Summary and Key Points: The Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider, a successor to the B-2 Spirit, is set to be the most advanced stealth bomber in the U.S. Air Force.
-Building on decades of stealth technology, the B-21 features enhanced low observability, advanced networking, and open systems architecture, allowing for future upgrades.
-Unlike its predecessor, the B-21 is designed for cost-effectiveness, with plans for at least 100 units. It is expected to be a cornerstone of U.S. air power for decades, offering superior capabilities in modern warfare.
The Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider is the Best Stealth AircraftAerospace and defense giant Northrop Grumman continues to develop its B-21 Raider long-range strategic bomber. The B-21 is the planned replacement for the aging B-1B Lancer and B-2 Spirit bombers.
Information is still sparse on the Raider, which is named for the men who took part in the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo in the spring of 1942. But there are several facts about the B-21 that we do know.
The B-21 is Building on the B-2's SuccessThe stealthy B-21 will not be the first Air Force bomber to feature a flying wing design to reduce its radar signature. Efforts to build an aircraft without a fuselage date back almost 100 years. Northrop Grumman’s B-2 Spirit was the first such design mass-produced, even if just 20 aircraft were manufactured.
Seen as the first successful flying wing aircraft, the B-2’s low-observable characteristics help it penetrate an enemy's most sophisticated defenses and threaten its most heavily defended targets. With these capabilities, the B-2 has ensured a strong, effective deterrent and combat force well into the 21st century.
The B-2's low observability was derived from a combination of reduced infrared, acoustic, electromagnetic, visual, and radar signatures. These signatures make it difficult for sophisticated defensive systems to detect, track, and engage the B-2. Many aspects of the low-observability process remain classified, but the B-2's composite materials, special coatings, and flying wing design all contribute to its stealthiness.
The Raider Bomber is BetterEverything the B-2 Spirit did right, the B-21 Raider promises to do better. There were reports its advanced stealth technology – much of which remains classified – could give the aircraft a radar signature as small as an insect. That's likely hyperbole, as no one expects to track a butterfly on radar.
The B-2's development began when disco was all the rage and Jimmy Carter was in the White House, while the B-21 Raider's development is truly a product of the 21st century. It takes into account numerous lessons learned from the F-117 Nighthawk, B-2 Spirit, F-22 Raptor, and F-35 Lightning II – and likely from programs yet to be disclosed.
As The Heritage Foundation reported, the B-21 Raider "is built around the most sophisticated and easily maintained stealth technology ever developed."
Even the aircraft's maker was only slightly more forthcoming, describing the B-21 as benefiting "from more than three decades of strike and stealth technology. It is the next evolution of the Air Force strategic bomber fleet. Developed with the next generation of stealth technology, advanced networking capabilities and an open systems architecture, the B-21 is optimized for the high-end threat environment. It will play a critical role in helping the Air Force meet its most complex missions."
Some 8,000 employees of Northrop Grumman and various other defense contractors of all sizes, spread across 40 states, have been secretly building the Air Force's new stealth bomber. Great efforts have been taken to prevent China and other potential adversaries from gaining access to its technology.
Cost-Effective as Well as StealthyEven the best aircraft is only good if it can be employed in significant numbers. The simple lack of B-2s has been the Spirit’s greatest weakness. The Air Force is seeking to guarantee the production of at least 100 Raiders.
To that end, the air service has emphasized cost containment while simultaneously allowing for maximum flexibility. The future backbone of the Air Force's bomber fleet has been noted for an open systems architecture that would allow future capabilities to be integrated into the aircraft, and fast.
With the B-21, the Air Force plans not only to have the best stealth bomber in service for years to come. By the end of the 2030s, it also plans to operate a strong number of these aircraft.
Author Experience and Expertise: Peter SuciuPeter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.
Image Credit: Creative Commons.
Summary and Key Points: This summer, Finnish and Spanish F/A-18 Hornets are taking part in NATO's air policing missions over Romania. Finland deployed seven Hornets in June for their first NATO mission since joining the alliance, operating alongside the Royal Air Force and Romanian Air Force.
-As Finland's deployment ended, Spain sent eight F/A-18+ Hornets to continue the mission, reflecting NATO's ongoing efforts to secure its southern flank in the Black Sea region.
The F/A-18 Is Getting Closer to Russia These DaysThe Boeing F/A-18 Hornet is a familiar sight over the skies of the Black Sea. This summer Hornets will continue to operate from Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base, Romania, although the national insignia on the aircraft will change.
In early June, seven Finnish Air Force Hornets were deployed on the first NATO Air Policing and Air Shielding mission in Romania since the Nordic nation joined the international alliance last year.
According to NATO, the "deployment was carried out in three rotations and involved over 250 personnel from all Finnish Air Force units." The staged deployments allowed the Finnish personnel to gain as much experience as possible, "operating under the direction of NATO's military command structure."
The Finnish personnel completed their rotation and returned home on July 29, 2024.
"The operation was interesting and rewarding. We will take home a lot of lessons learned about participating in a NATO mission and operating in a new environment." said Maj. Toni Vanhatalo, commander of the third rotation of the Finnish Air Force detachment. "Being under the direction of NATO's command structure required some minor changes in the planning of flight operations, but we adapted well, and also gained some lessons for developing our operations at home. Cooperation with Allies was smooth and continuous training activity improved our capabilities."
During their deployment to NATO's southern flank, the Finnish Air Force F/A-18 Hornets operated alongside Royal Air Force Eurofighter Typhoons and took part in exercise Ramstein Legacy 24 in Romania and Bulgaria. They flew with Romanian Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcons to perform escort drills with U.S. Air Force B-52 Stratofortress bombers deployed to the region.
Spanish Hornets Have ArrivedOn Tuesday, just days after the Finnish F/A-18s departed from Romania, eight F/A-18+ Hornets from Spain landed in Romania to begin a four-month deployment. A total of 150 Spanish Air Force personnel – including pilots, maintainers, and technical staff – deployed to Romania as part of NATO's Black Sea Air Policing mission.
Designated the C-15 in Spanish service, these F/A-18s date to the 1980s but have received significant service life upgrades that extended their operational lifespan and capabilities. The Spanish Air Force's Hornets were previously used in NATO missions in Kosovo in 1999, as well as during 2011's Operation Unified Protector to enforce UN Security Council resolutions during the Libyan Civil War.
In 2022, Madrid announced it would phase out its C-15 fleet, replacing those fighters with the Eurofighter Typhoon. Several of the modern combat aircraft have already entered service. The Spanish Air Force deployed five Eurofighter Typhoons, along with a 60-person team, to the same Romanian air base earlier this year.
Author Experience and Expertise: Peter SuciuPeter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.
Kezdődjék augusztus a TAI/TUSAS T626 Gökbey helikopterének júliusi, az angliai Farnborough-ban lezajlott nemzetközi bemutatkozásával. Diszkrét utalás, egy kiragadott példa arra, hogy ahogy a stratégiai folyamatokban, úgy a repülőgép- és védelmi iparban is hangsúlyeltolódásnak lehetünk tanúi, amit nem árthat figyelembe venni a jövő tervezgetésénél.
Zord
Depuis l’adoption de la nouvelle loi immigration, la France a mis en place une nouvelle procédure pour la régularisation des travailleurs étrangers. La nouvelle loi, […]
L’article Titre de séjour en France : nouvelle procédure de régularisation pour les métiers en tension est apparu en premier sur .
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The post Gearbox Failure, Pilot Decision to Keep Flying Blamed for Japan CV-22 Crash, Says Air Force Probe appeared first on The Aviationist.
Summary and Key Points: The X-44 MANTA was an experimental aircraft developed by the U.S. Air Force based on the F-22 Raptor, designed without traditional tail surfaces to reduce radar visibility and enhance maneuverability using thrust-vectoring engines.
-The program aimed to create a highly stealthy and agile fighter, potentially superior to the F-22.
-However, the project was canceled in 2000 before reaching production. Elements of the X-44 design influence today's Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program, but the original MANTA will never be realized.
The X-44 Manta Was Never Destined for Dominance, SadlyWhen one thinks of an aircraft with no tail, they normally think of plane in distress. One could be forgiven for not understanding that aircraft can be built purposely without a tail. That’s precisely what the United States Air Force did when they developed the X-44 MANTA concept plane. As with so many things in the US military, “MANTA” is an acronym that stands for, “Multi-Axis No-Tail Aircraft” (this is not to be confused with the US Navy’s new unmanned underwater vehicle, the Manta).
Based off the F-22A Raptor, the X-44 was intended to be the next step in advanced US military warplanes. The MANTA took what was back then the radical design of the F-22 and augmented it. Primarily, by removing the aircraft’s conventional vertical and horizontal tail surfaces.
Engineers at the time rightly believed these components significantly contributed to radar visibility (a key element of both the F-22 and X-44 projects were to make the birds as stealthy as possible). Instead, the X-44 MANTA’s designers added in thrust-vectoring engines. This new engine not only made the X-44 stealthier than even its advanced F-22 big brother, but it also made the experimental bird more maneuverable.
Indeed, the removal of the MANTA’s tail surfaces and the replacement of those surfaces by the thrust-vectoring engines were one of the most innovative concepts for that era. According to Jim Matthews writing in a 2008 article for the Smithsonian Magazine, “Thrust vectoring enables the pilots to fly up and over in a very tight arc [and] gives [pilots] the nose authority to turn the jet while the wings are stalled, similar to a controlled flat spin.”
Comparisons to the F-22Today, the F-22A is powered by Pratt & Whitney F119 turbofans, each providing 35,000 pounds of thrust. The F-22’s vector thrust nozzle can “direct exhaust thrust up or down as much as twenty-four degrees.” This is an impressive capability that few modern warplanes possess. The MANTA had these abilities and more. The X-44, if you can believe it, was more impressive than the F-22.
The bird was almost invisible on radar because of these modifications.
A downside of not having tail surfaces is that the pilots who manned these birds, had they gone into production and been deployed, would have needed to be highly trained. Flying tailless birds, even with the assist of vector thrust engines, is a difficult undertaking. What’s more, going into combat with such a plane would have tested even the best fighter pilots.
The X-44 MANTA had an impressive weapons package. MANTA housed a single 20mm internal cannon, two AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles. Additional armaments of AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles as well as two 1,000-GBU-32 Joint Direct Munitions were included as well. As I wrote previously, had the X-44 been mass produced, it would have likely been even better than the F-22A Raptor (which has been called the “Michael Jordan of fighter planes”).
An Inauspicious End to a Great ProgramIn 2000, the X-44 program was canceled. The bird never made it beyond the conceptual stage. In an alternative reality somewhere, mixed squadrons of F-22 Raptors and X-44 MANTAS fly into battle, firing the onboard lasers that the Air Force got to work.
Sadly, the United States government today is actually broke—contrary to what our elites seem to think. Trying to build this system today would not make economical sense. Not to fear, though, the Air Force is pushing ahead with their Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) platform which is loosely based upon the X-44 MANTA. To think, this platform could have already been flying by now had the Air Force just stuck with its guns twenty-four years ago.
Sadly, we’ll never get to see these birds fly again. Not even in its sixth-generation warplane form under the auspices of NGAD. There’s simply no way Congress will allow for that program to continue as the rest of the country feels the economic pinch.
Author Experience and Expertise: Brandon J. WeichertBrandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock.
From the Vault
Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships
Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)
Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.
Le ministre de la Justice et garde des sceaux a institué une commission nationale mixte chargée d’enquêter sur la mafia et les mauvaises pratiques judiciaires dont sont victimes les justiciables, personnes physiques et morales, indique un communiqué signé le 5 aout 2024 par son cabinet.
« La force du progrès est une structure de la ligue des jeunes de l'UDPS créée par feu Etienne Tshisekedi pour la quiétude de la population et consolider les acquis du président de la République »
L'enclave de pêche de Nyakakoma, située dans le territoire de Rutshuru, est tombée sous l'occupation des rebelles du M23 ce mercredi 7 août. Cela s'est produit après un bref échange de tirs avec la force marine congolaise, appuyée par des combattants de groupes armés locaux.
Deux personnes ont perdu la vie lors des manifestations de liesse après la publication des résultats de l’examen d'État à Kisangani, dans la province de la Tshopo. Une lauréate est décédée ce mardi 6 août dans un accident de circulation, et un jeune homme a été tué par machette lundi soir par un groupe de personnes en colère contre l’échec d’un des leurs.
Une dizaine de lauréats ont été grièvement blessés dans divers incidents.
So a young acquaintance asks what kinds of ships there are in a navy. That’s kind of a basic question. You would think it lends itself to a pithy answer intelligible to nonspecialists.
You would be wrong.
And that’s troublesome. Physicist Richard Feynman, a personal hero, maintained that if you can’t explain something to a sixth grader, you either don’t know the material well enough yourself or you have a problem communicating concepts. Ideas are not that complex. You need to deepen your knowledge, refine your teaching, or both. That’s sage counsel from a Nobel laureate. Let’s heed it.
Or try to.
The obvious way to approach queries about fleet design is by resorting to listmania. In other words, you could run through the litany of ship types found in naval inventories, from hulking aircraft carriers down to tugboats.
Do that and watch your questioner’s eyes glaze over.
There are many ship types, and distinctions between them can be obscure. For example, try explaining the difference between a U.S. Navy guided-missile cruiser and destroyer in a hurry. A cruiser is bigger than a destroyer, right? Well, not necessarily. The latest variant of the venerable Arleigh Burke-class destroyer displaces about as much as the Ticonderoga-class cruisers now leaving service. Burkes and Ticonderogas sport variants of the same combat system, known as Aegis—a combination radar, computer, and fire-control system. And they carry the same types of armaments, albeit cruisers feature substantially more vertical-launch missile siloes and thus more firepower than destroyers.
To further blur the distinction between ship types, the three Zumwalt-class stealth destroyers now being repurposed as surface strike platforms actually outweigh cruisers, and by a hefty margin. And they will pack hypersonic missiles whereas cruisers do not.
Etc. Distinguishing between surface combatants is far from straightforward. Feynman frowns.
Anyone trying to explain fleet design to nonspecialists runs afoul of such intricacies. Meeting the Feynman standard is hard. So rather than try to list all the ship types constituting a fleet, why not classify fighting ships by function? Simplifying is more promising. During the age of sail, in fact, it was downright easy. Ships of war were assigned to “rates” corresponding to the complement of guns they bore. Firepower determined their place in fleet operations. Naval historian extraordinaire Julian Corbett broke down wooden-walled fleets into three broad categories:
-Capital ships. These brawny combatants boasted the armament to mete out heavy gunfire barrages. They also had the defensive staying power—chiefly rugged hull construction—to absorb punishment while dueling rival capital ships. Capital ships constituted the navy’s battle fleet. They were big, specialized, and expensive. For that reason even the most lavishly appointed navy could only afford these apex predators in limited numbers.
-Cruisers. These were relatively inexpensive, less well-armed warships that nonetheless mounted sufficient gun power to police the sea lanes once the battle fleet had either vanquished the enemy fleet or blockaded it in port. Cruisers outgunned whatever remained of the hostile navy, letting them dominate less contested seas. Best of all, they were affordable in bulk. As a result the cruiser contingent had geographic reach that capital ships could never match given their small numbers. Cruisers could fan out, asserting control at many places on the nautical chart.
-Flotilla. This was a swarm of still smaller, more lightly armed, cheaper vessels that discharged the administrative duties all navies must discharge—chiefly in near-shore waters.
Corbett’s taxonomy of fighting ships remains a valuable point of departure for thinking through what various ship types are and do. But the neat lines separating those segments are indistinct nowadays. Even in Corbett’s day—over a century ago—he bewailed the revolution in seaborne weaponry that had overtaken naval warfare. It accompanied the changeover from wooden hulls and sail to steel hulls and steam and diesel propulsion. Even rudimentary submarines and surface patrol craft could now deploy heavy-hitting weapons such as sea mines and torpedoes. They could do heavy damage to cruisers and capital ships. No longer were small combatants an afterthought in naval warfare, as they had been for centuries when they were radically outgunned. This was now a battleworthy contingent.
A superempowered flotilla upended the Corbettian scheme of things—compelling battle fleets to take elaborate precautions to defend themselves when they ventured within reach of subs, torpedo craft, and minelayers. The new flotilla turned naval commanders’ world upside down, and Corbett’s with it. No longer was the age of sail—the chief source of historical data and insight into war at sea—a trustworthy guide to fleet design.
All of that being said, the fundamental naval functions endure. Some segment of a navy denies a foe access to important seaways if unable to defeat it outright. Sea denial is a quintessential flotilla action. Another fights for maritime command when the balance of forces favors it. There’s your battle function. A third exercises command once it’s in hand and the worst threats are at bay. Deny, win, and exploit control. There are your three basic ship types. Many types of hulls make up each contingent.
How would Corbett rate the U.S. Navy as a fighting force? I think he would find fault with it owing to imbalances in fleet design. It yaws overwhelmingly toward the battle fleet at the expense of other worthwhile endeavors such as sea denial. This is an artifact of navy culture. The U.S. Navy has grown accustomed to commanding the sea since 1945, as though command is a birthright. The service sees itself as being perpetually on offense. Thinking in terms of sea denial—by definition a strategy of the weaker pugilist—does not come easy to American naval chieftains.
Accordingly, the flotilla is a backwater in U.S. fleet design. About the only surface combatant that fits neatly into the flotilla category is the littoral combat ship, a vessel designed to operate in coastal waters under reduced threat. And the leadership has soured on the littoral combat ship, retiring youthful hulls at the same time shipyards complete the last few. If American commanders opt for sea denial, accordingly, they will be forced to harness heavier ships such as destroyers and submarines rather than purpose-built flotilla craft. This could change as technology matures. It will be reasonable to classify uncrewed surface and subsurface vessels as part of the flotilla as they join the fleet.
The result would be a hybrid, more balanced fleet. Gee-whiz technology could be salvation in the Western Pacific, where America is unlikely to be the stronger contender on day one of a conflict.
The capital-ship contingent predominates within the U.S. Navy—again, a force constructed with offense rather than defense in mind. Aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers boast that combination of offensive and defensive power needed to fight peer navies for command of the sea. Supporting the battle fleet is a combat logistics fleet made up of tankers, stores ships, and the like. Supply vessels don’t fit ideally into any of the three functions, but they are an indispensable enabler for everything the navy does. No navy prospers without regular supplies of fuel, ammunition, and stores of all kinds. That’s why no carrier or surface action group is complete unless accompanied by one or more of these workhorses.
And exploiting command? The cruiser contingent is no longer made up of cruisers in Corbett’s sense of light combatants fielded in large numbers to control the sea. Frigates and corvettes are the modern counterparts to his cruisers. The U.S. Navy is attempting to add a new frigate to the fleet, known as the Constellation class. A frigate is a lighter combatant than a cruiser or destroyer, with more modest sensors and weapons. It should be adequate for policing the sea against remnants of the hostile navy. But with only twenty Constellation-class hulls on the navy’s wish list, and with the program plagued by construction delays, it’s foreordained that capital ships will pull double duty once they have won maritime command.
Corbett was right: capital ships are too expensive to fit out in large numbers, and the U.S. Navy is top-heavy with them. It will not have enough ships in the inventory to control all vital sea lanes by itself, and to otherwise exploit the blessings of maritime command. It must fill in the force structure with low-cost craft—chiefly unmanned, one supposes—while seeking help from fellow U.S. armed services and allies.
Faster, please.
It's worth noting that Julian Corbett could have added a fourth naval function to the list. Indeed, he should have. He was a full-throated advocate of expeditionary operations, meaning operations that that navies execute to shape events on land, whether by landing troops, projecting force inland from the sea by means of fire support, or some other means. The U.S. Navy’s amphibious fleet—a fleet of transports used to deposit U.S. Marines on foreign shores—constitutes the core of the American naval expeditionary force.
Once the capital-ship fleet has wrested control of sea, sky, and coastal zones from an antagonist, it’s safe enough for amphibious groups to move in close enough to do their work. Some “amphibs” or “gators” bear a strong resemblance to aircraft carriers, featuring long, flat flight decks populated by helicopters and sometimes fixed-wing combat aircraft. Think Top Gun: Maverick. And in fact these “big-deck” amphibious warships are similar in proportion to frontline World War II flattops. Other amphibs look like humble transports. Many such vessels can ballast down, taking on seawater in order to partly submerge. Ballasting down allows landing craft to launch from bays in their sterns or return to the ship.
Corbett insisted that wars are won on land because people live on land. Controlling the sea while radiating power ashore is how the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps contribute to ultimate victory, working alongside the Army and Air Force as well as allies. Winning demands combined effort.
So there’s my rough guide to ship types. Does it meet the Richard Feynman sixth-grader standard? You be the judge.
About the Author: Dr. James HolmesJames Holmesi s J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Nonresident Fellow at the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. The views voiced here are his alone.
All images are Creative Commons.