb eines Wissensnetzwerks zu entfalten. Eine solche Vision besteht aus geteilten Werten und Überzeugungen und setzt den Rahmen für die praktische Arbeit des Netzwerks. Nur wenn klar ist, „warum“ das Netzwerk „was“ erreichen will, kann auch detailliert am „wie“ gearbeitet werden. Besonders erfolgreich ist eine Netzwerk-Vision, wenn sie partizipativ im Netzwerk erarbeitet wird. Beispielsweise wurde im MGG-Netzwerk diskutiert: Was ist das Narrativ unseres Netzwerks, welche Werte machen uns aus? Welche Vision haben wir für die nächsten Jahre? Worin sind wir besonders gut? An welchen Punkten kann unsere Arbeit ansetzen, um besonders effektiv zu sein? Solch ein Prozess stärkt das Gemeinschaftsgefühl, definiert einen Rahmen für zukünftige Aktivitäten und beschreibt das grundlegende Ziel des Netzwerks. Auch wenn dies auf den ersten Blick aufwändig erscheint, wird ein Netzwerk langfristig davon profitieren.

Starke Netzwerke brauchen starke Strukturen. Besonders sinnvoll für Wissensnetzwerke, die gemeinwohlorientierte Transformation zum Ziel haben, ist es, Strukturen für Selbstorganisation zu etablieren. Selbstorganisation hat den Vorteil, dass die Projektentwicklung durch intrinsische Motivation der Netzwerkmitglieder vorangetrieben wird, da sie ihrer eigenen Leidenschaft folgen können. In großen heterogenen Netzwerken wie dem MGG-Netzwerk hat sich Selbstorganisation bewährt, um vielfältige Projekte voranzutreiben, ohne durch zentrale Steuerungsprozesse blockiert zu werden. Ermöglicht wird dies in Formaten wie den MGG Network Days, die den Raum und die Unterstützung bieten, um kreativ und in Gemeinschaft eigene Projekte zu entwickeln und diese im besten Fall selbstorganisiert weiter auszuführen. Auch virtuelle Kommunikationsplattformen sind ein sinnvolles Mittel, um eine selbstorganisierte Zusammenarbeit zu ermöglichen.

Um globalen Herausforderungen effektiv, schnell und flexibel begegnen zu können, lohnt es sich, in starke Netzwerke zu investieren. Vertrauensvolle Beziehungen in Netzwerken ermöglichen schnelle Entscheidungen. Strukturen, die Selbstorganisation fördern, bringen Innovationen hervor. Eine gemeinsame Vision lässt alle an einem Strang ziehen. In durch MGG initiierten Aktivitäten wie z.B. neuen Ausbildungsformaten im öffentlichen Dienst zur Umsetzung der Agenda 2030 zeigt sich, wie eine solche Netzwerk-Kultur zu konkreten Veränderungen führen kann.

A decade after the adoption of the ‘Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities’, the EU presented the new ‘Concept on EU Peace Mediation’ in December 2020. Despite the 2009 concept’s importance for strengthening EU mediation capacities, there had been a persistent plea for updating the mediation concept in order to better outline the EU’s priorities and objectives in peace mediation and adapting them to a new geopolitical context. The new concept clearly delivers on these points.
The birth of the EU’s new concept on mediation and its enhanced ambition sensibly align with the EU’s unveiled ambition for a greater ‘geopolitical’ role. As the new concept underlines, the EU’s peace mediation efforts add to its geopolitical power and should not be seen as opposed to a vision of the EU becoming a more assertive global actor. Although the new framework is a positive step towards a politically and operationally more coherent EU mediation practice, open questions remain regarding the political and institutional conditions of an effective practical implementation of the new concept.
Going forward, the EU should further invest in institutionalising cooperation with member states in mediation, improve communication practices regarding its mediation activities and mainstream the mediation concept into its strategic and programming documents.

“At the IMF we recognize that the climate actions we take in our institution and globally are paramount for our future. We have embraced climate in everything we do.” — Kristalina Georgieva, December 2020

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has only recently started to acknowledge that climate change may be a “macro-critical” factor, that is, crucial to the achievement of macroeconomic and financial stability, which is at the core of the Fund’s mandate. In 2015, the IMF identified climate change as an “emerging  structural  issue”.  In  November  2015,  then  Managing  Director  Christine  Lagarde  recog-nized that “[t]he Fund has a role to play in helping its members address those challenges of climate change for which fiscal and macroeconomic policies are an important component of the appropriate policy response” (Lagarde 2015: 1). Upon assuming office in October 2019, the IMF’s new Managing Director,  Kristalina  Georgieva,  acknowledged  the  centrality  of  climate  change  for  the  Fund’s  work:  “The criticality of addressing climate change for financial stability, for making sure that we can have sustainable growth, is so very clear and proven today, that no institution, no individual can step from the responsibility to act. For the IMF, we always look at risks. And this is now a category of risk that absolutely  has  to  be  front  and  center  in  our  work”  (IMF  2019).  Since  then,  she  has  reiterated  the  importance of climate change for the IMF’s mandate countless times.

This paper examines the Global Climate Action Agenda (GCAA) and discusses options to improve sub‐ and non‐state involvement in post‐2020 climate governance. A framework that stimulates sub‐ and non‐state action is a necessary complement to national governmental action, as the latter falls short of achieving low‐carbon and climate‐resilient development as envisaged in the Paris Agreement. Applying design principles for an ideal‐type orchestration framework, we review literature and gather expert judgements to assess whether the GCAA has been collaborative, comprehensive, evaluative and catalytic. Results show that there has been greater coordination among orchestrators, for instance in the organization of events. However, mobilization efforts remain event‐driven and too little effort is invested in understanding the progress of sub‐ and non‐state action. Data collection has improved, although more sophisticated indicators are needed to evaluate climate and sustainable development impacts. Finally, the GCAA has recorded more action, but relatively little by actors in developing countries. As the world seeks to recover from the COVID‐19 crisis and enters a new decade of climate action, the GCAA could make a vital contribution in challenging times by helping governments keep and enhance climate commitments; strengthening capacity for sub‐ and non‐state action; enabling accountability; and realizing sustainable development.

This paper examines the extent to which addressing climate-related risks and supporting sustainable finance fit into the current set of central bank mandates and objectives. To this end, we conduct a detailed analysis of central bank mandates and objectives, using the IMF’s Central Bank Legislation Database, and compare these to current arrangements and sustainability-related policies central banks have adopted in practice. To scrutinise the alignment of mandates with climate-related policies, we differentiate between the impact of environmental factors on the conventional core objectives of central banking and a potential supportive role of central banks with regard to green finance and sustainability. Of the 135 central banks in our sample, only 12% have explicit sustainability mandates, while another 40% are mandated to support the government’s policy priorities, which in most cases include sustainability goals. However, given that climate risks can directly affect central banks’ traditional core responsibilities, most notably monetary and financial stability, even central banks without explicit or implicit sustainability objectives ought to incorporate climate-related physical and transition risks into their core policy implementation frameworks in order to efficiently and successfully safeguard macro-financial stability.

Эрдэс болон металл олборлох нь олборлолтод шаардлагатай усны хэмжээ, хаягдал ус хаях болон усны нөөцөд үзүүлэх боломжит бохирдлын хувьд усанд томоохон ул мөр үлдээдэг. Иймд уул уурхай болон усны салбар хооронд зохицуулалт хийх нь маш чухал. Уул уурхайн усны нөөц болон усны нөөцөөс хамааралтай орон нутагт үзүүлэх сөрөг нөлөөллийг бууруулах зорилготой энэ хүрээний олон тооны хэрэгслүүдийг гаргасан байдаг. Үүнд байгаль орчинд нөлөөлөх байдлын үнэлгээ (БОНБҮ), эдгээр үйл явцуудад болон голын сав газрын менежментэд оролцогч талуудын оролцоог хангах, уурхайд хаягдал ус цэвэрлэх сэдэлжүүлэлтийн төлбөрийн схемүүд зэрэг багтана. Хэрэгсэл бүрт нэлээд хэдэн урьдчилсан нөхцөлийг бүрдүүлэх хэрэгтэй учраас тэдгээрийг хэрэгжүүлэх эсэх, хэрхэн хэрэгжүүлэх нь үндэсний, бүсийн болон дотоодын байдлаас хамаарна.

Энэ судалгааны хураангуй тайланд Монгол улсыг бид жишээ судалгааны тохиолдол болгон авч, оролцогч талуудын оролцоо, хаягдал ус цэвэрлэх сэдэлжүүлэлт хоёр нь зохицуулалтыг сайжруулах үндсэн хоёр стратеги гэж үзнэ. Бид эдгээр стратегийг бодлогод хэрхэн хөрвүүлж, хоёр зэргэлдээ голын сав газарт бодитоор хэрхэн хэрэгжүүлснийг үнэлнэ. Ингэхдээ доогуур түвшний захиргааны нэгжүүд дэх хүн хүчний болон санхүүгийн чадавх, устай холбоотой мэдээллийн хүртээмжийг байгалийн нөөцийн үр дүнтэй засаглалын урьдчилсан нөхцөл гэж тусгайлан анхаарч үзнэ. Монгол улсын засаглалын систем олон тооны үйл явцуудаар оролцогч талуудын оролцоог хангадаг гэж заадаг бөгөөд хамгийн чухал нь голын сав газрын олон талт платформууд (ГСГОТП) болон БОНБҮ-ний журмын дагуу хийгддэг орон нутгийн хэлэлцүүлгүүдээр дамжуулан хангах гэдгийг бид олж тогтоосон. Гэхдээ

одоогоор судалгааны бүсийн ГСГОТП нь ихэнхдээ доогуур түвшний захиргааны ажилтнуудыг оруулан гишүүдээ шинэчлэх гэж байгаа ба энд орон нутгийн хэлэлцүүлэг бараг хийгддэггүй.Хаягдал усыг цэвэрлэх сэдэлжүүлэлтийн чиглэлээр Монгол улс 2019 оны зун Ус бохирдуулсны төлбөрийн тухай хуулийн нэмэлт, өөрчлөлтийг баталсан бөгөөд одоогоор хэрэгжүүлэх гарын авлагыг боловсруулж байна.Хүндрэлүүд нь сав газрын усны чанарын мэдээллийг цуглуулах болон хангалттай дээж авах, шинжилгээ хийх баталгаатай холбоотой. Энэ нь хамаарах мэдээллийг авах эсвэл үнэлэхэд хүндрэлтэй тулгардаг, доогуур түвшний захиргааны нэгжүүдийн хүн хүч, санхүүгийн чадавх хязгаарлагдмал байгаатай холбоотой. Бид дараах арга хэмжээг зөвлөж байна. Үүнд:

• Тэнцвэртэй хүртээмж болон платформ дахь хэлэлцүүлгийг хангахын тулд нийгэм, эдийн засгийн байдлын ялгааг харгалзан хувийн хэвшил болон иргэний нийгмийн төлөөллийг түлхүү оролцуулах хэлбэрээр ГСГОТП дахь оролцогч талуудын ялгаатай байдлыг бий болгох
• БОНБҮ-ний хүрээнд олон нийтийн хэлэлцүүлгийг идэвхжүүлэх (уул уурхайн лиценз авах болон БОНБҮ-г батлуулах гэх мэт) ба Засгийн газраас баталсан дүрэм, журмуудыг нээлттэй болгох, энэ хүрээнд хариуцлага тооцдог болох
• Усны мэдээллийг олон нийтэд илүү хүртээмжтэй болгох
• Уул уурхайн хаягдал усыг хаяхын өмнө цэвэрлэхэд урамшуулал олгохын тулд Ус бохирдуулсны төлбөрийн тухай хуулийг хурдхан хэрэгжүүлэх
• Эрх мэдлээ хэрэгжүүлэх боломжийг нь бүрдүүлэхийн тулд доогуур түвшний захиргааны байгууллагуудыг чадавхжуулах ба ГСГОТП-д санхүүжилт олгох.

The use of tax expenditures (TEs) is an important fiscal practice that is often overlooked in public spending debates. The fiscal cost as well as the lack of effectiveness of TEs can be significant. This chapter describes the state of TE reporting across the world, focusing on Africa. It begins by explaining in detail what TEs are and what their role in government expenditure is. It proceeds by offering examples of the fiscal cost of these provisions, their (in)effectiveness, and the reasons why they are often hard to remove. The main portion of the chapter focuses on the lack and inconsistency of TE reporting. The chapter provides the first results of the “Global Tax Expenditures Database” (GTED), an ongoing project aiming to increase transparency and boost research in the TE field. The GTED reveals that over 64% of African countries do not provide any information on their TEs, while most of the countries that do report on TEs leave out important information such as the policy objectives and beneficiaries of those provisions. Lastly, using the available data, the chapter reports that, on average, TEs in African countries account for 2.8% of GDP and 17.8% of total tax revenue, and being as high as 7.8% (in Senegal) and 58.4% (in Mauritania), respectively.

Scientific and expert knowledge is central to any sustainable future. Because consensual knowledge establishes the parameters within which decisions can be made despite complexity and uncertainty, it assumes a facilitating function. This can be for example well observed on how national strategies to achieve sustainability are developed, legitimized, implemented, and assessed. Policy-makers consult scientific experts to better understand problem issues and to come up with evidence-based solutions that can be jointly accepted by any political ideology and by the constituents. At the same time, the reliance of policy-making to scientific knowledge increases the demand or need to be critical of the emerging scientific authority or technocracy. In the context of transformation to sustainability (T2S) where the outcomes of bargaining and persuasion games represent new lock-ins, the ability or the inability to influence the definition of these lock-ins through equitable access to knowledge is integral to the legitimacy of T2S.
Knowledge diplomacy (and how it leads up to consensual knowledge) is an important driver of creating visions and narratives on sustainable futures. At the same time, the transformation process towards sustainability creates new norms for example in governance and social relations that have implications to how knowledge diplomacy is conducted. Expanding access to education as a strategy to reduce income inequality is more likely to empower a broader citizen participation in consensual knowledge making and thus in policy-making. Building on the author’s work on Sustainable Development Pathways, this article introduces three possible futures scenarios of how knowledge diplomacy can unfold depending on how access to scientific and expert knowledge translates into convening power: convergent cosmopolitan society (melting pot 1), convergent liberal world (melting pot 2), and divergent glocality (salad bowl).

The discussion paper investigates what effects cash-for-work (CfW) can have on local economic development (LED). It is based on the hypothesis that CfW, which is targeted provision of jobs to vulnerable households, affects LED directly (through employment and income for workers and the creation of public goods) but also indirectly (through multiplier and investment effects as well as better social cohesion). The article builds on quantitative and qualitative research conducted in Jordan in 2019, Jordan being a particularly interesting case for the topic: Here, different foreign donors have set up a whole bunch of different CfW programmes after 2016 to support Syrian refugees along with vulnerable Jordanians. The results confirm that CfW has an indirect impact on LED through multiplier effects since CfW participants spend most of their income locally. In addition, CfW programmes in Jordan improve the skills and employability of their participants. This upgrading does not transform into higher employment rates, however, because the Jordanian labour market is extremely tight. Finally, the programmes empower women; they open new doors to the labour market and contribute to a – however not irrevocable – change of traditional gender roles. Our suggestion is thus that other refugee host countries set up CfW programmes as well, covering both refugees and low-income nationals.

Reaching net-zero greenhouse gas emissions is a critical goal of climate policy. Across the world, growing numbers of governments are introducing targets and plans to achieve net-zero around the middle of this century. Alongside this, leading banks and investors are committing to align their portfolios with net-zero by 2050. As guardians of the financial system, central banks and supervisors also need to introduce explicit strategies to support the transition to net-zero as the next stage in confronting the risks of climate change. This report is a first attempt to examine the role that central banks and financial supervisors could play in supporting the transition to net-zero.

This article investigates and empirically tests the link between climate change and sovereign risk in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian countries are among those most heavily affected by climate change. The number and intensity of extreme weather events in the region have been increasing markedly, causing severe social and economic damage. Southeast Asian economies are also exposed to gradual effects of global warming as well as transition risks stemming from policies aimed at mitigating climate change. To empirically examine the effect of climate change on the sovereign risk of Southeast Asian countries, we employ indices for vulnerability and resilience to climate change and estimate country-specific OLS models for six countries and a fixed effects panel using monthly data for the period 2002–2018. Both the country-specific and the panel results show that greater climate vulnerability appears to have a sizable positive effect on sovereign bond yields, while greater resilience to climate change has an offsetting effect, albeit to a lesser extent. A higher cost of debt holds back much-needed investment in public infrastructure and climate adaptation, increases the risk of debt sustainability problems, and diminishes the development prospects of Southeast Asian countries.

Neofunctionalism, which primarily accounts for the dynamics of the European integration process, constitutes one of the main theories of European integration. However, it has rarely been applied systematically to the study of European Union (EU) external action. This chapter first recapitulates the evolution and main assumptions of neofunctionalism. It then proposes a neofunctionalist logic for explaining EU external action, building on four spillover mechanisms: functional, political, cultivated, and external spillover. To demonstrate how neofunctionalism can also be used for investigating the extension of the scope of EU external policies, the theory is applied to explain the EU’s initiation of the Belgrade–Pristina dialogue.

Der Band behandelt in interdisziplinärer Perspektive Widerspruch unter anderem als einen konzeptionellen Anker von Diskursanalyse und -theorie. Widerspruch ist eine Figur der Ordnung von Wissen und damit Ausdruck von Machtverhältnissen. Akteur*innen, die Widersprüche identifizieren und als solche erst wahrnehmbar machen, sind ebenso in Dynamiken der Widerspruchsdeklaration verwoben wie das, was in einer Zeit als widersprüchlich bestimmt und bezeichnet wird. Die performative Dimension von Widerspruch unter Einschluss des Widersprechens verweist auf historische Normalitätsproduktionen und soziale Hierarchien, in denen das Widersprüchliche stets als Anlass zu seiner Auflösung verstanden wird.

The European Green Deal can be considered as a roadmap of key policies for the EU's climate agenda, based on which the Commission has started, and will continue to develop, legislative proposals and strategies from 2020 onwards. The European Green Deal aims at transforming the EU’s economy towards sustainability and carbon neutrality. First and foremost, it defines internal plans and strategies for the EU that will also have global effects. Directed at internal transformation, this ambitious plan can make Europe a role model and a global leader, but it also involves domestic and external challenges. For promoting the global public good, the EU will need partners to jointly work with. This paper provides an overview of the core elements of the Green Deal and connects them to concepts of EU leadership. On this basis, it examines the need and entry points for EU cooperation with major global partners and (re)emerging economies, including China, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and South Africa. The authors argue that the success of the European Green Deal depends on close coordination with these powers and finds that the legitimacy and credibility of the EU's climate leadership can only be ensured by engaging intensively with actors from the Global South and with the various centres of an increasingly multipolar world.

Momentan weist die UN-Nachhaltigkeitsgovernance einige Schwächen auf. Verbesserungen würden eine ehrgeizigerer Unterstützung von nationalen Nachhaltigkeitsprozessen in den neun verbleibenden Jahren bis 2030 erlauben. Mitglieder des Rats für Nachhaltige Entwicklung haben gemeinsam mit Wissenschaftlerinnen von SWP und DIE Reformoptionen für eine effektivere UN-Nachhaltigkeitsgovernance entwickelt.

The current approach to governing the UN’s sustainable development work has a number of shortcomings. If improved, the UN could more ambitiously support national efforts for sustainable development in the remaining nine years until 2030. Even in the absence of large institutional reforms, an upwards spiral towards more ambitious and self-reflective reporting and learning could be initiated. However, the challenges ahead are complex. More ambitious UN reforms for include establishing a UN Sustainable Development Council – an upgraded and transformed ECOSOC.

Social protection is a powerful development policy tool. If well designed, it can contribute to manifold social, economic, and political goals such as those in the Agenda 2030 Its primary goal is to reduce poverty, vulnerability, and inequality. More indirectly, however, it can also promote education, health, gender justice, access to water, investment and pro-poor growth. And it can be a cornerstone in social contracts thereby stabilising societies, political systems and state-society relations. In most countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), however, social protection systems are not well designed and, hence, have only marginal effects on all of these goals.

REDD+ is a mechanism to address climate change by reducing deforestation and forest degradation. In this article, the implementation of the REDD Early Movers- REM/Visión Amazonia program in Guaviare, Colombia, is analyzed, focusing on the implementation challenges and scope of the program when addressing deforestation drivers in a post-conflict context. By taking a historical perspective on regional deforestation challenges in Guaviare, we link these challenges to the recent deforestation trends in the region. This article demonstrates the particular challenges to implementing REDD+ in the Colombian post-conflict context related to the power vacuum left by the FARC retreat, land grabbing for speculation and cattle ranching, power asymmetries and corrupted regional elites. The article concludes that the current scope of REM does not sufficiently address the main drivers of deforestation, and that REM's focus on campesinos and indigenous communities will not significantly reduce the substantial deforestation rates in the present post-conflict context.