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Great Power Competition, sometimes called the Second Cold War, is unfolding on a global scale. The United States is not competing with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in China, nor is the United States competing with Vladimir Putin’s system in Russia. Today, we are competing along a possible “kinetic front” in East Asia (Taiwan and the Nine Dash Line), Ukraine, and Israel. Additionally, there is arguably a “second front” in the realm of technology, encompassing the battle over artificial intelligence, telecommunications, subsea cables, and microchips. Perhaps the most underappreciated yet critical front, a “third front” in this Great Power Competition, is the “Global South,” or the developing world. During the First Cold War, the developing world was a major front, so it is not surprising that the Global South is again a significant theater or—in a scenario where the United States does not end up in a full Great Power War—is the central theater of competition over the next forty years.

The Global South is a notion that comprises many regions, including Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America, the Pacific Island States, South Asia, Central Asia, some post-Soviet countries, and the Middle East. Historically referred to as the “Third World,” this term is now widely considered to be outdated or even offensive. The “Global South” is a term recently popularized by the CCP—which has spent decades attempting to ingratiate itself within this theater—although the term’s appropriateness is debated. Alternative terms such as the “developing world,” “G-77,” or “new non-aligned countries” have been suggested, though none have proven to be completely satisfactory.

While the United States and allied national security community have focused extensively on the first two fronts—potential military conflicts and technological competition—the third front in the Global South remains critical yet underappreciated. This region represents some of the world’s leading sources of strategic materials, consumer markets, potential allies—as well as current or potential partners in security burden-sharing. China has been actively making inroads in the Global South for well over twenty years, with relationships dating back more than fifty years—some based on Chinese manipulation of anti-colonial sentiments. Russia, in some cases, has relations going back much further, with some lingering, popular appreciation for the Soviet Union’s support during these nations’ anti-colonial struggles.

China views the Global South as a pivotal market and partner in challenging the liberal world order. By leveraging the concerns of the Global South about the current international system, China aims to undermine the influence of the United States. The Chinese leadership, often accusing the United States of initiating a “new cold war,” advocates for the “democratization of international relations.” This narrative is part of China’s broader strategy to reshape the global order around its own interests rather than U.S. ones. Beijing’s asymmetric response emphasizes “non-alignment” and a commitment to helping countries protect their sovereignty, avoiding alignment with major power blocs or external dictates. This approach is presented as a counter to U.S. efforts to restore the appeal of liberal democracy, which China portrays as an outdated “cold war mentality” that threatens Chinese ambitions, both on a regional and global scale.

China’s engagement with the Global South, particularly through initiatives like the Group of Friends of the Global Development Initiative (GDI), underscores its ambition to present itself as a benign provider of international public goods in areas such as poverty alleviation, food security, and digitalization. Over seventy countries have joined the GDI, with over 100 supporting its goals, showcasing China’s role as a development leader. This commitment contrasts with the alleged global protectionism of the United States, which is accused of failing to provide adequate economic support. 

Chinese scholars argue that China’s readiness to mobilize the developing world, especially in regions with historical tensions with Western powers, positions it as a critical player in a post-American global order. This strategy is evident in China’s diplomatic stance on issues like Gaza, where it promotes “peace plans” without concrete proposals or direct condemnation of terrorist actions. China’s investment in these regions is part of its vision of “great changes unseen in a century,” emphasizing the growing economic and geopolitical significance of the Global South and its potential to reshape the international landscape.

China is not only a “Near-Peer Hard Power” competitor but also a “Near-Peer Soft Power” competitor. China can now begin to fill any vacuums left by the United States, which it did not have the capacity, power projection capability, or readiness to do just two decades ago. The economic landscape has shifted dramatically. In 1973, China’s economy was worth $138 billion compared to the United States’ $1.43 trillion. By 2023, China’s GDP had soared to nearly $18 trillion, while the United States’ increased to $27 trillion. Despite the United States maintaining a larger economy, China’s 2023 GDP growth rate of 5.2 percent per annum outpaces the United States’ meager 2.5 percent annually. When the West leaves a void, China now has the financial potential to fill it.

The challenge for the United States lies in offering a compelling alternative to China’s pervasive influence. Over the past decade, the United States has sought to discourage the Global South from engaging with Chinese initiatives like Huawei’s telecom solutions, Sinovac vaccines for COVID-19, or the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—often without providing a viable alternative. This “strategy,” has left many countries with little choice but to turn to China. We cannot fight something with nothing.

Meeting the aspirations of countries in the Global South with a credible, positive, forward-looking agenda is crucial. Failure to do so will result in these nations increasingly aligning with China, which is not in the United States’ interest.

It would be detrimental to the interests of U.S. interests if every developing country’s largest trading partner were China. If Chinese companies manage their ports, if their elites study in Beijing instead of Boston, and if Huawei or other Chinese technology companies dominate their telecom systems, there will be repercussions for U.S. national security. Developing countries may vote with China and against the United States on vital international issues such as the conflicts in Israel and Ukraine, support Chinese candidates for leadership positions in international organizations, and endorse Chinese-led initiatives in multilateral forums.

The United States must present better value propositions in the Global South to remain relevant. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union heavily invested in countries in the Global South, motivated by strategic interests and ideological goals. In the 1990s, Peter Rodman’s More Precious than Peace provided a compelling narrative of America’s engagement in the developing world through a Cold War lens, outlining how this competition allowed developing countries to claim a pivotal role in international political questions. American policy faced a twofold challenge at the time: “to guide the underdeveloped regions of the world through a transition to full-fledged participation in the international system and to do so in the face of a Soviet attempt to suborn them as allies in a radical assault on that international system.”

But this is not your grandparents’ developing world. It is more affluent and more free, and their governments enjoy a lot more options. Foreign aid is a very small part of the puzzle, along with private capital, trade, investment, remittance flows, domestic capital, and the ability to raise taxes in a society with much more significant sources of money than fifty years ago. So, the “theory of change” is not necessarily about more foreign aid or the threat of cutting foreign aid off. These countries do not want to be pawns in someone else’s game, nor do they want to be a hegemon’s vassal state.

Since the turn of the century, the developing world has also experienced substantial poverty reduction and progress across a range of social and economic metrics. Most of these countries now also have cell phone penetration rates that are approaching those of the United States. Additionally, these societies are often more free than in the past and boast more active civil societies. The percentage of free countries worldwide has increased from 30 percent in 1973 to 43 percent in 2023.

Hence, over the past thirty-five years, the developing world has prioritized different things than those in the developed world, including the United States. China and sometimes Russia increasingly offer the Global South what these countries actually want, including the development of energy and mineral resources, infrastructure, ports, and, oftentimes, hard security. The United States and the West have to be sure that we are also offering what these countries actually want as opposed to what our political system finds congenial or easy to deliver. The United States should take advantage of its strong international network, including the European Union, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Canada, and Mexico. Such American allies should be able to play a role in formulating a strategy for more proactive engagement.

Certainly, there are fragile and failed states in the Global South that present unique challenges. These fragile and failed states often are sources of mass migration, breeding grounds for terrorism, and areas where sustainable development progress is extremely difficult to achieve. Fragile and failed states are a problem all to themselves and worthy of a longer discussion somewhere else.

However, this does not change the fact that the United States must update its playbook to move beyond the strategies of the Cold War or the immediate post-Cold War era. It must adapt to these new realities in order to participate in the great power competition for the Global South, which is largely non-military. This involves engaging more proactively with the Global South in areas including trade, infrastructure, digital connectivity, education, and economic development.

Telecommunications, in particular, is a key sector. China has become a leading subsea cable provider and owner as part of its “Digital Silk Road.” Chinese state-owned and subsidized firm HMN Technologies (Huawei) is now the fourth-largest cable provider globally and has seen the fastest growth over the past decade, completing over 108 projects. Areas of investment also include emerging critical technology fields such as internet services, where Huawei has provided internet access for hundreds of millions. Today, Huawei subsidiaries own up to 70 percent of all 4G networks in Sub-Saharan Africa. 

China’s dominance in telecommunications poses a strategic threat to the United States. Allowing Beijing to control significant digital infrastructure flows increases its influence and potential for surveillance—a reality that has already begun to manifest as China assists despots in the developing world to oppress citizens and dissidents through China’s model of digital authoritarianism. The United States must counter this by increasing investment in digital infrastructure in the Global South, promoting American telecom companies, and offering secure and competitive alternatives to Huawei’s technology.

China has also developed a global network of strategically vital ports under its “Maritime Silk Road”—the oceanic counterpart of the “Digital Silk Road.” Beijing now owns or operates ports and terminals at nearly 100 locations in over fifty countries, spanning every ocean and every continent. The Chinese have ownership in about twenty-three ports in Africa alone. This effectively leaves China in control of ports at the heart of global supply chains, which could be leveraged for geopolitical gain. The United States must respond by investing in port infrastructure projects, offering favorable financing terms, and creating public-private partnerships to support port development in the Global South.

China has dwarfed the United States as Africa’s largest trade partner since 2009. Today, one-fifth of the region’s total goods exports go to China, mainly consisting of raw metals, mineral products, and fuel. The current volume of U.S. trade with African states is only one-fifth the size of trade between Africa and China. To date, fifty-two out of fifty-four African countries have also signed an agreement or understanding with the BRI. China has invested at least two-and-a-half times as much in African infrastructure projects as the entire Western world combined. China’s economic influence through trade and investment creates dependency, potentially leading to political alignment with Beijing. To address this, the United States must boost its economic engagement by increasing trade with African nations and supporting American businesses to enter these markets. Expanding the scope and scale of the Development Finance Corporation’s (DFC) operations and fostering sustainable development partnerships is the first step out of several that would help counterbalance China’s economic clout.

A significant aspect of China’s influence in the Global South also revolves around trade and debt. The DFC committed $9 billion across about 130 transactions last year, while China’s BRI undertook $90 billion across about 210 deals. As a result, many developing countries have become ensnared in Chinese debt traps. This economic dependency translates into political leverage for Beijing. In this new era of great power competition, the United States must reconfigure its foreign aid model to adjust to these realities. This involves rethinking the balance between development loans and grants and preserving open and market-based economies at home and abroad while resisting unfair economic practices. Development aid is not merely a charitable act; it is a strategic investment in future allies. Countries that build their capacities with American support are less likely to fall into Chinese debt traps and more likely to engage in fair and transparent governance.

Another key element of changing global dynamics is where the elites of the Global South choose to study. Higher education remains one of the most effective tools of soft power, fostering good governance, functional and accountable institutions, and an empowered civil society. China’s increasing number of foreign students highlights its recognition of the impact of educational exchanges on shaping future leaders’ perspectives and loyalties. In 2003, there were fewer than 1,300 African students enrolled in Chinese universities. In 2017, there were more than 80,000. According to the 2020 data from UNESCO’s Global Education Monitoring Report, China is the largest provider of scholarships worldwide. For public funding, the United States doesn’t even make the top ten. In 2020, China granted 12,000 academic scholarships to African students, while the United Kingdom offered 1,000. The United States’ Fulbright program offered just over 200. 

U.S. programs have been hampered by resource limitations, regulators’ unrealistic expectations, and visa restrictions. However, the United States’ competitive advantage remains its high quality of education, fair and transparent recruitment processes, and exposure to civic-minded curriculum. Indeed, in 2023, there were 290,000 Chinese nationals studying at U.S. colleges and universities, overwhelmingly without scholarships, by far the largest share of foreign students in the United States. The United States must leverage these values to ensure that more students from developing countries are exposed to its liberal educational system over China’s controlled and regimented environment.

Furthermore, a key element of changing global dynamics is where countries in the Global South source their military equipment. India and Russia, for instance, have maintained a close defense relationship for decades. The Indian Army is equipped with Russian-made tanks and rifles, while its air force uses Sukhoi fighter jets and Mi-17 helicopters. Despite deepening ties with the United States, India remains the largest buyer of Russian arms. This relationship has contributed to India’s reluctance to condemn Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. Although New Delhi indirectly called on Moscow to respect international law, it stopped short of criticizing Russia. This demonstrates countries purchasing military equipment from China or Russia often find themselves geopolitically aligned with these powers for times to come. The United States must provide better alternatives to ensure these nations support American geopolitical interests instead.

China’s vaccine diplomacy during the COVID-19 pandemic also significantly enhanced its influence; it claimed to have distributed 2.2 billion vaccine doses worldwide by September 2021. Unlike OECD countries, where vaccine distribution prioritized domestic needs over international diplomacy, China and Russia leveraged their autocratic systems to withhold vaccines in their own societies in order to gain geopolitical advantages abroad. By offering vaccines to countries like the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Brazil, China sought to secure diplomatic concessions, such as the non-recognition of Taiwan and the inclusion of Huawei in their telecom systems. There are rumors that Paraguay considered switching recognition from Taiwan to the PRC over this issue. This approach highlights a shift in global power dynamics, where countries like China, once incapable of producing vaccines, now use low-quality vaccines as strategic tools for diplomatic gains, disregarding the traditional norms of global health diplomacy embraced by OECD nations.

Ignoring the Global South is dangerous for American national security. The growing influence of China in these parts of the world is not merely an economic challenge—it is a strategic threat that can significantly reshape global power dynamics. Most countries would prefer to collaborate with the United States, but without a more attractive offer than what China provides, they will inevitably turn to Beijing.

The field of play in the global power competition has shifted, but the importance of the developing world is greater than ever. The United States must once again leverage its moral convictions and strategic insight to address this new era of challenges as effectively as it did during the Cold War. America’s long-term interests are best served by supporting the rise of partner countries that will, when push comes to shove, uphold a rules-based liberal world order. Renewing its commitment to engagement in the Global South is crucial for U.S. foreign policy to counter China’s “alternative vision for global governance.” By doing so, it can build resilient partnerships, promote good governance, and secure its interests in a rapidly changing global landscape. The stakes are high, and the time for action is now.

Daniel F. Runde is a senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He is also the author of the book The American Imperative: Reclaiming Global Leadership Through Soft Power (Bombardier Books, 2023).

Image: Shutterstock.com.

Ukrainian MPs passed a law banning the activities of a Russia-linked branch of the Orthodox church, paving the way for a historic rupture with an institution that Kyiv has accused of complicity in Moscow's invasion of Ukraine.

As member states call on the EU Commission to enforce the Union's external borders, the EU's border agency, Frontex, has launched tenders for around €400 million worth of equipment, including the purchase of drones and other surveillance technology.

Americas Boeing won a $27.6 million modification to a cost-plus-fixed-fee-order against a previously issued basic ordering agreement. This modification exercises an option to procure three retrofit A-Kits for Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) P-8A aircraft with Increment Three Engineering Change Proposal Six Capabilities. Work will be performed in Jacksonville, Florida (79.6%); San Antonio, Texas (10.9%); and Mesa, Arizona (9.5%), and is expected to be completed October 2026. Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity. Lockheed Martin has been awarded a $130-million contract modification to ramp up the production of Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM) and Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASM). Tooling and test equipment will be procured for the US Air Force contract, required for production increase. Work will be performed in Orlando, Florida, and is expected to be completed by December 15, 2027. Middle East & Africa Lebanon’s Iran-backed Hezbollah group said it launched several rocket salvos at Israeli army positions in the annexed Golan Heights on Tuesday “in response” to Israeli strikes on eastern Lebanon the previous day. Hezbollah fighters launched “intense rocket barrages” at two Israeli army positions in the occupied Golan Heights “in response to the Israeli enemy’s attack on the Bekaa” Valley — […]

Railways are the most environmentally sustainable mode of transport, compared to cars or planes, yet, they remain chronically underfunded and underdeveloped in Europe. High prices, complex booking systems, and a lack of cross-border coordination are just some of the problems making it harder for Europeans to consider trains a reliable and safe option.

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P-8A Poseidon (click to view full) Maritime surveillance and patrol is becoming more and more important, but the USA’s P-3 Orion turboprop fleet is falling apart. The P-7 Long Range Air ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare) Capable Aircraft program to create an improved P-3 began in 1988, but cost overruns, slow progress, and interest in opening the competition to commercial designs led to the P-7’s cancellation for default in 1990. The successor MMA program was begun in March 2000, and Boeing beat Lockheed’s “Orion 21” with a P-8 design based on their ubiquitous 737 passenger jet. US Navy squadrons finally began taking P-8A Poseidon deliveries in 2012, but the long delays haven’t done their existing P-3 fleet any favors. Filling the P-3 Orion’s shoes is no easy task. What missions will the new P-8A Poseidon face? What do we know about the platform, the project team, and ongoing developments? Will the P-3’s wide global adoption give its successor a comparable level of export opportunities? Australia and India have already signed on, but has the larger market shifted in the interim? Program Summary [youtube:v=EcgIjsRo3uM] A P-8 primer The Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft program to replace the P-3 fleet began in earnest in 2000, and […]

From advanced microchips to the green energy transition, critical minerals such as lithium, copper, and rare earth elements (REE) have become crucial inputs to the evolution of the global economy and modern life as we know it. They have also become the source of intense competition between the United States and China, both of which view ensuring access to such critical minerals as central to their pursuit of technological—and, in turn, geopolitical—influence. One country that has emerged as a pivotal element of this competition is Kazakhstan, whose wealth of critical minerals and foreign policy balance between East and West could serve as key indicators for how this technological tussle between Beijing and Washington is likely to play out. 

Kazakhstan is no stranger to geopolitical competition and maneuvering between large powers. Historically aligned with Russia, Kazakhstan only gained independence from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Major deposits of oil, natural gas, and uranium within Kazakhstan attracted attention from the West, with the United States and European companies investing billions in the country to bring its energy supplies out from the Russian orbit and onto global markets. This enabled Kazakhstan to become a leading economic player in Central Asia and build ties with the West while also retaining a strong working relationship with Moscow. 

The economic emergence of China brought a new player into the mix, with Beijing showing interest in Kazakhstan’s vast natural resources to fuel its energy-hungry economy. The country became a vital link to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, with Chinese President Xi Jinping formally announcing the global infrastructure and trade strategy during a visit to Kazakhstan’s capital of Astana in 2013. China invested heavily in road, rail, and pipeline development in Kazakhstan as both a resource destination and transit corridor for trade to Europe and beyond.  

The country’s geographic location in the middle of the vast Eurasian supercontinent and its economic ties with major regional and global players has been reflected in Kazakhstan’s “multi-vectoral” foreign policy, which aims for a balance among eastern and western power centers. Kazakhstan is simultaneously a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes Russia and China, and a prominent member of the C5+1 initiative between the United States and all five Central Asian states (as well as similar initiatives with the EU, Japan, and other entities). The country also serves as a critical node of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), which seeks to enhance trade connectivity between Europe and Asia.

The global geopolitical context has only strengthened Kazakhstan’s importance as a swing player when it comes to resources and trade. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 turbocharged European efforts to reduce their dependence on Russian energy. The Caspian region on Europe’s eastern periphery will be a key source of diversification. Kazakhstan has plugged its oil exports into Europe-bound pipelines, while the TITR has attracted significant interest from both the United States and EU as a means to bypass reliance on Russia as an energy provider and Eurasian transit hub in its own right. 

In the meantime, the disruptive impacts of climate change and the need for critical minerals to power the global energy transition to renewable forms of energy have heightened interest in Kazakhstan from a whole host of players. Building on the C5+1 diplomatic platform initiated back in 2015, the United States hosted the first-ever heads-of-state summit between President Joe Biden and all five Central Asian leaders on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly last year. During that summit, a critical minerals dialogue was launched and followed up on at the working level, with Kazakhstan serving as a vital link. The country has also signed multi-billion dollar agreements with the EU and UK on critical minerals cooperation. 

However, China still remains a major player in Kazakhstan when it comes to critical minerals investment and trade, which is in keeping with Beijing’s dominant role within the global supply chain of such minerals. This is of substantial concern for Washington, given the importance that critical minerals play in not only the green energy transition but also semiconductors and other technological uses. Beijing’s willingness to leverage this supply chain for political purposes, such as a temporary embargo of REE exports to Japan in 2010 and its recent export controls of gallium and germanium last year, has only emphasized the need for the United States and its allies to diversify their supply of critical minerals to more friendly nations. 

This brings us back to the unique and potentially pivotal role played by Kazakhstan. While the country cannot be neatly grouped into the Western or pro-Western bloc of allies for the United States, such as EU nations, Australia, Japan, and South Korea, the foreign policy orientation of Kazakhstan has proven to be pragmatic and willing to work with the West, even as it continues to engage with countries like China and Russia across the economic, diplomatic, and security spheres. For example, Astana recently hosted an SCO summit that promoted energy and security cooperation among its members, while the country has simultaneously been complying with Western sanctions targeting Russia even as it avoids passing sanctions of its own. 

Taking all of this into account, the United States would be well served to acknowledge Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy and work within it rather than against it. Kazakhstan has increasingly taken on the role of a middle power, leveraging its strategic position to balance relationships with major global players. Given its geographic position, Kazakhstan is unlikely to abandon or substantially weaken its relationship with China, Russia, or other non-Western players. However, the Kazakh government—particularly since the election of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in 2019—has proven to be highly responsive to measures that facilitate economic development and regional connectivity while also positioning the country as an important player in the global energy transition. 

Thus, it would be more effective for the United States to emphasize constructive carrots with Kazakhstan, such as investment and technological cooperation, as opposed to counter-productive sticks like sanctions and the maintenance of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. This Cold War-era holdover has restricted economic, trade, and political ties. The United States and its Western partners can also support Kazakhstan’s commitment to a balanced foreign policy while building upon their own diplomatic visits, dialogues, and summits at both the high-level and working-level in support of greater economic cooperation. They can also buttress Astana’s own diplomatic efforts to mediate and combat security instability throughout the region. 

If this approach is followed, Kazakhstan could play a highly influential role in not only helping the United States facilitate the global energy transition—which includes enhancing energy security for Europe while also ensuring a stable supply chain for critical minerals—but also in enhancing Washington’s position in its broader geopolitical competition with Beijing. As this competition between the United States and China heats up, whichever country is better able to maneuver the nuances of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy balance could unlock access to critical resources, transcontinental trade, and all of the strategic benefits that such access would entail. 

Eugene Chausovsky is a Senior Director at the New Lines Institute. Chausovsky previously served as a Senior Eurasia Analyst at the geopolitical intelligence firm Stratfor for more than ten years. His analytical work has focused on political, economic, and security issues pertaining to Russia, Eurasia, and China, as well as global connectivity issues related to energy and climate change.

Image: Shutterstock.com.

Summary and Key Points: Despite being officially retired in 2007, the U.S. Air Force continues to fly a fleet of around 45 F-117 Nighthawks, extending their operations until at least 2034.

-The F-117s are used primarily for research, development, and training, serving as "red air" aggressors and surrogates for stealthy cruise missiles in exercises.

-Their unique stealth characteristics make them valuable for testing new low-observability technologies and defensive sensors.

-The Nighthawk may also be contributing to the development of future aircraft, such as the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) sixth-generation fighter. The fleet is being gradually phased out, with jets transferred to museums.

F-117 Still Flying?

The F-117 Nighthawk was a revolutionary aircraft, one of the first in the world to incorporate stealth features. But with the onset of the F-22 Raptor, the F-117 became redundant and was retired. Or so it seemed. 

Despite the Nighthawk’s official retirement from active duty service in 2007, the U.S. Air Force still regularly flies a fleet of about forty-five F-117s. 

Why would the Air Force still fly a jet that was retired during the George W. Bush administration?

Flying the F-117 Nighthawk

The Air Force confirmed its intention to extend F-117 operations to 2034, which would mean that the jet will serve for 26 years after being officially retired. Obviously, such an extension would be unorthodox, but it is not without adequate reason.

“A portion of the remaining F-117A fleet, flown by Air Force test pilots, has been very actively used for research and development, test and evaluation, and training purposes in recent years,” The War Zone writes. “This has included using the jets as ‘red air’ aggressors and as surrogates for stealthy cruise missiles during large-scale exercises.”

The F-117 still has value for training. As an aggressor aircraft, the F-117 can teach pilots how to engage with low-observability aircraft. It can be used as a cruise missile surrogate in cruise missile training. “Despite their age, [the F-117] still offer important benefits when used in these roles given that their radar, infrared, and other signature profiles are likely to be extremely dissimilar to what pilots and air defense system operates are used to encountering in these contexts,” according to The War Zone. 

Research and development may be the main draw in keeping the F-117 around. Thanks to the Nighthawk’s stealth characteristics, the jet can be used as a control variable in testing for new low-observability coatings and technologies. It can also be used as a control in developing defensive sensors built to detect stealth aircraft. 

The F-117 may even be playing a role in developing new aircraft. Studying the Nighthawk might help developers incorporate stealth features into upcoming aircraft, perhaps including the Next Generation Air Dominance sixth-generation fighter. 

The F-117 won’t fly forever. The Air Force is expected to divest their F-117 fleet at a rate of two to three jets per year. How many jets the Air Force is still flying today is unclear. In 2019, the service said that fifty-one F-117s were still flying, but that up to a dozen would be transferred to museums in 2020. All of the remaining Nighthawks are flown and stored at the Tonopah Test Range in Nevada.

About the Author: Harrison Kass 

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Navy faces critical challenges, including a declining fleet size, shipbuilding delays, and maintenance issues, which undermine its readiness and ability to defend America.

-Experts like Dr. Seth Cropsey, Bryan Clark, and others warn of the Navy’s deteriorating state, highlighting the impact of poor leadership, underfunding, and mismanagement. As geopolitical threats from China, Russia, and other adversaries rise, the Navy’s ability to meet these challenges is in question.

-Calls for substantial investment and a broad-based naval building program are urgent to restore U.S. maritime strength and ensure national security.

Why the U.S. Navy's Decline Poses a Serious National Security Threat

Since 2017, I have written about the decline of the U.S. Navy. We have far fewer ships than we need to defend America. The shipbuilding industry is struggling to produce an ever-decreasing number of ships. Even if Congress appropriated more funds the shipbuilding industry does not have the capacity to provide more ships, faster. Ships are late in delivery and beset with problems.  We have advanced weaponry that works well as proved by recent use in the Middle East, but far too few to last in a sustained conflict. Our enemies overseas see weakness and become bolder. As good as our missiles are, ships carry limited numbers. Experts warn that we will run out of missiles far sooner than we will run out of targets. A third of our ships at any given time are not ready for sea due to maintenance issues.

The Navy’s goal is to have seventy-five ships ready to deploy on short notice at any given time. We barely have fifty ready. The Navy set this goal two years ago and recently admitted the goal will not be met. We have little surge capacity, and the so-called ready reserve fleet is deficient having too few ships. The last mobilization readiness stress test ended in failure.

The Navy’s leadership in recent decades has been marked by embarrassing failures. Examples include building whole ship classes like the Zumwalt and LCS which turned out to be complete failures, collisions at sea, and loss of a sub for 3 years due to a collision with an undersea mount. The Navy lost a capital ship, the USS Bonhomme Richard which burned pier side, a 3-billion-dollar loss to the USMC with no replacement. That failure exacerbates the Navy’s failure to provide the USMC with the Congressionally mandated 38 amphibious ships.

A worsening suicide rate, scandals like Fat Leonard and Red Hill, and an unseemly devotion to politicizing the Navy by celebrating “Pride,” promoting DEI, and diverting resources to fight climate change are all examples of Navy leadership failures.   The Navy has a recruiting crisis being dreadfully shorthanded and now forced to send ships to sea significantly undermanned, a recipe for disaster. The Navy recently reported a shortage of 18,000 sailors for shipboard assignment and for two years running will have missed recruiting goals by thousands. FY 2022 by more that 3000, FY 2023 by more than 10,000 and on track to miss in FY 2024 by another 6700. These shortages are cumulative and impossible to recover from. These shortages persist despite the Navy lowering standards to try to make the goals.

CBO, GAO, CRS, and Heritage Foundation all warn of the severe risk our nation is creating by having a weak Navy. There are increasing doubts that we can win the next war. Our enemies China, Russia, Iran, the DPRK, and radical Islam are all taking advantage of the perceived weakness by being more aggressive. Russia’s war on Ukraine has no end in sight. Iran is waging a war against the state of Israel, and this is bleeding our inventories dry of arms we will need to fight a looming future conflict with China. China grows ever more aggressive against Taiwan, the Philippines, Japan, and other Pacific nations as it asserts its hegemony against its far weaker neighbors while the U.S. mostly sits idly by tolerating their “wolf warrior” tactics.

Prominent naval experts share my concerns.

Dr. Seth Cropsey began his career as assistant to the Secretary of Defense and was later commissioned as a naval officer. He served as deputy Undersecretary of the Navy in the Reagan administration and acting assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict in the George H. W. Bush administration. Following 15 years as a senior fellow at Hudson Institute, Mr. Cropsey founded Yorktown Institute in 2022 and is the Institute’s president. He says in a recent article:

“The U.S. Navy is a ship without a rudder. The longer the service is allowed to decay, the more precarious America’s strategic situation will become. Turning things around won’t be easy. The best solution would be to retain every combat ship in the current fleet and encourage allies to pitch in with their own industrial bases. This expansion will require substantial funding, particularly in the workforce.”

Bryan Clark is a senior fellow and director of the Center for Defense Concepts and Technology at Hudson Institute. He is an expert in naval operations, electronic warfare, autonomous systems, military competitions, and wargaming. Mr. Clark recently made observations regarding the Navy’s management of the USS Constellation Class Frigate:

“The Navy chose a ship design already in use by navies in France and Italy instead of starting from nothing. The idea was that 15% of the vessel would be updated to meet U.S. Navy specifications, while 85% would remain unchanged, reducing costs and speeding construction. Instead, the opposite happened: The Navy redesigned 85% of the ship, resulting in cost increases and construction delays. Construction of the first-in-class Constellation warship, which began in August 2022, is now three years behind schedule, with delivery pushed back to 2029. The final design still isn’t completed.”

Eric Labs is a longtime Navy expert at the Congressional Budget Office. He says the shipbuilding industry is in its worst state in 25 years:

“Navy shipbuilding is currently in “a terrible state” — the worst in a quarter century,” “I feel alarmed,” he said. “I don’t see a fast, easy way to get out of this problem. It’s taken us a long time to get into it.”

Bryan McGrath is a retired naval officer who commanded a Destroyer and helped lead the effort to craft the nation’s maritime strategy 2007. Since retiring in 2008, McGrath has been a key Navy consultant on strategy, concepts of operation, and capability development to both the Navy and the defense industry. He said in early 2024:

“The U.S. Navy is too small for what is asked of it, and what is asked of it is insufficient to meet the nation’s needs. We have too few ships, submarines, aircraft, aircraft carriers, people, sensors, weapons, and networks. China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is growing faster than any navy has since the U.S. buildup to the Second World War, while the U.S. remains committed to efficient peacetime production levels that ignore the reality of this competition. Relative to the threats it faces, American naval power is weaker than at any time since the start of World War II. While the U.S. Navy remains the world’s most powerful seaborne combat force, not even the Soviet navy posed as dangerous a threat as China’s PLAN does today. The nature of that threat presents the prospect of a PLAN so powerful it could dominate the Western Pacific, destroying the legitimacy and effectiveness of America’s network of friends and allies by raising questions about America’s will and capability to support that network. The ability to dominate a region of the world responsible for 65% of global GDP represents a profound threat to U.S. national security and prosperity, and that of like-minded nations globally. A broad-based naval building program is required to meet China’s challenge, and all elements of the modern, balanced fleet should expand.”

Dr. James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Distinguished Fellow at the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare, Marine Corps University. Professor Holmes recently wrote in National Interest:

 “The U.S. Navy has been breaching the principle of continuity for decades, and to its own peril. At present, for example, surface combatants—guided-missile destroyers and cruisers—have to withdraw from a battle zone when they exhaust their missile inventories. They have to steam back to a specially equipped port to rearm. The logistics fleet cannot rearm them at sea for fear of damaging munitions or vertical launchers as the recipient and delivery ships sway with the waves. Depending on where the theater of conflict lies, the simple feat of rearming could mean voyaging thousands of miles—perhaps even all the way to a U.S. seaport. Such a journey would deduct whatever fraction that ship contributes to the fleet’s overall fighting strength—96 vertical launch siloes’ worth of missiles in the case of a destroyer, the surface navy’s workhorse—for weeks at a time.”

CDR Salamander is a retired Navy Commander and a former Commanding Officer of a Destroyer. He’s been writing an insightful column for many years on all things related to the Navy. I highly recommend his Substack which can be found at this link.  Recently he wrote about the Navy’s amphibious forces. He asks, “What has the 29-year old BOXER been up to? Well, earlier this month: 

"The amphibious assault ship USS Boxer is underway for a long-delayed deployment after a maintenance and overhaul period of almost four years. The ship has been conducting workups for the last several months with the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit. The Boxer last deployed in 2019. The Navy struggled to get the ship back to sea after a $200 million planned overhaul and maintenance availability in 2020. Wait … less than a couple of weeks later – what do we see?  The trouble-plagued USS Boxer has returned to San Diego after experiencing a new equipment problem during its first deployment in five years.”

Brent Sadler is Senior Research Fellow, Allison Center for National Security at the Heritage Foundation. In July 2024 He wrote: 

“Our nation’s maritime strength has been ebbing for years, but few policymakers have taken notice let alone real action—until now. More and more members of Congress are speaking up, with many determined to fix what has turned into a national strategic vulnerability. For example, Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) recently announced plans to increase defense spending by $55 billion to get industry “on a footing to deliver a 355-ship” Navy. It’s a long-overdue change. Barely 0.4 percent of our trade is conducted on U.S. ships, leaving our security and prosperity in the hands of Chinese state enterprises that are increasingly dominating every aspect of maritime activity. To reduce our overreliance on unfriendly nations, Congress must revive a critical industry that will require action in workforce, shipyards, shipbuilding, and shipping. Regaining American competitiveness is key. A successful renaissance in American shipping will allow us to build momentum and set conditions for a sustained revival in America’s maritime industry.”

As the old saw goes, “A word to the wise is sufficient.”  We must rebuild our Navy. We are a maritime nation. Our lives and economy depend on the sea. There is no time to waste. Contact your Congressional representatives now!

About the Author

CAPT Brent Ramsey, (USN, Ret.) has written extensively on Defense matters. He is an officer with Calvert Group, Board of Advisors member for the Center for Military Readiness and STARRS, and member of the Military Advisory Group for Congressman Chuck Edwards (NC-11).

This article was first published by RealClearDefense.

Summary and Top Points You Need to Know: The U.S. Navy maintains carrier superiority over China, but Beijing has demonstrated its ability to track American carriers, raising concerns. In 2015, a Chinese Kilo-class submarine shadowed the USS Ronald Reagan for over 12 hours near Japan, highlighting China's growing submarine capabilities.

-Despite these advancements, U.S. submarines and multi-layered defense systems remain superior, making it unlikely that a Chinese submarine could successfully attack or sink a U.S. carrier.

-While China's naval modernization is significant, the defensive architecture of U.S. carriers ensures robust protection against potential threats in the Western Pacific.

-The U.S. retains carrier superiority over its adversaries, both in the size and capabilities of its fleet. 

China's Submarine Tactics: Tracking U.S. Carriers in the Pacific

But while China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy may not currently have a carrier fleet that can compete with the U.S., it has demonstrated the ability to track American carriers. Indeed, Beijing’s ability and its willingness to track the exact locations of U.S. naval carriers is concerning – these powerful warships are not invulnerable to certain sophisticated weapons.

A Chinese Sub Has Tracked a U.S. Aircraft Carrier Before

Back in 2015, a Chinese submarine closely tracked an American aircraft carrier near the coast of Japan. The Chinese Kilo-class fast attack sub shadowed USS Ronald Reagan for more than 12 hours in what was considered to be “more than a brief encounter,” according to officials.

Beijing claimed that the American vessel was sailing in Chinese waters. The incident was reminiscent of an encounter in 2006, when a Song-class submarine surfaced undetected within torpedo range of the Kitty Hawk carrier.

While more recent Chinese provocations over the South China Sea have involved fighter jets harassing American aircraft, Beijing has been further developing its submarine capabilities in order to track American ships more diligently. 

In the past, Chinese submarines were considered to be a generation behind the U.S. in terms of specs and capabilities. They were quite loud, making them easier for U.S. warships to spot. But China has allocated a lot of resources and funds to modernizing its naval assets over the last decade, and its submarines could be far more capable now.

American Subs Remain Superior

Despite this growing threat, American submarines remain superior to their Chinese counterparts. 

As explained by Forbes, “If the threat is from undersea warships, the carrier can rely on Virginia-class submarines that greatly outclass their Chinese counterparts, plus antisubmarine sensors and rotorcraft deployed on both destroyers and the carrier itself. The architecture of the defensive perimeter dictates that if an enemy penetrates one layer of protection, it will then face another, and another. So even if the adversary can find a carrier in the vastness of the Western Pacific, the likelihood its weapons will reach the carrier and do serious damage is not great. The likelihood the carrier could actually be sunk is minimal, given its design features.”

Essentially, even if a Chinese submarine is successful in tracking a U.S. carrier for a period of time, it would not necessarily be able to carry out an actual attack.

About the Author: Defense Expert Maya Carlin 

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Summary and Key Points: One week into Ukraine's Kursk operation, its objectives remain unclear, underscoring Ukraine's exceptional operational security and strategic planning. The operation has flipped the narrative of Russian superiority, revealing significant Russian military failures and strengthening Ukraine's negotiation position.

-With approximately 1,000 square kilometers liberated and Russian forces in disarray, Ukraine has not only bolstered its defense but also gained moral and strategic advantages.

-The operation justifies continued Western support, as its success could lead to a new strategic situation globally, further weakening Russia's position and challenging Putin's narrative of victory.

The Strategic Brilliance Behind Ukraine's Mysterious Kursk Operation​

One week into Ukraine’s Kursk operation we still have no idea as to what its objectives are. This fact actually underscores the brilliance of the operation because our ignorance reveals the quality of Ukrainian operational security (OPSEC) and intelligence preparation of this battlefield (IPB). Indeed, the success of this operation to date, like any successful operation, now creates many more potential objectives than might have been previously imagined by Ukrainian planners.

Undoubtedly this action strengthens Kyiv’s hands if a negotiation comes about, and it certainly puts the lie to an unending stream of media reports claiming that Ukraine is steadily being ground down through Russian attrition. That outlook, after all, represents Putin’s articulated theory of victory, perhaps the only open left to him to validate his ongoing aggression against Ukraine.  Thus, this operation flips the script of Russian superiority even as it shows just how resourcefully Ukraine is defending its territory against Russian aggression. Indeed, perhaps the most telling outcome of this operation is that it strips away the brutal façade of Russia’s aggression. As of this writing, Ukraine has liberated about 1000sqKM of Russian territory, hundreds if not thousands of Russian forces have surrendered, Ukraine now controls 74 settlements, and 133,00 people have been evacuated from these territories and no credible military response is yet in sight.

These figures highlight glaring Russian failures in leadership, command and control, intelligence, morale, training, etc. Indeed Chief of the General Staff , General Gerasimov either lied to Putin or was himself deceived when he briefed Putin that only 1000 troops crossed the border and were then killed.  Thus, two years after the war began, the Russian army has poorly if at all addressed the sources of its disarray. All this continues to underscore the ongoing failures of Russia’s unprovoked aggression and the quality of Ukraine’s defense of its territory.

This context frames the discussion surrounding Ukraine’s objectives in this operation. Whatever they may be; this action has overturned Russia’s supposed negotiation posture as Putin now virtually screams that Ukraine in flipping Russian aggression back on Moscow is merely doing its Wester masters’ bidding.  Since nobody but he and his toadies believes this canard, it is no surprise that he also angrily declared that Russia cannot negotiate with people who commit such atrocities as invading foreign countries, taking prisoners, forcing evacuations, etc.  Of course, this screed merely repeats Ukraine’s reasons for not negotiating with Putin as long as he occupies parts of Ukraine and undermines his previous insistence that talks are only possible if Ukraine first recognizes Russia’s conquests. It is, perhaps, no surprise therefore, that Putin’s Western claque has gone silent since August 6 when this operation began, as all their rhetoric has been exposed as useful idiocy for Putin.  

But beyond torpedoing the myths of Russia’s looming victory unraveling Putin’s complacent theory of victory this operation, as noted above, has now generated numerous options for Ukraine to the point where in conversations with other analysts they raise the question whether this is the beginning of the end, either for the war or for Putin.  While we cannot succumb to wishful thinking; there is no question that to date this operation has enormously strengthened Ukraine’s morale, negotiation posture, and probably persuaded more Western onlookers that Ukraine actually can and should win this war.  It has also highlighted the continuing insufficiency of Russian military learning that clearly has not been enough, and the glaring deficiencies cited above.

This offensive also fully justifies the past, present, and future shipment of weapons, money, training, and political support. Ukraine remains the unprovoked victim of aggression even though Putin, having long since bet the farm on his aggression seems to know no reply other than doubling down on failure and threatening escalation. Thus, it seems unlikely that negotiations will occur anytime soon. For Putin negotiations in the absence of victory puts his domestic position at risk or so he appears to think, perhaps, because as we can now see, genuine negotiations not only undermine his narrative but also vindicate President Zelensky’s and Ukraine’s resistance to Putin.

Regardless of how this operation ultimately plays out, it has already inflicted serious damage upon Russia and is likely to harm it even more, not least because it has also exposed the disorganization and disarray inherent in Russia’s campaign.  Consequently, the gains that now redound to Ukraine from that operation go beyond the front to justify increasing Western support for the results of that support are ever more evident here. And thus, those gains now accruing to Ukraine and the losses accumulating on the Russian side can, if this operation keeps succeeding, bring about a wholly new strategic situation on the ground and in world affairs. The ramifications of this war have long been recognized to be global. Hence, if this operation, as appears to be the case now, continues to succeed, then its repercussions will be global too. But they will be to Ukraine’s benefit and to Russia’s deserved ignominy.

About the Author: 

Dr. Stephen J. Blank is a Senior Fellow at Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is an internationally renowned expert on Russian and Chinese defense policy. He is the author of "Light from the East: Russia's Quest for Great Power Status in Asia" (Taylor & Francis, 2023). He was a Professor of National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College.

This article was first published by RealClearDefense.

Thousands of Africans employed as domestic workers are fearing what could happen if war breaks out.

While heated debates in Europe have focused on how to respond if Donald J. Trump is re-elected to the White House, discussions in Australia, Japan, and South Korea reveal a greater sense of confidence in Washington’s commitments. The fear that the United States would withdraw its nuclear assurances is much less pronounced in the Indo-Pacific than in Europe. This serenity appears primarily grounded in a shared understanding that a bipartisan consensus is driving the US commitment to contain China’s rise – a goal that requires reliable allies across the Pacific. At the same time, US allies want to maintain the regional status quo and are willing to support Washing­ton’s efforts. Trump’s potential return does little to change these structural incen­tives. Instead, Pacific allies fear challenges to the East Asian regional order, challenges that are also relevant for Europe’s security and prosperity.

Cease-fire and hostage release negotiations are expected to resume in Cairo for two days starting Thursday.

A deal intended to reduce tensions in the South China Sea after a violent confrontation in June has had limited effect.

A botched rollout of the party platform shows how foreign policy is a sideshow in U.S. elections.

Le Sénégal veut renégocier ses contrats pétroliers et gaziers. Le Premier ministre Ousmane Sonko a nommé une commission pour travailler sur le dossier. Sa mission : trouver les failles dans les contrats avant d'engager les discussions avec les multinationales qui exploitent ces hydrocarbures sénégalais. Correspondance de Dakar par Elimane Ndao.

There is irony in what appears to be an Iranian hack of the electronic files of Donald Trump’s campaign. Details are unclear and unconfirmed, but a day after Microsoft issued a report about efforts by hackers in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard to target a senior official in an unnamed U.S. presidential campaign, the Trump campaign stated that it was a victim of that effort. 

In what may or may not have been a result of such a hack, internal campaign documents—including a vetting file on eventual vice-presidential nominee JD Vance—were then sent to Politico, the New York Times, and the Washington Post. Trump campaign spokesman Steven Cheung declared, “Any media or news outlet reprinting documents or internal communications are doing the bidding of America’s enemies and doing exactly what they want.”

The irony comes from comparing that complaint with Trump’s posture toward such hacking by foreign adversaries during his first presidential campaign. “Russia, if you’re listening,” said Trump in a campaign speech in July 2016, “I hope you’re able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing”—a reference to emails of his opponent, Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton. 

The Russian regime evidently was listening because shortly afterward, its hackers pulled documents from Clinton’s personal account as well as accounts of her presidential campaign. Russia conveyed the resulting large haul of documents to WikiLeaks—the operation that has divulged wholesale much stolen classified material related to U.S. national security—as its instrument for disseminating the Clinton material. Trump repeatedly and publicly expressed his delight with the Russia-WikiLeaks caper, saying, “I love WikiLeaks.”

Trump’s response to this operation was part of how he and his campaign welcomed, exploited, and facilitated Russia’s extensive and multifaceted interference in the 2016 election. Among other things, Trump or senior people in his campaign replayed material from Russian internet trolls and met with a Kremlin-connected Russian lawyer to seek dirt on their Democratic opponents. At the same time, the chairman of Trump’s campaign repeatedly met and shared polling data with a Russian intelligence agent. Trump brushed off any criticism of his use of the Russian election interference, saying this was just another form of “opposition research.”

The Founding Fathers were deeply worried about how partisan motivations could open the door in this way to foreign interference in American politics. The worries extended to interference by putative allies as well as adversaries. A price of the alliance with France during the Revolutionary War had been French meddling that exploited divisions between factions within the Continental Congress.

The Federalist Papers, which emphasized the evils of factionalism, drew attention to how those evils included the encouragement of foreign interference. Several of the earliest essays in the series—written by John Jay, who was in charge of U.S. foreign affairs between the Revolutionary War and the adoption of the Constitution—warned of damaging transnational alliances between foreign powers and American political factions.

The damage continued during much of the Federalist Era, which was plagued by intense partisanship. Policies toward France and Britain—the two foreign powers that then mattered most to the United States—were corrupted by how Federalists and Democratic-Republicans mixed their partisan affinities to one or the other foreign power with their domestic political objectives.

The growth of national power freed the United States, for most of its subsequent history, from significant foreign interference in its own elections. It became more common for the United States, as a superpower, to interfere in other countries’ domestic politics rather than the other way around. 

But over the last three decades, this pattern has changed. Foreign interference in U.S. electoral politics has again become significant. 

One reason involves technology. Hacking and trolling are tools for interference that did not exist in pre-internet times.

Another reason is partisanship, which has become at least as intense and poisonous as it was in the Federalist Era. The dissipation of an earlier Cold War consensus that had guided much of U.S. foreign policy means that the outcomes of U.S. elections matter more to foreign regimes than they did before. The identification with a party that many Americans feel more than with the nation as a whole has fostered an “anything goes” attitude toward political competition that leads to excesses such as Trump’s version of “opposition research.” 

The same sort of self-identification also breeds affinities with foreign factions and regimes of a similar political persuasion. Americans had traditionally played little role in transnational political movements, but that is no longer the case, at least on the Right. The sort of transnational factional alliance about which Jay warned is now a reality.

Congressional testimony earlier this year by Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines on foreign threats to the 2024 elections mentioned Russia, China, and Iran as regimes worth watching. Haines named Russia as the most active foreign threat to U.S. elections, with goals of discrediting U.S. democracy, exacerbating internal divisions within the United States, and impeding Western support for Ukraine. 

Intelligence directors shy away, especially in public testimony, from anything that starts to touch on partisan politics. Still, unquestionably, Russia’s goal this year, as it was in 2016 and 2020, is to help elect Donald Trump. Trump’s authoritarian-envy positive views of Russian president Vladimir Putin, which have helped to make the Republican Party—despite its traditional anti-Moscow posture from Cold War days—more favorably inclined toward Russia than the Democrats are, would be enough to influence Moscow’s choice. There also is the prospect that a second Trump term would likely mean less Western support for Ukraine.

Iranian leaders probably would like to see Trump lose, given that his policy toward Iran in his earlier term was unmitigated hostility and a rejection of diplomacy in favor of unrestricted economic warfare. The policy was bad news for everyone involved and led to an accelerated Iranian nuclear program and a more aggressive Iranian regional posture, and certainly was at least as bad for the Iranians themselves as for anyone else. An exception to this Iranian preference may come from some hardliners in Tehran who would welcome playing off hardliners in the United States to strengthen their own domestic position. 

Iran probably also has other objectives, such as general gathering of information, that would involve targets beyond Trump. Shortly after the Trump campaign announced that Iran had hacked it, Kamala Harris’s campaign revealed that it, too, was the target of a “foreign actor influence operation.” However, whether this involves Iran is something the FBI is still investigating.

Haines said China’s influence operations are aimed at cultivating favorable positions toward China at all levels. So far, these efforts do not appear to be aimed at helping one presidential candidate over the other. This reflects the Chinese expectation that Washington will take a hard line against them regardless of who wins the election in November.

Intelligence directors and other U.S. officials also shy away from any mention of Israel in the same breath as adversaries such as Russia, China, and Iran. Still, in omitting mention of Israel, Haines said nothing about the foreign state that has for years been the most active and successful foreign influencer in U.S. elections. The lobby that is involved recently demonstrated its continued clout by pouring millions into a couple of primary races and ousting two members of Congress who had dared to criticize Israel’s conduct in the Gaza Strip. 

Although that lobby for years strove to keep its fingers in both American political camps and to some extent still does—that recent demonstration of clout was in Democratic Party primaries—there now is a pronounced partisan tilt to its influence. The Republican Party has become the Israel-right-or-wrong party as politics within Israel have moved ever farther to the extreme Right. Trump and Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu are in a strong electoral alliance. 

The Israeli government conducts most of its influence efforts in the United States openly. But more recently, it has also employed covert methods, using fake social media accounts and fake news sites to influence American politicians and the American public in the same manner that Russia, China, or Iran might. 

The covert Israeli operations that have come to light so far are aimed at nurturing U.S. support for the Israeli military assault on the Gaza Strip. But any Israeli influence efforts, either overt or covert, that may get closer to presidential politics would certainly be in support of Trump, who, during his term in office, gave Israel and Netanyahu almost anything they wanted, with nothing in return except political support for Trump himself.

Interference by any foreign government in U.S. politics and elections entails several harms. For one thing, U.S. elections are supposed to determine the composition of a government that is of, by, and for the American people. This is less the case to the extent that non-Americans have an influential role.

Foreign interference also skews U.S. policy toward the countries that are interfering. U.S. policy toward, say, Iran ought not to be shaped by anything the Iranian regime might do to influence thinking, much less political outcomes, in America. The same goes for U.S. policy toward Russia, China, Israel, or any other foreign country.

A corollary to this harm is that an American politician who benefits from foreign interference may shape policy toward the foreign country in question out of gratitude for the help or as an implied quid pro quo. Trump’s still partially opaque relationship with Putin and Russia ought to be a source of worry in this regard.

A foreign country meddling in U.S. politics is a single-issue form of influence. The meddler cares only about his own country’s objectives and not about any collateral damage to U.S. interests. When the core of the Israel lobby, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), abandoned its pretense of not taking sides in U.S. partisan politics and formed its own political action committee, its initial list of endorsees in 2022 included dozens of election deniers—Republican members of the House of Representatives who had voted against certifying results of the 2020 presidential election. The collateral damage was a direct blow to U.S. democracy.

Intelligence agencies and the media can do only so much to uncover harmful foreign interference in U.S. elections. Mitigation of the problem requires adherence by politicians to a code of conduct, according to which acceptance of such foreign help is simply wrong. Such an ethos existed during the Federalist Era, despite breaches of the code, and was part of how the nation was eventually able to overcome both the foreign meddling and the intense partisanship of the time.

Some political leaders of both parties have exhibited such an ethos closer to our own time. In 1992, a group of Republican Congressmen urged President George H.W. Bush to try to salvage his faltering re-election campaign against Bill Clinton by asking the Russians or the British for information about Clinton’s protests against the Vietnam War as a young man while in London and Moscow. Bush and his senior aide, James Baker, immediately rejected the idea as improper. In 2000, when information surfaced that Al Gore’s presidential campaign and the Democrats possibly received Chinese financial contributions, Clinton and Gore made clear that U.S. elections must be free from any foreign interference and cooperated with the subsequent investigation.

Contrast that with the approach of Trump, who, according to Robert Mueller’s report, repeatedly impeded the investigation of the Russian interference in the 2016 election. It is only when such a destructive approach to the subject is eradicated that the harms from foreign interference in America’s elections will be overcome.

Paul R. Pillar retired in 2005 from a twenty-eight-year career in the U.S. intelligence community, in which his last position was as the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Earlier, he served in a variety of analytical and managerial positions, including as chief of analytic units at the CIA, covering portions of the Near East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. His most recent book is Beyond the Water’s Edge: How Partisanship Corrupts U.S. Foreign Policy. He is also a contributing editor for this publication.

Image: Shutterstock.com.

Summary and Top Line Points You Need to Know: The Soviet Union's Project 705 Lira (NATO: Alfa) submarines, introduced in 1971, were groundbreaking due to their use of titanium hulls and lead-bismuth cooled reactors.

-These innovations allowed the Alfa-class subs to achieve exceptional speeds of over 40 knots and dive to depths of 350 meters, with a crush depth of 1,300 meters.

-Designed during the Cold War to compete with American submarines, the Alfa class featured a double-hull construction, minimal crew requirements, and impressive capabilities.

-However, initial issues with hull cracking were eventually resolved. Despite their advanced design, only seven were built, with the last decommissioned in 1996.

The Soviet Alfa-Class Submarines: Speed Demons of the Cold War

The modern submarine is a sophisticated machine that must meet demanding mechanical specifications. The specifications are demanding because the mission profile is somewhat unnatural.

Submarines must host a crew of sailors at, and beneath, the sea for extended periods of time.

While at sea, the submarine is often tasked with clandestine and highly sensitive operations. And always, the submarine must have the capacity to hone its various weapons systems (including nuclear) on land and/or marine-based targets. Accordingly, the mechanical specifications imposed on submarines are demanding.

Naturally, submarine manufacturers have spent the last century innovating, pushing for technological advancements, and trying to improve their machines and their war-fighting capacity.

Incentive to Innovate

In the 1970s, the Soviet Union was locked in a global Cold War with the United States. The two countries raced to create and field more advanced weaponry than each other. The most apparent venue for the tech race between the two Cold War powers was of course in space. Known as The Space Race, competition to be the first fueled intense tech development – culminating in America’s Apollo program and men walking on the moon.

But the Cold War competition raged simultaneously in other, less visible venues. Aerospace development, for example, where Soviet manufacturers like Mikoyan and Sukhoi raced American manufacturers like Boeing and Lockheed to field the most advanced fourth-generation, and later fifth-generation, fighters. The competition also extended to tanks. Intercontinental ballistic missiles. Aircraft carriers. And submarines.

To gain some sort of edge on the Americans, the Soviets experimented and pushed. The result, in one instance, was rather novel: building a submarine hull from titanium.

Titanium Hull Alfa-Class

In 1971, the Soviets unveiled their Project 705 Lira submarine (NATO reporting name Alfa). Project 705 was a nuclear-powered attack submarine notable for two things: the use of a titanium hull, and for being one of the fastest military submarines ever built. I

In fact, the Alfa-Class was second in speed to only one other submarine model, a Soviet prototype known as K-222.

The Project 705 Lira marked the first time that titanium was used in the hull design of a submarine. Titanium is a chemical element that can be reduced to produce a lustrous transition metal with valuable properties: low density, high strength, and resistance to sea water. Understandably, given titanium’s properties, the Soviets were keen to experiment with the material in their submarine design.

While the Project 705 did not sail until 1971, the idea was first proposed in 1957. The project was conceptualized to meet a set of demanding requirements (in the name of competing with American submarine design).

The requirements held that the new submarine must have sufficient speed to be able tp pursue any ship; the capability to evade anti-submarine weapons; the ability to succeed in underwater combat; low detectability; minimal displacement; and as small a crew as possible.

To meet the array of proposed requirements, a titanium alloy hull was selected. The idea is that a titanium hull would allow for low drag, low weight, and as a result, high speeds and deep dives. The design was meant to serve as an interceptor, which would stay in a harbor, or on a patrol route, and then race to meet an enemy as needed.

The Alfa-Class hull, like most Soviet nuclear submarines, was constructed as a double hill. With the double hull design, the internal hull is built to withstand the water pressure imposed during deep dives, while the external hull protects the internal hull and provides a more ideal hydrodynamic shape.

The titanium hull, like so many novel technologies, proved difficult at first. The lightweight alloy was prone to cracking – and the first Project 705 submarine was decommissioned on account of hull cracking. But the Soviets were able to improve their metallurgy and welding technologies sufficiently to eliminate hull cracking on all future Project 705 submarines.

To propel the titanium-hulled Project 705, a lead-bismuth cooled beryllium-moderated reactor was installed. The liquid metal cooled reactor had several advantages including: higher energy efficiency; did not need to be refueled – ever; lighter and smaller than water-cooled reactors. The lead-bismuth cooled reactor, and its weight and energy advantages, was a conceptual fit with the titanium hull – both were geared towards making a smaller, faster vessel.

The finished product was a submarine measuring 81 meters in length, with a 9.5-meter beam, and a 7.6-meter draft. The Project 705 displaced 2,300 tons when surfaced, and 3,200 tons when submerged. The submarine could operate regularly at depths of 350 meters, with a crush depth of about 1,300 meters. Most impressively, the Project 705 could achieve speeds in excess of 40 knots – all while carrying a complement of torpedoes, and/or cruise missiles, and/or mines.

In all, seven Project 705 Alfa-Class submarines were commissioned, one of which remained in service until 1996.  

About the Author: Harrison Kass

Harrison Kass is a prolific defense write with over 1,000 pieces published. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

All images are Creative Commons. Image is of a Akula-Class sub.