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Andreas T. Hirblinger,

Bundesfinanzminister Wolfgang Schäuble fordert von der EU-Kommission einen Verzicht auf einen Teil ihrer Kompetenzen. Die Kommission könne nicht EU-Regierung und zugleich Hüterin der Verträge sein, zitiert ihn eine Zeitung unter Berufung auf Brüsseler Diplomaten.

“The international trade and civil liberties committees held a hearing on June, 16th to discuss how to reconcile the need for data protection with trade agreements that boost business in the EU, an iisue that has gained importance due to the upcoming reform of EU data protection rules. “ German S&D member Bernd Lange and UK S&D member Claude Moraes chaired the hearing, which was divided in two panels. Participants included MEPs, Giovanni Buttarelli the European Data Protection Supervisor, as well as representatives fro the European Commission, NGOs and business organisations.

 

Panel discussion I: Data flows, localisation and global value chains: offensive and defensive interests at stake.

 

Ignatio Irrurarezaga, Head of Unit on Services (EU negotiatior on TiSA), DG Trade:

It has been sad that data flows are the backbone of our economy. Indeed they represent a crucial factor in the new global economy. Data we refer to is a combination between personal and non-personal data. Sometimes they overlap. Do we have an offensive interest?
We think we do. On data flows we don’t have very good data. The EU is the largest exporter in the world, followed by the US. We have an economic stake here even if the data are not perfect.

Do we face problems in countries?
Yes we do. We face barriers especially Russia, China, Nigeria, Vietnam.

Typically the barriers we face are forced localization of computer services in those countries.

Is the localization of computer service a problem in itself?

No. The EU has obligations to store data locally in certain areas as heath care, gambling transactions. Restricted area that compromise important information. What we are trying to address in trade agreements are horizontal localization requirements that apply to all data without discriminating. These are more driven by digital protectionism more than a rational protection of data.
In our trade agreement we already had precedents on data flows. Those precedents take back at the creation of the WTO and the GATT agreements 1994. So far that precedent, limited until now to financial services, has not created any problems or limited our ability in any sense. In that document there is a document to ensure that financial services information can flow across boarders.

In that document there is an obligation for members, to ensure that financial service information can flow across boarders. We have similar provisions on data flows in other agreements.
What ever we do has to ensure our abilities not just in the present, but mostly in the future. We will have to ensure that the provisions we agree have safeguards inspired on not in those contained currently in the GATTS and the so called commitments on financial services. Currently to give u the state of play, there are proposals on the table (both on data flows and localization of the servers). In both negotiations the discussions are at an infant stage. The Union still has questions on the discipline, and it has questions on the safeguards proposed, to the extend we are still seeking qualifications on those proposals we have not yet proposed our own language to modify these provisions.

 

Giving a business prospective:
Chris Sherwood, Head of Public Policy, Allegro Group (on behalf of Industry Coalition for Data Protection):
From a business perspective, the importance of data flows help us to create something unified to compete with the global players.

The reality is that we need to move data cross boarder on a global base with the minimum of restriction. That’s the business reality that we face. Unfortunately the EU imposes severe restrictions on data flows disadvantaging business companies. The primary restriction is the EU DPD 1995 that will be replace by the new Data Protection Regulation, which in turn will be stricter than the already strictest directive on data protection in the world. Both the directive and the regulation in draft form, are structured as prohibitions of the export of data outside the EU. From the prospective of a company who works outside the EU in many of the countries where we operate these requirements are seen as data localization requirements. We need to be very clear on the way these rules are seen abroad and how they influence our businesses.

Defensive and Offensive issues:
One of the problems we are facing in Europe is the undelaying assumption that the IT sector and the Internet are American. It’s the politics of the spare that believe that Europe is not a leader.
We should rethink our schemes thinking as the EU as a leader in IT technologies, rather than being a consumer of foreign products. When we look at TTIP and
the Snowden revelations one may acknowledge that the revelations have changed the way the US government and industries approaches with data flows and trade agreements. It is quite considerable that European Snowden will occur and let us reconsider these things.
What is really important from our point of view is that European Data protection rules although they are a burden for companies, they are there for a good reason. But many companies in and outside Europe would prefer to not comply, and therefore the rules need to be enforceable. You cannot enforce this rules putting extra territorial provision in the legislation. Extra territorial provisions and legislations lied to unintended consequences. What’s much better would be to encourage foreign companies to comply using co-regulatory approaches.
The safe harbour can be a good example, because it enforced by an authority, which is taken extremely seriously in the USA.

A suspension of the Safe Harbour would damage EU companies, because they would not be prepared anymore to compete in the US. There is no evidence that suspension of safe harbour would enhance the safety of personal data. The fundamental problem here is the way the US government approaches data not the Safe Harbour itself.

Our appeal is to stop calling for the suspension of the safe harbour because it would damage European companies and ensure zero privacy benefit.

Finn Myrstad, Head of the Digital Services Section at the Norwegian Consumer Council (NCC= and EU Co-Chair, Information Society Policy Committee, Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue:

 

I have three main messages to the MEP today.

• <!–[if !supportLists]–> <!–[endif]–>Consumers on both sides of the Atlantic are concerned and want more privacy. It is not only EU consumers it is also US consumers.
• <!–[if !supportLists]–> <!–[endif]–>Unlike what was just mentioned about Safe Harbour. We believe Safe Harbour does not provide sufficient enforcement on the US side. Safe Harbour does not provide adequate protection for consumers along with European standard.
• <!–[if !supportLists]–> <!–[endif]–>We don’t believe that data flows should be tackled in trade agreements without proper safeguards for data protection privacy.

 

Talking about offensive interests. I believe that it is an offensive interest for EU consumers to have control over their personal data, to have transparency to understand the different purposes and benefits of data sharing and to have specific rights concerning the collection and sharing of their data. European consumers totally support to have more data protection in Europe.

You might think that American consumers do not care that much about their privacy. But it is not like this in reality. 90% of consumers believe they have lost control about their personal information. It is very clear that also US consumers are troubled about their data privacy. There is also a second point, consumers make their choices. Research clearly shows that this is not the case. The university of Pennsylvania pointed out that US consumers want more data protection and more clarity on their consensus to gather data and profiling activities. They don’t think it’s fair that on online store can collect profile and store data to improve their services. The system we have at the moment is an opt-out one. There is no trade of at the moment, there is just companies gathering data giving less back. So it’s the consumer who pays a higher price.

An example could be the CEO of Apple, Tim Cook Apple who said: “We believe that customer should be in control of their own information. You might like these so-called free services, but we don’t think they are worth having your email, your search history and now even your family photos data mined and sold off for god knows what advertising purpose. And we think some day, customers will see this for what it is. We believe that people have a fundamental right on privacy. The American people demands it, the constitution demands it, morality demands it.”

One of my messages to you is: raise the floor instead of lowering it. Keep working to fight for better standards in Europe.

About Safe Harbour:

We believe Safe Harbour does not work. It was mentioned that it is taken very seriously on the US side. I don’t believe it is a serious effort. These are principles; they don’t say they need to apply the European law.

Just to say the US system is based on privacy policies, but if a consumer wants to read them all, it would take him up to 25 days to read them all. This is not a clear framework.

Also a report to president Obama this year, noticed that the framework for notice and consent is becoming unworkable as useful foundation for policy. Only in a fantasy world consumers read the policies and understand the implications before clicking.

Conclusion: We have to have a better framework that assures a level playing field for businesses. Trade agreements are not the place to regulate data consumption and privacy.

Panel II: Data flows between the EU and partner countries

 

Paul Nemitz, Director for Fundamental Rights and Union Citizenship, DG Justice and Consumers:

The agreement on these rules in the Council reflects the view of the business representatives mentioned before. Stating that data protection is a burden is as saying that good quality is a burden. If you look at the European car industry they are saying it very clearly, a good data protection will be a positive point in the future, augmenting the quality of the product. On my opinion, the visions presented by Sherwood do not really reflect the ones of European businesses.

What does the regulation brings in terms of ensuring protection in global data flows. It provides a level playing field for businesses in and outside the EU. It strengthens the authority of the Data Protection Supervisor resulting in strengthening the function of the privacy framework. Trust is at the core of a good functioning financial market. That’s why it’s so important that the powers of our data protection authorities are strengthen.

Therefore I’m happy to see that the Council has agreed that the maximum fine will be of 2% of the world turnover. In this new digital world there is no reason to use a different type of methodology when we have to protect millions of consumers.

New provisions on international data flows have been proposed by the Commission and adopted by the Council. They will facilitate international flows of data while ensuring a higher level of protection.
Does it make sense to invest in the Safe Harbour?
The Commission has benefitted in the negotiations with the US from the clear position taken by the EP. We have been inspired to seek the highest level of commitment possible from the US on the 13 points the Commission put on the table in November 2013. It is true that US has made a great effort to reach a level of protection on 11 out of 13 recommendations. We in the Commission are very close to consider it as successful.
We need to remember the scope of Safe Harbour: It is to provide Europeans a higher level of protection when their data are exported for processing. Then it exists under existing law. We are seeking from the US commitments, which serve this purpose.

In the contexts of TTIP and TISA, we work very closely together with DG Justice and Commission. We have been working on it intensely for a long time. It is true that EU has a positive trade balance not only in industrial goods but also on services. Let’s not forget that Europe in contrast to the US is also a key exporter in industrial goods, machines cars and so on. For these machines to be develop further, to control the factories it is important that data can flow back to Europe to better control and plan the future investments and developments. We depend on free flow of data. But much of this data are not personal data, so it is important when we talk about digitally deliverable services from Europe we better acknowledge that most of them are not personal data. Let’s get the facts right when we are discussing this.

When we define our interest in global agreements we need to consider the nature of our exports, and the nature of the related data flows to these exports too. It is good to have general formulations on free data flows provided that when it comes to personal data we maintain the ability to act here according to our Charta of fundamental rights.

We need to continue to apply our system of adequacy also related to third countries.. When it comes to generalizing the rules on financial services, I want you to know that these rules goes back in time even before the Data protection directive 1995. When we look at the future texts we need to be sure that the relation between the texts we are comparing is real.

 

Giovannni Buttarelli, European Data Protection Supervisor:

 

My institution is not formally involved but we monitor development closely. That’s why I was pleased to accept the invitation to this important debate today. I would like to share a few main messages:

 

• <!–[if !supportLists]–> <!–[endif]–>International data flows are a reality:

A necessary motor for globalisation. The EU has been until now a strong advocate of rules-based free trade. The European Parliament has pivotal role in ensuring that it continues to do so. And the reform of this law can be seen as a once-in-a-generation opportunity to put international transfers on a clearer footing.

 

• <!–[if !supportLists]–> <!–[endif]–>Fundamental rights and freedoms are not negotiable.
  Data protection is an important concern when it comes to negotiate commercial agreements such as TTIP. When we look at the TTIP, we can see that there are useful references to shared values in the relevant areas of negotiations, such as human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the right of the EU and the Member States to adopt and enforce measures necessary to pursue legitimate public policy objectives.

However we can also see that the text of the mandate is not fully clear.

There is at least some rule for negotiating in areas relevant to data protection. At the same time, there is no precise language in the mandate, which would clearly state that the agreement would be without any prejudice to EU data protection law.

In particular, the mandate specifically covers ‘Information and Communication Technologies’ and ‘financial services’, and aims to ‘ensure the removal of existing NTBs’ (non-tariff barriers), and prevent the adoption of new ones. (ART. 25).

Concerns have been raised with regard to the risk that this may result in watering down existing data protection rules, or in preventing the adoption of further data protection rules in the future.
Junker, has made it clear more than once that fundamental rights are not here to be sold.

The LIBE committee, on its opinion on the TTIP, already emphasised that there is a need for a comprehensive and unambiguous horizontal self-standing provision, based on Article XIV of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), that ‘fully exempts’ the existing and future EU legal framework for the protection of personal data from the scope of the agreement.

 

• <!–[if !supportLists]–> <!–[endif]–>The EU data protection framework facilitates data flows.

The current EU regulation deems to provide an adequate level of data protection concerning international transfers of personal data. For those cases where the third country does not ensure an adequate level of protection, or, in the case of business sectors which are outside of sectoral decisions, personal data may still be transferred lawfully if there are adequate safeguards.

Together with the Article 29 Working Party, as well as the EDPS, we have been very active on this field especially on the binding rules field. This is a demonstration of the commitment of European data protection in order to facilitate international data transfer and promote accountability.

 

• <!–[if !supportLists]–> <!–[endif]–>My fourth message, relates to the on-going reform on data protection reform and its approach of continuity and change.
  Chapter 5 of the GDPR is related to international transfers. The consensus emerging is characterised by continuity and change.
  ‘Continuity’ because the main principles, such as the adequacy principle, have been maintained.
  ‘Change’ because many rules have to be reinforced, where necessary simplified enough not at the expense of fundamental rights: Binding Corporate Rules, for example, will soon become an explicit part of data protection law. Moreover ‘change’ also because the Reform will replace 29 different national legislations, with an EU Regulation setting down innovations like the one-stop-shop together with proximity.

In a nutshell the EU data protection law should be, and remain, the world standard concerning data protection and data flows worldwide.

Concerning the adequacy principle:
The adequacy system we are facing is in line with article 14 of the GATT.

The EDPS is committed to be, and remain active with you, recognizing the ethical imperative. As a rule of thumb, therefore, personal data rights should continue to be left out of any trade negotiations, and only be referred to, by way of exemption, as set out in Article XIV.

 

 

Anna Fielder, Chair of the Privacy International and Senior Policy Advisor of the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue:
I agree with many of the points made. My point is that trade is absolutely not the place for the EU to negotiate the transfer of personal information. I emphasise personal.

First of all trade has been a very positive driver fin encouraging countries to adopt data protection laws. Over 100 countries on all continents have now adopted a general/holistic data protection legislation. Just the US, Pakistan, Panama and Turkey have no regulations yet concerning DPR.

In relation to the TTIP negotiations, of the 12 partners currently negotiating, only Brunei and the US do not have a general data protection law.

Speaking about the US, to be clear, except for a few specific sectors (children, financial, health records and video hire), the processing of personal information for commercial purposes remains largely unregulated on the federal level. The US representatives, including the US Congress, have stated clearly and publicly that their aim is to achieve uniform standards through similar language for personal information transfers in all trade agreements, and that data protection must not be a pretext for protectionism.

By contrast Canada does have strong regulations concerning privacy. Indeed the concluded agreement between the UE and Canada (CETA) contains a general provision in its e-commerce chapter, which calls for respect of privacy laws, both for the private and public sectors, as well as privacy as a fundamental right in its constitution.

The fundamental issue here is that one partner sees the data protection regulation as a barrier and therefore tries to circumvent the majority of other partners’ privacy laws through a binding trade agreement that trumps them all.

A second aspect is related to the report on mass surveillance, recommending the US to revise its legislation without delay to recognize privacy and other rights of EU citizens, and provide for them judicial redress. The US have failed so far to take legislative steps to address concerns about access to the data of EU citizens by the NSA (National Security Agency and others. The ‘Freedom Act’ is a step forward, but only addressed to US citizens. As a consequence foreigners are still discriminated in the US. Equally negotiations on Safe Harbour are still not concluded, neither is the so called “umbrella agreement” which have been going on for years. Under these circumstances there can be no relaxation of data protection safeguards with regards to trans-border data flows.

We need to realize that safeguarding fundamental rights is not a priority in commercial agreements, they are about economic priorities and lowering barriers to trade. In the US trade negotiations are not opened to public debate; they are captured by industry through a combination of complete secrecy with privileged access for just a small part of private industry supervisors.

Our main ask, already put on the table by MR. Myrstad in the previous panel, is to not include personal information transfers in TTIP. If you absolutely have to; than please follow the recommendations of the LIBE committee, and vote for the amendments that follow this recommendation in your resolution.

On TISA, a resolution from the Parliament is also needed. We look forward to a timetable for such a resolution in the near future and are ready to engage.

Finally, a robust new data protection Regulation is long overdue. We find it shameful that after so many years of deliberation, the version produced goes below standards. The Council has found out major loopholes via a system of “approved” codes of conduct and certification schemes without approved coordination and oversight (Articles 38, 39 and 42).

We urge you in the forthcoming months of the trialogue to stick to your guns and not let this important law go beyond the protection of fundamental rights.

We need holistic privacy laws; it’s the most effective way to ensure privacy and fundamental rights protection.

 

Patrick Zingerle

Classé dans:DROITS FONDAMENTAUX, Protection des données personnelles

Human Rights Watch is one of the driving forces behind the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, who make headlines from time to time in their current quest to get “lethal autonomous weapon systems” banned under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. I have no particular beef with HRW, it’s an admirable organisation, but since the newspapers are in full-on “reprint the press release” mode after the publication of an open letter calling for a ban on autonomous weapons signed by a lot of scientists, it’s probably worthwhile pointing out that HRW has choices to make. Like: choosing between a world where states can make (usually imperfect) interventions to prevent mass atrocity, and a world where they can’t. The TL;DR version of this blog post is: if you ban autonomous weapons then aircraft carriers become floating junk, next time someone starts massacring people don’t expect anyone to ride to the rescue. That’s not to say the “the West” has a particularly admirable track record in atrocity prevention, but most of the arguments that now happen usually pre-suppose that if Western political elites could be coerced or persuaded, then they would have the technical means to deliver military forces to some point on the planet where very bad things are happening to civilians.

“Reaction time is a factor in this, so please pay attention.”

The problem with the autonomous weapons debate as it currently stands is that, for the most part, it ignores the current bits and pieces of automatic and autonomous systems that are part and parcel of everyday military life. Like the Phalanx Close-In-Weapon-System (CIWS) and other bits of gear that are designed to shoot down incoming missiles. Because shooting down missiles is something that humans are physically incapable of doing, outside of Hollywood. If one would like the capability to shoot down a missile, then you need a largely autonomous system to do the heavy lifting of identifying, tracking and targeting that missile, and the human being “in the loop” is largely reduced to something to whom a weapon system says: “Hey, meatbag, press the button so that I can save your life.”

“Look Dave, I can see you’re really upset about this. I honestly think you ought to sit down calmly, take a stress pill, and think things over.”

In theory, you don’t even need the human. Phalanx, and like systems, are tied to command and control systems such as AEGIS, which can be set to an automatic mode with user-defined “If… then…” routines doing the work. Like “If a missile is heading towards this ship, then please shoot it down as soon as possible.” The reason this is necessary is that one doesn’t want to entrust the ability to protect a ship to a person who is, well, liable to die when the anti-ship missiles start flying. Having a system the keeps working despite casualties is a sensible design for a military system. “But wait,” cry the detractors, “We’re not talking about missiles, we’re talking about machines that can make the decision to select and kill human beings (insert lengthy disclaimer about drones being controlled by human beings here).” That may be true, but from a machine’s point of view (and this is perhaps the core of the problem) the means of identifying an object as a missile is not too different from identifying a human being. If someone does conjure up a weapon system to run around killing human beings, then the difference is likely to be most evident in the sensors designed to detect human beings (over, say, a supersonic missile) and the code that interprets the information derived from those sensors, than in the actual process of going from detection to destruction. The difference between “automatic” and “autonomous” is merely the capability of the system to sense different objects, and what to do with them once it senses them. A system designed to identify humans and avoid them is one rule-change away from a system designed to identify humans and kill them. Program an autonomous weapon system to shoot down missiles and it’ll carry that out to the best of its technical limits, just as if you programmed it to shoot readers of young adult fiction over the age of 29, which, I think, is why the ethicists (and adult Harry Potter fans) are correct when they point out that autonomous weapon systems are disturbing. So why not ban them? The problem, returning to the Phalanx CIWS, is that they’re here to help, and in certain situations, autonomous systems are impossible to replace.

“Come with me if you want to live.”

The problem with aircraft carriers is that they are quite expensive, relatively rare, and vulnerable to missiles designed to kill them. America has ten Nimitz class aircraft carriers. They are the cornerstone of American power projection worldwide. By way of comparison, Russia has one, and China has one. I’ll leave it to my colleagues in KCL’s Naval History Mafia (err, “Laughton Naval History Unit“)  to debate how good any of these actually are. America’s carriers are so expensive that it takes over half a billion dollars to de-commission one. Of course the alternate route to decommissioning an aircraft carrier is to hit one with enough missiles to sink it. Logically enough, this is China’s approach to America’s 10:1 advantage in aircraft carriers. For this reason, anyone seeking to deter America needs some kind of long range anti-ship missile capability. For America (or anyone else using an aircraft carrier) you need defensive capabilities mounted on your aircraft carrier and support ships that stand a chance of shooting down said missiles, otherwise they become a bit useless in contested areas.

Contested areas are important, partly because the kind of regimes that carry out massacres usually have powerful friends. Consider Syria. Way back when in 2013, when meaningful international intervention was still a possibility, Russia transferred advanced anti-aircraft missile systems and anti-ship missile systems to the Syrian government in order to effectively forestall said intervention. In effect, Russia escalated the likely cost of international intervention by providing Assad with an asymmetric capability. Perceived costs are important because: politics matters. To return to HRW and autonomous weapons: there is a big difference between persuading America to intervene in a situation, and persuading America to intervene in a situation which puts one of its aircraft carriers at risk.

Alternate use for a Nimitz class carrier: attempt to save Pearl Harbor.

So here’s the issue as I see it: if you want to ban the military use of autonomous weapon systems, then you’re going to need to ban the kind of autonomous systems that are currently in service, and any that are being developed to combat anti-ship missiles in future. If you ban those kind of point defence systems, then any kind of power projection becomes very, very risky and costly for the country involved, so even though America has a poor track record, don’t expect them to help in future if a brutal regime is killing its citizens. This ushers in a world where states like China and Russia can effectively prop up any regime that they like, and, given the studied neglect-to-care about human rights in either country, this reduces the capability of states that purportedly care about human rights to intervene in the world at large. This lack of capability to intervene will reduce the incentive for would-be human rights abusers to adhere to the vaguest interpretation of compliance with human rights standards. This is a legal, political and technical issue – given the makeup of the UN Security Council – but at the moment Western states still have a technical means to intervene (if not the legal authority to do so, or the political will), forcing them to abandon the autonomous systems that they use to defend their prime military assets would deprive them of that. As disturbing as autonomous weapons are, is a world where dictators can massacre their populations without fear of reprisal better or worse?

Oh, and just to muddy the waters a bit: they already figured out how to point Phalanx at small surface ships that would probably contain human beings.

Cette recension d’ouvrages est issue de Politique étrangère (2/2015). Myriam Benraad, chercheur à l’Institut de recherches et d’études sur le monde arabe et musulman (IREMAM, CNRS), propose une analyse croisée de deux ouvrages : celui de Pierre-Jean Luizard, Le Piège Daech. L’État islamique ou le retour de l’Histoire (Paris, La Découverte, 2015, 187 pages) et celui de Patrick Cockburn, Le Retour des Djihadistes. Aux racines de l’État islamique (Paris, Équateurs, 2014, 174 pages).

Dans l’abondance d’essais, de récits et de témoignages récemment publiés autour de l’État islamique[1], les ouvrages de Pierre-Jean Luizard et Patrick Cockburn sont particulièrement bienvenus. Rédigés par le spécialiste de l’Irak le plus reconnu de sa génération en France pour le premier, et par un journaliste intimement familier des crises qui déchirent le Moyen-Orient depuis déjà plusieurs décennies pour le second, ils se distinguent par leur sérieux et la rigueur de leur démonstration. Les approches du phénomène djihadiste proposées par ces deux auteurs se complètent : tandis que Luizard illustre, à travers son argumentaire, en quoi l’Occident est tombé dans le « piège Daech », fruit du « retour de l’Histoire » selon lui, Cockburn met en avant la duplicité de ce même Occident qui a longtemps soutenu – et continue à soutenir – des puissances régionales étroitement liées à la mouvance radicale.

À travers un propos documenté et concis, Luizard vient combler les incompréhensions qui peuvent encore subsister concernant les conditions d’émergence et de développement de l’État islamique, ainsi que son fonctionnement interne et ses structures. Il y a encore un an, ce dernier était méconnu du grand public. Il a fait une entrée fracassante dans l’actualité internationale avec la chute de Mossoul le 10 juin 2014 et la conquête d’un vaste pan de territoire s’étendant entre l’Irak et la Syrie. S’il se penche nécessairement sur ces événements encore brûlants, Luizard relève le pari de rompre avec les commentaires à chaud en faisant « dialoguer l’actualité immédiate et la grande Histoire ». Historien et fin connaisseur du monde arabe et musulman, il ne se contente ainsi pas d’éclairer la réalité de cet « État » islamique, transformé en « califat » par ses concepteurs, mais réintroduit son irruption dans un continuum. L’État islamique n’est-il pas, de fait, le produit macabre d’une déliquescence plus ancienne des États nés du colonialisme au Moyen-Orient, dont l’Irak et la Syrie demeurent les symboles ? L’auteur réussit avec brio à mettre au jour des logiques moins visibles, locales et globales, sociales et religieuses, dont les racines remontent au début du xxe siècle, à l’époque où Français et Britanniques esquissaient secrètement les frontières contemporaines de la région.

La première partie de l’ouvrage s’ouvre sur une remise en perspective des origines de l’État islamique, issu de la mouvance irakienne d’Al-Qaïda et autoproclamé sur plusieurs provinces du pays en octobre 2006. Depuis la disparition de son premier émir Abou Omar Al-Baghdadi, tué en avril 2010 dans un raid américain, c’est Abou Bakr, prédicateur salafiste originaire de Samarra, qui en a pris la tête. Luizard rappelle à cet effet la centralité du contexte irakien dans l’essor de ce que l’on nommera communément par son acronyme arabe « Daech » – l’État islamique en Irak et au Levant (Dawla islamiyya fi al-‘Iraq wa al-Cham). Entre marginalisation chronique des sunnites depuis le renversement de Saddam Hussein, « communautarisation » excessive du nouveau champ politique en faveur des chiites et des Kurdes, dérive autoritaire et répressive de l’ancien Premier ministre chiite Nouri Al-Maliki et faiblesse généralisée des institutions, synonyme de toutes formes d’abus, la situation était propice à l’offensive des djihadistes. Luizard décrit parfaitement la détérioration continue du climat politique à Mossoul à l’aube de la crise, qui a contribué à la passivité des tribus et civils face à l’avancée de l’État islamique – quand ceux-ci n’ont pas directement collaboré avec ses membres contre l’armée et le gouvernement.

Au-delà de l’Irak et de la Syrie, l’État islamique entend redessiner le Moyen-Orient, dont il rejette la géographie née des calculs coloniaux et du démembrement de l’Empire ottoman. Son autre objectif est d’internationaliser le conflit, d’autant que ses combattants ont été arrêtés aux portes de Bagdad à l’été 2014 et que s’est organisée la contre-offensive armée, tout d’abord kurde, puis chiite, puis internationale avec la formation d’une large coalition conduite par les États-Unis. Le « retour de l’Histoire » évoqué par Luizard ne consiste pas uniquement en une vengeance contre l’occupation étrangère en Irak et contre le sort des sunnites dans ce pays, mais aussi en une revanche contre les accords Sykes-Picot[2] et les engagements trahis des Européens qui avaient promis l’indépendance aux Arabes à l’issue de la Grande Guerre. Al-Baghdadi entend ainsi entraîner l’Occident dans un véritable « choc de civilisations ».

Les États du Moyen-Orient, à maints égards artificiels et construits contre leurs sociétés, ravagés par l’autoritarisme sous couvert d’indépendance nationale, et finalement rattrapés par le confessionnalisme, s’évanouissent inlassablement face à ce califat sunnite débarrassé des influences extérieures et des « obstacles » intérieurs – chiites, chrétiens, yézidis, tous mécréants aux yeux des salafistes qui pourchassent et persécutent sauvagement ces communautés au nom de la défense d’une unicité (tawhid) aux accents totalitaires. Prônant un retour à l’islam des origines et une application rigoureuse de la chari‘a, ceux-ci visent l’édification d’un État au sens strict du terme, doté d’un territoire, d’une armée équipée et entraînée, de ressources économiques et financières, et d’un personnel administratif pour le régir. Daech se pose aussi comme une internationale révolutionnaire pour tous les opprimés à travers le monde, usant d’une communication hypersophistiquée et volontairement choquante par la mise en scène d’actions barbares ; il s’agit, par la violence, de glorifier un passé mythique et d’attirer dans ses rangs tous ceux qui souhaitent en découdre avec le système. En cela, l’État islamique a su susciter une réaction de l’Occident, piégé et incapable de résoudre la crise au Moyen-Orient.

Si Luizard étaie sa thèse avec conviction, doit-on réellement considérer Daech comme un « piège », considération faite de la responsabilité également très lourde des Occidentaux dans l’expansion du djihadisme depuis la fin des années 1980 ? C’est à cette question que Cockburn, journaliste de renom, tente précisément de répondre. Outre un retour tout aussi fouillé sur les origines de l’État islamique, constitué sur les ruines de l’invasion militaire américaine de 2003 et assimilé à « une version proche-orientale du chaudron des sorcières de Macbeth », l’auteur insiste sur le rôle écrasant joué par les États-Unis et l’Occident au sens large. En démantelant l’armée irakienne au début du conflit, Washington a mis à bas un État irakien traditionnellement dirigé par des élites sunnites et a pavé la voie au chaos. Cockburn fait bien aussi de rappeler la responsabilité de nos « alliés » actuels, dont l’Arabie saoudite et les monarchies du Golfe, dans la naissance du monstre djihadiste. Ces « parrains idéologiques et financiers des djihadistes » ont ironiquement fini par prendre peur face au « Frankenstein » qu’ils ont engendré. En face, l’Iran et ses relais chiites apparaissent comme les principaux bénéficiaires de cette expédition occidentale contre la barbarie ; de fait, le réengagement de l’Occident au cœur du Moyen-Orient s’insère dans le droit fil des fiascos qui l’ont précédé et dont les conséquences imprévisibles ne sont plus à démontrer.

En six chapitres, Cockburn retrace les étapes du passage d’un groupe insurgé sunnite tout d’abord minoritaire dans le paysage de la violence armée en Irak et rejeté par les autres factions nationalistes et islamistes, à une organisation militaire et politique surpuissante. Il s’appuie, comme Luizard, sur ses nombreuses enquêtes de terrain dans la région et sur une observation fine de ses réalités, que certains cercles stratégiques occidentaux, du haut de leurs concepts idéologiques tantôt sommaires et abstraits, tantôt volontiers manichéens, ont refusé d’accepter et peinent encore à appréhender. Aux antipodes de ce que beaucoup avaient prédit, le régime de Bachar Al-Assad – dont Cockburn reconnaît le caractère criminel tout en rappelant que la dictature baasiste en Syrie ne saurait se résumer à la communauté alaouite et à son soutien au tyran – ne s’est pas effondré. De même, Daech n’a pas jailli du néant, mais a construit sa popularité sur l’impasse politique, l’incompétence des élites, la corruption endémique et la brutalité des forces armées répondant du pouvoir de Bagdad et Damas.

Enfin, comme le mentionne très justement l’auteur, la tentative de promotion d’une opposition dite « modérée » dans ces pays n’a pas abouti en raison de la confessionnalisation extrême des dynamiques conflictuelles et du « détournement » des deux soulèvements irakien et syrien par les combattants ayant fait allégeance à l’État islamique ou à d’autres formations djihadistes. À ce titre, la promotion du wahhabisme par le royaume saoudien et ses partenaires sunnites dans la péninsule au détriment d’autres courants de pensée de l’islam, conjuguée à l’appui militaire malgré tout apporté par l’Occident à ces États en contrepartie d’opportunités commerciales et de bases militaires, ne sont aucunement dissociables de la « longue période de fermentation » dans laquelle le Moyen-Orient semble être entré. Luizard et Cockburn sont formels : il sera extrêmement difficile d’extraire la région du tourbillon dans lequel Daech l’a emportée.

[1]. Il serait trop long de dresser ici une liste exhaustive des titres disponibles, mais en voici trois d’intérêt et en français : L. Napoleoni, L’État islamique. Multinationale de la violence, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 2015 ; Ph. Bannier et F. Balanche, L’État islamique et le bouleversement de l’ordre régional, Paris, Éditions du Cygne, 2015 ; O. Hanne et Th. Flichy de la Neuville, L’État islamique. Anatomie du nouveau califat, Paris, Bernard Giovanangeli, 2014.

[2]. Accords secrets conclus le 16 mai 1916 entre le Royaume-Uni et la France et prévoyant le démantèlement de l’Empire ottoman.

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