The first example of the nEUROn UCAV (Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle) has successfully completed its flight test campaign in the Perdasdefogu range, Sardinia, Italy.
The nEUROn is a full-scale technological demonstrator for a UCAV developed by an industrial team led by Dassault Aviation with the collaboration of Finmeccanica-Alenia Aermacchi, Saab, Airbus Defence and Space, RUAG and HAI representing France, Italy, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland and Greece that rolled out on Jan. 20, 2012, after five years of design, development, and static testing.
The shape of the nEUROn reminds that of the American X-47B (even though, from a certain angle it also shows a certain resemblance to the F-117 Nighthawk...).
During the deployment at Italian Air Force’s Decimomannu airbase, the stealth killer drone demonstrator flew 12 highly sensitive sorties to assess its low radar-cross section and low infrared signature, during missions flown at different altitudes and flight profiles and against both ground-based and air radar “threats”, using in this latter case, a Eurofighter Typhoon.
The next testing phase will see the European UCAV deploy to Vidsel Air Base, in Sweden, for more low observability tests and some live firing activity needed to validate the capability of the nEUROn to use weapons carried in the internal weapons bay.
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Role player under NSC or manager of foreign policy?
The recent Washington Post article by Karen DeYoung, outlining the burgeoning role of the National Security Council (NSC), raises issues that go beyond the foibles of any particular administration. Most salient is that “politics … have become so much more corrosive and challenging that it’s a natural instinct for the White House to say, ‘We’ve got to have an eye on this. On everything,’ ” as DeYoung quotes an ex-White House official.
Micromanagement is a common impulse of executives for complex or contentious matters. Foreign policy today is both. As General Stanley McChrystal notes in his book Teams of Teams, the post-modern world’s complexity makes prediction of external threats almost impossible. It is inevitable, as Daniel Drezner comments, that events will “catch the White House off guard and cause the opposition party to howl in protest.”
Foreign policy is rife with potential points of political vulnerability. The growth of the NSC’s role, and the proliferation of politically-appointed ambassadors and officials, reflects their location at the interface of politics with management of a large, multi-faceted institution. Executive branch discretion over foreign policy makes it a high-profile political arena. Contests of presidents and opposition parties increasingly overshadow functional considerations. As the political environment locks presidents more and more into a marketing function, control of the political enterprise takes priority over institutional management.
A major consequence is that the world now has to guess what makes America tick. Politics involves management of diverse interests high and low. Their assembly into coalitions means that diverse claims will always tug and push at foreign relations. But beyond this natural play of interests, as pundit Ian Bremmer notes, friends and foes alike really do not know what America wants. Adversaries easily find evidence that the U.S. seeks economic domination or debases moral codes, and their claims go unrefuted.
Micromanagement is inefficient, even politically. Managing foreign policy to a coherent message of its own would be simpler. During the Cold War, foreign policy clearly revolved around “Containment“ of the USSR. The Soviets’ full-spectrum opposition to U.S. interests made reaction to their efforts a clear priority. Today America must assert its own enduring priorities to formulate a consistent message. But choosing and sticking to priorities is difficult, even without a politics that precludes consensus. After the Arab Spring, Americans might conclude that making democracy a priority over stability (or vice versa) will look foolish (or craven) as events unfold. The New York Times notes Washington’s difficulty choosing Russia, ISIS, or North Korea as the top national security threat.
Most dangerously, inconsistent policy overshadows America’s conviction in unalienable rights. It portrays free people caring less about freedom than short-term gratification. The nation was conceived in a document justifying independence on the principle of rights; failure to validate that “self evident” truth undermines the premise of American legitimacy.
Validation, therefore, defines U.S. foreign policy’s fundamental purpose. It is a nuanced, complex concept; full understanding yields a non-political guideline for foreign policy management. If a free society can defend itself, serve its people’s needs, and honor its principles, not only will America survive, but U.S. influence and power will revive.
Political leaders must set the ongoing choices of foreign policy. Most popular concerns will fit with the validation of America’s creed. It requires defense and prosperity as well as fidelity to the ideals of human liberty. What politics lacks, however, is a function to keep policies aligned with America’s creed, and with each other. A NSC and any number of political appointees can push a president’s political enterprise. A permanent corps should carry the management rationale, framing issues in terms of America’s fundamental interest.
The U.S. diplomatic corps is naturally positioned for this function. Diplomats staff the foreign policy decision processes, represent policies abroad, and can report successes or shortfalls in projecting America’s purpose. A new genre of professional formation, steeping U.S. diplomats in the origins, questions, and debates around the creed of individual rights, will be necessary to equip them for this mission. Institutional practices and structures will also be needed; a corps invested in the mission will shape them best.
This training and these practices will require time and effort to implement. But embedding America’s founding rationale in foreign policy institutions will aid administrations in managing policy. Balancing political considerations with enduring priorities will show America’s basic nature, as a catalyst for human freedom.
Good afternoon. Let me begin by saying how pleased I am to have my first meeting of the autumn political season today with President Petro Poroshenko. Thank you, Petro, for your presence here. This for sure shows that EU-Ukraine relations take no holidays.
I am especially glad to see President Poroshenko on a day that started with good news for Ukraine: I very much welcome the deal that was reached between Ukraine and its creditors. In addition, the Contact Group for Ukraine has reached an agreement on a new ceasefire to start on 1 September. Both of these pieces of news are cause for optimism.
During our talks today we discussed three main topics.
First, President Poroshenko briefed me on the recent increases in violations of the Minsk ceasefire. I am especially worried about the targeting of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission and call on all parties to make sure this does not happen again. Thank you for your information, Petro. After our meeting I am absolutely sure about your determination to help the Special Monitoring Mission in their duty. We are rapidly approaching the deadline for the complete implementation of Minsk so it is critical that everyone does their utmost to make it succeed. I hope that the new ceasefire agreed yesterday is a first step.
Second, we talked about the domestic situation in Ukraine, including the economic outlook, upcoming local elections and constitutional reforms. I welcome progress on amending the constitution to allow for greater decentralisation and encourage Ukraine to move more quickly on judicial reform.
Third, we discussed how Ukraine is implementing the Association Agreement, in particular those parts on visa liberalisation. We want to see free travel between Ukraine and Europe sooner rather than later. That is why I encouraged President Poroshenko to move quickly on this issue. As you know we are here in Brussels, both Jean-Claude Juncker and me, very engaged and supportive for this project. I am really satisfied when it comes to progress on your side.
I would also like to touch upon one more issue. Two days ago Oleg Sentsov was sentenced to twenty years in a labour camp in Russia. Sentsov protested against the annexation of Crimea, where he lived with his two children. Sentsov, Kolchenko, Savchenko and all other Ukrainians held illegally in Russia as well as EU citizens such as Eston Kohver are blatant acts of injustice. They are also symbolic of the cynicism that dominates Russian politics. As long as Oleg Sentsov and others stay in prison, all honest and decent people will not remain indifferent to their fate.
President Poroshenko and I agreed to be in contact early and often over these vital coming months. Thank you very much again, Petro.